expediencies of a technical nature, that you can follow, but the main thing is you have got to have a reasonably good assortment of sizes of rock, about the size of your fist on down. But the rock at Nouasseur was so hard it was difficult to crush.

If you do not have a good assortment of sizes of rock, it will be loose, as General Pick described it.

Mr. RILEY. You would have been able to do that if you could have screened the aggregate.

Colonel DERBY. Yes.

General NOLD. But it would have taken longer, of course.

Mr. RILEY. Did you have the equipment to do that?

Colonel DERBY. No; we did not have. In other words, we decided in January that we would use the rock, that we would find some way of making the crusher produce what we needed, and we would not attempt to bring screening equipment over there.

Mr. RILEY. When did you first know that Nouasseur and Sidi Slimane would be locations for the crash program?

Colonel DERBY. Nouasseur was one of the first places selected. That is the only one of the original group. Sidi Slimane was picked out, I believe, about the end of February 1951, as I remember.

Mr. RILEY. You did have some notice prior to the agreement with the French that it would be one of the first locations?

Colonel DERBY. Yes. But we did not have very much information about it.

Mr. RILEY. Mr. Furcolo?

REASON FOR SHUFFLING OF LOCATIONS BETWEEN BENGUERIR AND MECHRA BEL KSIRI

Mr FURCOLO. I am not completely clear, Colonel, for the reason for changing from one place to the other.

Colonel DERBY. From Benguerir or Mechra bel Ksiri; which one do you mean?

Mr. FURCOLO. The one where you went first, from Benguerir to this Mechra bel Ksiri. And then you went back to Benguerir.

Colonel DERBY. The set-up after that first initial shuffle. Initially we were to build bases at Nouasseur, Marrakech, Meknes, Khouribga, and Rabat-Sale.

We were short of people, and at the time we did not have the land turned over to us, so we started first building the camps at Nouasseur and Sidi Slimane. We had started, barely started, at Benguerir and had not yet made a start at Mechra bel Ksiri, which was one of the sites after the initial shuffle, when we were told to abandon Benguerir. Mechra bel Ksiri was a new place, and it was one of the four sites that we thought about moving to. That is the reason we moved there that was one that was already on the schedule.

Mr. FURCOLO. What was the reason that Mechra bel Ksiri was abandoned?

Colonel DERBY. Because it was at the foot of the hill that General Old considered was an obstacle.

Mr. FURCOLO. That is what I want to get straight. Apparently there was some difficulty throughout this whole picture; was that the reason, or was there some diplomatic reason? Was the difficulty one that might have been caused through a failure to recognize certain

geographical or topographical difficulties, which, at the time Mechra bel Ksiri was selected, might have been detected by an engineer?

Colonel DERBY. I would say it is a question of interpretation. I have never yet run across two pilots that will agree on what constitutes an obstacle, and yet in all the books that we have had on the subject, that location seemed to meet with the approved criteria.

Another thing, there was a change in command. First they had General Hamilton, and then they had Colonel Hardy, and then they had General Old. All of them had different ideas.

Mr. FURCOLO. Let me ask you the question this way: The reason for leaving Mechra bel Ksiri was not based on any diplomatic difficulty?

Colonel DERBY. No.

Mr. FURCOLO. But was because of something in the terrain, either the geographical or topographical terrain?

Colonel DERBY. That is correct. And I would say this, Mr. Furcolo, that the French were glad to see us go from there. It was a place they had approved, but when they found out we were going to leave, they were tickled to death; but that is not the reason why we pulled out.

Mr. FURCOLO. The reason had something to do strictly with the terrain.

Colonel DERBY. Yes.

Mr. FURCOLO. Geographical or topographical.

Colonel DERBY. Yes.

Mr. FURCOLO. Now, you mentioned, or at least not in connection with this, there being a hill or mountain that might have constituted some sort of a hazard apparently to take-off.

Colonel DERBY. Yes.

Mr. FURCOLO. Was there anything else that had to do with it, such as the terrain on which the runway was located?

Colonel DERBY. No.

Mr. FURCOLO. That was the only reason, the hill.

