The point is that many people seem to think that we must change everything and that what has been done in the past has not been considered, studied, and based on the best judgment of the people con

cerned.

In short, I believe that Mr. Warnke has already devalued his chips in this life and death poker game before he has been even dealt the first hand.

With this in mind, I recommend that Mr. Warnke be given the single assignment as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and certainly another individual be assigned as Ambassador and chief negotiator for the forthcoming SALT discussions.

Surely our great country can produce a negotiator without such well documented positions over the years, now suddenly reversed, and who creates a deep bipartisan concern and lack of confidence in the minds of many thoughtful and knowledgeable men.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman STENNIS. Gentlemen, we will proceed with questions. I will pass to start it off.

Senator Jackson.

Senator JACKSON. Admiral, thank you for your fine statement. The basic issue, as I see it, is what some of us perceive to be a substantial change of view by Mr. Warnke as expressed by him in his appearance before the Foreign Relations Committee and now this committee. I take it you have known Mr. Warnke over a period of time. Do you recall any statements that he made on strategic weapons matters prior to his nomination that substantiate the views that he has outlined before this committee and the Foreign Relations Committee? Admiral MOORER. I do not, Senator Jackson. I was under the impression that I would be able to tell you precisely what positions Mr. Warnke would take on a specific issue and now I am uncertain.

Senator JACKSON. During the time that you were Chief of Naval Operations and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs you were involved in SALT matters, in strategic arms limitation issues.

Admiral MOORER. Heavily, yes sir.

Senator JACKSON. That was one of your major responsibilities during that period so that you are quite conversant with the argument for and against the various strategic doctrines, not only as an officer but because of the special responsibility that you had to discharge in both capacities.

Admiral MOORER. That is correct.

Senator JACKSON. Do you understand what Mr. Warnke's view was prior to these hearings with reference to minimum deterrence, assured destruction, and so on, as he expressed it to you?

Admiral MOORER. Not directly to me in a private conversation, but I have, of course, read his testimony, read his various articles in the Foreign Policy magazine and Atlantic Monthly and so on. I think I am aware of his basic thrust; namely, that we should come forward with an initiative of some kind of mutual restraint and then wait and see if the Soviets would not follow suit.

He has also, I think, overstated on occasion when asked questions concerning the utility of certain weapon systems. He said, for instance. the cruise missile is nothing but a crossbow, something to that effect,

as I recall. He has certainly recommended the withdrawal of troops from Europe. He has somewhat downgraded the concept that the Army needs a new tank despite the fact that the Soviets have a major superiority in this area.

So, I think one would have to draw the conclusion, prior to his testimony, that Mr. Warnke would be inclined to favor reductions across the board. As a matter of fact, I do not recall his coming forward and taking a position in strong support of any weapon system. For instance, the Trident I missile he supported, I believe, while opposing the Trident submarine and Trident II missile. On occasion he has has suggested it was one of the better parts of our deterrence.

So, I would answer your question that my primary concern now lies in the uncertainty as to just where Mr. Warnke does stand.

Senator JACKSON. Thank you, Admiral Moorer.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman STENNIS. Senator Tower is recognized.

Senator TOWER. Admiral, the Joint Chiefs recently said they believed the Soviets in the last 15 years have caught up with us and possess a rough equivalence to the United States. During a good part of this 15-year period Mr. Warnke was saying that we had too many weapons. Do you believe Mr. Warnke's position indicates a lack of judgment and vision as to future technological and ideological trends? Admiral MOORER. I believe that Mr. Warnke felt that he could judge the military requirements. He certainly made very positive statements to that effect. As I said in my initial statement here, I advised this committee several times that the Soviets were ovetaking us at a rather alarming rate and if this momentum was allowed to continue that we would be in difficulty in the 1980's.

What I was saying was that you had a situation whereby the Soviets were going up and we were coming down. Whether these lines crossed in 1977 or 1976 or 1978 I don't think is too important. What is important is that the lines will cross, barring action on our part to build up our forces or barring the reaching of some kind of meaningful SALT III or disarmament agreement.

