A staggering number of new recruits moreover, do not serve their full enlistments. For fiscal year 1976, it is estimated that at least a third of all Army and Marine Corps entrants and a quarter of all Navy and Air Force entrants will be lost before completion of their initial enlistments. In the Army, where detailed data is available, over half of these losses occur more than six months after service entry. Indeed, it is possible that there is a greater personnel turnover in the lower enlisted ranks in the present all-volunteer Army-despite minimal enlistments of three and four years-than there was in the pre-Vietnam Army which was heavily dependent on two-year draftees. Also, desertion rates in the present peacetime Army, Navy, and Marine Corps are substantially higher than in the pre-Vietnam period.

All data consistently and dramatically show that service personnel with high school diplomas-compared to non-high school graduates are much more likely to complete their enlistments, have fewer disciplinary problems, have better promotion rates, and be more effective in job performance. In point of fact, high school graduation is a better predictor of soldierly success than mental group level. This is true regardless of racial background.

To assert that the all-volunteer military is in a state of crisis would be a gross exaggeration. But the evidence clearly indicates that currently both the Army and Marines are failing to attract qualified youth. The probability of increased difficulties cannot be ruled out of the Air Force and Navy in the future. Indeed, the Army and Marine Corps, despite their recruitment of large numbers of non-high school graduates, are below their authorized strengths at the beginning of 1977.

To have recruitment determined by marketplace forces results in a disproportionate concentration of youth from lower socio-economic levels and minority groups in the combat arms menial positions and a corresponding underrepresentation of these groups in the skilled and technical positions. While the enlisted ranks of the Army in the peacetime period between the wars in Korea and Vietnam had an educational level higher than that of the corresponding male civilian population, current trends in the all-volunteer Army will reverse this standing. Such a development will further reduce the Army's appeal to a representative cross-section of American youth. Most important, there is evidence that the most effective military is one that draws widely from all strata of society.

The present state of affairs in the all-volunteer military is in large part the result of the rationale for such a force set forth by the 1970 Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force ("Gates Commission Report”). The Gates Commission explicitly placed the primary reliance to recruit an enlisted force on monetary inducements determined by the prevailing marketplace economy, and thus emphasized the "occupational" aspects of military duty. Such an approach detracts from the ideal that military duty ought to carry with it values of national service and broadly based participation. Reliance on the doubtful assumptions of the Gates Commission, coupled with highly sophisticated statistical techniques, obscures the salience of organizational experience, sociological insight, and especially common sense. The inadequacies of econometric analysis have now been made plain by the recruitment and retention problems in the all-volunteer force. Indeed, we seem to have come full circle with the current talk of reinstituting the draft.

Paralleling the renewed concern with the viability of the all-volunteer force, there have been various proposals in the Congress to implement "youth service" or "youth corps" programs. Such programs are aimed at alleviating the plight of chronically unemployed youth rather than at instituting a form of true national service. These proposals have merits but they do not address the issue we seek to raise here the infusion of middle-class youth on a short-term basis into the ground combat arms. Like many other hastily proposed employment programs directed toward lower-class and minority youth they run the danger of becoming a segregated and self-defeating enterprise.

It is our position that a viable military must in some manner be representative of the broader citizenry it represents, and that military service ought to be consistent with more general societal values of citizen participation and obligation. One alternative is to have a full scale mandatory national service plan for all youth. Such a compulsory scheme would likely be construed as "involuntary servitude" within the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment and thereby be ruled unconstitutional. Even the goal of reinstituting conscription is probably unfeasible because of the absence of popular support. A return to the draft might well result in troop morale and discipline problems exceeding what the military

system could accommodate to. In fact, mass conscription does not meet the manpower needs to a military force "in being" designed for global deterrence.

The central question remains: Is there a way in which miiltary service can attract a large and representative cross-section of American youth without direct compulsion. We believe there is. The time is ready to consider a voluntary national service program-in which military service is one of several optionswhich would be a prerequisite for future federal employment.

For purposes of discussion, we proposed a two-year national service program aimed at youth-male and female. Such service would be expected to take place after high school, or during or after college. National service would be compensated for at levels comparable to that formerly given draftees. A major portion of compensation could be in the form of post service educational benefits. National service would be directed toward tasks which intrinsically cannot be filled through solely monetary incentives; for example, the caring of the aged, infirm, and mentally feeble, conservation work, and the combat arms of the armed forces. In turn, only those who had completed national service would be eligible for later government employment at the federal level.

