c. Aiding the universities to add at least as many scientists and engineers to the national supply as the space program will draw from the pool.

5. The long-range plan of the previous Administration covering all NASA programs, amounted to $17.9 billion for the period 1961-70. It soon had to be re-estimated at $22.2 billion. The long-range plan of the present Administration came to $42.5 billion. NASA judgments, coupled with a projection of no annual budget in excess of $6 billion, would bring the total to $48 billion for the decade.

6. Over the 10-year period, the NASA program as now conceived:

a. Will run fairly consistently at 2-1/2 times that of the 1961 tentative long-range plan. b. Would run about 4 times more in manned space flight costs.

c. Would run about double in applications and tracking costs.

d. Would run more than 1-1/2 times greater in space sciences and research and technology.

7. In over-all terms, the basic difference between the two programs is that the plan of the previous Administration represented an effort for a second place runner and the program of the present Administration is designed to make this country the assured leader before the end of the decade. This is not taking the narrow view that the project is just a race to reach the Moon first. Instead, it is an over-all coordinated program designed to return benefits to the economy and to the national security on a broad front. [3]

II. Benefits to National Economy from NASA Space Programs

1. It cannot be questioned that billions of dollars directed into research and development in an orderly and thoughtful manner will have a significant effect upon our national economy. No formula has been found which attributes specific dollar values to each of the areas of anticipated developments, However, the "multiplier" of space research and development will augment our economic strength, our peaceful posture, and our standard of living.

2. Even though specific dollar values cannot be set for these benefits, a mere listing of the fields which will be affected is convincing evidence that the benefits will be substantial. The benefits include:

a. Additional knowledge about the earth and the Sun's influence on the earth, the nature of interplanetary space environment, and the origin of the solar system as well as of life itself.

b. Increased ability and experience in managing major research and development efforts, expansion of capital facilities, encouragement of higher standards of quality production.

c. Accelerated use of liquid oxygen in steelmaking, coatings for temperature control of housing, efficient transfer of chemical energy into electrical energy, and wide-range advances in electronics.

d. Development of effective filters against detergents; increased accuracy (and therefore reduced costs) in measuring hot steel rods; improved medical equipment in human care; stimulation of the use of fiberglass refractory welding tape, high energy metal forming processes; development of new coatings for plywood and furniture; use of frangible tube energy absorption systems that can be adapted to absorbing shocks of failing elevators and emergency aircraft landings.

e. Improved communications, improved weather forecasting, improved forest fire detection, and improved navigation.

f. Development of high temperature gas-cooled graphite moderated reactors and liquid metal cooled reactors; development of radio-isotope power sources for both military and civilian uses; development of [4] instruments for monitoring degrees of

radiation; and application of thermoelectric and thermionic conversion of heat to electric energy.

g. Improvements in metals, alloys, and ceramics.

h. An augmentation of the supply of highly trained technical manpower.

i. Greater strength for the educational system both through direct grants, facilities and scholarships and through setting goals that will encourage young people.

j. An expansion of the base for peaceful cooperation among nations.

k. Military competence. (It is estimated that between $600 and $675 million of NASA's FY 1964 budget would be needed for military space projects and would be budgeted by the Defense Department, if they were not already provided for in the NASA budget.)

III. Problems Resulting from the Space Program

1. The introduction of a vital new element into an economy always creates new problems but, otherwise, the nation's space program creates no major complications. The program has, to a lesser magnitude, the same problems which Defense budgets and programs have been creating for several years.

2. Despite claims to the contrary, there is no solid evidence that research and development in industry is suffering significantly from a diversion of technical manpower to the space program. NASA estimates that:

a. The nation's pool of scientists and engineers was 1,400,000 as of January 1, 1963. b. NASA programs employed 42,000 of these scientists and engineers-only 9,000 directly on NASA payrolls.

c. On this basis, the NASA space program currently draws upon only 3% of the national pool of scientists and engineers. [5]

d. Taking into account anticipated expansion, NASA programs are not expected to absorb more than 7% of our country's total supply of scientists and engineers.

3. The majority of the technical people working for NASA fall in the category of engineering. However, NASA's education programs are designed to help the universities train additions to the nation's technical manpower needs.

