General PICK. Those are heavy "flash" floods. Mr. MCDONOUGH. I have no idea how it could be done. Mr. MCDONOUGH. It certainly is a challenge and a very important thing for that section of the country. I also want to compliment you on your statement, General. I am also interested in your statement that we do need additional authorizations to carry on. We are very short additional authorizations in the Los Angeles County flood control district and we hope to obtain favorable consideration for some additional authorizations in this legislation. On the water conservation, your interest here is all recreation and our interest out there is all a matter of keeping alive the millions of people that are in that area and in addition thousands that are.coming to us every month from the eastern counties that we find it difficult to supply water to. General PICK. I didn't intend to place emphasis on that particular, because all out through the West and in the arid sections of the country, the primary purpose of impoundments is to (1) eliminate floods and (2) to place that water in such a position that the maximum consumptive use could be made of it. In other words, it is a water conservation program to accomplish two main purposes: (1) To provide domestic, industrial, and irrigation water, and that is of tremendous importance. I was out there during that dry spell of the 1930's. The other purpose is that when you do that, you will have to accomplish flood control downstream to stop this terrific damage which we have been experiencing in the past and the cost of which is mounting annually. Because the development in the river valleys is increasing-it is increasing annually and including more highways, better railroads, more industrial plants, more people living in the valley, greater farming activities in the valleys and more livestock-the damage mounts. In certain sections of the country, the question of domestic water supply is much more important than others, and in those sections, we give particular attention to water for domestic purposes as well as other consumptive uses. Mr. MCDONOUGH. I don't know whether you are familiar with it or not, but we are seriously considering some practical way to convert ocean water into water for domestic and industrial uses, and we have a couple of large power plants that were built along the coastline for the purpose of the cooling effect of the ocean water, and we are hoping that the evaporation of that water on account of the power development from it will provide a means for producing water from the ocean that can be connected in to domestic uses at a reasonable cost per acrefoot. But in lieu of that, I am thinking that here are additional millions and millions of gallons of water going off in the "flash" flood period that will compensate for all the expense of diverting the water from the ocean. Mr. ANGELL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman from California yield for a question on that point? Mr. McDONOUGH. Yes. Mr. ANGELL. General, I do not understand that this comprehensive program development for the Columbia River Basin area contemplates the taking of the Columbia River to California. Mr. MCDONOUGH. It wouldn't be a bad idea [laughter]. We can use the water. General PICK. We are starting a big project there in Los Angeles County now, the Whittier Narrows Dam. Mr. MCDONOUGH. That is a gravel base which will provide a certain amount of underground absorption, and, of course, there is the Santa Fe Dam that you have been working on for some time, and also the San Gabriel Valley provides much greater underground water absorption than the Los Angeles River Channel does. Of course, up in the San Fernando Valley we have a great sponge there, a great mass of alluvial soil, that picks up a lot of water for storage in the underground water to supply the city of Los Angeles. I don't want to take up too much time on that. It is a very absorbing subject, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate the general's response; thank you very much. Mr. MACK. I regret I wasn't here to hear the opening part of your statement, but I do want to say I am very much interested in the development of the Columbia River Basin. My district is on the Washington side. It extends from the mouth of the Columbia River 150 miles upstream to above the Bonneville Dam. Last year I had occasion immediately after the floods to visit that area. These projects are, in my opinion, defense measures as well as for the protection and development of the area. We have in southwestern Washington at Vancouver and Longview these two great aluminum plants which are among the largest in the country, and produced the aluminum that was used in the production of airplanes during the war period. I inspected the plant of the Aluminum Co. of America at Vancouver, and saw where that company built dikes 15 to 20 feet high at a cost of almost $50,000 during that flood to protect that plant from having its pot lines put out of commission by the floodwaters. A somewhat similar condition was prevailing at the Reynolds Metal Co. in Longview, Wash. The city of Longview and Kelso have a population of about 35,000 people. They flew there each day more than 200,000 sacks which they filled with sand. Doctors, lawyers, and merchants all cooperated to protect those dikes in order to preserve the industries. We also need a development of the stream for the hydroelectric power that will be generated. Could you tell us, General, about the potential amount of power that will be generated on the Columbia River if all these contemplated dams were completed? General PICK. They have about 3,000,000 kilowatts out there now, sir; and under the plan, if all of the power that is provided for in the plan is installed, it will increase to about 10,000,000 kilowatts. Mr. MACK. About three times what they now have. General PICK. Yes, sir. Mr. MACK. These aluminum mills, they told me, are using about 600,000 kilowatts a year in the production of aluminum. It is very essential in the production of that material to have hydroelectric power, and lots of it at a cheap price. