Estimates are for 1,093 regular commissioned officers, plus 114 commissioned officers who are extra numbers in grade, 144 commissioned warrant and warrant officers, and an average enlisted strength of 17,500.

The 114 commissioned officers who are extra numbers in grade, consisting of 1 colonel, 95 captains, and 18 first lieutenants, are, with the exception of the 1 colonel, those who failed of selection by selection boards and must be kept on active duty by law until they can be retired under the provisions of the act of July 22, 1935. The majority of these officers, due to excessive age for their grade, are not fitted for duty with combat organizations.

AUTHORIZED ENLISTED AND OFFICER STRENGTH

Mr. UMSTEAD. General, what is your authorized enlisted strength! General HOLCOMB. Authorized under the law, 27,400. Appropriated for, for the year 1938, 17,000.

Mr. UMSTEAD. What is your authorized officer strength, exclusive of commissioned warrant and warrant officers?

General HOLCOMB. One thousand and ninety-three.

Mr. UMSTEAD. That number does not include officers who may be carried as additional numbers, does it?

General HOLCOMB. It does not, sir.

Mr. UMSTEAD. Including additional numbers, these estimates contemplate, I believe, an average commissioned officer strength in 1939 of 1,207, as indicated by your figures on page 2 of the justification. General HOLCOMB. One hundred and fourteen plus 1,093 is 1,207: yes, sir.

Mr. UMSTEAD. Is it your theory that officers who are not selected for promotion and who become in an extra number status should be dis regarded in the determination of your active officer needs?

General HOLCOMB. They, of course, do effective and useful work, Mr. Umstead. The objection to them is that they are in general too old in their grades and are therefore unfitted for field service. Of course, they do serve a useful purpose.

Mr. UMSTEAD. Many of the additional numbers are not too old for effective service, are they?

General HOLCOMB. Most of them are, sir. I have their ages.

Mr. UMSTEAD. What is the average age of the additional number group?

General HOLCOMB. For example, 27 captains are over 50; 24 are over 45; 29 are over 40; 1 is over 36. The ideal age for captains, the best age, is between 29 and 36. Those men are too old to command companies in the field.

Mr. UMSTEAD. You take the position that a man between 40 and 50 years old, generally speaking, is too old to command a company in the field?

General HOLCOMB. I do, sir.

Mr. UMSTEAD. Has any study been made as to both the maximum and average number of officers you will have in the future classified as additional numbers?

General HOLCOMB. I have not such a study, but it has been studied to the extent that we believe the number of additional officers under the present law might be eventually stabilized at about 40.

Mr. UMSTEAD. What is the attrition estimate as to officers during I the fiscal year 1939, if you have it?

General HOLCOMB. I have that, sir. We have estimated attrition from all causes in 1939 of 112 officers. This is an estimate.

Mr. UMSTEAD. What part of that number is responsive to officers becoming additional numbers?

General HOLCOMB. Thirty-four.

Mr. UMSTEAD. What class of duty is or will be assigned to officers I carried as additional numbers, who are unsuited for duty with combat organizations?

General HOLCOMB. Principally on guard duty at navy yards and naval shore establishments in the United States.

DESIRABILITY OF INCREASING STRENGTH OF MARINE CORPS

Mr. SCRUGHAM. General, with the international situation as it is today, is it not desirable to increase the strength of the Marine Corps, both in enlisted men and officer personnel?

General HOLCOMB. Well, the international situation is not a direct responsibility of mine, Governor, but I certainly think it is necessary. Mr. SCRUGHAM. In the justifications, as I read them, you are allowed 1,000 additional men.

General HOLCOMB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SCRUGHAM. Would it not be very desirable to have 2,000 or 3,000, in your opinion? That is all we are asking, your opinion. General HOLCOMB. As you know, sir, I am not permitted to attack the Budget.

Mr. SCRUGHAM. This is not an attack upon the Budget. We are asking you to answer a question of the committee.

General HOLCOMB. My answer is that it would be highly desirable to have a larger increase than we have gotten.

Mr. SCRUGHAM. That is all.

ADDITIONAL MARINE SEA DETACHMENTS

Mr. UMSTEAD. Proceed with your statement, General.