4. NASA has undertaken to support the annual graduate training of 1000 Ph.D.'s 1/4 of the estimated overall shortage of 4,000 per year. This program would more than replace those drawn upon by the agency.

5. In overall terms, NASA finds that diversion of manpower and resources is not a major problem arising from the space program. A major problem, however, is the need to minimize waste and inefficiency. To help meet this challenge, turnover of top level Government talent should be reduced and compensation more in line with responsibilities would contribute to this objective.

IV. Reductions and Expansions in the NASA Program

Without Affecting the Lunar Project

1. The fiscal 1964 NASA budget is divided between $4.4 billion for the manned lunar landing program and $1.3 billion for a multi-project scientific, research, and technology development and applications effort. Therefore, only 23% of the total budget is unrelated to the manned lunar landing program.

2. There are approximately 60 programs, projects and activities within this 23% of the budget. Examples include geodesy, orbiting observatories, planetary and interplanetary probes, international satellites, university program, advanced propulsion, and communications and meteorological developments.

3. It is pertinent under this heading to recall that the NASA budget requests for fiscal 1964 were reduced from $6.2 billion to $5.7 billion before the presentation to Congress. Further reductions would:

a. Lessen the quantity and quality of benefits to the economy.

b. Give additional ammunition to those who criticize the major funding weight given to the lunar program on the grounds that it diverts money from other programs. [6] c. Disrupt manpower teams, delay the realization of goals, and ultimately lead to increased costs to the stretchout process.

4. Growth of the present favorable international attitude toward our space programs would be inhibited if the lunar program were favored through a reduction or elimination of projects which promote international cooperation or promise actual or potential benefits to foreign governments.

5. In light of current conditions, it is not considered practicable to increase the size of the program. However, in considering future budgets, attention should be directed toward such developments as:

a. NASA/DOD space station competence.

b. Nuclear rocket propulsion and auxiliary power.

c. Interplanetary exploration.

V. Coordination and Cooperation Between NASA and Defense

1. The difficulties of assuring a single National space program have been recognized from the beginning, NASA and the Department of Defense carry the major burdens, but the program touches widely divergent agencies of government. In order to assist in coordination and in avoiding duplication, the following steps have been taken:

a. The National Aeronautics and Space Council has been authorized and activated to advise and assist the President in coordinating the entire program.

b. The Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board (and its six panels) has been organized for high-level managerial coordination to integrate major Space projects in the early stages of their development.

c. Within the agencies, a number of coordinating arrangements operate at various levels.

d. More than 50 joint written agreements have been worked out between NASA and DOD spelling out lines of action in such fields as development of launch vehicles and spacecraft, administration of range facilities, and planning for communication satellites.

[7] 2. However, it is inevitable that controversies will continue to arise in any field as new, as wide ranging, and as technically complicated as space. Areas in which cooperation could be further improved are:

a. Coordination in joint planning of advanced projects to insure that divergent views are not prematurely curtailed and that unwarranted duplication between NASA and DOD is avoided in the initial development of these projects.

b. Further strengthening of cross-fertilization in the areas of research and technology to insure that NASA research is available for the solution of critical military problems and that military research is available for the solution of NASA problems.

3. It must be kept in mind that no mechanical application of a formula will insure maximum cooperation and coordination and a minimum of duplication and waste. Continuous monitoring at a high level is essential at every stage of the development of the space program. The Space Council will continue to function on the premise that no relaxation of its efforts is possible.

Conclusion

There is one further point to be borne in mind. The space program is not solely a question of prestige, of advancing scientific knowledge, of economic benefit or of military development, although all of these factors are involved. Basically, a much more fundamental issue is at stake-whether a dimension that can well dominate history for the next few centuries will be devoted to the social system of freedom or controlled by the social system of communism.

The United States has made clear that it does not seek to "dominate" space and, in fact, has led the way in securing international cooperation in this field. But we cannot close our eyes as to what would happen if we permitted totalitarian systems to dominate the environment of the earth itself. For this reason our space program has an overriding urgency that cannot be calculated solely in terms of industrial, scientific, or military development. The future of society is at stake.

Document III-17

Document title: NASA, Summary Report: Future Programs Task Group, January 1965.