A 1976 Gallup poll reports that almost half of all young men aged 18 to 24 support the idea of national service and four out of five of these would choose military rather than civilian service. (The same poll reports that two out of three of all Americans support some form of universal national service.) Because of the immediate requirement of the military services, priority is given to volunteer national service for men; but clearly the goal is for all young people. In terms of military manpower needs, this would mean assignment to the ground combat arms and manual tasks in other services; it could also be oriented toward overseas assignment. Such a manpower program would also have the merit of channeling middle-class youth into relatively short assignments in non-technical military tasks where such enlistments are most practical. Almost surely, despite shorter tours than current enlistments, the effective length of military service would not be markedly different from present because increasingly the proportion of high school graduates would reduce the existing high attrition rates among first-term service personnel. At the same time, persons seeking technical training in the military would be required to serve for longer periods or enter under conditions similar to current recruitment procedures. It would be expected that equal opportunity practices within the military would result in increasing the representation of minority persons in such long-term and technical military positions.

Certainly such a national service plan would cause a fundamental readjustment of hiring priorities in the governmental sector. A modest precedent of sorts has been the preferential hiring accorded veterans in the federal civil service examination. Veterans taking the "zero-to-one-hundred" examination were given a five point (ten points if disabled) advantage. (Yet even this most minute benefit will no longer be available to those who will have entered the military after October 15, 1975.) We look forward to discussion of the manner in which the implementation and details of such a program could be worked out. But the central point of our proposal is irreducible-some linkage between voluntary national service and future government employment.

A voluntary national service program linked to future federal employment eligibility has many positive implications. It would meet pressing national needs in both the civilian and military spheres. It would assist the personal development, citizenship, education and entrance into the labor of large numbers of American youth. It would be morally defensible by connecting future employment by the taxpayer to prior commitment to national service. It would make public service an essential part of growing up in America. Most important, it would clarify the military's role by emphasizing the larger calling of national service.

STATEMENT OF MORRIS JANOWITZ, PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Mr. JANOWITZ. I hope my remarks will help to stimulate some controversy.

The best way to start is by saying that I represent the noneconomic point of view, the institutional point of view, or as we say at the Uni

versity of Chicago, those things which Milton Friedman doesn't deal with. [General laughter.]

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this distinguished group. I was invited here 20 years ago, and undoubtedly, my testimony 20 years ago accounts for why it took 20 years for me to get another opportunity. [General laughter.]

Senator NUNN. I have to confess, I did not know about that previous testimony. [General laughter.]

Mr. JANOWITZ. I therefore emphasize the nature of the continuity of my testimony. At that time, Senator Stennis asked a group, of which I was a member, to prepare research on retirement pay. It was in 1961-62 we completed the first retirement study, and we indicated what the cost would be and how it would escalate. We recognized the inability and the injustice of any retroactive action with respect to retirement pay and because this group and Congress did not take action in 1962, we have such escalated, high cost retirement pay.

So among the reasons why we have not succeeded in an effective All-Volunteer Force is the failure to follow my recommendations in 1960-61. [General laughter.]

I therefore urge you-although I am a defeated politician, that you pay some attention to what I have to say.

Senator NUNN. I assure you we will be listening carefully.

Mr. JANOWITZ. I would like to address the question of my point of view, so as to distinguish my point of view from what few facts may be interrelated.

I am committed, of course, to the idea of voluntary national service. And I don't even like the word, national, because of the hostility against the national symbols throughout the country. I call it voluntary community and national service.

Let there be no misunderstanding. In my family, there is no difficulty in defining and explicating what we mean by national service, or community service. My youngest daughter spent a year in a mental hospital, working and cleaning the place up. That is what we mean by national service.

My older daughter is serving as a VISTA-type lawyer representing, among others, disabled veterans of the past wars who are deprived of their insurance benefits under the existing ambiguities of law and judicial review.

Now, that is my point of view. I think it is good for the country and it would be good for the All-Volunteer Force if we had more of such national service opportunities. I don't need any more elaborate definition than the behavior of my children who keep me from being an abstract sociologist.

I now come to the question of how I stood on the question of the All-Volunteer Force, as to whether it is a good or bad thing. I wish to commend the King report. It is a fine report and we must have some professional jealousy-for a professor of business administration who practices business inside a university it is a splendid report. The important weakness lies in his analysis of the end of the draft. The end of conscription was not a political act in the heat of the postVietnam era. However, if you look more deeply at the references Professor King made to Feld, my colleague, and others, we have, since 1945, been emphasizing the fundamental transformation of the mili

tary establishments of the Western political democracies-to use our language, the decline of the mass armed forces.

