had had run out, and our contract obligated us specifically to notify the district engineer of the status of obligation of funds. It was within the district engineer's authority to advise what steps to take if we ran out of money, which we did, and a number of times advised the district engineer that we were in only a matter of days of running out of funds, and that we would have to shut down business, that we would have to lay off personnel if we were not permitted additional funds. On a number of occasions, the district engineer, through heroic effort, because we would be in constant touch with him day by day, result in getting funds, that is, through the assistance of the Chief's office, succeeded in getting funds sometimes 24 or 48 hours before we were going to have to shut off work, then we would go ahead and continue our procurement. But sometimes he was not able to get the funds before it was necessary to shut down; and we would have on order, individually, by specific names, we would have on order men who had been notified to get ready to go overseas, and who were prepared to be shipped over, their recruitment had gone through, they had gone through their examination, their records were ready for them to sail, and then we would have to get in touch with the recruitment sources, and in 2 or 3 weeks would have to start all over again, which of course would cause constant dissatisfaction among them. The men themselves, even when they eventually got on the job, after they arrived, because of such conditions, were delayed 2 or 3 or 3%1⁄2 months, by the time they were on the job, and by the time they got over there there had been such delays as to be disruptive of morale right from the start on their arrival. The same thing is true of procurement. We got into the situation by calling for bids of various items, and we had several complaints from vendors, who said that sometimes they would have several thousand dollars tied up in the preparation of plans, and in the preparation of estimates on which to submit bids, and some of them may be a low bidder. the meantime these delays would occur and the plans were not available or had been changed. And finally they would decide maybe they would not care whether they did business or not. We were in that particular situation, have been, and I presume it is something that is going to keep the vendors from knowing definitely what they can do, and many of them have reached the point where they do not care whether they get the business or not. BITTERNESS AMONG ARCHITECT-ENGINEERS, ATLAS CONSTRUCTORS, AND CORPS OF ENGINEERS I do not believe that Mr. Huggins properly evaluated the difficulties that were brought about in that regard, with respect to the situation of plans. As far as Mr. Huggins' statement on bitterness, it appears that Mr. Huggins has been to a number of individuals in the Air Force and in the architect-engineer's office concerning such statements; I do not know whom he talked to-I do not know their names. I can only say that as far as Atlas was concerned, that we were conscious, as I believe we stated yesterday, of situations where three or four echelons down the line, on occasions, it was necessary for us to appeal the decisions of the architect-engineer's representative to the district engineer's representative. There is certainly no surprise in that; there was nothing unusual, and certainly there was no unusual amount of disruption or dissatisfaction as far as we know. We did know that we took the district engineer's orders and he settled matters where there may have been controversies over work as they arose. Now, it must be remembered that Atlas contractors had no direct connection either with the Air Force or the architect-engineer representative. Our contract was with the Corps of Engineers, and certainly at that high level Atlas had not made it any of its business, and we were not permitted to get into any of the controversies or dissatisfactions that may have existed at this level. I personally met General Old on one occasion that I remember, and that was in August of 1951. We spent an entire day looking at various proposed sites, or air bases. They had not reached a decision. Mr. Mills, Colonel Derby, and a representative from the architectengineer people, as well as a representative from the district engineer himself were present on occasion. I stated at that time to General Old that I felt that it was urgent that somebody make up his mind where they wanted something. That was the only official contact that I personally ever had with the Air Force representative, except at a meeting in January. That meeting was held in the headquarters of the offices of Atlas, in Casablanca, by a representative of the Secretary of the Army, of the Air Force, of the architect-engineer people, and of Atlas. At that meeting there was discussion of the alleged bad performance of construction at Nouaseur. The representative of the architect-engineer, or rather one of the representatives, on that occasion indicated that he considered there had been definite failure to meet the specifications on the part of Atlas. I stated at that time, as I have stated before this committee, that there were no specifications, except instructions to us from the district. engineer in general, and that we had not failed to meet any of those instructions. I had made it clear to all concerned that we were in a