THE ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMED FORCE WEDNESDAY, MARCH 2, 1977 U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL OF THE Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 10:04 a.m. pursuant to recess, in room 5110, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding. Present: Senators Nunn, Byrd of Virginia, Anderson, Thurmond, Goldwater, Scott, Bartlett, Helms, and Garn. Also present: Senator Chafee. Committee staff present: Francis J. Sullivan, staff director; John T. Ticer, chief clerk; Phyllis A. Bacon, assistant chief clerk; Charles J. Conneely, Kenneth W. Fish, George F. Travers, professional staff members; Roberta Ujakovich, research assistant; and Judy Landesman, clerical assistant. Christopher Lehman, assistant to Senator Byrd; Jeffrey Record, assistant to Senator Nunn; Charles Stevenson, assistant to Senator Culver; Duane Scribner, assistant to Senator Anderson; Ron Lehman, assistant to Senator Bartlett; and Richard Bryan, assistant to Senator Helms. OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN Senator NUNN. The subcommittee will come to order. The purpose of today's hearing is to focus on the current status of the All-Volunteer Armed Force and possible alternatives. On Friday of this week, we will continue our review of the defense authorization request for fiscal year 1978 manpower, including active duty military, civilian, and Selected Reserve strengths. Because of the interest in the All-Volunteer Force, I have invited members of the full committee and the Budget Committee to attend today's hearing. Up until 1948, the Nation had relied on a voluntary Armed Force during peacetime to maintain a relatively small Defense Establishment. After President Truman reported that Active Forces could not reach desired end strength, Congress passed the Selective Service Act of 1948, which authorized peacetime military conscription. This act was extended continuously for 4-year periods through 1971. The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, the so-called Gates Commission, made its report in February 1970 and in 1971, Congress acted on an administration request to extend the draft for a final 2 years. It is important to remember the national climate, in the midst of the Vietnam war, when this decision was made. A large number of issues were discussed during congressional considerations of the last extension of the draft. Some 54 amendments were proposed to the bill on the Senate floor, many dealing directly with the Vietnam war. Indeed, the conference report indicates that the majority of the meetings in conference were devoted solely to the so-called Mansfield amendment which provided for the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Vietnam within 9 months. The Defense Department announced in 1973 that the Armed Forces would henceforth rely on volunteers 6 months before the final conscription authority ended in July 1973. My purpose in repeating this history here is to emphasize that an analysis of the All-Volunteer Force was not the sole consuming issue at the time. Indeed, the unpopularity of the Vietnam war and resulting opposition on campus and off were perhaps major factors considered in ending the draft. Currently, problems are apparent. In the last quarter of 1976, the Army was 6 percent under its recruiting objectives and the Marine Corps was 15 percent under. The Reserve Forces face even greater problems. The Selected Reserve is 52,000 below its authorized floor and the Individual Ready Reserve is in even greater difficulty with a shortfall of 180,000 that is growing. Army witnesses have testified that they are developing an incentive package for the Reserves that may cost three-quarters of a billion dollars or more per year. We will have to wait until that is submitted before we know the details. The situation for the future, at least in the view of the Senator from Georgia, looks even less bright. The projected decline in unemployment will create further problems for military recruiters. At the same time, the number of people in military age groups will decline substantially each year for the next 15 years. Increases in military pay as large as these over the past decade are probably unlikely. These current and potential problems constitute a potentially serious problem for our defense posture. Further, in the face of unparalleled quantitative and qualitative expansion of Soviet forces, the United States can no longer continue down the road of steady contractions in its force levels and decreasing proportions of the defense budget allocated to weapons systems in order to meet the ever-rising cost of military manpower. Because of these concerns, I hired Dr. William R. King of the University of Pittsburgh, to work on my Budget Committee staff last year and to begin a comprehensive study on the All-Volunteer Force and alternatives. Dr. King has returned to full-time teaching and is here today to present the findings of his report. While I may not agree with every single thing presented in the report, I do feel it is a very significant contribution to the consideration of alternatives to the All-Volunteer Force. We also have with us today a distinguished group of experts who will discuss Dr. King's findings and the issues involved in an analysis of the All-Volunteer Force. Martin Binkin is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution who is an expert on defense manpower matters. Mr. Binkin did an evalua tion of the All-Volunteer Force for the Armed Services Committee in 1973 and keeps an active interest in this and other manpower problems. Richard Cooper is director of defense manpower studies at the Rand Corp. and is now completing a book analyzing the All-Volunteer Force. Prof. Morris Janowitz of the University of Chicago