ESCALATOR CLAUSE

Mr. UMSTEAD. Is the shortage of torpedoes you have discussed ttributable in part to the construction to which we have become titled through the exercise by foreign powers of the escalator iause in the London Treaty of 1930?

Admiral FURLONG. Only those torpedoes requested for submarines re attributable in part to our actual increase in submarine tonnage ccasioned by Japan's invoking the escalator clause. With reference > torpedoes requested for destroyers, the destroyers are those built nder the original 1930 treaty limitation without invoking the escaator clause. We have not built up to the original limitation which rovided for 150,000 tons of destroyers; we now have 130,825 tons nderage, completed, building, and appropriated for. It is this atter tonnage that the torpedoes are for.

Mr. UMSTEAD. Does the shortage discussed by you include 40,000 ons of destroyers and 15,598 tons of submarines, which we are llowed if we invoke the escalator clause as has been done by foreign ations, assuming that we have the authority to do so under the inson-Trammell Act?

Admiral FURLONG. No, sir; the shortage I asked funds for and the hortage I discussed is for vessels that we actually have appropriated or. The shortage we have discussed applies only to vessels that we have appropriated for.

EIGHTEEN-INCH GUNS

Mг. THOM. Do we have any 16-inch guns in the Navy at the present time?

Admiral FURLONG. Yes, sir.

Mг. THOм. How many ships are so equipped?

Admiral FURLONG. We have three battleships so equipped. Our three latest ships that were laid down before the Disarmament Conference in 1922 were 16-inch-gun ships.

Mг. THOM. Were 16-inch guns used on the ships of any participants in the World War?

Admiral FURLONG. No, sir.

Mг. THOм. Has there ever been built by any country an 18-inch gun to your knowledge?

Admiral FURLONG. Well, we started the design of an 18-inch gun ourselves in 1917. The parts of the gun were about to be put together in 1922 when the disarmament treaty was signed and all work on the gun was discontinued and it was never finished, and the parts were ised to make a 16-inch gun.

Mг. THOм. Then there is no knowledge as to whether or not an 1-inch gun would be a serviceable gun or would fulfill expectations? Admiral FURLONG. No; except that we have certain data and designs and we have built 12-inch guns, 14-inch guns, and 16-inch guns, and we know it would be serviceable."

Mr. THOM. How many 18-inch guns are being built by any country at the present time?

Admiral FURLONG. None that I know of, but there is an unconfirmed report that Japan built an experimental 18-inch gun in 1936. Mг. THOM. Are you conversant with the gun calibers of the different countries?

Admiral FURLONG. Yes, sir; those that are being built by Britain and France, who, being signatories to the treaty, report the size of guns installed in ships. I do not know what they are contemplating building.

DEFINITION OF ESCALATOR CLAUSE

Mr. PLUMLEY. Admiral, would you shed a little light for me by giving me your definition of the escalator clause?

Admiral FURLONG. Well, the escalator clause is a clause that was put in the London Treaty of 1930 by which each signatory nation was given the right to build in excess of the limitation set by the treaty in case the signatory nations were materially affected by new construction of a power not signatory to the treaty.

In other words, any signatory nations could take an escalator and go up in tonnage if some nation not signatory to the treaty, built so many submarines or so many destroyers or other type as to make the signatory's position dangerous. Later Britain invoked the clause to retain 40,000 tons of destroyers in excess of treaty tonnage and Japan invoked it to increase her allowed submarine tonnage by 15,598 tons. Their acts automatically gave the United States a right to increase our tonnage by an equal amount in those types.

Mr. PLUMLEY. That is what I understood, but I never heard it defined.

Mr. UMSTEAD. With reference to that matter, Admiral, of course, the Washington and London treaties have now expired?

Admiral FURLONG. Yes, sir.

Mr. UMSTEAD. And the only extent to which we would be affected now, I take it, by those treaties, would be as to whether the Vinson-Trammell Act extends to vessels or tonnage which may be built pursuant to the escalator clause.

Admiral FURLONG. Yes, sir. The Vinson-Trammell Act authorizes the United States to build in accordance with the provisions of the Washington Treaty of 1922 and the London Treaty of 1930.

