"I was concerned about what was then referred to as the Mansfield Amendment because I thought that that might be something which would set back the stability of the situation in Europe. I thought that both from the political standpoint and from the standpoint of our conventional defense capability that would be a risky thing to do.

Mr. Nitze has alleged that Mr. Warnke is against the B-1 bomber. Mr. Warnke has expressed reservation about the B-1, but these are based on careful reasons, for example, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 28, 1972, Mr. Warnke stated:

Nitze comment: “This is a gross understatement of his past positions."

"I think that the B-1 is not a needed improvement at the present time. I am not sure that it is really an improvement. I think that it has been made clear by the Pentagon that the B-52 properly modernized can serve the purpose of the bomber part of our deterrent well into the 1980s. I think that the B-1 gives you less in the way of payload. I think that the B-52, particularly with SCAD and SRAM, gives you the capability of mounting a very serious threat to Soviet targets in a standoff capacity. All that the B-1 really does is to give you a lowlevel, supersonic capability. That is very expensive and relatively useless in the light of the development of SRAM; therefore, I think that the program is inordinately expensive and it probably gives us less for more money than we would have by modernizing the B-52." (Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 28, 1972.)

On September 11, 1975, he testified:

"The B-1 was devised at a time in which it was felt that you had to penetrate the Soviet radar defense by having a follow-on bomber that could fly at supersonic speeds at low levels under the defense radar and deliver nuclear bombs. "Two things have happened since then. One is the development of the lookdown radar, which makes this kind of low-level dash a less desirable characteristic. The other development has been, of course, the fact that we now have the capability of using longer range missiles on a standoff bomber and, as a consequence, you have more chance of penetration. I think a less expensive aircraft will do a better job. We should be developing as an aircraft something that would really be closer to the ballistic missile submarine. In other words, something that could stay a relatively long distance from the Soviet Union and attack targets in the Soviet Union.

“... I think that capability could be achieved by having a cruise missile which was air-launched. It would not be a ballistic missile and could come in on that kind of line rather than on a ballistic trajector." (Testimony before House Budget Committee's Task Force on National Security Programs, September 11, 1975.)

In recent testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee in his confirmation hearings, in three responses to questions from Senator Hatch, Mr. Warnke stated:

"I have been concerned about the penetrability of the B-1 bomber, as compared with, perhaps, a stand-off bomber with a long range missile. I think, again, this is something that requires study. It is my understanding it is being studied by the Department of Defense at the present time.

"If the B-1 bomber turns out to be the optimum bomber to replace the B-52, then that is the bomber we ought to buy.

"I have already indicated, Senator Hatch, thae I believe I would favor a continuation of the named bomber, and the question is what is the best weapons system for that purpose.”

Mr. Nitze has also alleged that Mr. Warnke has been against the Trident submarine, although not the missile. This is true and for very cogent reasons, as illustrated by Mr. Warnke's statements. For example, Mr. Warnke stated: "I think the Trident is the wrong weapon at the wrong time. It does not give us anything effective in the way of incremental capability. I believe that that program should be eliminated and research should continue until we are at the point at which we can determine the best follow-on submarine.

"For example, in the current budget request the Secretary of Defense has proposed that initial research be done on a smaller submarine which would contain the so-called Narwhal propulsion system.

"Now that submarine might be a more appropriate replacement but we don't have to decide that at the present time.

"We don't know at the present time what the dimensions of the threat might be in anti-submarine warfare. What concerns me is that we may be building

at immense expense a weapon that will be obsolete by the time it is deployed and certainly not the optimum replacement for the Polaris-Poseidon submarine." (Testimony before the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, May 30, 1974.)

Mr. Warnke's view has been consistent as is demonstrated by his testimony during the recent confirmation hearings:

"The Trident submarine stuck me as being quite questionable in being the appropriate follow-on submarine because of its size and unit costs.

"I have been concerned about it because, really, the greatest security that we have with our SLBM's, our submarine launched ballistic missiles, is their relative invulnerability. If anti-submarine warfare developments continue, then a larger submarine but a smaller fleet might render us less secure than if we had more submarines and, hence, more targets for the Soviet Union to have to search out and destroy.

