Mr. CASEY. It was stated here in connection with testing 60 miles below the torpedo station at Alexandria, that testing of the Alexandria products was of small consequence because torpedoes are so small that a great many of them can be transported by vessel to more suitable testing areas, and that therefore local testing facilities are not a determining factor. What have you to say about that? Mr. KINGSLEY. I would say that it should be a determining factor not only in the interest of economy, but also in perfecting the production. It bas been said by some that in Admiral Hart's recommendations for a plant at Coddington Point just north of the present station where a torpedo could be tested from the dock would have its advantages. Mr. CASEY. Why is that? Mr. KINGSLEY. Because of the tremendous amount of time that would be saved and under ordinary circumstances civilian mechanics. should assist and at least visualize these tests. Another point is that at Newport we have an outside range. Mr. CASEY. Let me get you clear there. You mean it would be an advantage to have skilled men who work upon these torpedoes watch the tests? Mr. KINGSLEY. I understand that that was the practice at Newport in years gone by. Of course gradually that is being encroached upon by the policy of the Navy Department. Mr. CASEY. What do you mean "encroached upon"? Mr. KINGSLEY. Well, they are attempting to use ordnance men and machinists' helpers and in many instances sailors in the service to do what should be civilian work. That has been done to some degree in Newport and to a much larger degree, I understand, in other navy yards especially Bremerton. Mr. CASEY. You mention that there was an attempt made sometime ago at Alexandria with the expenditure of some 50 or 60 million. dollars, that is a rough estimate? Mr. KINGSLEY. That is just a rough estimate. I don't know. Mr. CASEY. And they failed to produce an efficient torpedo in Alexandria-why did they fail to produce that, do you know? Mr. KINGSLEY. I could not say any more than I have previously stated. Mr. CASEY. I thought you had something in connection with the proving ground. Mr. KINGSLEY. I know from hearsay, of course, but it comes from reliable parties that they went along down there for a long period of time, and their master mechanic down there was the same master mechanic that we have now, and finally some admiral connected with the Navy Department demanded better results or he would close the plant. Mr. UMSTEAD. That was during the war; was it not? Mr. KINGSLEY. After the war. After that happened they never produced a bad torpedo according to the records, but I doubt if they ever produced one that could run without being sent to Newport first to be overhauled. Mr. CASEY. When was that? Mr. HUSMER. 1922, I think. Mr. KINGSLEY. In 1922 I think, because at that time they manufactured many parts that later were sent to Newport and the same master mechanic in charge down there was transferred to Newport to inspect the work he had manufactured and thousands of dollars worth of that product was junked. It seems peculiar to us inasmuch as there has been a demand for 3 or 4 years for torpedoes that all this time has elapsed without making any substantial improvements at Newport. You can see that if they equip Alexandria with modern machinery and continue to allow the Newport plant to run down and not make any substantial appropriation for new machinery and floor space, we will be handicapped. Mr. CASEY. One point you have not cleared up is whether or not a modernization of the Newport plant would give it an increased daily capacity, which I understand is the end. Mr. KINGSLEY. Yes, yes. We have been almost at the peak several times and we would have been under proper management. Mr. CASEY. How near did you come to that peak? Mr. KINGSLEY. I think we have been at about 20 percent below and I will say this that under the proper management we should have been at the peak even with the antiquated machinery we have had to work with and the conditions under which we have had to work. Mr. UMSTEAD. Are there any further questions, gentlemen? Do you have any further statement to make, sir? Mr. KINGSLEY. I should like to present a brief if the committee thinks this testimony is not sufficient. Congressman Forand, of course, has studied the matter thoroughly. Mr. UMSTEAD. Yes, you can put a statement in the record. Aircraft and air stations, maintenance and operation of 467, 473 497 Air stations, major repairs, etc., to public works and public Aviation, Navy, estimates, 1939, and appropriations, 1939. 460 Navigational instruments and supplies.. Navigational, photographic, aerological, and radio equipment.. Obsolete parts, inventory value of.... Personnel: Aviation personnel, status of ... Officers and enlisted, shortage of Philadelphia airplane factory Photographic equipment and supplies. Radio equipment and supplies.. Radio, installation in planes. 441 461 497 455 457 495 442 442 466 839 Carter, Lt. Comdr. W. J., statement of.... Classification Board, Departmental, membership of Cobey, Capt. E. A., statement of... Conard, Rear Admiral C., statement of. Deferred items on account of. Boatbuilding at navy yards and elsewhere.. Employees engaged in boatbuilding, number of.... 813 Increases requested for 1939 419 |