During the campaign, President Carter made strong statements to the effect that the United States should maintain its defensive capabilities against the Soviet Union. In fact, it was widely noted that he very often came across as more "hawkish" than President Ford. There is every indication that this attitude of resolve backed by strength was approved by the American people, and that it contributed significantly to his election. Since the election, President Carter has indicated a strong interest in human rights within the Soviet Union. His decision to meet with Vladimir Bukovsky is in strong contrast to the treatment accorded Alexandr Solzhenitsyn by President Ford. Direct actions of this kind cannot be taken without strength to back them up. The extent of U.S. involvement in human rights questions indicates a strong resolve to maintain a strong defense. By contrast, the signal that the Warnke nomination is emitting is a signal that the United States is willing to reach arms control agreements at virtually any cost. It is a signal that the United States and the U.S.S.R. are essentially similar in goals and structures, though perhaps somewhat different in tactics. The signal was widely understood as exactly that. One has only to consider the reception of the nomination by various parts of the news media and intelligentsia. Broadly speaking, the doves loved it. Warnke was hailed by thoughtful arms control advocates, of course, but the unilateral disarmers were overjoyed. The signal has not been more broadly perceived within the Senate, in my opinion, largely because of the startling shift in Mr. Warnke's mode of expression on arms control issues. We could argue for days over whether Mr. Warnke has actually changed his views, or is now just reflecting changed circumstances. Senator Jackson, who has long been a participant in and observer of arms negotiations has presented the best case against Mr. Warnke on this issue, and I must say that he has pursuaded me. But that aside, the problem with this nomination is that it reflects a basic misunderstanding of the Soviet mentality, as clearly shown in actions of the Soviet Union since 1917. As it happens, I have spent a good deal of time studying military and diplomatic history, and the results of attempting to placate powers such as the Soviet Union are invariably the same: destabilization and war. But it is not really necessary to study military history to understand the Soviet mentality. You can study it on the playground. It is the bully's mentality, and it cannot be satisfied by concessions and respect. It understands strength. And the signal sent out by the Warnke nomination is a signal that we will not be strong. I am perfectly willing to be proven wrong, and hope that I will be. If I am, I will say, as Mr. Warnke so often has during our hearings on his nomination, that I do not regret having opposed him, but that changed circumstances now show him to be the obvious choice to continue. As he explains it, that will not be a change of mind. о ya.Ars/3.024 / locks Senate. Armed Services. Hearings ADDENDUM TO CONSIDERATION OF MR. PAUL C. WARNKE TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND PIEAPMAMEN AGENCY AND AMBASSADOR DOCUMENTS DEPARTMENT HEARINGS APR 1 1977 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, UNITED STATES BERKELEY NINETY. Senator HANSEN. Mr. Chairman, I come before this Committee to express my deep concern over and strong opposition to the nomination of Mr. Paul Warnke to be the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and head of the United States SALT Delegation. I believe it is important, at this time, that we examine the nature of arms control and the psychological orientations of the parties thereto. For there can be no question but that the United States and Soviet Russia approach this question along different paths. Americans are a goal oriented people. We set objectives for ourselves, we set levels of performance which we expect to achieve and we dedicate ourselves to the attainment of those objectives. It is part of our political system, part of our national emotional make-up that above all else we must succeed, we must attain goals or reach bench marks. Americans who represent this country in disarmament talks behave no differently. They are willing to compromise in order to reach a recognizable objective, in order to be able to say, "Look what we've done." I believe that even the most forceful, defense-oriented negotiator we could possibly assign to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency would soon become a disarmament advocate. For instance, I believe we can find a very strong negotiator if we do not at the same time burden him with the management of the Disarmament Agency. There is another closely related phenomenon, that is the objective which the United States takes into arms control discussions. The United States negotiates with the ultimate objective of enhancing peace, of increasing the possibility that we need not ever go to war, that we achieve the Biblical dream of "peace on earth, good will toward men”. Yet we negotiate with a country of a totally different orientation. The Soviets approach the bargaining table, examine disarmament proposals with a realization that they need not reach agreement. As well, the Soviet Union seeks, in its negotiations, not the enhancement of peace, but the enhancement of their capabilities in case of war. The Soviets seek to be better able, at the conclusion of negotiations, to wage a winning war. It is with these thoughts in mind that I turn to the man