Admiral KIMMEL. Limited only as to types of ships, but not numbers.

DATA ON EMPLOYMENT AND EXPENDITURES AT NEWPORT TORPEDO STATION

Admiral FURLONG. There may be something said on the fact that we have not used Newport as much as we might have, that we might have gone ahead and employed more men at Newport to get greater production. So, I would like to give you some data on that.

We ran along before the war with around 500 or 600 men, and v. 1917 we had 1,377 men there, and in 1919 we reached the peak wi 2,758 men. Then when we had the disarmament conference in 1 we dropped down until for the 10 years preceding 1934 we employed about 1,000 men yearly.

Then to meet the requirements of the new building program, the first ships of which were laid down in October and December 1935, the employees at Newport were increased every year until now the maximum is reached that can be employed working three shifts.

The increases are shown in the yearly employment, as follows1933, 1,022; 1934, 1.264: 1935, 2217; 1936, 2.923; 1937, 3,095: 192-. 3.375.

Recent increase in expenditures at Newport is seen in the money spent there in the last 2 years which was for 1937 $7,450,928; for 1938, $9,305,536.

In addition to the above, new construction of buildings, slips, and a ferry in the last 5 years amounted to $700,000.

TORPEDO PROCUREMENT SITUATION

During the World War, manufacture of torpedoes was undertaken at four places, Alexandria, Naval Gun Factory, Newport, and E. W. Bliss Co., Brooklyn. After the war, contracts with Bliss were completed, torpedo activities at the Naval Gun Factory were brought to a close and Alexandria was placed in an inactive status. Newport was stabilized at about 1,000 employees.

Recent construction has added a large number of ships to the Navy. By January 1941, the Navy will have 34 new submarines and 89 new destroyers. The primary armament of these ships is torpedoes. To fulfill their mission, they must be supplied torpedoes of the latest design in the quantities prescribed by the Secretary of the Navy. The only source of supply today is Newport. By January 1941, working at capacity, 24 hours per day, Newport's deliveries will be seriously short of the requirement for these ships. In addition, torpedo planes, patrol planes, and target practice replacements require a considerable number.

The Bureau of Ordnance has, since 1934, rapidly increased the number of employees at Newport until now there are 3,375. This is the maximum number which can be efficiently employed at Newport. To expand Newport further is considered inadvisable for the following reasons:

(1) There is too great a concentration already at Newport. Our entire torpedo manufacturing facilities should not, from a military point of view, be concentrated in one place.

(2) To increase the output 50 percent, it would be necessary to provide about $4,500,000.

(3) It would entail a delay of about 12 years to construct the buildings.

(4) After the peak, the great reduction in force would be a serious blow to this locality.

Other possible sources of torpedo production, both Government and commercial, have been investigated. The most expeditious and economical means of increasing our supply of torpedoes is to rehabilitate Alexandria, where suitable buildings to a value of about $1.745,000 already exist. An excellent proving range is available. In this Budget, the Bureau of Ordnance has requested $1,277,000 for machinery and repairs to put Alexandria into torpedo production, with about 1,000 men at a rate of about one torpedo per working day. The estimated over-all cost to all bureaus for this project is $2.761.153 of which about one-half is asked in this Budget and the remainder to be asked next year.

If these funds are appropriated Alexandria will begin deliveries in January 1940 and both plants will be operated up to their full capacity, Newport at three shifts and Alexandria at one shift until at least 1944.

36929-38-24

This estimate does not include torpedoes required for ships which will probably be appropriated for in 1940 and subsequent years.

From a standpoint of national security, it is considered advisable to have at least two plants tooled-up for torpedo manufacture. Two or more plants already in operation at a low rate can be expanded more rapidly in time of emergency than one plant already at capacity.

