changes in sites caused little harm to the progress of work, for at that time we did not have enough construction workers to go ahead on five fields simultaneously. I told General Old at that time that he could make a pretty thorough investigation, as far as I was concerned, and if we actually had the three additional sites turned over to us clear and ready to start on by the 15th of August 1951, that I would feel it would have no serious effect on the work.

PROBLEM IN ACQUIRING SITES ADAPTABLE TO USE BY JET BOMBERS

He threw himself into that with a great deal of vigor, and of course I naturally worked with him a great deal in that process. It soon became evident that he had a new concept, an idea which the people in the Air Force had never given, and that was the sensitiveness of jet bombers to altitude and to temperature in take-off. So he was very insistent that the fields should, as far as possible, be located where the temperature was generally cooler and the site at a lower altitude. Unfortunately it happens that such land also comprise the best agricultural lands. And in a country that is predominantly agricultural, and since such sites fell in the very heart of the agricultural land, again we ran into difficulty with the French, because the basic Government agreement required that the French were to contribute the land for the bases, to put them at our disposal without cost to us.

If they picked sites that were located in good farming territory, naturally it would cost them a great deal more money than if we went to some place that was dry farming.

That I can readily appreciate; I can appreciate the French point of view. You can imagine what would happen if we picked out the best farming land in your community or State, and asked the State to donate the land to the Federal Government for an airfield. would expect to encounter some difficulty.

SELECTION OF OTHER SITES

You

So it was not until September of 1951 that we arrived at sites which would be acceptable both to the Air Force and to the French. In the course of the reshuffle we went back to Benguerir, and we also picked out a place called Boulhaut, a short distance from Casablanca--about halfway between Rabat and Casablanca.

It is not too good a site there, but we will come back to that later. It was the best that we could do then to meet the operational requirements, and still be acceptable to the French.

The other place was Sidi Slimane, up to the northeast, and little southeast of Port Lyautey.

These places were to be made available to us, but here we encountered delay. We did not get general clearance to start construction. on them until mid-December-I think we got Boulhaut turned over to us sometime in January of 1952; El Djema Sahim has not been turned over to us yet, for the reason that about the time the French got ready to turn it over to us the evaluation of the location had gone to the point where the Air Force was convinced that they had to have a much larger reservation in order to have proper dispersal for airplanes.

96640-52-pt. 4

El Djema Sahim had been accepted as a very minimum size reservation, and the French had given it with a great deal of reluctance, as it constituted some of the better agricultural land down there.

Then they were suddenly told in January of 1952 that the Air Force needed nearly double the amount that they were going to give us. The French were not able to do it, and the El Djema Sahim site is still floating around undetermined.

Well, we went ahead and met the 14th of July date all right, and in doing so we thought everything was going along fine. We did not have as much camp space, and so forth, as we had hoped to get. And I might mention at this point that the camp construction was a completely new arrangement, because the original plan had contemplated that the troops would live at the existing bases with the French and we would not have to build a whole lot of new troop housing right away.

(Off-record discussion.)

TIME LOST IN SHUFFLING SITES BETWEEN BENGUERIR
AND MECHRA BEL KSIRI

Mr. RILEY. Colonel Derby, Benguerir was one of the original bases selected?

Colonel DERBY. After the first reshuffle.

Mr. RILEY. After the first reshuffle.

Colonel DERBY. Yes.

Mr. RILEY. Then you moved the operation up to Mechra bel Ksiri.

Colonel DERBY. I think Mechra bel Ksiri was the substitute for one of the original sites.

Mr. RILEY. Am I correct in understanding that was after the visit of these gentlemen from the Air Force office?

Colonel DERBY. What they did was to stop operations.

Mr. RILEY. At Benguerir.

Colonel DERBY. And we moved camp from there.

Mr. RILEY. To Mechra bel Ksiri.

Colonel DERBY. That is right.

