military reactor program, we find we do not need to start construction of the $12 million facility itself during 1964. The R. & D. money is still needed.

Mr. EVINS. These reactors that are built and developed and in operation and providing power on your military bases are pretty much 50-50 financed by the Army and the Atomic Energy Commission, generally speaking?

Colonel BURLIN. No. Actually, some of them are entirely financed by the Army after the research and development has been done through the Atomic Energy Commission. For example, the PM-2A in Greenland was bought entirely by the Army, the SM-1A in Alaska was bought entirely by the Army, and the new barge plant is being bought entirely by the Army.

Mr. EVINS. Supplying all your power needs and power requirements at these sites?

Colonel BURLIN. Yes, sir.

Dr. PITTMAN. In the other cases, the Sundance plant was jointly funded as research and development prototype development.

NAVAL PROPULSION REACTORS

Mr. EVINS. With respect to the naval propulsion reactor program, for which you are budgeting $96,990,000, were any reductions in the original budget estimate made by the Bureau of the Budget?

Dr. PITTMAN. No, sir. There were no changes between the request by the admiral and the figures that you see in the budget before you, in the Navy part of the program. Of course, in seed and blanket, which is part of the civilian program, there was the $3.5 million reduction we discussed this morning.

ROCKET PROPULSION REACTORS

Mr. EVINS. Concerning the rocket propulsion reactor program, for which you are budgeting $98,930,000, some members of the committee were under the impression that this program was to be leveled off, but you are showing a $28,300,000 increase.

Dr. PITTMAN. This is one of the rapidly increasing programs, Mr. Chairman. In order to meet the objectives of this program, there is no possibility of this leveling off. This is getting to the point that flight testing will be envisioned within the next few years, and in order to reach that point it will require an ever-increasing budget for both AEC and NASA. This is not one of the leveling-off programs. Mr. EVINS. "Ever" is a long time, Dr. Pittman. How much do you envision will be your total expenditure?

Dr. PITTMAN. The total cost of this program estimated out through about 1973-when I said "ever-increasing," I obviously did not mean forever, sir-is about a billion dollars or $1.1 billion. Ever is a long time.

Mr. EVINS. A billion dollars is a lot of money. You frighten us, Doctor.

yesterday_somewhat

Dr. PITTMAN. It is an expensive program, sir. Mr. EVINS. We discussed yesterday somewhat your ROVER program between AEC and NASA, but I wish you would tell us again

how much you are proposing to budget for this work and how much NASA is budgeting for the program.

Dr. PITTMAN. I would like Mr. Finger, who is head of our joint office with NASA, Mr. Chairman, to discuss that program with you. Mr. EvINS. Mr. Finger, we always hear you with profit, and we are glad to hear you.

Mr. FINGER. Thank you very much, sir.

As I indicated this morning, the NASA budget for ROVER includes $96.7 million for direct R. & D. costs, and $20.5 million for construction work. The AEC budget, as you see, is $98.93 million for operations and $5.4 million for construction and capital equipment. This makes a total of $221.5 million.

The division of responsibility between the two agencies is very much as Colonel Burlin described for the Army program, in that the AEC provides the reactors, does the research on the reactors, shielding work, and so on, all of the nuclear aspects of the system, and NASA handles the nonnuclear aspects of the system, including the flight vehicle work. The program, however, is run as a single program, and the overall dollars required are planned as a single effort, and then the dollars are apportioned appropriately by the responsibilities of the agency. The request you have before you is a fully coordinated one. In fact, it was prepared as a single program with the request that is before the NASA committee.

Mr. EvINS. Do you anticipate this level of funding on the order of $220 million for the next several years?

Mr. FINGER. Yes, sir: I do.

To answer your earlier question, Mr. Chairman, I think we are in a position where we will be getting into more and more hardware work and a lot more of the hardware development effort. To a very large extent, up through fiscal 1963 we have done research effort, and we will go on then into major hardware development, which involves many copies of reactors and a great deal of material procurement and fabrication of that material. We expect the costs will go over the $220 million which is indicated here for the next several years.