Colonel DERBY. That is correct.

Mr. FURCOLO. That is, to the best of your knowledge.

Colonel DERBY. That is correct. And I would like to take this opportunity to flatly deny a statement that has gone the rounds about this place being subject to flood. I have been in the flood-control business for 4 or 5 years, or longer, and I made a specific point of checking into this to see where the floodwaters would come to, and see that the site would not be any place where it would be below floodwaters. From the construction point of view, it was a very fine site. It was close to a gravel pit, only a very short distance away, and would have been an ideal site from my point of view. And the only reason why-well, Colonel Haseman brings out another point, which I think should be added. It is that General Old was very conscious of the fact that you can fly fighters off a bomber field-but you cannot do it the other way. Mechra bel Ksiri had been chosen as a fighter field and the terrain did not lend itself to expansion to a bomber field.

So that he also felt, and I think quite soundly, that if another site were readily available and could be readily expanded into a bomber field that it would be an advantageous thing to do. That was another consideration that entered into the picture.

PROBLEM OF RECRUITMENT

Mr. FURCOLO. It is my impression that in your testimony you mentioned the difficulty of getting men, or the manpower situation. Colonel DERBY. That is correct; that was a very critical thing in the early days.

Mr. FURCOLO. I understood from one of the witnesses we had about 2 weeks ago I think it was in connection with both bases-he testified that there was no difficulty at all in getting men from the United States, recruiting them in New York, even though the rate of pay was a little bit less than it was in this country.

At the time I questioned him about that, and asked if he were certain of it, and if that were so, why would workingmen be willing to leave this country and go over to these bases at a lesser rate of pay than they can get right in New York, and my recollection was he said there was no difficulty because of the fact they were to get the work at a guaranteed annual income.

Now you testify your experience is just contrary to that, assuming my recollection of what he said is correct.

Colonel DERBY. My experience is contrary to that. The build-up was quite an annoying problem, although Atlas recruiting was not limited to New York; they drew from the whole. United States, and not just from the New York area.

The main reason I think these men were willing to go over there to work was that they were getting overtime; they were on a 66-hour week originally, although the plan was to cut the hours back to 60. But it was the overtime that brought them over there, rather than the rate of pay, which is, as you say, less than the New York rate and less than even at other places around over the country.

There was, of course, a guarantee that they would get 40-hour week, 173 hours per month. So that that was one of the inducements, but it was the prospect of overtime that we felt brought these men over, even though it did not bring them over as fast as we would like to have had them.

Mr. FURCOLO. General NOLD, did you want to add something to that?

General NOLD. I think perhaps it was my testimony at the time, Mr. Furcolo.

Mr. FURCOLO. I do not remember whether it was you who was testifying.

General NOLD. I think it was. The discussion we had at that time had to do primarily with the rates of pay and income, and the question of whether men could be obtained, and apparently one of the explanations given then was that we would not have difficulty, and I think the statement was that it would be substantially more than they would expect to get in the United States.

However, this was not in answer to the point that was raised, but referred to one of the difficult problems.

PROBLEM OF TERRAIN AS FACTOR IN ABANDONING PROJECT AT MECHRA

BEL KSIRI

Mr. FURCOLO. This last question: As I have understood your testimony with reference to leaving Mechra bel Ksiri, I understood you to say that the reason for the change was the presence of that

hill, and the fact that the base could not be expanded into a different type of operation.

Colonel DERBY. Those two factors both entered into it.

Mr. FURCOLO. Do I understand that both of those factors were known to the Air Corps all of the time?

Colonel DERBY. Certainly the first one was plainly visible to any Air Force officer who wanted to look at it.

I think it is a matter of difference of opinion on the other matter, because there was a change in commanders, concerning the operation of planes. Apparently General Hamilton did not know much about the operation of planes, but I do know that he had operating people on his staff, and there were operating people who were concerned with both fighter fields and bomber fields. I recall that the Strategic Air Command complained that they were not represented. They may not have felt they were adequately represented, but they certainly were represented.

I think it is a matter of opinion of different people concerning the question of expanding to the bomber base, which was a policy matter, which I do not think came up at the time of the original selection.

