the land bill of the last session, with his objections to it. He says that the want of time to give the subject due consideration prevented his return of the bill before the rising of Congress. Before he states his objections, he goes into a historical review of the public lands, from the Articles of Confederation in 1777, the resolutions of the old Congress on the subject, and the cessions of the dif ferent States.

He objects to the bill, that it violates the pledge to the new Western States, of giving them twelve and a per cent. of the net proceeds of the public lands before any apportionment was made.

half

It violates the conditions upon which the other seveneighths of the proceeds should be distributed.

Because Congress possesses no constitutional power to appropriate the public money for local purposes, and this bill directs the proceeds to be applied to objects of internal improvement or education within the respective States.

The bill assumes a new principle. Its object is not to return to the people an unavoidable surplus of revenue paid by them, but to create a surplus distribution among the States. He says that a more direct road to consolidation could not be devised, and he dwells on the extent and danger of giving such a power to the Federal Gov

ernment.

He argues that the measure would, moreover, be injurious to the new States; and he reaffirms his opinions of our true policy to be, that the public lands should, as soon as practicable, cease to be sources of revenue.

After this message was read, Mr. Clay addressed the Senate, and animadverted with much severity on the course of the President. The subject of the public lands, at the session before the last, had been fully discussed,

and had been introduced by the President himself in his first message to Congress; of course it must have been well understood by him. The bill was again brought before Congress at the next session, and passed both Houses, just before the close of the session; but the President, without acting on the bill, or communicating his reasons, retained it. The question was, whether the bill now returned was to be again acted on, or was an existing law. As he had not made up his mind on the subject, he moved that it be laid on the table.

Mr. Benton warmly defended the President against what he called an unfounded attack, which produced a full reply, and a more detailed reference to the legislative progress of this bill. Mr. Benton having withdrawn his motion to take up the bill, it was then laid on the table. The next day, Mr. Clay asked leave to bring in a bill essentially the same as that of the preceding sessions.

Mr. Benton having offered a resolution requiring the amount of money in the Bank of the United States, each month and year since its establishment, Mr. Clay moved, as an amendment, that he also report the names of all the new deposit banks, their respective capitals, the amount of public money in each, their condition, and other facts relative to the transfer of the deposits; which resolution and amendments were, on his motion, ordered to be printed.

He then adverted to the report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the removal of the deposits, which was made the order of the day for the succeeding Monday; and he moved that the President inform the Senate whether the paper purporting to have been read by him to the Heads of the Departments on the eighteenth of September was genuine, and if so, that he cause a copy to be laid before the Senate.

The next day this application was resisted, and after some modification of the resolution, omitting the question of genuineness, it was adopted by twenty-three votes to eighteen.

On the following day the President, by a message, replied to the Senate, that the Executive is a co-ordinate and independent branch of the Government; and he has yet to learn "under what constitutional authority the Senate could require of him any communication made by him to the Heads of Departments, acting as a Cabinet Council." He would always be ready to explain to the American people the grounds of his conduct, and to give to either branch of the Legislature any useful information knowing the rights of the Senate, he should not interfere with them; and knowing those of the Execu tive, he should endeavor to maintain them, agreeably to the provisions of the Constitution, and his oath to support it: he must, therefore, from a due regard to those rights, decline to comply with their request.

As the removal of the deposits was followed, in all the commercial cities, with a very great pressure on the mercantile community, meetings were frequently held to send memorials to Congress, or to the President, for the purpose of procuring their restoration. The subject was the most prominent and interesting topic of debate in both Houses of Congress.

Among the papers accompanying the President's message was one signed by Mr. Taney,' in which, as Secretary of the Treasury, he assigned his reasons for removing the Government deposits from the Bank of the United States.

In that paper, assuming that the Bank charter, which would expire in March, 1836, would not be renewed, he

1 Register of Debates, Vol. X., Part IV., Appendix, page 58.

thought that the public interest required the removal without further delay, and that there were other reasons for the removal, growing out of the misconduct of the Bank, to which he specially refers, and which accord with those stated by the President to his Cabinet, and repeatedly referred to throughout this controversy.

On the fourth of February, a message was received from the President, complaining of the refusal of the Bank of the United States to deliver the books and papers in its possession relative to the pensions to officers of the Revolution, which it insists it has a right to pay, under a just construction of the act of Congress of June, 1832. He has felt it to be his duty to submit the matter to the consideration of Congress.

Accompanying this message was a letter from Mr. Butler, the Attorney-general, to the President, condemning the conduct of the Bank relative to the pensions, and a correspondence between Nicholas Biddle, President of the Bank, and General Cass, Secretary of War, on the same subject.'

On the fifth of February, Mr. Webster made a report on the removal of the deposits. He considers that these deposits were one of the benefits which Congress meant to render to the Bank in return for the bonus of a million and a half which it paid to the Government; and the Bank has a right to the deposits, unless it has afforded just cause for removing them.

The safety of the public funds was another consideration of this provision, and the removal of course involves the question of political propriety and expediency.

The propriety of the Secretary's course is subject to the revision of Congress. The right of removal is not

1

1 Register of Debates, Vol. X., Part IV., Appendix, page 102.

absolute, but conditional. If they are removed without good cause, he impairs the rights of the Bank.

The Committee do not concur with the Secretary, that whenever he thinks the public good requires it, he may remove the deposits. This power of the Secretary is not to be exercised abitrarily or capriciously, but only on grounds of necessity, or plain and manifest expediency. He has in nothing else the unlimited power here claimed. The power now contended for would be to place the whole management of the Bank under his control. But the management is exclusively confined to twentyfive directors. No part of their management, unconnected with the public deposits, is submitted to his judgment. He has no authority, whether it has or has not violated its charter.

The Secretary seems to suppose he has a general guardianship over the Bank, but there is nothing to warrant this opinion. The law has provided the Secretary with ample powers to judge of the safety of the deposits by requiring frequent returns of the condition of the Bank; but it has furnished him with no means to judge of the depreciation of the paper, and other cases of maladministration. Congress has appropriate remedies, to be applied exclusively by itself. It is clear, from looking to the whole law establishing the Bank, that Congress gave the power of removing the deposits to provide for some sudden evil, for which there was no other prompt remedy, and not for an over or under discount. Between these evils and the remedy by the removal of the deposits there is no connection.

The controversy about the French bill furnishes no ground of removal. It is a question about which men may differ, and is proper for a judicial decision.

The power given to the Secretary is a trust power,