position where there had in fact been no standard specifications possible of adoption; that the specifications had been developed as the job opened up, and that in fact all we had were the instructions of the district engineer which we had followed to the best of our ability. That particular occasion is the last one in which I personally had any contact with the Air Force people on the site. I did have a second meeting with the district engineer people, and was on the job for some time after that. As far as we are concerned in the matter, if Mr. Huggins' statement has any connection with Atlas, insofar as any bitterness or extreme dissatisfaction is concerned, he has talked to people who certainly did not convey it to us. Mr. FURCOLO. Later on I may want you to comment on the same thing, but first I would like to go through a part of this statement which Mr. Huggins made. I am not going to ask so much about the general conclusions, but the facts, to come down to some specific things that he said with reference to facts. We very often can draw a different conclusion from the same facts but let us see what the facts are. DATE OF TERMINATION OF CRASH PROGRAM Let us see whether or not we are in agreement or disagreement on what he said concerning certain facts. I think I would like to ask you first with reference to the statement made by Mr. Huggins that he was under the impression that July 14 was supposed to have been the end of the crash program. There was no written directive given by the Air Force, but later on in a question asked by Congressman Davis he again says, "I think it was the feeling that the crash program was to end on July 14." Now, I would like to ask first the Atlas people when they thought the "crash program" was over? Mr. BONNY. We still thought the crash program was not over until January 15 of this year; we were so advised. Mr. FURCOLO. Which year? Mr. BONNY. 1952. And in the second place, we had very definite crash directive orders for immediate and urgent performance under crash conditions long after July 14 in connection with urgent housing for the Air Force, where they called upon us to perform additional construction to house troops in a matter of a very short number of days, not once, but several times, when we were called upon to expedite urgent matters in the way of paving specific areas for parking airplanes, and where they called upon us for extreme and urgent construction of warehousing facilities to house Air Force goods, to keep them out of the weather up to the time of the storm, which were performed to the best of our ability. There was a series of individual crash orders within the crash program, there was no indication that the crash program ended on June 14. Mr. FURCOLO. I want to ask the engineers when, as far as you know, was the crash program over? General NOLD. I would say in a general way, Mr. Chairman, that as far as the Chief of Engineers was concerned, we knew the crash program was over when we received the directive dated January 15. Colonel Derby will cover that item in detail. Mr. FURCOLO. I wonder if, in your answer, Colonel Derby, in reading whatever order or directive you had, if you will give us the date. Colonel DERBY. This is dated January 15, 1952. The Department of Air Force, Headquarters, United States Air Force, Washington, D. C., January 15, 1952. Subject: Construction of French Morocco Air Force Bases. (Enclosure.) Reference is made to our initial directive for the French Morocco construction under letter subject Construction Authorization for Certain Overseas Installation, dated November 29, 1950. Subsequent directives were issued under date of May 31, 1951, and June 21, 1951. Paragraph 2. Initial directive cited above indicates that the first phase of this construction to produce maximum operational facilities in the minimum of time would require about 6 months subsequent to clearance for you to enter the Morocco area. This phase of the work is considered to be accomplished in the extreme urgency indicated under paragraphs 3 and 4, and will be considered as applying to continuation of this program, and the remainder of this program will be carried out in a normal, businesslike manner, consistent with sound engineering and good engineering practices. For the Chief of Staff: COLBY M. MYERS, Brigadier General, United States Air Force, Deputy Director of Installation, Mr. FURCOLO. Is that the first notification that the engineers had from the Air Force that the crash phase of the program was over? Colonel DERBY. Absolutely. Mr. FURCOLO. When did you, if ever, notify Atlas that the crash phase of the program was over? Colonel DERBY. At the time the letter was received from General Pick-General Pick brought it over with him, and then General Pick and I personally notified Atlas that it was over. Mr. FURCOLO. So your answer would be that the first time you notified Atlas would have been sometime after January 15, 1952? Colonel DERBY. That is correct. Mr. FURCOLO. In other words, as far as the engineers were concerned, the crash phase of the program was never over before January 15, 1952? Colonel DERBY. That is correct, and I can give you some records at the appropriate time showing why I thought so. The crash pro gram was an amount of work, not a date. Mr. FURCOLO. Those records will be printed in the record at this point. (The documents are as follows:) AFOAI-CO-6. 