assent to the four propositions, and to bring the negotiation to a speedy and satisfactory conclusion. [71] Owing, probably, to the interruption in the communications between Washington and New York when the dispatch of April 24 was written, Mr. Adams does not appear to have been able to *communicate his instructions to Lord John Russell before the 21st of May. He then informed Lord John that he had received instructions to negotiate, which he would "submit to his consideration if there was any disposition to pursue the matter further." Lord John Russell " expressed the willingness of Great Britain to negotiate, but he seemed to desire to leave the subject in the hands of Lord Lyons, to whom he intimated that he had already transmitted authority to assent to any modification of the only point in issue which the Government of the United States might prefer." He did not inform Mr. Adams that he also proposed to open negotiations with the insurgents, nor had Mr. Adams reason to suspect that fact. Matters were thus suspended in London, to enable Lord Lyons to work out Lord John Russell's instructions at Washington and in Richmond. 66 Lord Lyons received the dispatches of the 18th of May on the 2d of June,2 and at once conferred with Mr. Mercier. It was agreed that they should try to manage the business so as to prevent an inconvenient outbreak from the Government "3 of the United States. He then notified Earl Russell of what they proposed to do, and informed him of the instructions to Mr. Adams on this subject. He also intimated that it would be unreasonable *to expect that the insurgents should abandon privateering, unless "in return for some great concession." What concession remained to be given except recognition of national independence? Lord Lyons's inter ard. [72] It was not until the 15th of June that Lord Lyons and Mr. Mercier communicated the purport of their instructions to Mr. Sewview with Mr. Sew- ard in a joint interview, of which we have Mr. Seward's account1 and Lord Lyons's account,5 both dated the 17th of June. These accounts do not differ materially. The action as to the British Minister was this: Lord Lyons stated that he was instructed to read a dispatch to Mr. Seward and to leave a copy with him if desired. Mr. Seward refused to permit the dispatch to be read officially, unless he could first have an opportunity to acquaint himself with its contents. Lord Lyons handed him Lord John Russell's No. 136 for the purpose of unofficial examination. Mr. Seward saw that it spoke of the insurgents as belligerents, and on that ground refused to permit it to be officially communicated to him. He added that he preferred to treat the question in London, and Lord Lyons left with him, unofficially, a copy of Lord John Russell's 136, in order that he might more intelligently instruct Mr. Adams. The instructions thereupon written to Mr. *Adams are in the [73] same tone. Mr. Seward expresses regret that the British and French governments should have seen fit to take joint action in the matter; he refuses to admit that there are two belligerent parties to the struggle; he expresses regret that Great Britain did not await the arrival of Mr. Adams before instructing Lord Lyons, as Mr. Adams's instructions covered the whole ground; but be nowhere manifests a knowledge of the purpose of Great Britain to enter into communica 1 Vol. 1, page 52. 2 Vol. I, page 55. 3 Vol. I, page 56. tions with the insurgents at Richmond. That was studiously concealed from him. Termination of with United States. The negotiations were then transferred again to London, to the "profound surprise" of Mr. Adams. They were protracted there until the 19th of August, when Lord Russell informed negotiations Mr. Adams that Great Britain could only receive the assent of the United States to the Declaration of Paris upon the condition that Her Majesty should not thereby "undertake any engagement which should have any bearing, direct or indirect," upon the insurrection. The United States declined to be put upon a different footing from that of the forty-two independent Powers enumerated in Lord Russell's No. 136 to Lord Lyons, whose assent had been received without conditions, and the negotiations dropped. Great Britain de vateering. [74] *The arbitrators will thus perceive that Her Majesty's Government, having recognized the insurgents as belligerents, felt itself bound to receive the assent of the United sired to legalize priStates to the declarations of the Congress of Paris only conditionally, so as to have no bearing upon letters of marque that might be issued by the insurgents. But they will also observe that the two steps of the recognition of belligerency and the invitations to assent to the second and third clauses in the declarations were taken simultaneously, in accordance with a previous arrangement for joint action; and it is not impossible that they may come to the conclusion that Her Majesty's Government, when the insurgents were recognized as belligerents, contemplated that they would proceed to issue letters of marque, and intended to legalize those letters in the eye of British law, and to countenance the bearers of them in the destruction of American com merce. Meanwhile Lord Lyons had not forgotten his instructions to secure the assent of Mr. Jefferson Davis to the second and third rules of the Declaration of Paris. On the 5th of July he sent instructions to Mr. Bunch, British Consul at Charleston, to "obtain from the existing government in Negotiations at those [the insurgent] States securities concerning the [75] Richmond. proper treatment of neutrals.”1 He inclosed a copy of *Lord Russell's 136. He advised Mr. Bunch not to go to Richmond, but to communicate through the governor of the State of South Carolina and he accompanied this with "a long private letter on the same subject." The nature of that private letter may be gathered from what Mr. Bunch did. He put himself and his French colleague at once in communication with a gentleman