Senator TOWER. The fact is that our relative military postures are asymmetrical rather than symmetrical, we don't necessarily have the same doctrines, the same requirement, the same problems confronting us; for example, we don't have thousands of miles of hostile borders. In any case, what I am getting at is that the Soviet requirements may differ somewhat from ours. You used that term "requirements" a while ago. Do you think that Mr. Warnke has an inadequate understanding of what our requirements may be in maintaining an adequate defense posture against the Soviets?

Admiral MOORER. I think that Mr. Warnke does have an inadequate understanding of this balance. I think that he has little experience really in this field other than what he has taken upon himself with these various organizations to discuss.

Mr. Nitze, on the other hand, has been continually exposed to this in many capacities including Secretary of Defense representative in a negotiating group and I feel he does have an understanding of the problem.

Senator TOWER. What would have happened during this 15-year period that I mentioned a while ago when the Soviets, according to the Joint Chiefs, caught up with us, what would have happened in that period if we had listened to Mr. Warnke and accepted his recommendations relative to significant reductions in our investments in strategic programs?

Admiral MOORER. Senator Tower, I think if we had taken his recommendations literally we would have concluded at one time a $30 billion reduction and another time a progressive reduction in the real dollar terms of the budget.

Over that period of time I dare say that we would have been weakened to the point that it is likely that we, for instance, would not have access to Middle East oil today. I think the situation in Europe would be far more unsatisfactory than it is today and I think that likewise in the Pacific that the United States would be driven into essentially an isolationist posture if we had, in fact, made such radical reductions while the Soviets at the same time were building up with great momentum.

Senator TOWER. What risks do you think that we would have assumed if these recommendations had been set?

Admiral MOORER. I think we would have found ourselves in a position where we would have either had to accept actions on the part of the Soviets that were extremely detrimental to our whole political and economic posture or the American people, based on what they did, for instance, after Pearl Harbor, would demand a restoration of our position, our relative position, and that in itself might well be destabilizing since the Soviets could endeavor to take action before this correction took place.

So I think it would have been a very unstable situation, Senator Tower.

Senator TOWER. Based on your observations of the Soviets, on what they have been doing, as a professional military man, would you come to the conclusion that the Soviets believe that nuclear war is unthinkable, or do you have some reason to believe that perhaps they don't believe that nuclear war is unthinkable, based on your assessment of what they have been doing in terms of their own military development?

Admiral MoORER. I feel that the Soviets do not believe it is unthinkable, so to speak, because they have taken certain actions relative to their shelters, their civil defense program. They are not unaccustomed to having many people killed. As a matter of fact, they have killed many of their own people.

At the same time, I do not personally think that so long as we maintain a survivable deterrent that the Soviets are willing to take the risk of getting engaged in a major nuclear exchange with the United States. I think their interests are more far-reaching and have to do with gaining influence over the world at large. I think you see a manifestation of this in Africa with what they have done with Mozambique and Angola. They have joined with the Middle East on the oil there. You will see them in other parts of the world. I think they have other courses of actions set out right now.

At the same time, I think they want the world at large to perceive that they are stronger so that they will have greater influence in pursuing these other economic and political objectives.

Chairman STENNIS. I am sure it is agreeable with you for copies of your statement to be made and given to the membership.

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. I wrote it on an airplane so it is not too legible. I would like to smooth it up.

Senator TOWER. You think the question of whether the Soviets conceive of nuclear war as being either thinkable or unthinkable would depend largely on our ability to respond to a first strike?

Admiral MOORER. I think it would depend on their perception as to whether or not we had a capability to inflict what they perceive to be unacceptable damage, no matter what preemptive action they took at the outset. I think that is what they based it on.

Senator TOWER. Thank you very much, Admiral.
Chairman STENNIS. Senator Cannon?