"I have supported consistently the Trident missile, because that's what gives you the increased capability. The Trident missile, of course, initially raises the range from 2,000 miles to 4,000 miles, and I believe that the follow-on has a range at 6,000 miles. That is a distinct increase in the deterrent efficacy of our force, and I support it. But I wonder whether we shouldn't have that missile perhaps on more platforms."

Mr. Nitze has further alleged that Mr. Warnke opposes adequate carrier forces. Mr. Nitze stated:

"I think he has expressed himself as thinking we do not need 12 carrier task forces but we could do well with 9."

In 1973, Mr. Warnke testified on the DOD FY 1974 Budget Request before the Congress, and expressed a preference for a long-range goal of nine carrier task forces. Mr. Warnke stated:

"What we have suggested in this report is that is is not necessary at this point to build more so that we would still be able to maintain a carrier force of 12 in the future. I think 12 is too many. I think a more responsible force would be nine. I would get down to that gradually. I see no reason for throwing away still effective modern ships. But I would aim in the long range to have a carrier force of nine, which would give you one carrier with two backups for the Mediterranean, and two with four backups for the rest of the world. I think that is adequate under the present circumstances." (Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on FY 75 Budget, July 17, 1973.

Mr. Nitze also alleges that Mr. Warnke has been against proceeding with the AWACS program.

In 1973, Mr. Warnke presented a report to Congress which detailed the reasoning for his position on AWACS.

"The 1974 budget calls for $210 million for continued development and production of Airborne Warning and Control Systems designed to provide highly sophisticated and invulnerable control systems for defense against Soviet bomber attack and for tactical air defense. The tactical system is too expensive and vulnerable to airplane attack to be worthwhile; the strategic system is unnecessary, as Soviet strategic strength is in missiles, not bombers." (Ibid.)

Mr. Nitze has alleged that Mr. Warnke has been against accuracy improvements in missiles.

In 1974, Mr. Warnke presented a report to the Congress in which it was explained that enhanced capabilities to destroy Soviet missiles- including higher accuracy-in pursuit of the so-called counterforce policy would be a dangerous mistake because the net effect would be to destabilize the strategic balance and make both side's land-based missile forces more vulnerable.

The report stated:

"The Nixon Administration appears confused over what the new policy istargeting military installations as well as cities, more flexible planning and command or a new requirement for weapons with enhanced capabilities for counterforce, i.e., for attacking enemy nuclear forces. Our plans have always included military targeting, so the announcement of a 'new' targeting strategy is only a public announcement of an existing option. Similarly, insuring that our command and control and our planning are flexible enough to give us choices besides a final world-destroying spasm is scarcely a novel idea and certainly requires no new weapons.

"But neither the new policy nor the admitted uncertainties of Soviet programs and plans justify Administration requests to build weapons with enhanced capabilities to destroy Soviet missiles-a capability President Nixon

and his earlier Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird once denied seeking-by higher accuracies and yields for our ICBMs. These programs include new warheads, new guidance systems and advanced work on a new ICBM. Their approval would be a mistake and a dangerous one.

"New counterforce weapons would introduce a major new and very dangerous element into the strategic equation, for they could be construed to threaten the entire Soviet land-based missile deterrent and thereby provide a strong impetus to the arms race. They are not the right answer to potential Soviet counterforce capability. Instead of reducing the feared vulnerability of U.S. ICBMs to a Soviet counterforce strike, they would increase the attractiveness of our ICBMs as targets." (Hearings before the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee on the FY 1975 DOD Budget, May 30, 1974.)

Further, Mr. Nitze criticizes Mr. Warnke for opposing the MX-1 tank, yet Mr. Nitze himself acknowledges the controversial nature of the MX-1 tank and refuses to take a stand thereon:

"With respect to the MX-1 I know there is a debate about this and there certainly was a debate that I participated in within the Government on the preceding advance modern battle tank which turned out very badly. I don't want to express an opinion on that, but I do think that those who are responsible for this you know, for recommending what we ought to do in the tank-be worthy of respect. They should not be just out of hand condemned as not making

sense.

