Avery v. Fox. that the effect of opening the new channel will not be as stated in the bill of complainants and in Colonel Webster's affidavit. On the contrary, that if the improvement is made, it is his opinion the present outlet will not be filled by drifting sands or by the action. of the water. He further states that strong westerly winds raise the water in White Lake twelve inches or more, and the result will be, if the new channel is made, that as the wind subsides and the water of Lake Michigan recedes, the pent-up waters of White Lake will seek both outlets into the outer lake, not through the new channel alone, and will keep the present channel from filling with drifting sand. Such are the facts, and such the conflicting opinions presented upon this motion, from which to determine whether the complainants will be irreparably injured by the new channel when constructed. It is clear that it will not be the new channel which will cause the old outlet to fill with sand, but the wind blowing the sand into this channel that will close it if it should be closed. The current in this outlet cannot be greater than that of the river above, which is two or three miles per hour-it is probably less, but if as great, a current running but two or three miles an hour would produce little or no effect in removing sand precipitated into the bed of the outlet; hence it is that great expense is necessary annually to remove the deposited sand. The only current that removes sand from the outlet is that which flows at irregular intervals, caused by water from Lake Michigan, blown into White Lake on account of strong westerly winds, running out when the wind subsides; but this current is not adequate to remove the sand from the channel, and must be aided by the artificial means which are employed. It appears, then, that this outlet would cease to be navigable to its present extent were it not for the use Avery v. Fox. of such artificial means. And, as I view the facts, it does not appear but that, after the new channel is made, the same application of artificial means will keep this outlet open for all practical uses which complainants now enjoy therein. That use is principally in running logs, as vessels now receive complainants' lumber near the mouth of the outlet, and not at their mill, the lumber being conveyed by land carriage to a dock near Lake Michigan. Complainants have a tug which they employ in this outlet, but it does not appear, from the facts of the case, but that the employment of artificial means in keeping the channel clear, to the extent now employed, would continue the present facilities for tug navigation, as well as other purposes, for which complainants now use the channel; unless the effect of the new channel will be, not only to take a portion of the water accustomed to flow through the old, but lower the level of White Lake to such an extent as to materially reduce the depth of water in the present outlet. It is said by the bill that White Lake will, in consequence of the new channel being very much wider, deeper, and shorter than the old one, naturally and necessarily seek the level of Lake Michigan. This conclusion may be conceded; but what effect will thereby be produced in the present channel? The bill gives no information from which to answer satisfactorily the question. How much above the level of Lake Michigan is White Lake? Is there any considerable difference, or such difference in the level of the two lakes as that the new channel will so far lower White Lake as to prevent its water flowing into the old outlet, or materially reduce the depth of water therein? These questions I am unable to answer from the facts of the case, and do not feel disposed to interfere with the public work at White Lake, designed, as it is, greatly to benefit com Avery v. Fox. merce and navigation by affording what does not now exist, a safe and commodious entrance to one of the best harbors on the lake, except the showing is such as decisively to require it. It will be conceded that the present channel, in its natural condition, is not so far navigable as that vessels of ordinary draught of water navigating Lake Michigan can enter through it into White Lake, and that it is only kept or made navigable for crafts of light draught when artificial means are employed at great cost annually in dredging out the sand which is therein deposited by the frequently recurring strong westerly winds; and that the new channel will afford ample facilities for all classes of vessels to enter the harbor of White Lake. It is, therefore, of great public importance that the cut be made. If complainants can reach vessels in White Lake, which enter through the new channel, to transport their lumber to market, without much greater inconvenience than they now do vessels at the mouth of the outlet, they would not seem, in this particular, to be materially injured by the new cut. Their mill cannot be materially different from midway between White Lake and the mouth of the outlet. If sufficient water is left in the outlet, with or without the employment of the artificial means, for floating their logs to their mill, I cannot see wherein they are to be irreparably damaged. The result of the new channel may be to give complainants some inconvenience; more time may be consumed in running their logs if the current of the present outlet is diminished, as it probably would be; but mere inconvenience, or delay in navigating a stream, must be submitted to from motives of public policy where the public good demands it. The right to interfere by injunction rests on the principle of a clear and certain right to the enjoyment of the subject in question, and an injurious interruption Avery v. Fox. of that right, which, on just and equitable grounds, ought to be prevented. A court should be extremely cautious in the exercise of this power, and before enjoining an important public work, require a clear case on the facts as well as on the law. The injury should be apparent, and in a case like the present, of apprehended injury, resting largely in opinions on one side, and denials of injury on the other, the question of damage should be put beyond mere probabilities, and reach something like demonstration. My investigations have led me to the conclusion that complainants' right to the enjoyment of the water of White River outlet, as riparian owners, and as well in right of the public easement, to the extent which they now enjoy its use, is at law clear; but that the facts do not make a clear showing of necessity for the exercise of the restraining power of the court by injunction to protect them in the enjoyment of their rights. The motion for a temporary injunction is denied. Bailey v. Milner. BAILEY v. MILNER. District Court; Northern District of Georgia, February T., 1868. CONFEDERATE NOTES.-THEIR INVALIDITY. The securities known as "Confederate treasury notes," issued by the self-styled Confederate States, during the civil war of 1861-'65, although not "bills of credit," issued by a State, and as such prohibited by the Constitution of the United States, Art. I. § x. subd. 1, were, nevertheless, illegal; because they were issued by a pretended government, organized in the name of certain States, by subjects of the United States, who were at the time in rebellion against the rightful government of the United States, with design to dismember and destroy it. A promissory note given in consideration of such bills is void, and does not constitute a debt provable in bankruptcy. Question upon the certificate of a register in bankruptcy. ERSKINE, J.-In 1863, John Neal loaned twenty-five hundred dollars in "Confederate treasury notes," to Milner, the bankrupt, for which amount he made his promissory note to Neal. Subsequently Neal, in making a disposition of some of his property among his children and grandchildren, gave this note to his sonin-law, Samuel Bailey, in trust for minor children of Susan Beall, a daughter of Neal. Bailey, as trustee, sought to prove this claim against the estate of the bankrupt. Counsel for the latter objected: First, because the consideration for the con tract was Confederate treasury notes; secondly, because |