EVALUATION OF FINAL TESTS OF CONSTRUCTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION NEEDED Mr. DONNELLY. Mr. Chairman, this morning the committee is pleased to have before it Mr. Huggins, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force. Yesterday the Air Force was represented by Mr. Perry, the Deputy for Installations, and it had been the committee's desire that Mr. Huggins be here today to hear the testimony with respect to the evaluation of the final tests of construction and the corrective action needed, if any, as well as the extent thereof. Mr. RILEY. We are delighted to have Mr. Huggins here to hear this presentation. Mr. DONNELLY. Also we have here today Mr. Porter, of the firm that is one of the members of PSUOM, the architect-engineer. SOURCE OF DECISION FOR COMPLETION OF NOUASSEUR AND SIDI SLIMANE TO A LIMITED EXTENT OPERATIONALLY BY JULY 14, 1951 Before we go into the final tests and the necessary corrective action, I would like to ascertain from the Air Force whether the completion of Nouasseur and Sidi Slimane, the two bases, to a limited extent operationally by July 14, represented a date that was desired and needed by the Air Force. In fairness to Mr. Huggins I would like to state by way of background that Mr. Perry on July 2, 1952, testified that the Air Force had no idea as to where the July 1 date for completion of any of the work came from; and in that testimony I referred him to a letter written by Major General Timberlake, of the Air Force, dated January 10, 1951, requiring that four of the five bases reach a ready date of July 1, 1951. Mr. Perry indicated that he had just muffed that letter; that he had missed it completely. There has been a public statement made recently that Colonel Derby was apparently the one solely responsible for the decision to make the two bases, Nouasseur and Sidi Slimane, operational to a limited extent so that on July 14 a flight of Air Force planes landed at both bases. The committee should like to know from the Air Force whether that decision to have the bases operational to that limited extent on July 14, 1951, was in keeping with the decision and the needs of the Air Force. Mr. HUGGINS. I think, Mr. Donnelly, that the Air Force wanted those operational just as quickly as they could get them. In the state of confusion that existed at that time I would say that it is probably a little difficult to put your finger on any one individual and say that he was responsible for it. In reference to the General Timberlake letter of January 10, we had heard there was such a letter. We hunted all through the files and actually this is the first time I have had such a provision read to me. The initial directive of November called for the bases to be operational within 6 months after the equipment was admitted to the country. I think in everybody's mind the date of July 1 became fixed because they expected to get in on January 1. As we all know, they did not get in on January 1, but the date of July 1 remained fixed in everybody's mind and, to the best of my knowledge-and I have tried to inquire both here and abroad as to whether there was any specific direction to complete them by July 1, or to change that date—the specific date was never discussed once entry was obtained. I think the Air Force was delighted at the thought that they could get in in July. Certainly we did nothing to say "Slow down" if a slowdown were in order. My guess is-and it was largely a carry-over of a state of mindthat maybe somebody should have stopped, in view of the 4 months' delay in getting in there, to take a review of the situation and say, "Well, forget the July 1 date; pick up some place else," but that was not done. Mr. DONNELLY. I do not want to take advantage of you here with respect to testimony on this matter, but you indicate that the July 1 date was decided upon assuming entry would be had by January 1. Mr. HUGGINS. That is right. Mr. DONNELLY. And the Air Force did not review the situation after entry had been obtained and readjust the target dates for completion. Mr. HUGGINS. So far as I know, nobody reviewed it. Mr. DONNELLY. We have here a directive from USAFE-United States Air Force in Europe-headquartered at Wiesbaden, dated April 9, 1951; that was the date on which the district engineer was given a written directive by the 9ir Force to proceed with the construction of these bases. This is addressed to the district engineer and it says: 1. The below-listed projects are furnished to serve as a guide in establishing priority of construction for accomplishment within the over-all base-development plans in French Morocco. The primary objective of establishing these priorities is to achieve minimum operational facilities at the earliest date possible: a. Fighter base Then it has listed the date August 1, 1951. The specific locations for the fighter base, as I understand the program now, would be Boulhaut and El Djema Sahim. Mr. HUGGINS. That is right. Mr. DONNELLY. Here we have the Air Force on April 19, 1951, laying out the requirement for the fighter base to be operational by August 1, 1951. This is a classified letter or a secret letter, or I would put it in the record. It specifies the dimensions of the runway; the aircraft parking; the Avgas storage, and the like. Let us pass over