"I don't want to take a position on the MX-1, but I would think the burden of proof would be on those who would think that the Army is wrong."

Mr. Nitze also alleges that Mr. Warnke has expressed himself as being in total opposition to the F-14, but on the other hand has indicated his support for the acquisition of the F-18 by the Navy. As evidenced by his recent (February 8) testimony:

"I have questioned whether the F-14 again, was an appropriate replacement for the F-4. I suggested that at one point we ought to explore a cheaper alternative. They now have come up with the F-18, which I support."

In 1974, Mr. Warnke stated:

"I think also the planes that the Navy has on the drawing board such as the VFX (the Predecessor to the F-18), are a more appropriate replacement for the F-4 than the F-14 would." (Testimony before the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on the FY 1975 DOD Budget, May 30, 1974.)

It should also be noted that Mr. Warnke supported the F-15:

"I think the F-15 is a cost effective weapon.” (Ibid.)

Mr. Nitze has also alleged that Mr. Warnke has expressed himself as being against the Marine Corps in its entirety.

To the contrary, Mr. Warnke wrote:

"On the conventional side, the emphasis should be on maintenance of something close to . 17 combat-ready divisions (14 Army and 3 Marine) and total manpower of about 2.5 million." ("Security or Confrontation: The Case for a Defense Policy," Foreign Policy, Winter 1970-1971, Paul C. Warnke and Leslie H. Gelb.)

"Turning to the Marine Corps as a whole, it has had political support perhaps matched only by the FBI in Mr. Hoover's heyday. But there is today some question as to the separability of its missions from those of the Army. The island-hopping campaign of World War II won't happen again in the nuclear age. And the capability to project American military power into the Third World is not one that the American public particular prizes or that the Congress is apt to authorize. But cutback or merger for the Marine Corps could only follow enlightening analysis of the pros and cons. And only the brave and the competent-not those attuned primarily to politics-would dare argue the issue." (The Defense Debate That Won't Happen," The Washington Star, November 16, 1975.)

Again, as in all of the specific instances cited by Mr. Nitze. Mr. Warnke has not been challenging the size of the defense budget but the content. Nitze comment: "This is a formulation difficult to swallow."

In his words:

"The real issue now, as it always has been, is not whether we are spending too much or too little but rather whether the large chunk of Federal funds devoted to defense is spent on the right things. It is, after all, of no real relevance to our national security whether the defense budget is going up or going down or whether we are spending more or less money than the Soviet Union. The

criterion for meeting defense needs is whether we are maintaining the military forces necessary to protect against feasible external military threats."

"What has not been addressed and what should be addressed is the fundamental question whether our present and planned military capability is best adapted to perform the missions truly vital to national security in the waning years of the 20th century. The debate about the underlying issues, if it occurs at all, will be the poorer for the loss of Dr. Schlesinger's active participation." Nitze comment: “Everything from page 17 to page 26 appears to support the case that Mr. Warnke has been against those programs that it has been asserted he was against."

V. CONCLUSION

Paul C. Warnke has been nominated for the position of Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. As director of the Agency it would be his statutory duty to advise the Secretary of State, the National Security Council and the President on arms control and disarmament matters. As chairman of the SALT delegation, assisted by representatives of the other national security agencies, Mr. Warnke would be implementing the President's instructions developed in the interagency process in Washington.

The record shows that Mr. Warnke has been a forceful, consistent and constructive participant in the arms control debate. The record further shows that Mr. Warnke is a realist and harbors no illusion about the real threat to our national security.:

"I don't think that the intentions of the Soviets have been anywhere near the beneficent or disinterested in the genuine sense, as ours. I think that we genuinely wished the world well. I don't believe that the record of the Soviet Union is any such record."

