4. What the Soviets do and what they are likely to do are therefore matters of great importance from the viewpoint of national prestige. Our attainments constitute a major element in the international competition between the Soviet system and our own. While the future military value of advanced space capabilities cannot be predicted very well, it, nevertheless, [2] is important to insure that the basic technological building blocks are created in an orderly and timely manner. These building blocks, moreover, must give us capabilities which match the Soviets in all areas of international competition.

5. Because of their national importance and their national scope, it is essential that our space efforts be well planned. It is essential that they be well managed. It is particularly undesirable in this connection to undertake crash programs needed to compensate for inadequate planning. It is likewise undesirable to spread our engineering resources too thinly. It is doubtless necessary to sponsor parallel efforts in the design stage, but it is essential to avoid duplication in the advanced development, procurement and deployment of operational equipment.

The comments in the following paragraphs are based upon these and similar assumptions. They deal with two major areas: launch vehicles and payload recovery." B. Launch Vehicles:

It is important from a national standpoint that the launch vehicle "gap" presently separating Soviet and U.S. capabilities be closed in an orderly but timely way. It is also important that our capabilities in the 1965-1970 period continue to grow so that similar important gaps are avoided. There will come a point, of course, at which a superior capability on the part of the Soviets or ourselves will be of little importance since either capability will suffice, but that point will not be reached for many years.

1. The Current "Gap":

1.1 The ATLAS-CENTAUR development should continue. If it is successful, it will enable us to boost 8,500 lbs. into a 300-mile orbit which still does not match the Soviet's capability of placing 10,000-14,000 lbs. into a 300-mile orbit.

1.2 CENTAUR like other developments is not assured of success. A substantial delay or major development shortcomings would be serious.

[3] 1.3 It is important, however, that our national launch vehicle program focus on a very small number of devices. A major element in the success of the Soviet program is the orderly, focussed way in which they have placed continued emphasis on the repetitive use of a single booster and a very small family of upper stages.

1.4 It would seem desirable, however, to inaugurate one or two back up programs for ATLAS-CENTAUR. An example would be an advanced upper stage for use with TITAN-II. Another might be a high boost segmented solid rocket booster for use with existing AGENA stages or possibly with an advanced AGENT. There is even the possibility of developing an upper stage using different propellants. It is not possible to decide at this time, but the results of current studies will make it possible to recommend action which fits into an improved over-all plan.

2. Follow-on Efforts:

2.1 The SATURN C-1 consisting of a cluster of eight chambers will give a total thrust of about 1.5 million pounds. It is unlikely to become operationally useful for missions such as manned orbital flight until after 1966. Should it prove inadequate or subject to excessive delays, a serious gap in boost capability would develop even if the early undertakings listed above were wholly successful.

2.2 The SATURN, depending as it does upon the clustering of very complex engines, may present very serious reliability problems. It seems almost certain that it will not

'Attachment A summarizes the Department of Defense space projects and shows the budgetary changes that were made as a result of the detailed review of FY-62 budget estimates. No further changes in funding levels for FY-62 are recommended for these programs.

be fully usable in its present form for the DYNASOAR mission. For such reasons it appears likely that a suitable parallel effort should be undertaken to insure that present planning and programming provides adequate insurance against the development of a launch vehicle gap in the 1965-1970 period.

2.3 The F-1 engine capable of developing 1.5 million pounds thrust in a single chamber should be more vigorously pushed. Detailed design studies for a suitable first stage utilizing this engine should be undertaken at once. After assessment and analysis, long lead time procurement and development efforts should be begun which give us the opportunity to accelerate and back this route to a 1 1/2 million pound booster if SATURN's progress warrants such a decision.

2.4 Other possibilities also present themselves. Upon further investigation it may be desirable to augment the development of large segmented [4] solid rocket boosters capable of 50-70 million pounds/second thrust. Other proposals such as the development of a high pressure hydrogen-oxygen cluster booster should also be investigated.

2.5 It is important to make sure that the number of such programs is adequate but not excessive. It is essential that engineering resources be focused and not spread too thin. It is vital that hard decisions be made at the critical decision points. Such decisions will include the total termination of unprofitable ventures and the deployment of fiscal and human resources on the highest priority and most promising undertakings.

2.6 It is difficult to estimate at this point the magnitude of the efforts which might be initiated to supplement the SATURN development. It is not unlikely, however, that as much as 50-100 million dollars of additional funds might be utilized in FY-62. These funds represent people and facilities. It is mandatory that policies be followed which utilize and strengthen existing organizations. Our national posture may be worsened rather than improved if added expenditures result in the still greater dispersal of scientific engineering and managerial talent among a variety of organizations too small or too over-loaded to do a fully adequate job.