Mr. EVINS. Is there any auditing committee or governing committee? Is there any limiting committee on these programs by NASA and AEC? It costs a lot of money to go to the moon. The sky is the limit. Just ask for dollars and come and get it.

Mr. FINGER. I do not think that is quite the way this program has worked, particularly in the formulation of the budget which is before you. The dollars which are requested have been paced to a large extent by the technological development progress we have made. We are, in fact, in certain elements of the program, particularly in the nonnuclear part of it. holding back with the flight system, with the development of a full engine system, in order to demonstrate first the Successful reactor operation. We are pacing the program by technobogical considerations. The proposals we have submitted have been very carefully reviewed within both agencies, and both agencies feel this is a "roper program to present.

Mr. Exaxa. The AEC has done great work for the Army, and certainly it has done significant work for the Navy. You got in with the Air Fome and the unclear-powered airplane was shown not to be feasible. It was abandoned after spending a lot of money. Can you

not judge from this aviation experience that maybe you should not spend so much money in the rocket and missiles field?

Mr. FINGER. Mr. Chairman, I think the circumstances are somewhat different. I think the potential performance advantage of the nuclear rocket far outweighs the performance advantages that were possible with the aircraft system. We have here a system that will provide very high specific impulse. It will let us carry extremely high payloads over very long distances in space, much higher payloads than we can. anticipate for any other propulsion system that is available to us or that has real promise at the present time.

In addition to that, it will permit us to go to distant space objectives. It is for the development of a future capability of this country to explore space that we are really going into this work as heavily as we are, and the potential performance is so great.

Mr. EVINS. Are all these requested by NASA, or are you initiating some of these on your own?

Dr. PITTMAN. The nuclear rocket program is a joint program between us and NASA, and anything that is done is done as a result of the coordinated effort of the two agencies to come up with a program that meets the objectives of the basic NASA program. Of course, some of our advanced reactor work may later on turn out to be useful in subsequent years in this program, but the nuclear rocket program as you see it before you is a joint effort.

Mr. EVINS. Who decides that, you and Administrator Webb?

Dr. PITTMAN. It goes a lot higher than me, sir. It goes to the top of the Commission, and to Administrator Webb on the other side.

MISSILE PROPULSION REACTORS

Mr. EVINS. Turning to the PLUTO program, the committee notes you are programing $14,200.000. Is there any evidence that there will be a weapons system which can make use of this machine?

General LUEDECKE. As of the moment, there is not clear evidence. that it will be used. The Department of Defense testimony before the Joint Committee in September really asked for more time to evaluate it. At that time we had progressed with the program to the extent that funding was submitted to the one remaining test which the Commission felt would demonstrate the technical feasibility of such a rocket. It was the Commission's decision that we should proceed through this test, and if a commitment had not developed by that time, then we would have completed our research and development program insofar as feasibility.

Mr. EVINS. What funds are in the budget of the Defense Department for the PLUTO program?

Dr. PITTMAN. For 1964, $15 million, sir.

Mr. EVINS. What will these funds be used for?

Dr. PITTMAN. These are for the development of the airframe, if this program is ever to be forwarded, which would surround the reactor, the bird, as they call it, the thing which would fly with the reactor inside it. It is a program which has been going on in the Air Force for several years, and they feel the same way we do, that having gotten it this far, even though next year it is decided not to use it, it would be the wrong move not to continue to get the information that is coming out of the contracts.

Mr. EVINS. Are you aware of any funds in the Navy budget for the PLUTO program?

General LUEDECKE. The Navy is expending some funds of its own on some studies in connection with the application of PLUTO in a smaller version from on board ship.

Mr. EVINS. How long have we been working on the PLUTO program?

Dr. PITTMAN. The first cost was in 1956, sir.

Mr. EVINS. How much have we expended to date?

Dr. PITTMAN. The total amount we have expended, including the $14.2 million shown here, would be $141.5 million; the Air Force has spent $57.5 million during the same period.