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman. Mr. FORD. General, in your prepared statement on page 10, I am a little confused. In the second paragraph you state that the monetary authorizations amount to $366,000,000 and total cost of work completed and under construction is $757,000,000. Could you clarify that for me, please? General PICK. That is about the Missouri Basin, sir. We have a money authorization out there now for flood control of $366,000,000. We are doing work on a number of projects, large dams, where you have many contracts. The amount of work that we have going on out there now under construction, if we had a total authorization to cover all of the work that would come within the scope of those projects, it would amount to $757,000,000. Mr. FORD. What I am getting at is that you haven't gone beyond your authorizations in the work you are now participating in. General PICK. No, sir; we haven't gone beyond the work. We haven't gone beyond our authorizations. Mr. FORD. It would appear that way to me. General PICK. Well, sir; you take one of those big dams up there. The estimated cost is around $177,000,000. We are doing a particular feature of work. We haven't all of that work underway. We haven't all of it under contract. Mr. FORD. Is all of it authorized? General PICK. All of it is authorized, sir, but we haven't gotten the money authorization to cover all of the work. Mr. FORD. That is all, Mr. Chairman. Mr. DAVIS. Mr. McGregor, I know you have some questions. Mr. McGREGOR. Mr. Chairman, I don't have any specific questions. I do appreciate the general's statement relative to his comprehensive plan, his activities and his anticipated program. But, General, since your last appearance before this committee, there has been a publication, the Saturday Evening Post of May 14, under an article appearing on page 30, under the title "The Battle That Squanders Millions," and over the signature of the Chairman, National Resources Committee, Hoover Commission, ex-Governor of Wyoming, Leslie A. Miller, where some very specific statements have been made, accusations more than statements possibly, relative to the activities of the Army engineers, and Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that article inserted in the record at this point. (Article from Saturday Evening Post under date of May 14, 1949, submitted by Mr. McGregor follows:) THE BATTLE THAT SQUANDERS BILLIONS (By Leslie A. Miller, Chairman, Natural Resources Committee, Hoover Commission; Ex-Governor of Wyoming) Do you want to pay a $52,000,000,000 water bill? You may have to, if someone doesn't stop the money-spending contest between the Army engineers and the Reclamation Bureau. Here from a Hoover Commission expert-is the story of their incredible extravagance. When former President Herbert Hoover asked me to serve on the Natural Resources Committee, one of the task forces of his Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, I went into the job with my eyes open. I knew it would be a sort of surgeon's job. And I suspected just enough about the swollen, pork-fed condition of our two principal prospective patientsthe autocratic Army engineers and the Department of the Interior's spendthrift Bureau of Reclamation-to know they would scream loudly when we sank the surgeon's knife into some of their diseased tissues. I said I went into the job with my eyes open. They are open a lot wider now. As close as we thought we were to the problem of how the taxpayers' money is being spent for irrigation, flood control, and power development, my seven committee colleagues and I were amazed and dismayed to learn how bad the situation really is-how billions are being squandered on duplicating, badly engineered projects. John Q. Taxpayer doesn't realize it, but efforts are being made to place his name as cosignor on a note for $52,706,500,000—or, to break it down, about $1,500 in tax obligations for the average American family. That is the staggering amount estimated as the cost of water-resources-development projects now in the construction and planning stages, and it does not include the $4,779,700,000 spent on projects already completed. All but a fraction of these projects originate with the engineers or the Reclamation Bureau. As a westerner who has been in public service for a good part of my life, I yield to no reasonsable man in my appreciation of water resources and what their proper development can mean to my part of the country and to the Nation as a whole. But $52,706,500,000 worth is a terrific water bill. Along with my astonishment over the size of the bill that the engineers and reclamationists are running up for us, there also is a touch of disillusionment. It has not been inspiring to witness the manner in which the Army Corps of Engineers, a body of soldiers supposedly responsible to its Commander in Chief, the President, has engaged in undisguised political lobbying to defeat the President's wholly admirable efforts to reduce the high cost of Government in this field. Nor can I say much for the way some elements in Congress already have indicated they will try to temporize with our recommendations to strip the Corps of Engineers of its civil functions, a field in which the Army does not belong. I realize how longingly those Congressmen who make up the so-called rivers-and-harbors bloc look upon the lush projects which the engineers seem to think it is their privilege to bestow. But, in this era of top-heavy Government, costly foreign aid and staggering national-defense bills, it should be the solemn duty of every legislator to place preservation of the American economy above preservation of political pork. The principal charges I must bring against the Army engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation, as result of my investigations as chairman of the Hoover Commission's Natural Resources Task Force, are these: 1. The two agencies are so violently jealous of each other that an extravagant and wholly senseless competition has sprung up. They will encroach on each other's territory and stake out rival claims simply to beat out each other in the race to construct expensive projects. Naturally, it is the taxpayer who suffers. 2. In their indecent zeal to extend their empires, both agencies are guilty of underestimating-apparently deliberately-the cost of the projects they propose to build. This underestimating has the effect of bamboozling Congress into easy acquiescence to proposed projects. Then, after the first batch of concrete is poured, the engineers and reclamationists always can come back with a request for a supplemental appropriation. For instance, if the whole $52,706,500,000 water-development program should be approved by Congress, the entire job when completed, on the basis of past performances in estimating by the engineers and Bureau of Reclamation, probably would cost more than double that figure. 