In fact, I thought that the reverse was true. Would you care to comment on this?

General POWER. Yes; deterrence is really the theme of the book. The title of it was "Design for Survival," and it developed the present strategy in this country which is one of deterrence.

I think this is a worthwhile mission. As I said before, any fool can get into a war, but it takes a smart man to stay out of one on honorable terms. I think it would be incredible stupidity if this world would get into an all-out nuclear war.

There would be no winners, only losers. So I think deterrence is a very worthwhile mission. And the book built this up.

It outlined the threat and some of the various things we could do to try to maintain a position of deterrence. It did not advocate preemptive war.

Senator SYMINGTON. I wanted that clear for the record.

Senator JOHNSON. Could I ask one question? Who stopped the book?

General POWER. The book was written by me.
Senator JOHNSON. I know you wrote it.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MC ELROY WITHHELD PERMISSION TO PUBLISH

BOOK

General POWER. Prior to writing it, I requested permission of the Air Force and then went ahead with it. It was submitted in accordance with regulations. The Secretary of Defense decided that the book should not be published, and that ended that matter as far as I am concerned.

He is my superior. When he said he didn't want it published, that was the end of it.

Senator JOHNSON. What were the reasons given?

General POWER. He didn't want it published. That was all that

was necessary.

Senator SYMINGTON. There was more than that to it.

General POWER. That was all that was necessary as far as I was concerned.

Senator JOHNSON. That was Secretary of Defense McElroy; wasn't it?

General PoWER. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you feel that General LeMay is an expert in the field of strategic bombing?

General POWER. Yes, I do.

1956 TESTIMONY OF GENERAL LE MAY ON MANNED BOMBERS CITED Senator SYMINGTON. Before a subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee nearly 4 years ago, he was asked a question:

In what year or at what time, if the present programs go along, vis-a-vis the Communists, in what year do you think they will be in a position, if they hit us, to destroy us? We will accept it as a guess from the man who has the most right to guess.

General LeMay answered:

I don't like to guess on those things, but if you insist I will come up with a guess. You noticed on the war gaming, the staff exercise, we gave you what happened in 1960 with a surprise attack. We lost definitely with that number, so that is definite. 1960 he can do it with a complete surprise attack. Now the problem is to back off to where you think that same thing will happen.

I pointed out that in 1958 we would probably be equal, so somewhere between those two possibly is the answer, say 1959.

I want to read this sentence again:

You noticed in war gaming, the staff exercise we gave you what happened in 1960 with a surprise attack. We lost definitely with that number * *

Have you any comments on this testimony given under oath before the Senate in 1956, in April?

General POWER. No, I would rather not comment because I haven't studied the whole testimony. It is difficult to take part of it out of context and make a sound and reasonable evaluation of what he was driving at.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

Senator WILEY. Was that before the missile came into being, 1956, when he commented?

Senator SYMINGTON. I don't quite understand your question, Senator.

Senator WILEY. My point was this, that he was probably commenting then in relation to bombers. There wasn't any missile in 1956, was there?

Senator SYMINGTON. I don't know whether the Soviets had any long-range missiles at that time. I don't think there was any intelligence estimate of ICBM's in 1956.

Counsel has just read a statement that the Soviets had ICBM's operational since 1958. At the time of General LeMay's testimony we knew that the Soviets were testing ballistic missiles very extensively at that particular time. They were testing missiles over hundreds of miles of range. It is difficult to know whether a missile is being tested to full range. Hence, it was difficult to know whether they were testing ICBM's at that time or whether they were only testing IRBM's.

Senator WILEY. He made a statement, General, in 1956. At that time it was a question of the strength of the bomber, was it not? General POWER. I have no idea what General LeMay, at that time, based his opinion on.

Senator WILEY. You didn't know what he had in mind, but wasn't he in charge of SAC?

General POWER. Yes. He was head of the Strategic Air Command at that time.

U.S. WORKING ON DEFENSE AGAINST BOMBER FOR NUMBER OF YEARS

Senator WILEY. Well, you said that we are working on the antimissile the answer to the missile. Are we working on the answer to

the bomber, too?

General POWER. Yes; they have been working on that for quite a few years.

Senator WILEY. And with American ingenuity, are we downhearted or are we hopeful we can find the answer to both?

General POWER. Well, we are always hopeful that we can find the answer to all of these problems.

Senator JOHNSON. If there are no other questions, we thank you very much, General Power, and if you and General Schriever will return to the committee, we will stand in recess until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., a recess was taken until 2 p.m. of the same day.

AFTERNOON SESSION

(At the reconvening of the session, the following members were present: Senators Johnson, Stennis, Symington, Young of Ohio, Cannon, Bridges, Saltonstall, Smith, Wiley, Martin, Case of New Jersey, Jackson, Engle, Bush, and Goldwater.)

Senator JOHNSON. The committee will come to order. When we recessed this morning, we had about finished asking General Power questions that could be answered in open session.

Therefore, unless other members of the committee have further questions, I shall ask Mr. Vance or Mr. Weisl to proceed with the questioning of General Power, if they have any more questions.

Mr. WEISL. Just one question, General Power. When you referred to the clearance of your speech of January 19 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, did you mean each member of the Joint Chiefs or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General POWER. I meant, and I request that the record show I meant, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, General.

Mr. Vance, will you proceed with the questioning of General Schriever?