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

In the last year of the Kennedy administration, the Bureau of the Budget and the White House Office of Science and Technology shifted focus from whether or not to go forward with Apollo to what programs NASA was likely to propose to follow the lunar landing program. After Kennedy's assassination, President Johnson asked NASA Administrator Webb on January 30, 1964, to identify future objectives for the civilian space program. Webb was quite reluctant to identify NASA's goals and priorities in advance of any expression of political support, a position he had taken even during the debates preceding the decision to go to the Moon; he preferred that NASA identify a variety of paths it could take, and then have top policymakers choose the option they wished to pursue.

This is the approach NASA took in response to the president's request. Webb appointed a Future Programs Task Group, headed by Frank Smith of the Langley Research Center, to prepare an overview of the capabilities that NASA was developing during the 1960s and the uses to which they might be applied. The group's summary report, completed in January 1965 (several months late) and not released publicly until April, set no priorities and made no recommendation, except to continue a "balanced" program in all areas of space activity. Some figures have been omitted from the excerpt printed here.

This summary report of the Future Programs Task Group, directed by Francis B. Smith of Langley Research Center, presents the results of studies made during 1964 to answer inquiries made by President Johnson as to criteria and priorities for space missions to follow those now approved for the decade of the 1960's.

The President's request was for a review of space objectives in relation both to what we have learned from our space efforts and to the most important emerging concepts of missions needed for scientific purposes and for advances in technology. The President requested that our evaluation be made in relation to estimates of time and funds required to complete programs already approved and under way.

The Future Programs Task Group was established to develop materials to meet the President's request. It has studied: (1) the capability being created in the present aeronautical and space effort; (2) next-step or intermediate space missions that could use or extend this capability; and (3) a number of long-range missions which deserve serious attention. This summary report, resulting from these studies, provides a source of information on accomplishments to date and indicates the general time periods within which we can assume or forecast the availability of further scientific and technical knowledge. It is, in addition to providing a review for the President, a timely and valuable working document for use within NASA and other agencies as a foundation for further analysis and discussion looking toward decisions that can be based on a broad consensus as to values and timing.

A major concern of the Task Group has been to identify the areas and levels of technology required to accomplish the most likely future missions and to provide a basis for informed decisions relating to the allocation of resources and timing for those which may be approved. Considerable attention has been given to steps we need to take to insure that these areas and levels or technology are available as needed.

The long range developments section of this report contains a discussion of the technology development programs which are under way in NASA and a number which should be given careful consideration in making future plans. Many of these programs are broadly based, but are also essential to provide optional means to accomplish the minimum under study and also provide a strong basis for judgments bearing on the value, time and cost elements.

James E. Webb
Administrator...

[1]

Summary Report: Future Programs Task Group

I. Introduction

The successful flight of Sputnik I, in its most fundamental aspect, meant that man had taken the first step toward the exploration of a new environment by means of a new technology. It also meant that in the USSR, which accomplished this first step, new horizons were opened and there was a surge of national pride and accomplishment. An internal drive was created that changed the posture of Soviet society and lifted it above many of the frictions and tensions of the existing status. Horizons were widened. Internationally, the leadership and image of the Soviet Union were vastly enhanced. The flights of Gagarin and other Soviet Cosmonauts added impetus to a marked degree.

In the United States and in the Free World, as we all know, the immediate effects were quite the opposite. However, since then, we have made tremendous progress under a broad based and balanced program aimed at achieving preeminence in aeronautics and space.

Down through the course of history, the mastery of a new environment, or of a major new technology, or of the combination of the two as we now see in space, has had profound effects on the future of nations; on their relative strength and security; on the relations with one another; on their internal economic, social and political affairs; and on the concepts of reality held by their people. From the elements of each such new situation which history records, all or most of the developments listed in Figure 1 have materialized.

The long-range effects of man's entry into space, in person and by instruments and machines, can be best forecast in terms of these considerations. As a new environment, space may well become as important to national security and national development as the land, the oceans and the atmosphere; rockets and spacecraft as important as automobiles, trucks, trains, ships, submarines and aircraft. The foreseeable returns from scientific advances, technical advances, and practical uses compare favorably with the returns yielded