President Carter has recommended to be America's chief negotiator of the SALT discussions as well as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Mr. Warnke has written often and eloquently in strong advocacy of his approach to arms limitations and eventual disarmament. There is no absence of materials from which those desiring to know Mr. Warnke's position may draw their own conclusions. Over a period of seven years, Mr. Warnke has espoused his own particular viewpoints, setting forth in scholarly journals, letters to the editor, and Congressional hearings his concepts of arms control. Mr. Warnke has compared the United States and Soviet Russia to "two apes on a treadmill", in ignorant imitation of one another's "mindless build-up" of weapons systems. He believes that the Soviet Union has only one superpower model to follow and that given the "monkey see, monkey do phenomenon" of de fense policy, Russia would have no alternative but to follow the good lead of the United States in disarmament. One could well question why the Soviets have not chosen to ape the restraint already demonstrated by the United States. Mr. Warnke has called for a moratorium on further MIRV-ing of our land and sea-based missiles, as well as a hold on development of the Trident submarine and the B-1 bomber. He has called such unilateral moves "low-risk initiatives". Mr. Warnke has called nuclear superiority, a "meaningless and irrelevant criterion in designing strategic forces" despite the efforts of the Soviet Union in civil defense preparation as well as the designing of personnel carriers capable of operating in radioactive areas. Mr. Warnke has suggested that "We need not procure ground forces for protracted land war or naval forces for an extensive war at sea, for it is inconceivable that such forces would ever be so employed." He has maintained this position despite the fact that the Soviets have out-produced the United States since 1972 in tanks (5.9 to 1), tactical aircraft (1.9 to 1) and artillery pieces (8 to 1), and despite the massive Soviet Navy build-up. Mr. Warnke has written that the U.S.'s basic objective should be a force "which guarantees the U.S. nuclear deterrent and maximizes our conventional war fighting capability." He writes that this would involve "eschewing notions of superiority or avowed greater readiness to use nuclear weapons. It would also forgo both world-wide military readiness and continued accretion of sophisticated but unproven weaponry, while concentrating on efficiency and simplicity". This despite the tremendous expenditures by the Soviets on military research and development and the fact that the United States must be prepared for weapons of the future. Mr. Warnke, in his discussions of nuclear war, has often used such words as "unthinkable," "too dreadful to contemplate," "nightmare issues". It would seem that his initial revulsion at the thought of a first strike by the Soviets has not enabled him to explore the issue as it must be explored. Yet the Soviet Union is not similarly restrained in its approach given the tremendous effort which Russia has devoted to the matter of civil defense. Mr. Warnke in his writing has concluded that the experience of the United States in Viet-Nam, the Mideast and the Pueblo crisis demonstrates the limitations on U.S. military power as a force in the world. This belief has lead Mr. Warnke further to conclude that one of the fallacies of American foreign policy is that "a failure by the United States to maintain a cosmetic military superiority' will cause us political disadvantage, the loss of bargaining position in arms limitations negotiations, and the sacrifice of the confidence of our allies." He makes such statements aware of the after effects of the United States pull-out of South Vietnam, of President Marcos' quick trip to Red China, of the loss of American bases throughout the world and of the Russian actions in Africa after this Congress voted against funds to aid Angola. Mr. Warnke has advocated programs of defense cuts that would produce a defense budget for fiscal 1978 of approximately $25 billion less than what President Carter considers necessary. He advocates these cuts no doubt in the spirit of "unilateral initiatives" and "superpower aping" in apparent ignorance of the fact that there exists a point below which the Soviets will not go, given the continued existence of possible Sino-Soviet confrontations. In short, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Warnke has advocated stands on matters of national defense and the American weapons systems that have never even been suggested by the Soviet Union in their negotiations with the United States. I am gravely concerned that when we consider the nature of these negotiations. when we take the orientation of Americans as negotiators, when we contemplate the approach of this nation to arms control and we combine them with Mr. Paul Warnke, and his positions and his proposals, we have the makings of a national disaster. Mr. Chairman, some of my colleagues have suggested that Mr. Warnke is but a member of a team make up of President Carter, Secretary of State Vance and Secretary of Defense Brown. Yet that assertion causes me grave concern, for it was President Carter who called for total elimination of nuclear weapons. It was President Carter who according to a recent newspaper column, suggested an immediate study examining the possibility of a reduction of the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal down to only 200 to 250 ICBMs. It was Secretary Brown who before the Senate