1. Courts of bankruptcy will, in general, give effect to liens according
to priority of date. Scott's Case, 336.

2. Maritime liens, which by the law of the admiralty would take
precedence over charges of an earlier date, may, however, be
accorded a similar preference in a court of bankruptcy. Ib.
3. A lien for supplies, &c. furnished to a vessel, founded upon a State
statute, and not of a strictly maritime character, may be recog-
nized and enforced, in a court of bankruptcy; but it cannot
relate back, as a maritime lien may do, so as to take priority
over a mortgage recorded prior to the creation of such lien. Ib.
4. The question of insolvency is a question of fact, and depends, in
part, upon the usage and understanding which prevails in the
locality with reference to which the question arises. Driggs v.
Moore, 440.

5. The rule that a trader who is not able to pay all his debts in the
usual ordinary course of business as persons carrying on trade
usually do, is to be regarded as insolvent,-approved, as a
general rule. Ib.

6. Failure to pay a single debt when due, is not sufficient to establish
insolvency. Ib.

7. When an insolvent debtor gives a mortgage in favor of one
creditor, with intent to secure to him a preference over other
creditors, and such creditor has, at the time, reasonable cause to
believe the debtor insolvent, the mortgage is void, by the pro-
visions of the bankrupt law of 1867. Ib.

8. If, from the circumstances under which the mortgage was given,
it must necessarily have operated as a preference, the creditor
will not be heard to say, in support of the transaction, that the
debtor did not intend to create one. Ib.

9. The decision of a district court, sitting in bankruptcy, upon an
application to confirm a sale made of a bankrupt's estate, is not
a matter within the general supervisory jurisdiction conferred
by section 2 of the bankrupt law of 1867, 14 Stat. at L. 520, upon
the circuit courts. York's Case, 503.

10. A proceeding in bankruptcy, from the filing of the petition to

BANKRUPTCY-Continued.

the distribution of the bankrupt's estate and his discharge, is a
single statutory proceeding. Ib.

11. When it occurs, pending this proceeding, that the assignee or
creditor is driven to file a bill in equity or bring an action at
law, the circuit court has no supervisory jurisdiction of the pro-
ceedings had therein; nor has it when the claim of a supposed
creditor has been rejected in whole or in part,-nor where the
assignee is dissatisfied with the allowance of a claim. These
classes of cases may be taken up on writ of error or appeal. Ib.
12. Other questions, however, arising in the district court in the
progress of a case in bankruptcy, whether of legal or equitable
cognizance, fall within the supervisory jurisdiction of the court
and may, upon bill, petition, or other proper process of any
party aggrieved, be heard and determined in the circuit court
as a court of equity. Ib.

13. In computing the time within which an appeal in bankruptcy
must be taken, Sunday is to be counted, except that when the
last day would fall on Sunday, that Sunday is to be ex-
cluded. Ib.

14. Although, by the bankrupt law of 1867, jurisdiction in bank-

ruptcy is conferred on the district court, instead of being vested
in a new tribunal, yet the district court, when sitting as a court
of bankruptcy, is to be regarded as a separate court, exercising
powers and a jurisdiction distinct from its powers as a district
court as originally constituted. Norris' Case, 514.

15. The district court, when sitting as a court of bankruptcy, should
not decline jurisdiction of a claim presented by petition,
which is within its jurisdiction as a court of bankruptcy, on the
ground that the claim might be prosecuted by bill, in the dis-
trict or circuit court, sitting in equity. Ib.

BILLS AND NOTES.

A circuit or district court has no jurisdiction to entertain an action
brought by an indorsee of a promissory note where both the
maker and the payee and indorser are citizens of the same State.
As the payee could not have sued the maker, his assignee or
indorsee cannot do so, under section 11 of the judiciary act of
September 24, 1789. So held, notwithstanding the note was not
negotiable in terms. Shuford v. Cain, 302.

BILLS OF CREDIT.
WAR, 7, 8.

BOND.

DUTIES, 2-5.

CARRIERS.

1. The duty of a common carrier by water is not fulfilled by simple
transportation from port to port. The goods must be delivered;
or at least landed, and a reasonable opportunity given to the
consignee to inspect them. The Mary Washington, 1.

2. The general rule requires the carrier to notify the consignee of the
arrival of the goods. If a carrier relies on circumstances as
excusing this duty, he must prove them. Ib.

3. To show that the carrier was accustomed to store goods in his
warehouse, on their arrival, and let them remain there until the
consignee should learn from the consignor that they had come,
›without showing that the consignor knew of and assented to
this practice, is not enough to excuse the carrier from the duty
of giving notice himself to the consignee. He will continue lia-
ble as carrier, until the consignee has received, from some quar-
ter, information of the arrival of the goods and an opportunity
to remove them. Ib.

4. The fact that after receiving such notice the consignee refuses to
take the goods, cannot relieve the carrier from liability for
injury sustained by them before that time. Ib.