C. Payload Recovery:

The Soviets have developed a recovery system which enable them to recover large payloads with a comparatively high degree of landing accuracy. This capability is essential to the success of manned experiments in space and is important to the success of many other space missions.

The U.S., however, has developed only the DISCOVERER type of recovery system. It is complex and has not proved to be very reliable.

The MERCURY system using parachutes is not very accurate and requires search operations of an enormous sea area.

The DYNASOAR system will not be testable for many years. Hundreds of millions of dollars will be required before maneuverable entry from orbit can be demonstrated.

It seems most desirable, therefore, to undertake the development of a controlled reentry and recovery system emphasizing simplicity, modest accuracy and high reliability. It is not likely that a recovery system per se will prove desirable. Rather, the development of a standardized space vehicle equipped with such a recovery system and incorporating standardized propulsion [5] and control components is likely to be most attractive. If it is large enough, such a vehicle can be used to carry a great variety of payloads with comparatively minor and largely internal modifications. This aspect of our planning for the future has not been addressed in much detail. It is difficult, therefore, to estimate the amount of additional funds which may be required to begin developments in this direction. It would appear, however, that the amounts involved in FY-62 could be comparatively modest.

Robert S. McNamara

Document III-8

Document title: Lyndon B. Johnson, Vice President, Memorandum for the President, "Evaluation of Space Program," April 28, 1961.

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

This memorandum, prepared by Edward C. Welsh, the new executive secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, and signed by Vice President Johnson, was the first report to President Kennedy on the results of the review he had ordered on April 20. The report identified a lunar landing by 1966 or 1967 as the first dramatic space project in which the United States could beat the Soviet Union. The vice president identified "leadership" as the appropriate goal of U.S. efforts in space.

[1]

Memorandum for the President

April 28, 1961

Subject: Evaluation of Space Program.

Reference is to your April 20 memorandum asking certain questions regarding this country's space program.

A detailed survey has not been completed in this time period. The examination will continue. However, what we have obtained so far from knowledgeable and responsible persons makes this summary reply possible.

Among those who have participated in our deliberations have been the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense; General Schriever (AF); Admiral Hayward (Navy); Dr. von Braun (NASA); the Administrator, Deputy Administrator, and other top officials of NASA; the Special Assistant to the President on Science and Technology; representatives of the Director of the Bureau of the Budget; and three outstanding non-Government citizens of the general public: Mr. George Brown (Brown & Root, Houston, Texas); Mr. Donald Cook (American Electric Power Service, New York, N.Y.); and Mr. Frank Stanton (Columbia Broadcasting System, New York, N.Y.).

The following general conclusions can be reported:

a. Largely due to their concentrated efforts and their earlier emphasis upon the development of large rocket engines, the Soviets are ahead of the United States in world prestige attained through impressive technological accomplishments in space.

b. The U.S. has greater resources than the USSR for attaining space leadership but has failed to make the necessary hard decisions and to marshal those resources to achieve such leadership.

[2] c. This country should be realistic and recognize that other nations, regardless of their appreciation of our idealistic values, will tend to align themselves with the country which they believe will be the world leader-the winner in the long run. Dramatic accomplishments in space are being increasingly identified as a major indicator of world leadership.

d. The U.S. can, if it will, firm up its objectives and employ its resources with a reasonable chance of attaining world leadership in space during this decade. This will be difficult but can be made probable even recognizing the head start of the Soviets and the likelihood that they will continue to move forward with impressive successes. In certain areas, such as communications, navigation, weather, and mapping, the U.S. can and should exploit its existing advance position.

e. If we do not make the strong effort now, the time will soon be reached when the margin of control over space and over men's minds through space accomplishments will

have swung so far on the Russian side that we will not be able to catch leadership.

f. Even in those areas in which the Soviets already have the capability to be first and are likely to improve upon such capability, the United States should make aggressive efforts as the technological gains as well as the international rewards are essential steps in eventually gaining leadership. The danger of long lags or outright omissions by this country is substantial in view of the possibility of great technological breakthroughs obtained from space exploration.

g. Manned exploration of the moon, for example, is not only an achievement with great propaganda value, but it is essential as an objective whether or not we are first in its accomplishment-and we may be able to be first. We cannot leapfrog such accomplishments, as they are essential sources of knowledge and experience for even greater successes in space. We cannot expect the Russians to transfer the benefits of their experiences or the advantages of their capabilities to us. We must do these things ourselves.

[3] h. The American public should be given the facts as to how we stand in the space race, told of our determination to lead in that race, and advised of the importance of such leadership to our future.

i. More resources and more effort need to be put into our space program as soon as possible. We should move forward with a bold program, while at the same time taking every practical precaution for the safety of the persons actively participating in space flights.