General HOLCOMB. No increases are contemplated for any stations outside the continental limits of the United States, unless disturbed conditions in the Far East so require.

Requirements under this heading are given first priority in order to provide proper allowances for vessels of the fleets. During the fiscal year 1939 the commissioning of the U. S. S. Wichita, U. S. S. Nashville, U. S. S. Phoenix, U. S. S. St. Louis, U. S. S. Helena, and personnel for the U. S. S. Honolulu, U. S. S. Savannah, U. S. S. Boise, U. S. S. Philadelphia, and the U. S. S. Brooklyn will require ten additional marine detachments at sea. The total increase of personnel at sea will be 15 officers and 343 enlisted.

Mr. UMSTEAD. You do not put marines aboard new ships while they are in the building stage?

General HOLCOMB. No, sir. We assemble the detachment, train it, and put it aboard when she goes in commission.

Mr. UMSTEAD. The Helena is to be commissioned, General, I believe, on September 16, 1939. That is the estimated date.

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General HOLCOMB. It is. We will have to have her detachmer enlisted in the spring of 1939 if we are going to supply it at tha time.

Mr. UMSTEAD. As to the vessels coming into service during the fiscal year 1938, how will you care for their complements?

General HOLCOMB. We had to reduce other activities in order t do it, make a reduction in the Fleet Marine Force, because, as yo know, we got no increase in strength. That is the first requiremen filling those detachments on board ship.

Mr. UMSTEAD. I believe, however, General, that you have gotter whatever the Budget Bureau has approved.

General HOLCOMB. We have, sir.

Mr. UMSTEAD. But there was no increase in enlisted person. requested in the estimates submitted to this committee for the prese fiscal year?

General HOLCOMB. That is true, sir. The committee gave us w... the Budget approved.

ADDITIONAL MEN, FISCAL YEAR 1939

Mr. PLUMLEY. I should like to ask if the 500 additional me. given as the average here for the fiscal year 1939, are sufficient t carry out the proposed naval program as contemplated by the 190Budget.

General HOLCOMB. If I may explain, sir, it is an increase of 1.0. men; that is, they appropriate for half that number, as we enlist s each month, so that at the end of the fiscal year we will have 18 which is 1,000 more than now.

Mr. UMSTEAD. It is an average of 500 for the entire fiscal year c 1939?

General HOLCOMB. Yes: and we wind up with 1,000 more.

Mr. UMSTEAD. The estimates presuppose that at the end of t1year you will have an increase of 1,000?

General HOLCOMB. That is correct, sir. Now, you asked if tha will keep up with the naval program?

Mr. PLUMLEY. That is what I asked.

General HOLCOMB. No, sir; it will not. It will permit us to <!ply Marine detachments for the ships, but it will leave the fl marine force, an active unit that serves with the fleet, as you will a little later, at 22 percent the strength that we are supposed to start operating with if an emergency arises. And it should not less than 50 percent, if we have any hope of being able to do o work.

Mr. PLUMLEY. That means eventually 2,000 men instead of 1.0** General HOLCOMB. It means eventually 5,000 more, or even mor than that; that is, 10,000, or 9,000 more than we have got now, if ware going to carry out our other contracts, our emergency contractwith the Navy.

Mr. UMSTEAD. Proceed with your statement, General.

MARINE GUARDS FOR NAVAL ACTIVITIES

General HOLCOMB. One hundred and one officers are at present pe forming duty with marine guards for naval activities. This n' niis inadequate for the proper safeguarding and administration of

activities. These guards should have an increase of 36 officers, or a total of 137. Guards on receiving ships and at naval ordnance depots have only one officer, and naval air stations and naval training stations have only one or two attached. However, with the present limited personnel and increasing demands for marine detachments on new ships, no increase over present allowances can be made.

Mr. UMSTEAD. You do not have marine detachments aboard destroyers and submarines, General?

General HOLCOMB. No, sir; except in the case of two destroyers that are now in special service squadron.

Mr. UMSTEAD. You do maintain detachments on battleships and cruisers and carriers?

General HOLCOMB. Yes, sir.

Mr. UMSTEAD. And what other categories, if any?

General HOLCOMB. Transports, and gunboats in the Yangtze.

TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL EDUCATION OF OFFICERS IN SERVICE SCHOOLS

Mr. UMSTEAD. Proceed, General.

General HOLCOMB. The reasonable demands for the preparedness of our officers to assume their functions in an emergency, require that all officers during their careers receive a progressive tactical and technical education, extending from the grade of second lieutenant to that of colonel. The present allocation and attendance of officers at service schools is too low. For example, to put all of our officers through the Marine Corps schools while they are in the grades of major, captain, and first lieutenant would require that 151 attend each year. However, it is only practicable to allocate, with our present authorized strength, 78 officers as students in these schools.

Mr. UMSTEAD. Are those who are not allocated for the reasons stated required to take correspondence courses?

General HOLCOMB. They are not, sir; but correspondence courses are open to all officers, and a large number do take them.

Mr. UMSTEAD. Would it be practicable to detail officers carried as additional numbers to the billets of the officers you say are denied the school training?

General HOLCOMB. We do that, sir, to the fullest extent that we can. We use these extra numbers to release as many of the other officers who are going to stay in the corps, to go to the schools, and even with that we have only been able to get 78 in the schools this year.

Mr. UMSTEAD. What weight, if you know, does the lack of school training have with selection boards, as regards officers who may have or may not have had it?

General HOLCOMB. That, Mr. Chairman, calls on me for an expression of opinion as to how various people react on selection boards. I should say that in general selection boards are guided by the results that an officer accomplishes rather than by whether or not he has been to a school. Now, undoubtedly, if he has been to a school, he has better opportunity to accomplish results than otherwise.

Mr. THOM. He has, however, an opportunity voluntarily to take a correspondence course.

General HOLCOMB. Yes; he has the opportunity of taking a corre spondence course. That is not comparable to the work he gets m class, but it is useful.

Mr. THOM. However, if he is anxious to receive promotion and he is industrious, he ought to take a correspondence course if he is denied the right to attend a service school.

General HOLCOMB. I should like to state it as my opinion that be cause it has been impossible to send an officer to a service school that. in itself, would not influence his selection. It would not deter his selection or prevent it.

Mr. THOм. But you do agree that if he is industrious and on the job, he ought to take a correspondence course? General HOLCOMB. Yes, sir.

FLEET MARINE FORCE

The Fleet Marine Force is an essential component of the fleet an: must be maintained in a state of immediate readiness. Its peace. time allowance of personnel should be at least 50 percent of its w complement for this force to be in an efficient state of readiness. I' is contemplated that the remaining 50 percent will be secured fror the Marine Corps Reserve in a national emergency. To this eni. the Reserve must also be built up with men who have had at leas basic military training. On June 30, 1938, the training allowances of existing organizations of the Fleet Marine Force will total only 16 percent of its war complement. Upon the return of the Second Marine Brigade from Shanghai, China, and its attachment to the Fleet Marine Force, the strength of this force will be increased to percent of its war complement.

Mr. UMSTEAD. The Second Marine Brigade is part of the Fle Marine Force whether it be in China or not, is it not?

General HOLCOMB. The headquarters and the Sixth Marines are part of the Fleet Marine Force, sir. The Fourth Marines, which ha been stationed in Shanghai for 10 years, is not part of the Fleet Mirine Force but would be added to it if it returns.

Mr. UMSTEAD. Is the Fleet Marine Force supposed to be kept intact and not used wholly or partly for special missions such as the ot the Second Brigade is now engaged upon?

General HOLCOMB. The purpose for which the Fleet Marine Fore is organized is for service with the fleet. They have beer, used China this time because they were the only force available, but, after all, that is a naval mission.

Mr. UMSTEAD. Then there is no rule that would keep the Flet Marine Force intact under such circumstances?

General HOLCOMB. No, sir; not if higher authority wanted to do something else with it. Of course, that is beyond my control.

The increase of 30 men under this heading is to provide a mar detachment for the new naval air station which is to be constructe i in the San Francisco Bay area.

Mr. UMSTEAD. General, did you not have a detachment at Sunnyvale before the Army went there?

General HOLCOMB. Yes, sir; I think we did.

Lieutenant Colonel WRIGHT. We had 120 enlisted men and 5 offers there. Most of them went to San Diego to the Fleet Marine Fore when the post was abandoned.