Armed Services Committee failed to volunteer mention of the Soviet arms buildup. Where is the voice of concern on this team. Who among these men will act as the brase on runaway détente. I have always believed that a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, a team only as good as its pocrest batter. How wili the American team do when Paul Warnke comes to bat across the negotiating table. There is yet another weakness to this "team concept" which those supporting Mr. Warnke have urged upon us. While it is true that in our system the Chief Negotiator receives guidance from the National Security Council and the President, it is the Chief Negotiator who is on the scene. His descriptions-by message of the Soviet reactions and counteractions has a significant influence on the decisions of the National Security Council and the instructions which he receives. It is entirely possible that given Mr. Waruke's approach, he will be overly optimistic in his reading of the Soviets resulting in decisions by the National Security Council unwarranted by Soviet actions. There is another matter beyond numbers of missiles or size and number of submarines; beyond the forces that actually exist. That is the manner in which these items are perceived to be. This matter of perception is tremendously important in a world of growing shortages, in a world where the United States must depend upon third world countries for the raw materials which we must have to survive, and in a world where most transportation must be by sea. At a time when we are importing approximately 42 percent of ur petroleum requirements and I must point out that last month we imported 50 percent, we cannot survive with a third world convinced that the big man on the block with whom they should cast their fate is the Soviet Union. As the junior Senator from Wyoming pointed out during hearings on Secretary Brown, there are few coal-fired aircraft in America's armed forces. There can be little question but that the United States has been on a military decline while the Soviet Union has been moving through a long upswing. In 1967, the United States had 1,054 land-based ICBM launchers; the Soviet Union had fewer. Today we still have 1,054; the Soviet Union has nearly 1,600. In 1967, the United States had 656 submarine launchers; the Soviet Union had less. Today the United States still has 656 while the Soviet Union has over 800. At what point will the power inexorably shift to the Soviets. No one in this room can state with any certainty, although I feel we are all agreed that the trends are there and they are real. But long before it shifts in reality, it will be perceived to have shifted and like precinct and state political leaders chasing after the sure nominee, no third-world country will want to be the last to declare its allegiance and alliance with the projected winner. Americans have begun to perceive a change in the international power balance. According to a poll of 1,071 Americans conducted last September, Americans believe that the Soviet Union is virtually the equal of the United States and that this standoff will persist into the future. Interestingly enough, 71 percent of those polled felt that spending for military and defense purposes should be increased or kept at present levels. Given the present trends, and President Carter's nomination of Paul Warnke to represent the United States in arms negotiations with the Soviets, one can only wonder how long the perception of the balance of power will remain in our favor, if indeed it is so now. Many of my colleagues have brought to my attention the testimony of Mr. Warnke before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. They have pointed out that sharing concerns similar to mine, they were pleased by Mr. Warnke's responses to questions on the B-1, on unilateral disarmament, on the Soviet Union's civil defense system, and on the importance of universal perceptions of military preparedness. I should be pleased to learn of Mr. Warnke's new positions. I should greet with enthusiasm such a new-found understanding of U.S.-Soviet relations. However, I continue to have grave fears and doubts. I am concerned with a man who strongly advocates one position for six or seven years only to change so suddenly in one afternoon before a Senate committee. I wonder with columnist George Will, has he "changed his mind-or just his words." There is another matter to this rather sudden change in the nature of Mr. Warnke's arms control orientation. That is the confidence of the American people. Mr. Warnke must return to the United States and sell to all Americans whatever program is decided upon in negotiations with the Soviet Union. How can the American people have adequate confidence and faith in a man whose positions seemed so firm for so long and then suddenly changed? What man was he in the negotiations, Americans will ask themselves. Was he Paul Warnke, the forceful advocate of arms control, the author of "Apes on a Treadmill," or was he Paul Warnke, President Carter's nominee in his appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee? In conclusion, I must state my total opposition to Mr. Paul Warnke. I must so stand because of Mr. Warnke's positions and proposals over a period of seven years, despite his recent questionable re-awakening, because of the very nature of the negotiations themselves, because of the importance of international perceptions of military preparedness, because of the attitudes of the American people and because of the position in which America's defense finds itself today. |