Mr. RILEY. And you then abandoned Mechra bel Ksiri and came back to Benguerir?

Colonel DERBY. That is right.

Mr. RILEY. Would you estimate that would constitute about 6 months' construction time?

Colonel DERBY. It was from April to December

Mr. RILEY. That would be a little longer?

Colonel DERBY. I think that would be a little overstatement. Mr. RILEY. How much time would you say was lost on construction. Colonel DERBY. My feeling still is that had they completed the reshuffle by the 15th of August, as they promised, that we would have lost very little time, but actually, let us say from the middle of August to the middle of December-that would be September, October, November, and December 1951-4 months.

Mr. RILEY. I understood you to say you had already set up operations, had made some progress at Benguerir, and that operation was moved to Mechra bel Ksiri, and you did some work there, and you found that it was not operationally safe, so you came back to

Benguerir. Certainly to a layman that would involve a considerable loss of time in that reshuffling back and forth.

Colonel DERBY. Oh, yes.

Mr. RILEY. If you had been allowed to go ahead with Benguerir, you could have completed it shortly after you did Sidi Slimane.

Colonel DERBY. I am not sure. Shortly after that, no; for the reason that we did not have enough people to put all the equipment on a two-shift basis. You realize that due to the fact that starting late in April there was a manpower shortage, as well as other things facing So that I feel that all that we lost on that was the time put in on these construction camps, which could have better been put on some other work.

us.

And also we might have been able to put these people to work on Nouasseur and Sidi Slimane would have speeded up that work by a week or so. Then, we did lose, by virtue of the fact that instead of the French and the Air Force agreeing on sites by the 15th of August, which was the date I had given them, it was not until December, which is about 4 months. So I would say that we lost about 4 months.

EXPENDITURES AT MECHRA BEL KSIRI

Mr. RILEY. How much money would you say was spent on Mechra bel Ksiri?

Colonel DERBY. It was a good $100,000 spent, and according to more recent bookkeeping studies-I looked over the first estimate they made-it was a little more than that. It may have run as much as $300,000, but I do not think it ran over that. That was just before I left.

Mr. RILEY. That would involve the moving expenses, as well as the construction at Mechra bel Ksiri?

Colonel DERBY. I would think so. I am not too positive on that point.

Mr. RILEY. Is there someone elese who could answer that? Colonel DERBY. Some of the construction people who are here would know more about that than I would; they kept the records for us, but just before I left Morocco they gave me the $300,000 figure. The previous study had been based on just the minimum unsalvageable losses, which had been about $140,000, if I remember the figure correctly.

Mr. RILEY. You had equipment at Benguerir, and you had some supplies and materials there?

Colonel DERRY. Yes.

Mr. RILEY. Which you had to move some distance.

Colonel DERBY. Some 200 miles, and the cost of moving the equipment and the labor.

Mr. RILEY. And then moving it back again.

Colonel DERBY. Whether we physically moved the same stuff back, I would not say.

Mr. RILEY. It has the same effect.

Colonel DERBY. Because some of it we had used. No doubt that it cost something like $100,000.

Mr. RILEY. But that was the decision of the Secretary's office of the Air Force which caused that?

Colonel DERBY. It was the decision of the Secretary-that is rightto move from Benguerir in the first place; it was the decision of the Air Force, that is true, as I understand, concurred in by the Secretary. That was of course their decision; the move from Mechra bel Ksiri back to Benguerir was, of course, on General Old's recommendation, rather than the Secretary, but he got the approval, of course.

Mr. RILEY. You were acquainted, of course, with the architectural contracting firm before you went over to Africa?

Colonel DERBY. Just before I went over. I selected them-I recommended them for selection to the Chief, because he has the final authority. The contract is made by him; I recommended the firm, after discussing it with various people in the Chief's office, with those who were in the airfield business. And he recognized that Mr. Porter is an outstanding authority on foundations and paving and that sort of thing.

