SECTION VI.

Of the Argument against the Pre-existence of Chrift from the Materiality of Man; and of the Ufe of the Doctrine of the Trinity.

Might have urged another kind of argument against both the divinity and preexistence of Christ, viz. from the doctrine of the materiality of man, which I presume has been fufficiently proved in my Difquifitions on Matter and Spirit. I have there shewn that there is no more reason why a man should be fuppofed to have an immaterial principle within him, than that a dog, a plant, or a magnet, fhould have one; because in all the fe cafes, there is just the fame difficulty in imagining any connexion between the visible matter, of which they confift, and the invifible powers, of which they are poffeffed. If univerfal concomitance be the foundation of all our reasoning concerning caufes and effects, the organized brain of a man must be deemed to be the proper

proper feat, and immediate cause of his fenfation and thinking, as much as the inward ftructure of a magnet, whatever that be, is the cause of its power of attracting iron.

The most inanimate parts of nature are poffeffed of powers or properties, between which and what we fee and feel of them, we are not able to perceive any connexion. whatever. There is just as much connexion between the principles of fenfation and thought and the brain of a man, as between the powers of a magnet and the iron of which it is made, or between the principle of gravitation and the matter of which the earth and the fun are made; and whenever we shall be able to deduce the

powers of a magnet from the other properties of iron, we may perhaps be able to deduce the powers of fenfation and thought from the other properties of the brain.

This is a very short and plain argument, perfectly confonant to all our reasoning in philofophy. It is conclufive against the doctrine of a foul, and confequently against the whole system of pre-existence. If Peter, James, and John, had no preexiftent

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existent state, it must be contrary to all analogy to suppose Jesus to have pre-existed. His being a prophet, and having a power of working miracles, can make no just exception in his favour; for then every preceding prophet must have pre-existed.

I think I have alfo proved in my Difquifitions, that the doctrine of a foul, as a substance distinct from the body, and capable of being happy or miferable when the body is in the grave, was borrowed from Pagan philofophy, that it is totally repugnant to the system of revelation, and unknown in the fcriptures; which speak of no reward for the righteous, or punishment for the wicked before the general refurrection, and the coming of Chrift to judge the world.

I might therefore have urged that, fince the doctrine of Chrift's pre-existence is contrary to reason, and was never taught by Christ or his apoftles, it could not have been the faith of their immediate disciples, in the first ages of chriftianity. This argument will have its weight with those who reject the doctrine of a foul, and make them look with fufpicion upon any pretended

proof

proof of the doctrine of Chrift's pre-existence, and of its having been the faith of the apostolical age, as well as their previous perfuafion that fuch is not the doctrine of the fcriptures. And fince all the three pofitions are capable of independent proof, the urging of them is not arguing in a circle, but the adducing of proper collaterial evi

dence.

I would conclude this Introduction, with advifing the advocates for the doctrine of the trinity, to confider what there is in it that can recommend it as a part of a system of religious truth. All that can be said for it, is that the doctrine, however improbable in itself, is neceffary to explain some particular texts of scripture; and that if it had not been for those particular texts, we should have found no want of it. For there is neither any fact in nature, nor any one purpofe of morals (which are the object and end of all religion) that requires it.

Is not one felf-exiftent almighty, infinitely wife, and perfectly good being, fully equal to the production of all things,

and alfo to the support and government of the worlds which he has made? A fecond perfon in the godhead cannot be really wanted for this purpose as far as we can conceive.

Whatever may be meant by the redemption

of the world, is not the being who made it equal to that alfo? If his creatures offend him, and by repentance and reformation become the proper objects of his forgivenefs, is it not more natural to suppose that he has, within himself, a power of forgiving them, and of reftoring them to his favour, without the strange expedient of another perfon, fully equal to himself, condefcending to animate a human body, and dying for them? We never think of any fimiliar expedient in order to forgive, with the greatest propriety and effect, offences committed by our children against ourselves.

Whatever be supposed to be the use of a third perfon in the trinity, is not the influence of the first perfon fufficient for that alfo? The descent of the Holy Spirit upon the apoftles was to enable them to work miracles.