WAGE SCALE

Mr. FURCOLO. May I also ask you this question: What was the wage scale? Was it the same as the New York City wage scale, or was it higher or lower?

Colonel DERBY. It was lower than New York City, and it was higher than at some other places; it was based on the average throughout the country, plus maybe a little bit more to make it attractive. But the Chief of Engineers has an expert on that subject who studies the wage rates which are available, and keeps a pretty good record and a check and no doubt gets to a point where he averages them up. He studies the figures, and comes up with an average figure, which will work up pretty well.

Mr. FURCOLO. Öff the record.

(Off-record discussion.)

Mr. RILEY. Mr. Davis?

Mr. DAVIS. Colonel Derby, as the district engineer of the east Atlantic district, you had jurisdiction over the construction work in north Africa?

Colonel DERBY. Yes.

Mr. DAVIS. How much time have you actually spent in north Africa?

Colonel DERBY. I went there the 1st of October 1950 for 2 weeks. I went back in January of 1951, and was there until the end of February. I went to Paris, which is a related part of the problem, for about 10 days in April. Then I got back about the 20th, or somewhere in the twenties, of May, and with the exception of a very short trip back here, I have been there ever since May until I was called back here recently.

METHOD OF SELECTING CONTRACTOR

Mr. DAVIS. It was your responsibility as the district engineer for the east Atlantic district to recommend to the Chief of Engineers, if my understanding is correct, the contractor to handle this job?

Colonel DERBY. That is correct.

Mr. DAVIS. Will you tell us about how you went about the selection of the contractor for this work?

General NOLD. I believe I had better answer that, Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS. I wonder if you should, in view of the fact that Colonel Derby testified it was his responsibility to recommend the contractor. Suppose we let him tell us what he did, and then if you would like to add anything to it, very well.

General NOLD. All right.

Colonel DERBY. All of the various engineers' offices have brochures on file of the various people, that is, of the contractors who are willing and available to do work, when we want them.

Also, the Chief of Engineers had a policy of spreading the work around amongst them, so far as negotiated contracts were concerned. I would not make any recommendation of a contractor until I had time to check the contractors we had available for the job. Based on that policy, and also on the information that was available, I started studying the brochure of available people, and also letting the word out, and I think I did that myself; I think I let the word out in order that I would have some contact, that we had some work. And some of them came to me asking about work.

And in addition I had had some experience of my own with some of them. I eventually wound up by having a large stack of brochures about this high [indicating].

I had prepared several alternative recommendations to the Chief, one of which was to give it to the Morrison-Knudsen Co.; another one was a combination headed by Mr. Mills, and consisting of Mills, Blythe Bros., and Nello L. Teer.

The Chief, after looking over these, said that there were not enough, that "I do not want either of those combinations"; so I got Mr. Bonny and Mr. Mills to come back and add another, I believe, Bates & Rogers. So we went back to the Chief, and as I recall, he put Rogers & Bates in addition to Mills group, combined it with Morrison-Knudsen, and said it would be an acceptable firm.

I also called Mr. Bonny and called Mr. Rogers over the phone, and he said he would be willing to join the group, and the Chief said that was all right, that it would compose a fine group.

So we selected a combination headed by Mr. Bonny and Mr. Mills. All of them were firms who had worked with us very successfully, and with me in Norfolk, Va., particularly. Bates & Rogers, who had done competitive work, had done work on the Buggs Island and Philpott jobs, and had done an exceedingly good job. So we had great confidence in them.

That is how we happened to come up with a combination headed by Mr. Mills and Bonny. Bates & Rogers had the Philpott job, had been a part of the combination; of course, as far as Morrison-Knudsen are concerned, they are known all over the world and you do not have to go very far to find out about them.

Genera! NOLD. I would like to make this further explanation, if I may. As has been explained, we had a tremendous program ahead of all of us; and, as Colonel Derby has told you, we had some contractors who had done jobs in combination with others.

The district engineer normally calls up and makes a recommendation, which is gone over by the division engineer, who is the immediate supervising agency of the district.