Mr. EvINS. Are we more likely to get a Navy application of this than an Air Force application ultimately?

General LUEDECKE. I think we are really not in a position to say, sir. The Navy within the last year has shown interest, but I think the Air Force interest is not lagging.

Mr. EvINS. Have you projected what the ultimate cost of this program may entail?

General LUEDECKE. Not in a firm sense, as we have in ROVER. It would be a program of somewhat less magnitude, but still an expensive program.

SATELLITE AND SMALL POWER SOURCES PROGRAM

Mr. EVINS. With respect to the satellite and small power sources program-is this your SNAP program?

General LUEDECKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. EVINS. For which you are budgeting $85,450,000, the committee expressed some concern in its report about the coordination between yourselves, NASA, and the Department of Defense. Please bring us up to date on what arrangements have been worked out.

Dr. PITTMAN. The SNAP-50 is being handled as an AEC program, but under an arrangement in which the Air Force furnishes to the AEC an officer, Colonel Douthett, who serves as manager, the SNAP-50 program, reporting to me. He heads up those activities. We have an agreement with the Air Force and with NASA in which both the Air Force and NASA supply personnel, each of them supplying a deputy to Colonel Douthett. We have a further agreement by which the Air Force effort on the SPUR program, which is really a part of the SNAP-50 program, both by contractors and at their Wright Field installation, report in to Colonel Douthett through the Air Force deputy.

So, as of this minute, by an agreement that was just recently signed and completed, we have complete coordination on the SNAP50 program between ourselves, the Air Force, and, to the extent that NASA is participating, for NASA.

With regard to the SNAP-2 and SNAP-10, those are also completely AEC programs with us furnishing a package to the Air Force for testing. In that case, the coordination is handled more by direct tiein with those who are to carry out the test.

In the case of SNAP-8, we have responsibility only for the reactor. NASA, the using agency in that case, has responsibility for the power conversion equipment. The two agencies are working closely together, but not in an integrated single program.

Mr. EVINS. What results have you had in the last year? What have you accomplished? What new developments?

Dr. PITTMAN. The SNAP-10A program, which will be the first one to launch a reactor in space, is moving ahead with the final procurement and testing of the flight-type reactor. The SNAP-2 program has had some serious difficulties in the past in the conversion equipment, but those technical difficulties are beginning to be worked out, and we think the SNAP-2 program is now reasonably well on the tracks.

The SNAP-8 reactor, a much larger reactor than the other two, is going into initial test phases just at this moment.

Mr. EVINS. Will you supply for the record the budget for the other agencies participating in this program?

Dr. PITTMAN. Yes, sir. I can provide it now, if you like.
Mr. EVINS. Supply it for the record.
(The information requested follows:)

SNAP program-Other agency funding

Mr. EVINS. Tell us if there are any devices that may be reduced or eliminated. Have you too many devices on which you are experimenting? Can we cut down on them?

Dr. PITTMAN. Actually, we are studying two types of reactors. One, a reactor system

Mr. EVINS. This is small devices we are speaking about.

Dr. PITTMAN. There are two basic types. One is isotopes. There are no reactors in that at all. You use the heat of various types of isotopes to generate electricity through straight thermal means. In this case we are really developing only two or three types, but there are different power levels all the way from a few milliwatts up to maybe 10 or 20 watts. In each case you do have to engineer separately. I do not think it is a separate development program. It is more a separate engineering program to meet the specific requirements.

Getting into the reactors, where really the big money is involved, we have two different reactor types that are under serious study right now. One is the reactor which is used in SNAP 2, 10, and 8. It is exactly the same type of reactor in all cases. The other is the SNAP50 reactor. That is for the high power.

Looking at the power ranges, we have, if anything, a very minimal program of development.

Mr. EVINS. Doctor, we cannot get you to yield on anything, can we. Dr. PITTMAN. I have already yielded to others before I ever get to see you, Mr. Chairman. I have been bled to death.