Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, except in those instances specifically exempted by either Director, National Reconnaissance Office or the Secretary of Defense.

C. With the single exception of this directive, no mention will be made of the following titles or their abbreviations in any document which is not controlled under the special security control system (s) referred to in B. above: National Reconnaissance Program; National Reconnaissance Office. Where absolutely necessary to refer to the National Reconnaissance Program in communications not controlled under the prescribed special security systems, such reference will be made by use of the terminology: "Matters under the purview of DoD TS-5105.23."

Chapter Three

The Evolution of

U.S. Space Policy and Plans

by John M. Logsdon

The July 1958 National Aeronautics and Space Act [II-17] and the statement of "Preliminary U.S. Policy for Outer Space" adopted by the Eisenhower administration in August 1958 [II-20] provided the framework within which the new space agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), planned an initial set of programs and projects. In the subsequent thirty years, the interactions among formal statements of national space policy, various presidential decisions on specific space undertakings, and project proposals emanating from internal NASA planning have resulted in an evolving U.S. civilian space program that has been able to meet the Space Act mandate of making the United States "a leader" in space. This essay provides an overview of those interactions as they are manifested in key policy documents included in this work.'

The Early Years: Space Policy and Planning, 1959-1960

NASA's initial plan of activity was based on preexisting programs inherited from the Department of Defense and NASA's predecessor organization, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA). [III-1] Within a few months after it began operations, the agency had shaped this inheritance into a short-term program, and its new leaders, Administrator T. Keith Glennan, who had come to NASA from his position as president of the Case Institute of Technology in Cleveland, and Deputy Administrator Hugh L. Dryden, who had been the NACA Director, set about the task of developing their own plans for the new space agency.2

By the end of 1959, just over a year after NASA began operations, the space agency had prepared a formal long-range plan. [III-2] The plan noted that NASA's activities during the 1960s "should make feasible the manned exploration of the moon and nearby planets, and this exploration may thus be taken as a long-term goal of NASA activities." The plan called for the "first launching in a program leading to manned circumlunar flight and to a permanent near-earth space station" in the 1965-1967 period. It also called for the first human flight to the Moon sometime "beyond 1970." Although the first NASA long-range plan featured a balanced program of science, applications, and human spaceflight, from the start proposals for the future of the piloted portion of its activities excited the public, and NASA, therefore, became the focal point of future thinking.

1. This brief essay cannot purport to be a comprehensive history of the evolution of U.S. space policy; that would require at least book-length treatment. (Such a book does not now exist.) Rather, this essay attempts to put the documents selected for this section of the work in their historical context, so that they can be understood in terms of where they fit in the overall development of U.S. space policy and plans.

2. On Glennan's career, see J.D. Hunley, ed., The Birth of NASA: The Diary of T. Keith Glennan (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4105, 1993).

3. Office of Program Planning and Evaluation, "The Long Range Plan of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration," December 16, 1959, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC.

Making human flights to the Moon and planets the stated long-range goal of the NASA program was, to say the least, controversial within the Eisenhower administration. NASA planners since early 1959 had been investigating the appropriate focus for NASA's human spaceflight program, once the initial Project Mercury had demonstrated the ability of the human body to withstand the rigors of launch, weightlessness, and then reentry. In particular, a group chaired by Harry J. Goett, Director of the new Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland, concluded by mid-1959 that the appropriate goal for NASA's post-Mercury human spaceflight program was to send humans to the Moon, not just for extended stays in Earth orbit. Even after the lunar landing goal had been included in NASA's long-range plan, it continued to be debated within the top councils of NASA, but by early 1960 a decision was made to proceed with a lunar expedition as a major element in NASA's future planning.