Various other locations have been considered in the study of this problem. Many of them, for example Mare Island and New Orleans, did not have, in their vicinity, waters suitable for a proving range. Keyport is being utilized up to the limit of its present material facilities for modernization work, manufacture of torpedo parts, and the upkeep of a large number of old torpedoes. The lack of a satisfactory proof range at Keyport makes it an unfavorable location for a torpedo factory. San Diego is a satisfactory location for a torpedo station, but would cost approximately $4,500,000, and would take at least 12 years longer to get into production than Alexandria. The only commercial plant in the United States with experience in torpedo manufacture is the E. W. Bliss Co., of Brooklyn, N. Y., which built during the war period about 5,000 torpedoes. They have not manufactured torpedoes since 1922 and it is estimated that rehabilitation would cost $1,750,000. Torpedoes built at this or other commercial plants would have to be ranged by the Government.

Regarding commercial manufacture, the experience at Alexandria is an illustration. Alexandria was built as an assembly plant, the parts to be manufactured commercially. This was a complete failure and a change over had to be made. Alexandria did not get into production until after the Armistice.

It might be possible to interest commercial companies, but in view of the secret nature of the design, it is believed that this is one type of ordnance equipment which should be manufactured exclusively in Government plants.

Newport is and will remain our primary source of torpedo manufacture and the center of torpedo research and design.

Alexandria is needed now to help relieve the present shortage. It is needed also, and perhaps even more acutely, as a second source of supply capable of immediate expansion in the event of war.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 15, 1937.

BUREAU OF ENGINEERING

STATEMENTS OF REAR ADMIRAL HAROLD G. BOWEN, ENGINEER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES NAVY, CHIEF OF BUREAU; LT. COMDR. J. E. HAMILTON, UNITED STATES NAVY; AND CAPT. H. M. COOLEY, DIRECTOR, NAVAL RESEARCH LABORATORY

GENERAL STATEMENT

Mr. UMSTEAD. We will now take up the estimates of the Bureau of Engineering. Proceed, Admiral.

PURPOSE OF THE APPROPRIATION "ENGINEERING"

Admiral BOWEN. The appropriation "Engineering" is used for(a) Repair, preservation, and renewal of propulsive machinery, uxiliary machinery, and boilers of naval vessels, yard and district raft, and small engine-driven boats; distilling and refrigerating apparatus on board ships; repair, preservation, and renewal of all elecrical generators and distribution systems and of electrical appliances of all kinds on board naval vessels, except motors and control appaatus used to operate machinery belonging to other Bureaus.

(b) Maintenance and operation and improvement of the naval-communication service, including maintenance of radio stations of a public-works nature.

(c) The purchase, installation, repair, and preservation of mahines, tools, and appliances at industrial navy yards jointly with the Bureau of Construction and Repair, and at military stations of matters under the cognizance of the Bureau of Engineering.

(d) Research, experiment, and development of engineering materials and equipment.

(e) The Engineering portion of minor additions to the Naval Establishments not covered by the appropriation "Replacement of naval vessels," such as yard and district craft, aircraft rescue boats, and Marine Corp landing boats.

BASIS OF ESTIMATES FOR 1939

The estimate for 1939 has been based primarily upon the actual expenditures under each object during the fiscal year 1937, which figures are the last available.

Allocations for all recurring items in 1938 were made by the Bureau on the basis of actual reported expenditures for the same purposes in 1937. Where applicable, unit costs were obtained for various purposes during 1937 and the 1938 unit allocation was made equal to the 1937 unit cost. Changes of 1938 allocations over 1937 actual costs for recurring items under various objects are due entirely to changes such as: number of ships to be commissioned, number of ships in commission, number of ships to be decommissioned, number of overhauls, and number of interim dockings. Although it was known and recognized that the cost of all material entering into repair and maintenance of naval vessels was increasing rapidly, appropriation limitations denied me the means to increase the allocations for any purpose to compensate for this increased cost. It was also recognized that newer ships coming into service have much more powerful machinery installations which have been made possible by a weight and size reduction, with the resultant increase in complexity and decrease in accessibility.

Mr. UMSTEAD. Admiral, I wish you would explain that last statement you just made.

Admiral BowEN. The horsepower of our ships has been going up. That has been made possible because with the improvements in engineering we find that we can put more horsepower in the same cubical contents.

Mr. UMSTEAD. Just what do you mean by decrease in accessibility? Admiral BowEN. There has been, in some cases, in some of our ships a decrease in accessibility due to the desire to put more horse