The fears voiced by one critic that Mr. Warnke might negotiate an arms control agreement not acceptable to the Senate are without basis in fact. Both the President and his nominee, Paul Warnke, have pledged themselves to full and close consultations with the Congress.

To date President Carter has made evident his sincere intent to consult the Congress. An example is his recent breakfast meeting with Senator Jackson, after which the Senator was quoted in The Washington Post on February 10 as having said, "I am very pleased with the President's position [on SALT] so far." Arms control is neither an easy nor a noncontroversial task. It requires informed and responsible debate in an open forum to permit critical analysis and exploration of divergent views. Unsupported assertions, such as that by Mr. Nitze charging President Carter's position on SALT II as not being in the national interest, are not helpful in furthering such debate.

Nitze comment: "When did the doctrine arise that the President's views as to what is in the national interest must be above public debate? Certainly they must be taken with great respect and those challenging them should be prepared to bear the burden of cogently supporting their side of the argument. If they are 80 prepared, I think they should do so.

Above all, as stated by Mr. Warnke in his confirmation hearing, arms control cannot succeed unless the measures proposed are soundly conceived and fully supported by the American people through their elected representatives. (End of memorandum and comments.)

Chairman STENNIS. All right, Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Nitze, I am glad to have you with us. Mr. Nitze, during the testimony last week I discussed with Mr. Warnke his opposition to research and development in many weapon systems. We went over the strategic cruise missile, the B-1, Trident, airborne early warning and control system, mobile ICBM, and so forth. While on some systems Mr. Warnke claimed he had favored alternate programs and he had favored some basic research, the testimony ended like this:

"Senator THURMOND. We had done the basic research on these weapons. We were ready to go forward, but you opposed the research and development. “Mr. WARNKE. That is correct."

Now, Mr. Nitze, Senator Jackson went over a list of 13 weapon systems that Mr. Warnke had opposed for procurement. On top of that, his answers to me affirmed that he even opposed research and development in many of these systems.

In your judgment, how would this attitude of Mr. Warnke's against even development of many essential weapon programs impact on his position as a SALT negotiator?

Mr. NITZE. I am not sure that there is a direct connection, Mr. Senator. I think it is much more relevant to his position as director of ACDA.

I believe that it is important that a person try to look into the future, try to estimate as best he can what the requirements for the United States for security are going to be 5, 8, 10, or 15 years from now, I think it does make a difference as to whether his record in the past gives one confidence as to his viewpoints, his usefulness in the future.

I think that these recommendations against R. & D. on programs that I think today he would agree are important and useful programs, his record of having been against it 5, 6 years ago, so forth and so on, would raise doubt in my mind that his abilities as head of ACDA would be questionable.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Nitze, I understand that Senator McIntyre has read a lengthy paper referring to my opposition and that of other Senators on the committee to your nomination in 1960 as Secretary of the Navy. It just so happens last Thursday I placed in the Record some editorial comment on the Warnke nomination, and one of the article ended, and I quote:

A reporter who is expert in the national security field summed it up by describing Mr. Nitze as "a Paul Warnke who got religion through negotiating with the Russians."

Now, Mr. Nitze, how long were you involved in negotiating with the Soviets?

Mr. NITZE. Five years, Senator.

Senator THURMOND. What did you learn about the Soviets?

Mr. NITZE. Well, in my prepared statement I drew a distinction between what I believe to be the point of view from which we have been negotiating for strategic arms control and the way in which I believe the Soviets, the purposes that the Soviets have had in mind, and I might, if you would permit, repeat that.

It is not my belief that the Soviet Union would wish to initiate a nuclear war even from a position of strategic superiority. They are prudent and realistic people and expect others to be so, too. They are quite clear that it would be desirable for them to have nuclear preponderance. They believe that we can then be expected realistically to adapt our policies to that change in the most fundamental element of what they call "the correlation of forces."

To phrase this in a different way, the United States in my view properly, is intent on strategic arms control arrangements designed to neutralize strategic arms as a factor overhanging international politics, while I believe the Soviet Union to be intent on strategic arms arrangements, calculated to afford the Soviet a strategic predominance