WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, December 31, 1940. Supplement I to the Military Laws of the United States, 1939, containing legislation of the 76th Congress, is published for the information and guidance of all concerned. It includes notes of court decisions and opinions of the Attorney General rendered since 1939, and certain provisions omitted from the original text. BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR: G. C. MARSHALL, OFFICIAL: E. S. ADAMS, Major General, The Adjutant General. II AMERICA ARTICLE I. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT CLAUSE 1 Notes of Decisions Common defense.-The national defense is not an exclusively Federal function or responsibility precluding cooperation from the States. U. S. C. A., Const. art. 1, sec. 8. State ex rel. Gibbs, Atty. Gen. v. Gordon et al. (Fla., 1939), 189 So. 437. The statute creating the Duval County Air Base Authority in aid of the Federal national defense program, and declaring that the national defense is a joint responsibility of the Federal and State governments, does not violate the Federal Constitution as an encroachment upon an exclusive function of the Federal Government. Acts 1939, H. B. 1145, par. 1; U. S. C. A. Const. art. 1, sec. 8. Id. General welfare.-Change citation to read: Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority (1938), 21 F. Supp. 947; affirmed (1938) 306 U. S. 118. Under authority of Congress to spend money in aid of the "general welfare," the discretion to determine between particular and general welfare belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong or a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment, and courts will respect judgment of Congress unless the use be palpably without reasonable foundation or is shown to involve an impossibility. U. S. C. A. Const. art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 1. In re United States (two cases), (D. C., 1939), 28 F. Supp. 758. There is a middle ground between particular welfare and "general welfare" for which Congress is authorized to spend money, in which discretion is at large and belongs to Congress unless the choice is clearly wrong. U. S. C. A. Const. art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 1. Id. CLAUSE 3 Notes of Decisions In general.-A State cannot tax interstate, because the seller fulfills the contract by commerce either by levying a tax upon the shipments to the purchaser of goods from business which constitutes such commerce a point without the State. Id. or by taxing the privilege of engaging in it. State ex rel. v. Southern Oil Service, Inc. (Tenn., 1939), 124 S. W. (2d) 704. Where interstate shipment of goods is not contemplated or required by party, a contract of sale within State between persons residing in State for delivery of goods therein is not "interstate commerce" merely The Federal Government's jurisdiction over navigable waterways is based on section of Constitution authorizing Congress to regulate foreign and interstate commerce and make all laws necessary and proper to carry such powers into execution. U. S. C. A. Const. art. 1, sec. 8. Grand River Dam Authority v. Going et al. (D. C., 1939), 29 F. Supp. 316. CLAUSE 17 Notes of Decisions Jurisdiction in general.-The constitutional provision giving the United States exclusive jurisdiction over places purchased "for the erection of forts * * * and other needful buildings" is applicable to lands over which the Federal Government seeks exclusive jurisdiction, and does not limit the right of acquisition of land by eminent domain. U. S. C. A. Const. art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 17. In re United States (two cases) (D. C., 1939), 28 F. Supp. 758. Mere ownership and use of land by United States does not withdraw land from State's jurisdiction, but constitutional provision authorizing exercise by Congress of exclusive legislation over places purchased for erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards and other needful buildings becomes applicable when United States acquires land with State's consent for those purposes. U. S. C. A. Const. art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 17. State v. Blair (Ala., 1939), 191 So. 237. |