is a noted military sociologist who has written a great deal about the All-Volunteer Force and was one of the first scholars to forecast serious problems. I welcome all of you gentlemen here today. I hope this hearing will serve as the basis for provoking serious thought and comment from others. I might say that although I haven't talked to the panelists individually, except for Dr. King, in recent months, I do know that they have different views of the All-Volunteer Force. Our purpose here this morning is not in any way to come out with a consensus. Our purpose is to promote meaningful discussion by people who are experts in these issues. I believe that it will be helpful for the Nation to have a debate on the Volunteer Force. We are not asking the panelists to agree. We hope that where they disagree, they will be candid and frank and, although all of them are professionals and sometimes are reluctant to criticize other opinions, we encourage you to do that. We think it will be helpful for this hearing, and for the Congress, and for our deliberations. We need to explore fully those changes in policies and manpower management in recruiting, training, attribution, and manpower utilization which suggest better ways to deal with a Volunteer Force. Some suggest the draft, as previously constituted, is the only alternative to the All-Volunteer Force. I disagree with that assessment and I expect today's presentation of alternatives to indicate that other choices exist. We need to explore methods for assuring adequate strengths for our Reserve Forces, given our reliance on the Reserves in the so-called total force policy. We need to explore whether or not the current operation, with no registration of any kind, of the Selective Service System is sufficient for our emergency needs. Army Chief of Staff Rogers recently testified that, in an emergency, trained people who had been drafted could not be provided until 7 months after the start of hostilities under current plans. We need to explore national service alternatives which promise help in solving many national needs while at the same time helping with the tragically high unemployment rates of our young people. On the other hand, any proposal with estimated costs of many billions of dollars must be approached with a great deal of caution. In summary, I believe that we cannot consider the Volunteer Force, the future of the Volunteer Force, the possible options and alternatives to the Volunteer Force strictly from a military point of view. I think there are many other factors that have to come into play. I do not presume to think that this subcommittee, or even the Armed Services Committee alone can grapple with this problem. I believe that other committees involved in unemployment, involved in job training, involved in many of the problems of our young people today, also have a vital stake in this issue. We are meeting today to hear from experts in the beginning of what we hope will be a meaningful national debate, not only by this committee of Congress, but by many other committees with appropriate jurisdiction over other facets of the problem. I expect we will be spending considerable time on all these issues. I suggest, Dr. King, you begin with your presentation and then we will follow with any presentations the other panelists would like to make, whether that is a statement of their own, or whether they would like to comment on your remarks. I would first like to ask if Senator Scott, our ranking minority member who, I have already been informed has a conflict later in the day, would like to make any type of statement. Also, Senator Helms, if you have any statement, we would welcome it. Senator SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have a conflict. The Committee on the Judiciary meets at 10:30. We have to act on the President's nominee to be Solicitor General and five Assistant Attorneys General. One of them is a professor of law at the University of Virginia and I have to present him to the committee. Let me commend the chairman for preparing these series of hearings. Dr. King, I have read your report in its entirety. I have obtained a research paper from the Library of Congress that is three times as long as your paper on the same subject matter, and I think it is highly important when we consider that 58 to 60 percent of the defense budget goes for personnel-related costs. It is a matter that we should examine in detail. I am going to ask to be excused now, so that I can go to the Judiciary Committee but will come back and, having read your paper, I am sure that what you have in your abbreviated statement contains much of the material that is in your more complete statement and I do want to pose some questions to you after I am able to return. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator NUNN. Thank you, Senator Scott. I might add that Dr. King has a rather comprehensive text that we had hoped would be ready this morning but it has not come from the printers. I understand it was due here at 9 o'clock, but now it will be ready about 1 o'clock, which is about the time we will finish the hearing. The complete text of about 150 pages will be available for distribution to the public and to the media some time today. Senator Helms? Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, my only comment is that I commend you for calling these hearings. Anyone who has examined the situation with respect to manpower and our defense capability is bound to recognize that if something is not done, we are going to experience an awesome deterioration, not to mention the tremendous and ever increasing cost. So I commend you for calling these hearings and I shall listen with interest to the alternatives to the restoration of the draft. Thank you, Senator. |