in-law of Prioleau, of South Carolina, the managing partner in the Liverpool house of Fraser, Trenholm & Co. On the 7th of October Wright gave a power of attorney to one Corbett, an Englishman, "to sell her at any time within six months for a sum not less than £45,000 sterling. On the next day she cleared for Bombay, and sailed with a large supply of coal and about fifty [294] tons of metal and a *crew of forty-seven men." Corbett sold her to the insurgents on the high-seas, or rather made the form of transfer comply with the facts of the original transaction which took place in England. On the day after the Sea King left London, the Laurel, a screw-steamer, "nearly new built, very strong, and admirably adapted for a privateer," left Liverpool, clearing for Matamoras via Nassau. She took on board" a number of cases containing guns and carriages;" and she had "twenty-one seamen, six stewards, besides deck-hands and firemen," as first reported by the Consul at Liverpool. Further infor mation after she left led him to write that she had taken "about one hundred men, forty or fifty of whom were on the pirate Alabama, and all Englishmen." The two vessels met off Madeira. On the morning of the 18th of October they went together to the barren island of Porto Santo near Madeira, and there, with eighteen hours' work, transferred to the Sea King the arms and ammunition from the Laurel, “guns, gun-carriages, shot, shell, powder, clothing, goods, &c." The insurgent commander of the Sea King and about forty men came out of the [295] Laurel and took possession of *the vessel, and named her the Shenandoah; the insurgent flag was hoisted, the Laurel hoisted the English flag, and took on board some of the men of the Shenandoah, who could not be induced, even by "a bucketful of sovereigns,” to aid in violating the Queen's Proclamation; and the two vessels separated. The next appearance of the Shenandoah in a British port was at Melbourne in January, 1865. Her character and history were well known, and were at once brought to the notice of the Governor by the Consul of the United States. The evidence was so clear that the authorities evidently felt they must go through the form of arresting and examining her. This was the shell conceded to the United States. The kernel was reserved for the insurgents. The vessel was discharged and allowed to make extensive repairs; to go upon a dry dock; to take on board three hundred tons of coal, having at the time four hundred tons on board; and the authorities deliberately shut their eyes while she enlisted about fifty men.8 The Shenandoah, with its British crew, continued its career of destruction until long after the insurgents had abandoned the contest in [296] America. It was not until the 19th of June, 1865, that Bul*lock, managing things to the last, issued his instructions to Captain Waddell to desist. This communication the Foreign Office undertook to forward to him.10 Captain Waddell arrived with his ship in the Mersey in November, 1865, and surrendered his ship to the British Government, by whom it was handed over to the United States. 9 1 Dudley to Seward, Vol. III, page 319. 9 Bullock to Waddell, Vol. III, page 457 Mr. Mountague sels detained by Great Britain. It is due to Great Britain to say that, in addition to the rams, some other vessels were detained by Her Majesty's Government. Bernard's list of ves- Mr. Mountague Bernard, one of Her Majesty's High Commissioners at Washington, in his able and courteous, but essentially British, "Historical Account of the Neutrality of Great Britain during the American Civil War," thus recapitulates the action of the British Government in the cases which have not been hitherto noticed in this paper. From his position, it may reasonably be assumed that the list is a complete one : * * 1 "November 18, 1862-The Hector. Mr. Adams's application referred to the Admiralty November 18. This was an inquiry whether the Hector was building for Her Majesty's Government. On reference to the Admiralty it was answered in the affirmative.―January 16, 1863-The Georgiana. Referred to Treasury and Home *Office [297] January 17. Ship said to be fitting at Liverpool for the Confederates. Mr. Adams could not divulge the authority on which this statement was made. Reports from the customs, sent to Mr. Adams on the 18th, 19th, and 27th of January, tended to show that she was not designed for war. She sailed on the 21st of January for Nassau, and on the 19th of March was wrecked in attempting to enter Charleston Harbor.March 26, 1863-The Phantom and the Southerner. Referred to the Treasury and the Home Office March 27, to the Law Officers of the Crown June 2. The Phantom was fitting at Liverpool, the Southerner at Stockton-on-Tees. Both proved to be intended for blockade-runners. * *-March 18, 1864-The Amphion. Referred to Home Office March 18. This vessel was said to be equipped for the Confederate service. The Law Officers reported that no case was made out. She was eventually sent to Copenhagen for sale as a merchant-ship.-April 16, 1864-The Hawk. Referred to the Home Office, to the Lord Advocate, and the Treasury April 18. This case had been already (April 4) reported on by the customs, and the papers sent to the Lord Advocate. On the 13th of April the ship, which was suspected of having been built for the Confederates, left the Clyde without a register, and came to Greenhithe. The Law Officers *decided that there was no evi- [298] dence to warrant a seizure. She proved to be a blockade-runner. * * * January 30, 1865-The Virginia and the Louisa Ann Fanny. Referred to Treasury February 1. Vessels said to be in course of equipment at London. No case was established, and they proved to be blockade-runners, as reported by the Governor of the Bahamas, who had been instructed to watch their proceedings.