29 NOVEMBER 1950. Subject: Construction Authorization for Certain Overseas Installations. 1. This is Air Force Construction Directive No. SP-600-51. 2. The work authorized by this directive consists of: a. All necessary work preliminary to award of a contract for construction at five (5) airfields in substantial conformity with the plans forming part of recent report by Colonel Stanley T. Wray, which has been furnished your office separately. b. Purchase of necessary construction materials and equipment deemed advisable to be supplied by the Government. c. Construction of the works described above. 3. In view of the immediate need for beneficial occupancy of the facilities, planning and construction will proceed concurrently and cost plus fixed fee contracts are authorized when required in your judgment. 4. It is definitely recognized that the work is to be prosecuted at a faster than normal rate requiring the mobilization of more than the usual amount of equipment for a job of this magnitude. It is desired that sufficient equipment shall be mobilized to insure the completion of the six-months phase of the program within six months of the date when clearance to enter the country where the sites are located is obtained. The work should be prosecuted in such a manner as to produce the maximum of operational facilities in a minimum of time. 5. Funds in the amount of $11,400,000 have been programmed by this headquarters under Appropriation symbol 57 x 4300 (Acquisition and Construction of Real Property), Project 331, Construction Overseas, for the projects authorized herein. Necessary funds to continue the over-all program are programmed for presentation to Congress for inclusion in the next supplemental appropriation bill. Funds programmed for work authorized by this directive are provided under Air Force Form 265C, dated 29 November 1950. 6. Clearance from this headquarters will be required before personnel or equipment is dispatched to the country where the work is to take place. For the Chief of Staff: COLBY M. MYERS, Director of Installations, Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Matériel 10 JANUARY 1951. Subject: Information Requested for Efficient Execution of Air Force Construction Program To: Chief of Engineers Department of the Army 1. Your memorandum to Mr. Zuckert of 29 December 1950, subject as above, has been referred to me for reply. 2. Upon receipt of this memorandum a conference was held with representatives of your office and the contents of the entire memorandum were carefully discussed in detail. It was the consensus of opinion of the conferees that establishing the relative priorities of the world-wide Air Force program in one all-inclusive list would be impracticable. The conferees further concluded that your requirements for determining relative importance of projects and speed of construction can be met by fixing completion dates and utilizing "phased" construction methods. Accordingly, two such lists (Z. I. and overseas) have been prepared and are inclosed herein. The "ready dates" shown in these tabulations establish the relative priority of the stations in the Air Force program. 3. Phasing of work at individual installations will be accomplished in the field. Thus Corps of Engineers field offices are authorized to contact directly Air Force Installation Commanders for the purpose of determining phasing within projects and within single project line items; for example, the Installation Commander may indicate that barracks and messing shall be given priority over warehousing and that within a line item of eight warehouses only two need be done by X date, four by Y date and the remaining two by Z date. The objective is to meet an early "ready date" with a minimum of facilities. In this connection Air Force Liaison Officers should be employed to assist in establishing dates and phasing where Installation Commanders may not have been assigned. 4. A "ready date" of 1 January 1951, means that the base is presently operating, but under difficulty. Deficiency items are included in the Second Supplemental Program and are to be provided as rapidly as possible. However, stations with "ready dates" of March 1951, will have to be developed to accept their mission by March 1951; thus such stations will present a more difficult problem than those having a January 1951 date. 5. The work is so spread throughout the world that critical projects will probably not be competing to a prohibitive extent in a single localized labor and materials market. Should such competition make impossible the meeting of ready dates, the Chief of Engineers shall present his analysis of this situation to this Headquarters; meanwhile field work must continue to the maximum extent practicable. 6. In disseminating this information to the District Engineers it should be pointed out that information regarding the activation of new stations has not, in many cases, been made public. Press releases on reopening of stations will be made by Headquarters; USAF, sufficiently in advance to permit construction to proceed without delay. This will not delay the District Engineers in the accomplishment of preliminary work involving visits to the sites. Answers to questions from local citizens can be to the effect that field parties are surveying possible future sites. For the Chief of Staff: PATRICK W. TIMBERLAKE, Major General, USAF, Director of Installations, |