5. A carrier transported goods to the port of delivery, and then,
without notifying the consignee that they had come, stored
them in his warehouse; where they were injured before the
consignee knew of their arrival.

Held, 1. That the carrier was liable as such, and not as ware-
houseman only; in the absence of affirmative proof of some facts
excusing him from the duty of giving notice.

2. That, as the contract was for transportation over navigable
waters, the consignor might proceed for damages, in the district
court, in admiralty; notwithstanding the port of shipment and
the port of delivery were both in the same State. Ib.

6. The owners of a steam-tug or tow-boat, engaged in the business
of towing vessels from point to point, but not receiving the ves-
sels or the property on board of them into their care or custody
otherwise than is involved in the mere act of towage, are not
liable as common carriers in respect of such employment. To
charge them for an injury to the tow, such injury must be shown
to have resulted from some neglect or fault in the management
of the tug. The Neaffie, 465.

CIRCUIT COURTS.

COURTS, 11-25.

CITIZENS.

1. Free persons of color, born within the allegiance of the United
States, are citizens; and have always been entitled to be so
regarded. United States v. Rhodes, 28.

2. The dicta to the contrary, in Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393, disap-
proved. Ib.

3. The emancipation of a native born slave, by the thirteenth amend-
ment, removed the disability of slavery, and made him a citizen
of the United States; subject, however, to any lawful restric-
tions imposed upon his right to vote, or other powers or privi-
leges. Ib.

4. Colored persons, equally with white persons, are citizens of the
United States. So held, of one who was formerly held as a
slave, and was emancipated in the general abolition of slavery
throughout the State, accomplished by a new State constitu-
tion. Turner's Case, 84.

CIVIL RIGHTS.

1. The act of April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. at L. 27, known as the "civil
rights" bill, is constitutional in all its provisions. It is an
appropriate method of exercising the power conferred on Con-
gress by the thirteenth amendment. United States v. Rhodes, 28.
2. The civil rights bill is not a penal statute. It is a remedial one,
and is to be liberally construed. Ib.

3. The criminal jurisdiction conferred upon the circuit and district
courts by section 3 of the civil rights bill, is not confined to
offenses committed by colored persons. It extends to prosecu-
tions against white persons for offenses affecting persons who
cannot enforce in the State courts the rights secured to them by
section 1. Ib.

4. A prosecution for burglary is "

a cause affecting" the owner of the
building entered, within the meaning of section 3 of the civil
rights bill, giving the courts of the Union jurisdiction of all
causes affecting persons who cannot enforce in the courts of the
State any of the rights secured to them by the first section. If
the owner of the building entered, is, on account of color, incom-
petent, by the law of the State where the offense is alleged to
have been committed, to testify in support of the indictment as
a white person might, the circuit court has jurisdiction. Ib.
5. An indictment for burglary in entering the house of T. in Ken-
tucky, averred that T. was of African descent, and a citizen;
and that she was, by the laws of Kentucky, denied the right to
testify against the defendants, they being white. There was a
public statute of Kentucky, enabling white persons under simi-

CIVIL RIGHTS-Continued.

lar circumstances to testify. Held, that the indictment was
sufficient, and that the circuit court might take jurisdiction
under section 3 of the act of April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. at L. 27,
known as the "civil rights" bill, notwithstanding there was no
averment of the statute of Kentucky. The circuit court should
take judicial notice of such statute, and the indictment should
be construed in the same manner as if the statute were
averred. Ib.

6. The civil rights bill of 1866 is constitutional, and applies to all
conditions prohibited by it, whether originating in transactions
before or since its enactment. Turner's Case, 84.

7. An indenture purporting to bind a child of negro descent appren-
tice, which does not contain important provisions for the secu-
rity and benefit of the apprentice, which are required by the
general laws of the State in indentures of white apprentices, is
void; under section 1 of the civil rights bill of 1866. Ib.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 18-22.

COLLISION.

1. Where, in a collision case, the evidence is so conflicting or uncer-
tain that the court cannot determine upon which vessel the real
cause of the collision should be charged, the damages should be
divided between the colliding vessels. The Comet, 451.

2. The rules and authorities governing the apportionment of dam-
ages for collision, in cases of mutual fault, inscrutable fault, and
inevitable accident,-elaborately reviewed. Ib.

CONGRESS.

COPYRIGHT, 4; INJUNCTION, 5.

CONSIGNOR AND CONSIGNEE.
CARRIERS, 1-5.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1. The history of the adoption of the first thirteen amendments to
the constitution, and the objects and proper construction of
them,-explained. United States v. Rhodes, 28.

2. The act of April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. at L. 27, known as the "civil rights"
bill, is constitutional in all its provisions. It is an appropriate
method of exercising the power conferred on Congress by the
thirteenth amendment. Ib.