-February 7, 1865-The Hercules and Ajax. Referred to Treasury and Home Office February 8 and 9. Both vessels built in the Clyde. The Ajax first proceeded to Ireland, and was detained at Queenstown by the mutiny of some of the crew, who declared she was for the Confederate service. She was accordingly searched, but proved to be only fitted as a merchant-ship. The Governor of the Bahamas was instructed to watch her at Nassau. On her arrival there she was again overhauled, but nothing suspicious discovered, and the Governor reported that she was adapted, and he believed intended, for a tug-boat. The Hercules being still in the Clyde, inquiries were made by the customs officers there, who reported that she was undoubtedly a tug-boat, and the sister ship to the Ajax." This is the whole catalogue of good works, additional to those already alluded to, which the accomplished advocate of Great Britain is able to put in *as an offset to the simple story of injuries which has been told in this paper. Comment upon it is unnecessary. 1 Bernard's Neutrality, page 352. [299] The United States have now completed what they have to say in this connection of the conduct of Great Britain during the insurrection. Some of the narrative may, in its perusal, appear minute, and to refer to transactions which will be claimed on the part of Great Britain to have been conducted in conformity with some construction of alleged International Law. These transactions are, however, historically narrated; and even those which come nearest to a justification, as within some precedent, or some claim of neutral right, exhibit a disinclination to investigate, not to say a foregone conclusion of adverse decision. British municipal statute rather than recognized International Law was the standard of neutral duty; and the rigid rules of evidence of the English Common Law were applied to the complaints made in behalf of the United States, in striking contrast to the friendliness of construction, the alacrity of decision, and the ease of proof in the interests of the insurgents. Before proceeding to relate in detail the acts of the several cruisers, which will constitute specific claims against Great Britain, the United States ask the Tribunal to pause to see what has been already established. September 25, 1869, idence. [300] *In a dispatch from Mr. Fish to Mr. Motley, on the 25th of September, 1869, in which the Government of the The charges in Mr.. United States, for the last time, recited diplomatically its Fish's instruction of grievances against Great Britain, certain statements were sustained by this evmade which were esteemed to be of sufficient importance to be transferred to Mr. Mountague Bernard's book. Mr. Bernard was pleased to say of these statements, that a "rhetorical color, to use an inoffensive phrase, [was] thrown over the foregoing train of assertions, which purport to be statements of fact." The United States now repeat those statements which Her Majesty's High Commissioner did them the honor to incorporate into his able work, and to comment upon, and they confidently insist that every statement therein contained has been more than made good by the evidence referred to in this paper. Those statements were as follows,1 the references to the proof being inserted for the convenience of the Tribunal : "As time went on; as the insurrection from political came at length to be military; as the sectional controversy in the United States proceeded to exhibit itself in the organization of great armies and fleets, and in the prosecution of hostilities on a scale of gigantic magnitude, then it was that the spirit of the Queen's Proclamation showed [301] itself in *the event, seeing that in virtue of the Proclamation maritime enterprises in the ports of Great Britain, which would otherwise have been piratical, were rendered lawful, [see Lord Campbell's speech in the House of Lords, May 16, 1861; cited ante, page 14,] and thus Great Britain became, and to the end continued to be, the arsenal, [see Huse and Ferguson's letters and Gorgas's report of Huse's purchases,] the navy-yard, [see the foregoing account of Bullock's doings,] and the Treasury, [see the foregoing evidence as to Fraser, Trenholm & Co.'s acts as depositaries,] of the insurgent Confederates. "A spectacle was thus presented without precedent or parallel in the history of civilized nations. Great Britain, although the professed friend of the United States, yet, in time of avowed international peace, permitted [see the decision in the Alexandra case; also the refusals to proceed against the Florida, Alabama, and the rams] armed cruisers to be fitted out and harbored and equipped in her ports to cruise against the 1 Bernard's Neutrality of Great Britain, 378-380. merchant-ships of the United States, and to burn and destroy them until our maritime commerce was swept from the ocean. [See Mr. Cobden's speech in the House of Commons, May 13, 1864.] Our merchantvessels were destroyed piratically by captors who had no ports of their own [see Earl Russell's speech in the House of Lords, April 26, 1864] in which to refit *or to condemn prizes, and whose only [302] nationality was the quarter-deck of their ships, built, dispatched to sea, and, not seldom in name, still professedly owned in Great Britain. [See the evidence in regard to the transfers of the Georgia, and of the Shenandoah.] * * * * * * * "The Queen's Ministers excused themselves by alleged defects in the municipal law of the country. [See Earl Russell's constant pleas of want of sufficient proof to convict criminals] Learned counsel either advised that the wrongs committed did not constitute violations of the municipal law, or else gave sanction to artful devices of deceit to cover up such violations of law. [See the decision as to the Florida; as to the Alabama until she was ready to sail; as to the rams; and as to the operations at Nassau, Bermuda, and Liverpool.] And, strange to say, the courts of England or of Scotland, up to the very highest, were occupied