seven hundred thousand dollars, to postpone the sale; and failing in that, as also in the application to the Government to postpone the redemption, on the ground of extraordinary pressure on the Bank, it found itself compelled to negotiate a loan abroad. General Cadwalader was sent by the President to negotiate this loan, without consulting the Board of Directors. He agreed to purchase a part of the three per cent. stock, and to defer the redemption of a part. This purchase, it was alleged, was contrary to their charter. When it was known, by a publication of the Barings, that this negotiation had been made by Cadwalader, it was then said that he had exceeded his instructions, which had been to negotiate a loan, and not to purchase stock. It was thus alleged that the Bank had interfered in the purchase of the three per cents. which the Government wished to make, because it was unable to pay to the Government the deposits it held.

As usual, in such cases, the Bank was blamed or justified by men, according as they were supporters or opposers of the Administration. If it was a settled purpose of the Government to pay off this debt, it seemed improper in the Bank, which had been established by the Legislature principally for the purpose of aiding the Government in its finances, to defeat its purpose.

It seems, too, to be subject to censure for exacting of the Government damages beyond what they had actually sustained, in consequence of the protest of the bill. There were several circumstances to distinguish this case from that of an ordinary mercantile transaction. First. The very large amount of the bill-for the damages which would be sufficient to indemnify in the case of an ordinary sum would be far more than sufficient in the case of millions. The amount is commonly

regarded both in the rate of interest for money, and in case of commissions. Second. From the relation in which the Bank stood, as the financial agent of the Government, which was obviously a source of great profit, and they might have been content to sustain an occasional loss in an agency which was commonly so gainful. Third. There was another reason why, in equity, they should not have set up the said demand against the Government which they might have urged against an individual: they had a security here which individuals could not give, more especially as they had the means of payment in their own hands.

In the month of May, a treaty of commerce and navigation with Russia was ratified. It had been negotiated by Mr. Buchanan, the Minister from the United States. The vessels of each nation were allowed to enter the ports of the other on payment of the same duties as were paid by its own vessels, and they were free to import every kind of merchandize. The same freedom was allowed in exports as in imports: nor were any higher duties to be laid by either nation on the manufactures of the other than are laid on the manufactures of any other foreign nation. Each nation might appoint Consuls and Vice-Consuls in the ports of the other, who might act as judges and arbitrators between the captains and their crews of the respective nations; and who might require the aid of the local authorities to search, arrest, and imprison deserters from their respective ships. The citizens and subjects of the two nations. should have power to dispose of their personal goods within the jurisdiction of the other; and where they held real estate, and the laws of the country did not permit their lands to descend to an alien, time should be allowed to his representatives to dispose of them. Any VOL. IV.-10

favors or privileges in navigation or commerce granted to any particular nation by either of the parties should. also be granted to the other. The present treaty to be extended to Poland, so far as the same was applicable.

Mr. M'Lane having resigned the office of Secretary of the Treasury, in consequence, it is said, of his unwillingness to remove the public deposits from the Bank of the United States, Mr. Duane, of Pennsylvania, was appointed in his place, and Mr. M'Lane was made Secretary of State.

Amos Kendall having reported the agreement of the State banks to render the services to the Government which were then performed by the Bank of the United States, on such terms as were deemed safe and satisfacfactory, the President was determined to delay the removal no longer.

The legality of the President's interfering in the discharge of a duty which had been specially assigned to the Secretary of the Treasury, had been contested by the friends of the Bank; but as his power of appointing and removing that officer was unlimited, except by the Senate, it seemed futile to deny him the power of ordering that to be done directly which he could always effect by appointing some one who agreed with him in opinion, or who, at least, would be willing to comply with his wishes.

The subject was, however, much discussed in the Cabinet, and the sentiments of the members seem to have been greatly divided about the measure, either as to its legality or its expediency. But General Jackson was not to be thus diverted from his purpose. On the eighteenth of September, he read to his Cabinet, called together for that purpose, a paper setting forth the rea

sons on which he had decided to remove the funds of the treasury from the Bank of the United States.

He begins by referring to his opinion of the dangerous tendencies of the Bank, from the time that he entered on his duties as President, which he had indicated in all his early messages to Congress, and which the acts of the Bank have since confirmed; and believing the institution to be both inexpedient and unconstitutional, he had determined never to give it his sanction.

He then recites the objectionable measures of the Bank. Its motives for applying for a recharter in 1832 were to influence the election of the President, and thus obtain a reversal of his decision.

Although the charter was approaching its termination, and it was known that the Government wanted its deposits for the payment of the public debt, it extended its loans from January, 1831, to May, 1832, from forty to seventy millions of dollars-by way of bringing as large a portion of the people as possible under its influence; and that some of the most considerable sums were granted to conductors of the public press; and the motive was manifested by the insufficiency of the security, and by the unusual length of the loans.

Many documents and articles were circulated at the expense of the Bank to bring the people to a decision. favorable to that institution. Its debtors were warned of the ruin which awaited them, should the President be sustained, and of the depression in the price of property, and other inconveniences and distress.

Under these circumstances, he asks, if the question of the recharter was not decided at the Presidential election. The issue was frankly met by himself, and fairly made up before the people. In confirmation of this

view, he refers to the conclusion of his veto message on the bill for rechartering the Bank.

Of all the substitutes proposed for the present Bank, none seems to have united a large portion of the public in its favor. Most of them are liable to the same constitutional objections. In ridding the country of "an irresponsible power," that has attempted to control the Government, it would be equally dangerous with the Executive. He therefore assumes that the charter of the present Bank will not be renewed, and that no substitute for it will be established. It is, therefore, his duty to provide in time for the public services now rendered by the Bank.

After citing the passages of the act of Congress relative to the deposits, he remarks that the power of the Secretary of the Treasury is "unqualified," and the provision that he shall report his reasons for a removal to Congress, is no limitation. He refers to Mr. Crawford's declarations of his power to transfer the deposits to the State banks, and says that in some instances he did transfer by way of showing that this power of the Secretary of the Treasury was undisputed.

Since the charter of the Bank will expire in little more than two years and a half, he urges that it is not too soon to provide that new system for the collection, and distribution of the revenue which will then be necessary. Some of the changes cannot be suddenly made without great inconvenience. It is safer to begin the reform too soon than too late.

It is for Congress to decide on the best substitute for the present Bank, and the President would have been relieved from a painful responsibility if the charter had not devolved it on one of the Executive Departments. But this provision is in the nature of a contract with