DEVELOPMENT OF PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS AS CONSTRUCTION

PROGRESSED

Mr. RILEY. Have you been able to draw any plans and make the specifications prior to actually starting work on construction at Nouasseur and Sidi Slimane?

Colonel DERBY. Oh, no.

Mr. RILEY. You were not able to do that until you got clearance with the French?

Colonel DERBY. They came over, the first of the architect-engineer people, in January with me. The French were not objecting to our sending over architect-engineer people. I think that the statement that was made was 130 Americans could be enough-that means 130 contractor people.

Mr. RILEY. But what I would like to know, Colonel, is if there was any condition that prevented you from making preliminary plans and drawing up specifications that would meet the requirements at Sidi Slimane and Nouaseur, or is it something that would develop after actual construction work got started?

Colonel DERBY. It was both. We had made some very minor preliminary studies beforehand, but that is something that goes on continuously during the job.

Now, I might bring out a further point on this specification business: That normally I think it is the thought that perhaps we did not have very nicely typewritten sets of specifications for the contractor, in detail; that we could not possibly have a contract without having the specifications written up beforehand.

On a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee job the contractor simply agrees to do what we tell him, and we pay the cost of it; so that if we arrive at a situation in the field where we have one type of specifications and find it is going to cost a great deal more money to follow them, because it might result in delay and increased cost, then the Government must pay these extra costs, and not the contractor, which is contrary to the normal set-up.

So we restudy the designs, consider whether they will cause delay or increased expense. We must balance the product, we would like to have, against cost and money and time.

So that the specification business was being conducted, and adjustments made, on the job. We did have joint meetings, working with Mr. Porter or his people he was not there too much of the timeour people and Atlas. I have very excellent people in my own staff, one is Mr. Coy here. We would have the three agencies get together, go out on the job and discuss what was the practical thing to do, write a little memorandum about it, and ordinarily that memorandum constituted the specifications that we operated under.

Mr. RILEY. In other words, would it be a fair statement to say that specifications were developed as the work progressed? Colonel DERBY. Yes.

Mr. RILEY. And in accordance with conditions that were then existing?

Colonel DERBY. That is right.

Mr. RILEY. Would it be correct to say, Colonel, that it would be impossible to do very much planning in advance of actual construction? Colonel DERBY. Yes. Studies are continuous while we are on the work. It is a little bit like telling a fellow that I would like to have him build me a house up in New York State some place; go ahead and get started, buy the building material, and when I get the plans made, I will be able to tell you where I want you to build it, and how many rooms, how many bathrooms I will want in it.

ADAPTATION OF SPECIFICATIONS TO LOCAL MATERIAL AVAILABILITY

Mr. RILEY. Were you able to get materials at Sidi Slimane and Nouasseur to compare with the materials that could have been obtained in the United States, such as aggregates, sand, and so forth? Colonel DERBY. Oh, yes; cement?

Mr. RILEY. Yes, comparing favorably with materials that could have been obtained in this country?

Colonel DERBY. The aggregates are always available, of course, varying individually with one location to another, just as in this country.

Mr. RILEY. That would mean you would have to modify your specifications to meet the situation.

Colonel DERBY. Oh, yes; we would adapt the specifications to what was available in the locality, what was available on the ground.

We had at Sidi Slimane a very fine gravel pit about 5 miles away from the runway, and that made it a very economical situation for us. At Nouaseur we had a quarry. The difficulty of the quarry was that it was well, there were two difficulties-one being that the rock was so hard that the contractor's equipment could not crush it without heavy maintenance. The other was it came out of the quarry in such shape that it would not break up to the right size rocks.

I believe I have mentioned to you that back in January when we first got together, we had decided that we would plan on doing this job with crusher-run materials; that the materials would not be sorted out in different sizes, but that we would take the materials just as they came out of the crusher. And in doing that we have always had control, in that we can take some of it and recrush it, or we could add a little earth if we did not get the right sizes. There are all sorts of