3. Both agencies stoop to deception in furtherance of their efforts to stake out claims on projects. The engineers will use navigation and flood control as a guise for a hydroelectric project; the reclamationists use irrigation as their alibi for hydroelectric development. While there may be much to say in favor of Government construction of hydroelectric projects, it is my impression that the United States still is not a socialistic country and that the production and sale of electricity remains a matter for private enterprise. I say this with full appreciation of the Tennessee Valley Authority experiment, which has served a useful purpose, but which, our task force concluded, should not serve as an excuse for setting up similar independent authorities throughout the Nation. 4. Both agencies are guilty of brazen and pernicious lobbying to achieve their ends. Of course, I must plead guilty to a certain amount of bias in expressing my opinions. When I became governor of Wyoming in 1933, I inherited a $1,000,000 overdraft that had been on our books for some 20 years. I got rid of it simply by not spending money on certain projects that would have been nice, but unnecessary. I never have believed in living above our means, and never shall. Let me cite two cases which our task force uncovered as examples of wastefulness and bad planning on the part of both agencies. First, the case of the Reclamation Bureau and Boysen Dam: Out in the central part of my State of Wyoming is a rugged canyon through which the Big Horn River runs. To the head of this canyon some 30 or 40 years ago came an enterprising Minnesotan, one Asmus Boysen, who built a small power dam. It was strictly a private enterprise. Then came the Burlington Railroad, which built a track alongside his dam, and the State followed suit with a paralleling highway. Boysen overlooked one thing: silt, the curse of all dam builders, even the mighty engineers and reclamationists. In a relatively short period of years, the silt had built up behind Boysen's dam so thoroughly that his power production was seriously impaired. He built a superstructure on his dam to raise the water higher. With that, the railroad went into court and charged that the dam was a menace to its railroad. After a long and expensive suit, which almost broke Boysen, the courts held the dam was a nuisance and ordered it dynamited. Now, a few years ago, when Reclamation plunged into the wild race to stake out projects in the Missouri Basin ahead of the rival engineers, it hit upon the idea of again damming up the Big Horn at Boysen's old site. A reconnaissance survey fixed the cost at $8,200,000. Reclamation started building a mighty structure designed to aid flood control, supply irrigation water, and produce power; in my opinion the need, if any, for additional power in that area could be provided more consistently by enlarging the capacity of existing installations or of projects already underway. The structure was designed at least 10 percent larger than its purposes required, in order to cope with the siltation problem. But the railroad and highway people were no more anxious to be flooded than they had been 30 years before. So Reclamation had to shoulder the cost of relocating the railroad and highway. To relocate the highway alone, I am informed, will cost $1,642,000. The cost of relocating the railroad will be staggering$15,096,000 at the latest estimate. It calls for several miles of construction work through solid rock, including the blasting of a tunnel, well over a mile long, through armorlike diorite and granite. At last count, Reclamation itself was admitting that the project would cost $29,726,000; only time will tell how much more it will run. The budget request for the 1950 fiscal year alone is $8,000,000. If I were the arbiter, I'd say let's wash out the 8 to 10 millions that Reclamation already has squandered and not pour another $20,000,000 or more into this ill-starred silt trap. Now for an example of how the Army engineers, in their zeal for pouring concrete, persist bullheadedly in spending money for projects of doubtful necessity. At the city of Denver, Colo., an inconsequential stream known as Cherry Creek flows into the South Platte River. Cherry Creek ordinarily is placid, but occasionally it floods, causing relatively minor damage in portions of Denver. Some years ago, Kenwood Dam, a structure designed for a maximum flood discharge of 70,000 second-feet, was built as a PWA project to protect Denver against Cherry Creek floods. According to a committee of the Colorado section, American Society of Civil Engineers, the worst Cherry Creek flood ever measured in Denver occurred in 1885 and had a peak discharge of some 20,000 second-feet. The engineers have stepped in, however, and, by a decidedly roundabout means of figuring, have come up with the conclusion that a flood of 113,000 secondfeet a figure that is 5.65 times as great as the maximum flood of record-is theoretically possible. So now the engineers are engaged in a truly massive project on this trifling creek-a dam 14,300 feet long and 140 feet high, with a control structure 174 feet in height. Needless to say, it will eliminate the existing dam, which local engineers think is adequate. Cost: $15,700,000 for the dam alone; about $21,000,000 if storage and operating facilities for irrigation-water storage, now being eyed by the Bureau of Reclamation, are included. The engineers went ahead with this project despite the forthright opposition of the Denver engineers, who declared that, by even the most generous figures, the project was not worth the cost. The local engineers significantly pointed out that if the Denver taxpayers instead of Uncle Sam were directly footing the bill they never would commit themselves to such a project. But, it would appear, nothing can stop the Army engineers. The Cherry Creek incident brings up another significant point: Our task force, in conducting its research, learned that both engineers and Reclamation habitually build dams and canals without sufficient or accurate hydrologic data to justify the projects. The limit of error or ignorance in present water developments is rarely less than 25 percent, and frequently is more. In other words, engineers and Reclamation do not always know, before spending their billions, whether there is going to be enough water for the operation of their projects. To build monumental dams and all the subsidiary installations or to dredge a navigation channel and then pray for rain is either sublime faith or wasteful folly. The Corps of Engineers, one of the oldest of Government services, has become undoubtedly the most powerful lobbying and pressure group in the Government 9232949- 3 |