Mr. VANCE. General Schriever, last year you stated to this committee on January 29, and I quote:

In an era where survival becomes the most important factor, not just security, the risk becomes greater than at any other time in history. I think we should do everything we can to reduce that risk to a minimum. We could build larger ballistic missile forces if decision were made to do so which would increase our retaliatory capability down the road timewise.

You went on to say:

In my opinion, in view of the very dangerous situation with respect to a ballistic missile threat, I think we should build greater ballistic missile forces.

General, were the ICBM programs stepped up to the degree you felt they should have been?

TESTIMONY OF GEN. THOMAS S. POWER AND LT. GEN. BERNARD A.
SCHRIEVER-Resumed

General SCHRIEVER. I have to give my personal opinion here.
Mr. VANCE. Please do.

ICBM PROGRAMS INCREASED SINCE LAST YEAR

General SCHRIEVER. The ICBM programs were, of course, increased since last year. Since that time I have taken on a new assignment, and I have been very busy in this new assignment. I do not have the

knowledge to say whether or not we have sufficient numbers scheduled now. I did say we had a greater capacity for producing missiles and getting them into the field in 1958, when I first testified before this committee.

I again said so in 1959. I want to make it clear that the matter of numbers is not my responsibility. Our job has been to get the missile into an operational state, and in this particular job I think we have done better than anyone could have expected.

ICBM PROGRAMS NOT INCREASED TO DEGREE GENERAL SCHRIEVER RECOMMENDED

Mr. VANCE. General, I am afraid you haven't answered my question. Last year, you testified that it was your personal opinion that the ballistic missile program should be stepped up.

I am asking you, were those programs stepped up to the degree that you felt they should have been?

General SCHRIEVER. Last year? I would say that they were not stepped up to the degree I thought they should have been, and this is a personal opinion.

Mr. VANCE. What steps could be taken to step up the production of ICBM's today?

ICBM LEADTIME FOR OPERATIONAL STATUS IS 24 TO 30 MONTHS

General SCHRIEVER. This is somewhat difficult to answer. If we had made a decision to put more missiles in the field in 1958, we could have had more missiles in mid-1961 and in mid-1962.

If we had made the decision in 1959, we could have had more missiles in mid-1962. There is a leadtime of anywhere from 24 months to 30 months involved from the time you make the decision to get additional missiles into the operational inventory until they are actually there.

I am talking about the missiles that General Power will use in SAC. If we talk about increasing the numbers of ATLAS or TITAN now, we are beginning to run into the time period where the MINUTEMÁN starts getting into the picture.

TOO LATE TO AUGMENT ICBM FORCE IN 1961 AND 1962

Mr. VANCE. Are you saying, General, that it is too late now to step up the production of ATLAS and TITAN for the critical period 1961 to 1962?

General SCHRIEVER. Yes, sir.

Mr. VANCE. Now, is that opinion based upon putting the missiles in hard sites?

General SCHRIEVER. The time involved in either hard or soft sites is not too much different. It is a very big problem for installation, checkout, and construction of the bases, whether they are hard or soft.

Mr. VANCE. Is it your testimony then, that the time has passed by and we cannot augment our ATLAS and TITAN forces during this period 1961 to 1962?

General SCHRIEVER. We probably could add a little at the end of 1962, but very little. That would be the earliest we could add any additional missiles if we made a decision now.

Mr. VANCE. So that the record will be clear, is the statement which you have just made predicated on the assumption that we could not do that, even if we were planning soft or toughened sites?

General SCHRIEVER. That's right.

Mr. VANCE. Now what can you tell us in open session about the TITAN program?

SUCCESSFUL TITAN TEST ANNOUNCED

General SCHRIEVER. I can make one announcement, that we have just had a completely successful flight with the TITAN about half an hour or so ago. This was the fifth flight out of seven that has been successful. It was the first flight where we had complete guidance and second stage operation. It was a major milestone in the TITAN program, and I am very happy about it.

I can say something further about the TITAN. There are always a number of things that come up about the TITAN program. So, here is where I am going to volunteer a little bit of information.

TITAN TO BE ONE-THIRD OF ICBM FORCE IN 1962

In the first place, the TITAN program represents approximately one-third of our planned ICBM missile inventory toward the end of 1962. We had to make a decision on the TITAN with respect to bringing it into the inventory approximately 3 years ago. There has been talk from time to time about canceling the TITAN. When people talk about canceling the TITAN, they simply are not familiar with all the facts and the problems involved in bringing missiles into the operational inventory. So to cancel out, for example, today, would mean that we would have approimately one-third less missiles in our inventory in this critical time period than we now have programed.

Secondly, and in every program that I have ever been associated with in the missile business, we always have a number of failures. This does not involve only the Air Force program but the programs of the other services. Invariably when we have these failures, we get a lot of panic button pushers. We have come through every one of our programs, the Air Force with the ATLAS and the THOR, the Army with their JUPITER, and the Navy with their POLARIS. All of these programs have had a number of failures, but they are all going well at this time. You simply have to go through this stage in development.

Mr. VANCE. Could you tell us in open session whether or not the TITAN shot which was successful today was a full-range shot? General SCHRIEVER. It was not programed to go full range. Mr. VANCE. Now you mentioned, this morning, the MINUTEMAN program. I would like to go into that in more detail in closed session. But can you tell us anything about it in open session?