When, in 1955, I said that conscription was to come to an end, people thought I was crazy. But it has come to an end, not because of any particular political action, but for fundamental transformations of Western political democracies, their goals, their values, and their attitudes.

I have summarized the movement from 1945 on, as to why we are moving away from the mass armed force based upon conscription. In the first place, its military technology and international relations: The development of thermonuclear weapons has changed the nature of warfare. We have used, this morning, many times, the distinction between wartime and peacetime. The President of the United States does not use that distinction. We are in a period of deterrence.

Our forces are "in being." The distinction between war and peace is no longer one that is relevant in the simple sense and it has profound implications to the nature of our military institutions.

Second, draft armies are no longer possible to enforce colonial hegemony of the white Westerners over the rest of the world. We learned that the bitter way, so we no longer need conscription for overseas deployment, for purposes of the continuation of Western hegemony.

Western hegemony in the world depends upon values, intellectual values, political values, and economic values.

And finally, the internal changes in our society. Economic priorities, the changing character of the style of life means that conscription has come to an end as the basis for asserting citizenship. Whether one likes it or not, that is a fact and it has been underway in the United States and in Great Britain and in other Western European countries.

Senator NUNN. Let me ask you a question. What other Western European countries? My impression is, of the 14 members of NATO, the only two that have a volunteer force are Great Britain and the United States.

Mr. JANOWITZ. In France, the debate is going on now. The French are debating putting an end to conscription.

Senator NUNN. I have indications that the French and the Germans are looking at our example and are, therefore, going to go against the volunteer force because they see the great problems that we are having. I would disagree with you on the trends being in that direction. Mr. JANOWITZ. Well, I would like to agree with you. Life would be much easier for me and for my children if we had conscription, because in the absence of conscription, we have many problems.

But as I look at the figures more carefully, the length of service under conscription in all Western European countries has steadily and gradually declined. I see no reversal.

Senator NUNN. That is true. I agree with you.

Mr. JANOWITZ. I see that in countries such as Denmark, they are moving toward phasing out of conscription-it is a small country. It is moving toward phasing out. The small countries would be the first to phase it out.

Holland, I would suspect, within 5 years will phase it out. Only the Germans are going to continue. The French situation is very much tied up with internal security.

Senator NUNN. Do you suppose we could get the Soviets to go to a volunteer force? That would solve SALT II and MBFR and everything, wouldn't it?

Mr. JANOWITZ. Yes, and I do hope they are listening to what we are saying. I am certain that they will not pay much attention to it. I think clearly negative images are very important, but the fact is that the United States and Great Britain have gone-the tendency is to reduce the length of conscription in the Western powers.

And I believe that even in the case of Germany, another form will emerge which will be a militia system because of the presence of the Soviet forces and the deep division between East and West Germany. They will have a very limited conscription system which would be an alternative for the existing system.

Furthermore, in the case of Germany, 10 percent of the young people do not serve because of moral grounds, which would be very difficult to have on the American scene. In other words, another way each country solves its own problems.

It is important to anticipate another aspect and that is, the Germans have a 412 percent growth rate in their economy and we don't have it. They can do many things which we can not do and I hope your committee will look into the facts as to why they have a higher growth rate than ours. I am not an economist so I leave that to you, but we can not solve our military problems either by conscription or the voluntary national service without some marked increase in the growth of our economy.

Senator NUNN. What is it you are saying about the present system? Let me make sure I understand.

Mr. JANOWITZ. The system, I am saying, is that the end of conscription in the United States was not linked specifically to Vietnam, but to the transformation of the position of the United States as a world power, which leads us away from a mobilization concept to a force in being.

We must have a large, expanded force in being and it turns out to be-whether I like it or not-it becomes an All-Volunteer Force.

Now, it can be augmented and made more efficient and more compatible with our society by having a domestic civilian national service, as well as a military service. Only history will prove me right or wrong, and statesmen cannot rely upon experts; they have to make judgments. I see no likelihood of our going back in the next 5 to 10 years to conscription, for political reasons, as well as for technical and military

reasons.

The only conditions under which I believe we would go back to conscription would be a Soviet-Sino rapprochement. If the Soviets and the Chinese got together, then the manpower requirements would surely increase.

In the next 5 to 10 years, we will have to rely, and need to rely upon an all-volunteer force because that is a force-in-being, where conscription is a force for mobilization.

Another way of putting this is that if we had conscription, we would only be making use of about 400,000 or 500,000 young men and women out of a total age core of 4 million. I leave it to you, as elected political leaders, to figure out which of the 400,000 would serve and which would not. Over the long run, a lottery system would not be