Admiral Cook. I consider that, insofar as quality goes, our planes are the equal of, and in some cases superior to, any planes built abroad. Due to the uncertainty of information as to the building programs of foreign planes, I am unable to make any reliable estimate as to comparative strengths.

USE OF COMMERCIAL PLANES IN TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY

Mr. UMSTEAD. Admiral, to what extent would commercial planes be useful in times of emergency?

Admiral Cook. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will answer that question for the Navy only. I do not feel qualified to speak for the Army. Insofar as actual military operations are concerned, the usefulness of commercial planes, other than the flying-boat type, to the Navy would be limited, due to their inherent limitation for naval operations, being purely land planes. Any large flying boats, such as the Pan-American operates now, in time of war would be very valuable for the purpose of scouting and for obtaining information, even through their combat ability was less than it would be had they been built as military planes. Unfortunately, however, there are very few of these planes available.

Mr. UMSTEAD. Of course, I take it, from the nature of things, that the situation with reference to the Navy using commercial airplanes in time of emergency would be quite different from that of the Army? Admiral Cook. Yes, sir.

Mr. UMSTEAD. I assume that is the reason you do not undertake to speak for the Army?

Admiral Cook. Yes, sir; I do not feel qualified to speak for the Army, as I am not sufficiently familiar with their requirements.

STATUS OF AVIATION PERSONNEL

A statement of the situation with respect to aviation personnel as of September 30, 1937, is submitted below in tabular form. The figures include both officers and enlisted men of the Navy and Marine Corps but do not include aviation cadets.

Both officers and enlisted men assigned duties in Naval Aviation continue to be well trained and efficient. It is believed they compare favorably with personnel of any foreign air service.

Mr. UMSTEAD. Admiral, on the table just inserted it is stated that the Navy personnel or flying duty on September 30, 1937 was 3,752. Does that number include both officers and enlisted men?

Admiral Cook. Yes, sir.

Mr. UMSTEAD. Does it include aviation cadets also?

Admiral Cook. Aviation cadets are reserves. They are not members of the Regular Navy. This is just the Regular Navy.

Mr. UMSTEAD. That figure simply deals with the regular officer personnel and enlisted men?

Admiral Cook. That is correct.

Mr. UMSTEAD. And excludes aviation cadets?
Admiral Cook. Yes, sir.

Assuming that Pensacola's training facilities are used to the degree planned, there will be on June 30, 1938, a shortage of approximately 506 Naval aviators of the regular service. The situation resulting from this shortage of naval aviators will be alleviated by the use of a corresponding number of aviation cadets of the Naval Reserve who will have qualified as pilots by June 30, 1938. Due principally to the commissioning of new cruisers in the Scouting Force and the Wasp squadrons, the shortage will be approximately 671 naval aviators by June 30, 1939. Present estimates indicate that a sufficient number of aviation cadets will be available to fill these prospective vacancies, with a surplus sufficient to allow for attrition.

It will be necessary to continue the use of Naval Reserve officers on active duty at Pensacola as instructors in order to maintain the training schedules necessary to qualify adequate personnel to man the aeronautic organization.

The Navy has continued the expanded Coast Guard training program at the Naval Air Station, Pensacola. On September 30, 1937, there were seven officers and five enlisted men of the Coast Guard undergoing flight training.

USE AND TRAINING VALUE OF OBSOLESCENT PLANES

Mr. PLUMLEY. I wondered, with respect to the accidents which sometimes occur at these training stations, whether you hold the mechanical factor due to obsolescence or the type of planes responsible, or the human element responsible?

Admiral Cook. Mr. Plumley, there have been cases where there have been material failures, but which have not necessarily been ascribable to the fact that the plane was obsolescent. We rather feel that the use of the obsolescent plane for training purposes, provided it is safe, is desirable in the early stages of flying in place of the new service types of planes which are very much more difficult to fly, and it is much better to have an intermediate step to the other planes in training.

Mr. PLUMLEY. But is that not one of the compelling factors, the fact that these planes are obsolescent and useless so far as practical duties are concerned?

Admiral Cook. They are useless as far as combatant military use is concerned. When operated under certain restrictions, they are of military value for training purposes.

Mr. PLUMLEY. I wondered to what extent accidents were really caused by the use of obsolescent planes at training stations.

Admiral Cook. To the best of our knowledge there have been none from this cause. There are many obsolescent planes that are perfectly safe to fly under certain limitations. It seems very extravagant to scrap them, and some use should be made of them, and this is the only nonmilitary use to which they can be put and still get some more value out of them.

SHORTAGE OF OFFICERS AND ENLISTED PERSONNEL

Mr. DITTER. Admiral, the total of 784 on the personnel table just inserted represents the shortage in officer personnel?

Admiral Cook. Officers and enlisted men.

Mr. DITTER. And enlisted men?

Admiral Cook. There is some shortage of enlisted men required for flying duty.