As for the specific questions posed in your memorandum, the following brief answers develop from the studies made during the past few days. These conclusions are subject to expansion and more detailed examination as our survey continues.

Q.1- Do we have a chance of beating the Soviets by putting a laboratory in space, or by a trip around the moon, or by a rocket to land on the moon, or by a rocket to go to the moon and back with a man. Is there any other space program which promises dramatic results in which we could win?

A. 1- The Soviets now have a rocket capability for putting a multi-manned laboratory into space and have already crash-landed a rocket on the moon. They also have the booster capability of making a soft landing on the moon with a payload of instruments, although we do not know how much preparation they have made for such a project. As for a manned trip around the moon or a safe landing and return by a man to the moon, neither the U.S. nor the USSR has such capability at this time, so far as we know. The Russians have had more experience with large boosters and with flights of dogs and man. Hence they might be conceded a time advantage in circumnavigation of the moon and also in a manned trip to the moon. However, with a strong effort, the United States could conceivably be first in those two accomplishments by 1966 or 1967.

[4] There are a number of programs which the United States could pursue immediately and which promise significant world-wide advantage over the Soviets. Among these are communications satellites, and navigation and mapping satellites. These are all areas in which we have already developed some competence. We have such programs and believe that the Soviets do not. Moreover, they are programs which could be made operational and effective within reasonably short periods of time and could, if properly programmed with the interests of other nations, make useful strides toward world leadership. Q.2- How much additional would it cost?

A.2-To start upon an accelerated program with the aforementioned objectives clearly in mind, NASA has submitted an analysis indicating that about $500 million would be needed for FY 1962 over and above the amount currently requested of the Congress. A program based upon NASA's analysis would, over a ten-year period, average approximately $1 billion a year above the current estimates of the existing NASA program.

While the Department of Defense plans to make a more detailed submission to me within a few days, the Secretary has taken the position that there is a need for a strong effort to develop a large solid-propellant booster and that his Department is interested in

undertaking such a project. It was understood that this would be programmed in accord with the existing arrangement for close cooperation with NASA, which Agency is undertaking some research in this field. He estimated they would need to employ approximately $50 million during FY 1962 for this work but that this could be financed through management of funds already requested in the FY 1962 budget. Future defense budgets would include requests for additional funding for this purpose; a preliminary estimate indicates that about $500 million would be needed in total.

[5] Q.3- Are we working 24 hours a day on existing programs? If not, why not? If not, will you make recommendations to me as to how work can be speeded up?

A.3- There is not a 24-hour-a-day work schedule on existing NASA space programs except for selected areas in Project Mercury, the Saturn C-1 booster, the Centaur engines and the final launching phases of most flight missions. They advise that their schedules have been geared to the availability of facilities and financial resources, and that hence their overtime and 3-shift arrangements exist only in those activities in which there are particular bottlenecks or which are holding up operations in other parts of the programs. For example, they have a 3-shift 7-day-week operation in certain work at Cape Canaveral; the contractor for Project Mercury has averaged a 54-hour week and employs two or three shifts in some areas; Saturn C-1 at Huntsville is working around the clock during critical test periods while the remaining work on this project averages a 47-hour week; the Centaur hydrogen engine is on a 3-shift basis in some portions of the contractor's plants.

This work can be speeded up through firm decisions to go ahead faster if accompanied by additional funds needed for the acceleration.

Q.4 In building large boosters should we put our emphasis on nuclear, chemical or liquid fuel, or a combination of these three?

A.4 It was the consensus that liquid, solid and nuclear boosters should all be accelerated. This conclusion is based not only upon the necessity for back-up methods, but also because of the advantages of the different types of boosters for different missions. A program of such emphasis would meet both so-called civilian needs and defense requirements. [6] Q.5- Are we making maximum effort? Are we achieving necessary results? A.5- We are neither making maximum effort nor achieving results necessary if this country is to reach a position of leadership.

Lyndon B. Johnson

Document III-9

Document title: Wernher von Braun to the Vice President of the United States, April 29, 1961, no pagination.

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

Of all those consulted during the presidentially mandated space review, no one had been thinking longer about the future in space than Wernher von Braun. Even when he had led the development of the V-2 rocket for Germany during World War II, von Braun and his associates had been planning future space journeys. After coming to the United States after World War II, von Braun was a major contributor to popularizing the idea of human spaceflight. As he stressed in his letter, von Braun had been asked to participate in the review as an individual, not as the director of NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center. Von Braun told the vice president in his letter that the United States had “an excellent chance" of beating the Russians to a lunar landing.