month after month with juridical niceties and technicalities of statute 'construction in this respect, [see the Alexandra case,] while the Queen's Government itself, including the omnipotent Parliament, which might have settled these questions in an hour by appropriate legislation, sat with folded arms, as if unmindful of its international obligations, and suffered ship after ship to be constructed *in its ports to wage [303] war on the United States. [See the decision of the Cabinet, communicated to Mr. Adams, February 13, 1863, and Lord Palmerston's speech in the House of Commons, March 27, 1863.] "When the defects of the existing laws of Parliament had become apparent, the Government of the United States earnestly entreated the Queen's Ministers to provide the required remedy, as it would have been easy to do, by a proper act of Parliament; but this the Queen's Government refused. [See the account of Lord Russell's interview with Mr. Adams, February 13, 1863.] "On the present occasion, the Queen's Ministers seem to have committed the error of assuming that they needed not to look beyond their own local law, enacted for their own domestic convenience, and might, under cover of the deficiencies of that law, disregard their sovereign duties toward another Sovereign Power. Nor was it, in our judgment, any adequate excuse for the Queen's Ministers to profess extreme tenderness of private rights, or apprehension of actions for damages, in case of any attempt to arrest the many ships which, either in England or Scotland, were, with ostentatious publicity, being constructed to cruise *against the United States. [See the evidence as to the [304] Florida, the Georgia, the Alabama, the rams, the Bermuda, the Tallahassee, the Pampero, the Rappahannock, the Laurel, and other vessels.] “But although such acts of violation of law were frequent in Great Britain, and susceptible of complete technical proof, notorious, flaunted directly in the face of the world, varnished over, if at all, with the shallowest pretexts of deception, yet no efficient step appears to have been taken by the British Government to enforce the execution of its municipal laws or to vindicate the majesty of its outraged sovereign power. [The Alabama, the Florida, the Georgia, and the Shenandoah escaped. The rams were seized, but never condemned; no guilty party was ever punished; Bullock and Prioleau were never interfered with.] "And the Government of the United States cannot believe-it would conceive itself wanting in respect for Great Britain to impute-that the Queen's Ministers are so much hampered by juridical difficulties that the local administration is thus reduced to such a state of legal impotency as to deprive the Government of capacity to uphold its sovereignty against local wrong-doers, or its neutrality as regards other Sover eign Powers. [Contrast with this the course of the British Gov[305] *ernment and Parliament during the Franco-German war.] 66 If, indeed, it were so, the causes of reclamation on the part of the United States would only be the more positive and sure, for the law of nations assumes that each Government is capable of discharging its international obligations; and, perchance, if it be not, then the absence of such capability is itself a specific ground of responsibility for consequences. [This statement probably will not be denied.] "But the Queen's Government would not be content to admit, nor will the Government of the United States presume to impute to it, such political organization of the British Empire as to imply any want of legal ability on its part to discharge, in the amplest manner, all its duties of sovereignty and amity toward other Powers. "It remains only in this relation to refer to one other point, namely, the question of negligence; neglect on the part of officers of the British Government, whether superior or subordinate, to detain Confederate. cruisers, and especially the Alabama, the most successful of the depredators on the commerce of the United States. "On this point the President conceives that little needs now to be said, for various cogent reasons: [306] *First, the matter has been exhaustively discussed already by this Department, or by the successive American Ministers. "Then, if the question of negligence be discussed with frankness, it must be treated in this instance as a case of extreme negligence, which Sir William Jones has taught us to regard as equivalent or approximate to evil intention. The question of negligence, therefore, cannot be presented without danger of thought or language disrespectful toward the Queen's Ministers; and the President, while purposing, of course, as his sense of duty requires, to sustain the rights of the United States in all their utmost amplitude, yet intends to speak and act in relation to Great Britain in the same spirit of international respect which he expects of her in relation to the United States, and he is sincerely desirous that all discussions between the Governments may be so conducted as not only to prevent any aggravation of existing differences, but to tend to such reasonable and amicable determination as best becomes two great nations of common origin and conscious dignity and strength. "I assume, therefore, pretermitting detailed discussion in this respect, that the negligence of the officers of the British Government in [307] the matter of the Alabama, at least, was gross and inexcusable, and such as indisputably to devolve on that Government full responsibility for all the depredations committed by her. Indeed, this conclusion seems in effect to be conceded in Great Britain. [See the preface to Earl Russell's Speeches and Dispatches.] At all events, the United States conceive that the proofs of responsible negligence in this matter are so clear that no room remains for debate on that point, and it should be taken for granted in all future negotiations with Great Britain." |