Commander PoWNALL. The figure of 784 here used consists of officer naval avaitors, Navy enlisted pilots, and other enlisted men in flying status, or a total shortage of 784 on active flying duty in the Regular Navy.

Mr. DITTER. Would that be officer personnel?

Commander POWNALL. It includes officer personnel.

Mr. DITTER. Of this 784 shortage, how many are officers and how many are enlisted men?

Commander PoWNALL. Of the 784 shortage?

Mr. DITTER. Yes, sir.

Commander PowNALL. Four hundred nighty-eight officers, 44 Navy enlisted pilots, and 242 other enlisted men required for active flying duty, or a combined total of 784.

INVOLUNTARY RETIREMENT OF NAVAL AVIATORS DUE TO SELECTION SYSTEM

Mr. DITTER. Can you tell me in your unit how many officers qualified as aviators have been involuntarily retired from the service as a result of the action of a selection board?

Admiral Cook. No, sir; but I can obtain that information and put it in the record.

Mr. DITTER. Will you give me the total, showing the number of men who have been involuntarily retired during the last year, and their flying experience, as a result of the action of a selection board? Admiral Cook. I will, sir.

Mr. DITTER. Insert it at this point.
Admiral Cook. The list is as follows:

1 Officer would have retired due to selection on June 30, 1937, but requested retirement due to 30 years' service, effective Jure 1, 1937.

NAVAL AIRCRAFT FACTORY

The Naval Aircraft Factory started operation in the autumn of 1917 with all its activities in one building that was erected on Govcrnment land in the navy yard, Philadelphia, in the late summer of 1917. It was established for the purpose of building flying boats to be used in antisubmarine patrol operations. Before the end of the war the factory had been so expanded that the original building was used entirely as shop space and another larger building was in use exclusively for the same purpose. An administration building for offices and engineering work was in use. There were, in addition, two large storehouses, one for raw material and one for finished articles, a steam-generating plant, dry kilns, garage, and two seaplane hangars.

In addition to the plant within the navy yard, the Naval Aircraft Factory also operated several industrial plants in the Philadelphia area that built component parts for the flying boats being assembled at the navy yard plant. The Naval Aircraft Factory had approximately 12,000 men on its rolls, of whom 3.500 were employed in the plant within the navy yard.

Upon the signing of the armistice in 1918, production of flying boats was concluded as rapidly as possible. By the summer of 1919, all activities beyond the limits of the navy yard had ceased entirely. and the Naval Aircraft Factory had reduced its force to approximately 1,400 men. Since that time the size of the force has fluctuated, but it has remained of substantially that size.

With the suspension of the flying boat building program, the character of the work at the factory changed. Some small airplanes of

the fighting and observation classes were manufactured, experimental models of many types having been manufactured, overhaul and alterations to existing airplanes of all types have been carried out, laboratories for the testing of airplanes and airplane materials and for the testing of engines and engine accessories have been established and operated. The proportion of the total force employed that has been used on the various kinds of work has varied from year to year, but as stated above, the total force has remained substantially constant.

The production of airplanes in quantity had by the year 1924 practically ceased, but other activities had increased.

When the building of airplanes and engines at the aircraft factory was required by the Vinson-Trammell Act, some of the space in the principal shop buildings had been preempted by the laboratories that had been established and by activities not easily adaptable to manufacture, and additional shop space was necessary. This was accomplished by the construction of a new building to house the shops for the manufacture of engines, by the construction of a maintenance shop building into which the maintenance activities in the principal shop building could be moved, and by the construction of an assembly shop and hangar building in which the airplanes could be erected. Engineering spaces in the administration building were then occupied by the engineering force engaged in experimental and development work, and an addition was made to this building to house the engineering personnel required for the design of airplanes and engines.

Since the manufacture of airplanes had been stopped, the character of the equipment in the factory had gradually been changed to suit its changed functions, and structures of airplanes had changed from wood to metal. It was necessary, therefore, to acquire considerable equipment suitable for the manufacture of modern airplanes.

No engines had ever been built at the Naval Aircraft Factory, and all of the tools and equipment for this purpose had to be purchased. The cost of this equipment was the largest item in the total cost of preparing the factory for manufacture of airplanes and engines.

The provision of these additional facilities has now been completed for the particular models under construction, and the factory is currently manufacturing training airplanes, and radial air-cooled engines for use in training airplanes.

The program of airplane building is further advanced than the engine program, due to the fact that the factory had sufficient facilities to manufacture an experimental model of a training airplane before the additional facilities were ready, and due to the availability of a nucleus of personnel experienced in the manufacture of airplanes with which to proceed, neither of which favorable conditions was present in instituting the engine manufacturing program.

At the present time, the Naval Aircraft Factory has delivered 117 training airplanes of a total of 182 that have been ordered manufactured, and is now assembling material and making preparations for the manufacture of 44 observation planes, deliveries of which will follow upon completion of the training-plane program. At the present time, the factory has completed one engine of a total of 121