to "b" where it lists the projects for each bomber base, for the date of August 1, 1951, giving specifications again; the dimensions for runway, aircraft parking, Avgas storage, warehouses and shops, and so forth. It mentions specifically the runways for the bomber bases; 9.000 feet by 200 feet, and at Ben Guerir 11,000 feet by August 1. And by October 1 the runways were to be extended so that at Ben Guerir they would be 13,000 feet and the other bases 11,000 feet. Then we have the depot at Nouasseur, again with the dimensions of the runways and other paving, and an outline of other facilities desired, again by August 1, 1951. The reason that I have asked the question is that there has been considerable confusion in the matter; that the Air Force was equivocating in congressional hearings on the matter in the past; and the record also shows that the contractors, the Corps of Engineers and the architect-engineer built to a limited operational extent by July 14 two bases, the one at Nouasseur in 83 days and the second base at Sidi Slimane in 64 days; and that these same men are building the balance of the bases and are still working for the Air Force. I just wanted to note for the record that what they had done by July 14 was actually in keeping with the wishes and the needs of the Air Force. Mr. HUGGINS. Let me just speak to that. It is the Air Force's fault that we do not have that document here. I had not known about it. But, insofar as a 6-month period for construction was set, that was based upon conferences between the Air Force and the Corps of Engineers. The Air Force is not a construction agency, has no background of knowledge as to what can be done within a given time. I would doubt somewhat in my own mind that we would give a directive-I cannot speak specifically to that-that we would give a directive saying, "Complete something by a given date" unless we had had some information that it could be done by that date. Certainly the initial directive was based upon a conference between top Air Force people and top Corps of Engineers people. Therefore, I express at least a doubt that the dates in that directive were pulled out of the air by the Air Force without consultation with somebody. But I cannot speak to it because I know nothing about it. Certainly it would be quite contrary to normal practice, and I think we would also expect the Corps of Engineers to tell us, if they could not do the work properly within that time, that the dates were unrealistic. Mr. DONNELLY. May I ask you this question, Mr. Huggins? Does the Air Force feel that the district engineer should be criticized for having had the two bases operational to a limited extent on July 14? Mr. HUGGINS. The Air Force feels that he should be criticized for not telling us that they could not be built under the specifications within that time. And, so far as I know, that was not done. We never authorized deviation from specifications, so far as I know, and I have tried to check on that point very carefully. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AIR FORCE AND CORPS OF ENGINEERS Mr. DONNELLY. Mr. Huggins, Mr. Perry also testified when he was here on July 2 to the relationship of the Air Force as the customer and the Corps of Engineers as the construction service. I should like to read his testimony and ask you whether it reflects the Air Force position: At the outset, I think it is extremely important that we understand the nature of the relationship between the Air Force and the Corps of Engineers. This relationship is spelled out in agreements between the Departments of the Army and the Air Force. These agreements describe the responsibilities of the Corps as, first, providing technical assistance in preparation of master plans; second, execution of designs and preparation of preliminary plans outlined in specifications and cost estimates; third, administration and on-the-site supervision of the construction; and, fourth, providing the Air Force with periodic progress and fiscal reports. The same agreements describe the responsibilities of the Air Force as, first, determination of its construction requirements and defense of its requirements within its budget estimate; and, second, stating generally its requirements for construction in terms of space lay-out, architectural style, characteristics of operations and equipment to be accommodated, degree of permanence, and such other details as are necessary to enable the designer to proceed in accordance with Air Force qualitative and quantitative requirements. Obviously, such a relationship requires a considerable degree of cooperation. This, in turn, makes it difficult to determine, in actual cases, where the responsibility of the Corps of Engineers begins and the responsibility of the Air Force ends. I think it is evident, however, that the Air Force cannot supervise actual construction and that the Air Force must rely upon the Corps for the quality of the construction and for the exercise of a sound judgment as to the cost of construction. If the Air Force attempted to supervise construction and costs on any detailed basis, it would be compelled to create an engineer corps of its own, thereby bringing about the very duplication which the Army-Air Force agreements were designed to avoid. Certainly, the