who was well qualified to serve his purpose, but who was not the governor of South Carolina. They showed to this agent Lord John Russell's dispatch to Lord Lyons, and Lord Lyons's official and private letters to Mr. Bunch, and they told him that the step to be taken was one of "very great significance and importance." The agent asked them whether they "were prepared to receive an official act which should be based upon their request, thus giving to the Confederate Government the advantage before the world of such an implied recognition as this would afford." They replied that they "wished a spontaneous declaration;"" that to make this request the declared basis of the act would be to proclaim this negotiation, and the intense jealousy of the United States was such that this would be followed by the revocation of their exequaturs," which they wished to avoid; that could 3 Manuscript in Department of State. 1 Vol. I, page 71. 2 Vol. I, page 123. 3 [76] only look upon this step as the initiative toward a recognition, yet the object of their Government being to reach that *recognition gradually, so as not to give good ground for a breach, this indirect way was absolutely necessary." And they added, "All we have a right to ask is that you shall not give publicity to this negotiation; that we nor our Governments should be upon the record.”1 Their agent, being thus possessed of their views, went to Richmond, with Lord Lyons's letters and Lord Russell's dispatch, and while there be secured the passage, in the insurgent congress, of resolutions partially draughted by Mr. Jefferson Davis, which declared their purpose to observe principles toward neutrals similar to the second and third rules of the Declaration of Paris; that blockades to be binding must be effectual; and that they "maintained the right of privateering." In communicating this result to Lord Lyons, Mr. Bunch said, "The wishes of Her Majesty's Government would seem to have been fully met, for, as no proposal was made that the Confederate Government should abolish privateering, it could not be expected that they should do so of their own accord, particularly as it is the arm upon which they most rely for the injury of the extended commerce of their enemy. The United States think that the tribunal of Arbitration will agree with Mr. Bunch, that it was not expected that the insurgents would abolish privateering. 273 [77] The Tribunal of Arbitration cannot fail to observe that the propositions which were made in these negotiations to the Government of the United States were communicated to the insurgents, while pains were taken to conceal from the United States the fact that negotiations were opened at Richmond; that Earl Russell refused to receive the assent of the United States to the Declaration of Paris, except upon conditions derogatory to their sovereignty; and that Lord Lyons was instructed to secure the assent of the Government of the United States to the four principles laid down by the Declaration of Paris, while he was instructed, as to the insurgents, to secure their assent only to the second, third, and fourth propositions; and had no instructions to take steps to prevent privateering or to induce the insurgents to accept the first rule in the Declaration of Paris, although it had been agreed that the rules should be maintained as a whole and indivisible, and that the Powers who might accede to them should accede to them as such. The practical effect of this diplomacy, had it been successful, would have been the destruction of the commerce of the United States, (or its transfer to the British flag,) and the disarming a principal weapon of the United *States upon the ocean, should a continuation of this course of [78] insincere neutrality unhappily force the United States into a war. Great Britain was thus to gain the benefit to its neutral commerce of the recognition of the second and third articles, the rebel privateer cruisers were to be protected, and their devastation legalized, while the United States were to be deprived of a dangerous weapon of assault upon Great Britain. When the whole story of these negotiations was understood by Mr. Adams, he wrote to his Government as follows:4 "It now appears plainly enough that he wanted, from the first, to get the first article of the Declaration of Paris out of the negotiation altogether, if he could. But he did not say a word of this to me at the outset, neither was it consistent with the position hereto Mr. Adams's comments. 1 1 Unpublished manuscript in the Department of State at Washington. 4 Vol. I, page 103. fore taken respecting the necessity of accepting the declaration 'pure and simple.' What I recollect him to have said on the 18th of May was, that it had been the disposition of his Government, as communicated to Lord Lyons, to agree upon almost any terms, respecting the first article, that might suit the Government of the United States. When reminded of this afterward, he modified the statement to mean that the [79] article might be omitted altogether. It now *turns out, if we may judge from the instructions, that he did not precisely say either the one thing or the other. Substantially, indeed, he might mean that the general law of nations, if affirmed between the two Governments, would, to a certain extent, attain the object of the first article of the Declaration of Paris, without the adoption of it as a new principle. But he must have known, on the day of the date of these instructions, which is the very day of his first conference with me, and four days after the issue of the Queen's Proclamation, that the Government of the United States contemplated, in the pending struggle, neither encouraging privateers nor issuing letters of marque; hence that such a proposition would only complicate the negotiation for no useful purpose whatever. Besides which, it should be borne in mind that the effect, if adopted, would have been, instead of a simple adhesion to the Declaration of Paris, to render