Senator CANNON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, a few days ago in a hearing I stated to Mr. Warnke the following:

One of the problems I have had in these hearings is hearing words used by you on different occasions that mean two different things to me and many others but represent no change of position to you. Now, perhaps that is the test for a good negotiator, to use words that mean the same thing to him but represent a change of position so that they might think you are flexible and are willing to adjust your position. So I congratulate you on that.

Let me ask you, you have obviously seen and heard a lot of Mr. Warnke's earlier statements and then his recent testimony before this committee and before the Foreign Relations Committee. Would you say in your judgment that his earlier statements are consistent or inconsistent with the position that he represented to this committee, and, if so, does that represent a change in position as you view it?

Admiral MOORER. In my view, the way I understand the English language it represents a change in position, Senator Cannon. I am not a lawyer, so I am not very skillful at saying two things with one word. To me it indicates a change.

Senator CANNON. He also said:

I do not today support each and every recommendation I have advanced in the past 8 years. The merit of the proposal is a function of its timing as well as its substance. I believe that the general thrust, in my view, has been constant and consistent.

Then I asked him about his present reference to a number of the weapon systems that I think Senator Jackson had pointed out where he had taken positions somewhat different than the position he has presently taken today to indicate he had not been constant and consistent.

Now, I also asked Mr. Warnke this question: "Would you today in a negotiating context advocate the kind of approach of unilateral restraint that you advocated in 1975?" Mr. Warnke said: "I would not." Now, I take it that you would object to the type of unilateral restraint advocated in 1975 by Mr. Warnke, but would find no fault with his position where where he says he would not advocate unilateral restraint such as he did in 1975.

Admiral MOORER. I would be far more concerned over the abrupt change in position than I would about the substance of his second

statement.

Senator CANNON. As to what brought about that change and whether it was or was not a change for convenience?

Admiral MOORER. Or whether he might change back.

Senator CANNON. If he were to change in one direction rather easily be probably would not have too much difficulty making the change back in the original direction.

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. Once again, if I were a Soviet negotiator I would be encouraged to see if I could achieve a change through persistent effort.

Senator CANNON. Senator Tower asked Mr. Warnke about one of his quotes the other day that gave me some concern. This was the quote:

Rather than creating a climate in which restraint can be practiced the existence of negotiations themselves has been an occasion for acceleration of strategic arms development. I would not like to see the SALT talks stop, but if we must accept the insistence that the momentum of our strategic weapons programs must be maintained in order to bargain effectively, the talks have become too expensive a luxury. Insofar as formal agreements are concerned we may have gone as far as we can now go. We should instead try a policy of restraint while calling for matching restraint from the Soviet Union.

Now, do you see any type of situation occurring in which the SALT talks could become too expensive a luxury? Don't you think those have to be pursued to the ultimate conclusion?

Admiral MOORER. Absolutely. Senator Cannon. I think the first part of Mr. Warnke's statement, to the effect that the SALT talks accelerated arms production, is true with respect to the Soviets but I pointed out in my initial statement that we remained static for years in terms of our force levels.

For that matter I think the record will clearly show that the expenditure in terms of the percentage of the defense budget for strategic systems made by the United States during these 10 years is far less than that made by the Soviets.

So, I pointed out in my initial statement that we did exercise restraint for a long time in terms of force levels while the Soviets went forward with a strategic arms program which we have never equaled in terms of acceleration.

Senator CANNON. In some of his statements in 1975 Mr. Warnke stated and I quote: "I think it is obvious there can be troop reductions so that maybe some of these can be made in advance of reaching any agreement with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact on mutual force reductions."

Now, that statement was made at a time that MBFR talks were in process. Do you think that would lead to a good negotiating position on MBFR for a negotiator to be talking about making troop reductions on our part alone?

Admiral MOORER. No, sir. Again, if I were a Soviet I would say, "Let us stick around a while," and we will not even have to negotiate because we are achieving the fundamental objective of breaking up NATO and they hope to do that by forcing a withdrawal of the United States. If we are going to do that unilaterally we are solving their problem for them. There is no point in their negotiating at all. They just have to wait.