Air Force has the duty of providing the corps with all the information necessary to draw the plans and specifications for, and carry out, the construction set forth in Air Force construction directives. By mutual agreement, the actual preparation of master plans for the Moroccan bases was a responsibility accepted by the corps, which, in turn, contracted the work to the architect-engineers. The Air Force has the right to approve all master plans in order to insure that they satisfied Air Force requirements. Mr. Huggins, let me hand that to you; it is quite lengthy. Mr. DONNELLY. Do you agree with that statement, General Pick? Would you like to look at it? General PICK. I would like to look at it. Mr. HUGGINS. I might add I have no specific recollection in the case of Morocco that the corps was to have charge of the master plans. Normally the Air Force provides the master plans. But it may be that there was a special deal on that. Certainly the same architectengineers were doing both the master planning and the detailed planning. General PICK (referring to testimony of Mr. Perry). I think that is in general a correct statement. NATURE, QUALITY, AND VALIDITY OF TESTS AND PROCEDURES USED IN FINAL STUDY AND DETERMINATION Mr. DONNELLY. So much by way of background of the interrelationships of the Air Force and the Corps of Engineers, and the role of the architect-engineers. We now come to the extensive months-long evaluation tests which were studied at Morocco, as I understand, in the latter part of August of this year. They were interpreted and a determination was then made by representatives of the Corps of Engineers, headed by General Pick, by the Air Force, by the architect engineers, headed by Mr. Porter, and by Atlas Constructors, as to the extent of the weaknesses or deficiencies in construction and the scope of needed corrective action. In that respect, General Pick, would you give the committee a statement as to the nature of the tests, the period covered, the quality of the tests, the validity of the tests, and the procedures employed in the final study and determination? General PICK. Mr. Chairman, I would like to review a moment the preliminaries leading up to the studies which have been referred to by counsel. REVIEW AND STUDIES OF MOROCCAN PROJECTS BY CHIEF OF ENGINEERS In the early part of October of 1951 it was brought to my attention that conditions were not going too well in north Africa. I could not go myself; so I sent General Nold, the Deputy Chief of Engineers, to north Africa, in the middle of October, to review the situation and make recommendations. The administrative and organizational problems over there were such that I thought it was necessary to look into them. General Nold made a report to me when he returned. He actually reported to me over the telephone from over there. As a result of his report it was decided to do some reorganizing on our part, so I established a new division and set up the headquarters at Richmond, Va. I put the work under that division, and took it out of the New York division office. As a result of that trip of General Nold and the reports which I had from our former division engineer, and the new division engineer, I had meetings with the members of the contracting firm of the Atlas Contractors and the officials of Atlas Contractors' firm and in the latter part of December I decided to make a trip to north Africa to see for myself. Prior to my going I sent two of our experts, Mr. Philipe and Mr. Pringle, over to north Africa to look into the construction features and to determine the character of the work. I made a trip out there in January and returned in February. As a result of that trip and the technical studies we had started, I directed that they be continued, and I had that included in a report which I submitted to the Secretary of the Army-a memorandum report to the Secretary of the Army-on the 6th of February 1952. And in that report I stated that There are exhaustive studies being conducted to determine whether or not the pavements which were rushed to completion in 1951 are fully responsive to the design criteria. If these studies show a need for additional treatment to insure the long life and low maintenance cost of the work, I believe that it will be a relatively minor undertaking. The completed work has been thoroughly tested with the heavy roller and no weak pavements were found— That was the condition that I observed when I was there in February. Mr. Chairman, I should like to insert a copy of this report of February 6 in the record at this point. Mr. RILEY. Without objection it will be inserted in the record at this point. (The document is as follows:) Memorandum for the Under Secretary of the Army. Through: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4. Subject: Visit to Middle East and Mediterranean areas. FEBRUARY 6, 1952. 1. Reference is made to letter dated February 4, 1952, from Office of the Under Secretary of the Army, subject: "Corps of Engineers Construction Contract in which request was made for a report upon the completion of my visit to Morocco. 2. There is attached a memorandum report on these projects which both points out the evaluation of the operations and also indicates the steps which have been taken to improve performance. LEWIS A. PICK, |