it necessary to reopen a series of negotiations for a modification of it between all the numerous parties to that instrument. Moreover, it is admitted by his Lordship that no powers had been given to make any convention at all-the parties could only agree. Yet, without such powers, what was the value of an agreement? For the Declaration of Paris was, by its very terms, binding only be[80] tween parties who acceded to it as a whole. Her Majesty's Government thus placed themselves in the position of a party which proposes what it gives no authority to perform, and which negotiates. upon a basis on which it has already deprived itself of the power to conclude. "How are we to reconcile these inconsistencies? By the terms of the Queen's Proclamation his lordship must have been aware that Great Britain had released the United States from further responsibility for the acts of its new-made belligerent that was issuing letters of marque, as well as from the possible offenses of privateers sailing under its flag; and yet, when the Government of the United States comes forward and declares its disposition to accept the terms of the Declaration of Paris, pure and simple, the Government of Her Majesty cannot consent to receive the very thing that they have been all along asking for, because it might possibly compel them to deny to certain privateers the rights which may accrue to them by virtue of their voluntary recognition of them as belonging to a belligerent power. Yet it now appears that, on the 18th of May, the same Government was willing to reaffirm the law of nations, which virtually involved the very same difficulty on the one hand, while on the other it had given no powers to negotiate a new con vention, but contemplated a simple adhesion to the old declaration [81] on *the part of the United States. The only way by which I can explain these various involutions of policy with a proper regard to Lord Russell's character for straightforwardness, which I have no disposition to impugn, is this: He may have instructed Lord Lyons prior to the 18th of May, the day of our first conference. I certainly received the impression that he had done so. Or he may have written the paper before one o'clock of that day, and thus have referred to the act as a thing completed, though still within his power, in order to get rid of the proposition to negotiate directly here. Of that I do not pretend to judge. But neither in one case nor in the other was there the smallest intimation of a desire to put in any caveat whatever of the kind proposed in his last declaration. That seems to have been an afterthought, suggested when all other obstacles to the success of a negotiation had been removed. 66 "That it originated with Lord Russell I cannot credit consistently with my great respect for his character. [82] "That it was suggested after his proposed consultation with his colleagues, and by some member who had in view the defeat of the negotiation in the interests of the insurgents, I am strongly inclined to believe. The same influence may have been at work in the earlier stages of the business *as well as the latest, and have communicated that uncertain and indirect movement which I have commented on, not less inconsistent with all my notions of his lordship's character than with the general reputation of British policy." The partial purpose which was thus disclosed in the first official act of the Queen's Government, after the issue of the proclamaconduct of Great tion of neutrality, appears often in the subsequent conduct United States, in the of that Government. Contrast between Britain toward the Trent affair, and toward violators of British neutrality in est. Thus, when, a few months later, an officer of the Navy of the insurgent inter- the United States had taken from the deck of a British vessel on the high seas four prominent agents traveling on an errand that, if successful, would result in disaster to the United States, against which they were in rebellion, the course of the British Cabinet indicated an unfriendliness so extréme as to approach to a desire for war. The news of this reached both countries at about the same time. In the United States, while there was some excitement and some manifestation of pleasure, Lord Lyons bears witness to the moderation of the tone of the press. Mr. Seward immediately wrote Mr. Adams to acquaint him that the act of Captain Wilkes was unauthorized, and Mr. Adams communicated this fact to Lord Russell.2 1 *The excitement in England, on the contrary, was intense, and [83] was fanned into animosity by the press. Although without information as to the purpose of the Government of the United States, peremptory instructions were immediately sent to Lord Lyons to demand the release of the four gentlemen, and to leave Washington with all the members of the legation, if the demand was not complied with in seven days.3 In anticipation of a refusal, vessels of war were hurriedly fitted out at the naval stations, and troops were pressed forward to Canada. In the midst of this preparation Lord Russell received from Mr. Adams official information that the act had not been authorized by the Govern ment of the United States; but this intelligence was suppressed, and public opinion was encouraged to drift into a state of hostility toward the United States. The arming continued with ostentatious publicity; the warlike preparations went on, and the peremptory instructions to Lord Lyons were neither revoked nor in any sense modified. Contrast this conduct of Great Britain with reference to a violation of British sovereignty that had not been authorized or assumed by the Government of the United States, and that, to say the least, could be plausibly defended by reference to *the decisions of Sir Wil- [84] 1 Lord Lyons to Earl Russell, Nov. 25, 1861, Blue Book No. 5, North America, 1862, page 10. 2 Earl Russell to Lord Lyons. 3 Earl Russell to Lord Lyons. Same, page 11. Blue Book No. 5, North America, 1862, page 3. |