The fact that NASA was contemplating sending people to the Moon did not escape the notice of those advising President Dwight D. Eisenhower on overall science and technology issues. By the end of 1960, an Ad Hoc Panel on Man-in-Space of the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), chaired by chemist Donald F. Hornig of Brown University, had completed its own investigation of NASA's post-Mercury planning. [III-3] The panel concluded that "at the present time. . .man-in-space cannot be justified on purely scientific grounds. ... On the other hand, it may be argued that much of the motivation and drive for the scientific exploration of space is derived from the dream of man's getting into space himself." The group also estimated that landing humans on the Moon would cost $26-38 billion above the $8-9 billion cost of Earth-orbiting and circumlunar flights, and could not be accomplished until after 1975. The report of the PSAC panel was presented to President Eisenhower at a December 20, 1960, meeting of the National Security Council; Eisenhower's reaction was that "he couldn't care less whether a man ever reached the moon."

At the end of the Eisenhower administration, then, NASA had in place a long-range plan that anticipated a budget gradually increasing during the 1960s to a $2.5 billion level in 1960 dollars, but without White House approval for its centerpiece activities—a postMercury program of human spaceflight aimed at an eventual lunar landing and the development of the large boosters required for such a program. Dwight Eisenhower recognized that the United States was in a space race with the Soviet Union, but he was not interested in winning that race at any cost. His attitude is best captured by the policy guidance provided in a January 1960 comprehensive statement of U.S. space policy. [II-21] That statement directed planners to, in orde

To minimize the psychological advantages which the USSR has acquired as a result of space accomplishments, select from among those current or projected U.S. space activities of intrinsic military, scientific or technological value, one or more projects which offer promise of obtaining a demonstrably effective advantage over the Soviets and, so far as is consistent with solid achievements in the over-all space program, stress these projects in present and future programming."

To President Eisenhower, a race to be first on the Moon did not meet the requirement of "intrinsic value," and he was unwilling to approve future human spaceflight efforts that were steps in the direction of such an undertaking. This left NASA in a state of high uncertainty about its future prospects-uncertainty that was resolved within a few months by the new president, John F. Kennedy.

4. The work of the Goett Committee is discussed in John M. Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the Moon: Project Apollo and the National Interest (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970), pp. 56-57.

5. The President's Science Advisory Committee, "Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Man-in-Space," December 16, 1960, pp. 6, 9, NASA Historical Reference Collection.

6. Hunley, ed., The Birth of NASA, pp. 292-93.

7. National Aeronautics and Space Council, “U.S. Policy on Outer Space," January 26, 1960, p. 11, paragraph 36, NASA Historical Reference Collection.

The Decision to Go to the Moon

However, this uncertainty was not reduced by the first indication of the posture the new administration might take with respect to the civilian space program. [III-4] After his narrow victory over Richard M. Nixon in November 1960, Kennedy had formed a "transition team" to assess the national space effort. That team was headed by Jerome B. Wiesner, a Massachusetts Institute of Technology physicist who was slated to become Kennedy's science adviser. The "Wiesner Report" [III-5], released on January 10, 1961, was very critical of the quality and technical competence of NASA management and of the emphasis that had been placed on human spaceflight. It called the Mercury program “marginal” because of the limited power of its Atlas booster and criticized the priority given to the Mercury program for strengthening "the popular belief that man in space is the most important aim of our non-military space effort." As the new president took office on January 20, the future course for NASA remained unclear.

Events of the next few months, however, made most of the recommendations of the Wiesner Report moot. President Kennedy announced on January 31 that James E. Webb, a politically skilled and aggressive lawyer-administrator, would become NASA Administrator, and that other senior members of NASA management would remain. Webb took office on February 14, and within six weeks met with the president with a request for a significant acceleration of the NASA program, with an emphasis on larger boosters and a new spacecraft for human spaceflight. Kennedy deferred a decision on Webb's request until the fall of 1961 deliberations on his next budget.

Then, on April 12, the Soviet Union launched the first human, Yuri Gagarin, into orbit. World and domestic reaction to the achievement was universally positive, and within a few days President Kennedy decided that the United States had to not only accept the challenge to a space race put forth by the Soviet Union, but also to enter the race with an intent to win. On April 20, he asked Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson to conduct an "overall survey of where we stand in space." [III-6] In particular, Kennedy asked: “Do we have a chance of beating the Soviets by putting a laboratory in space, or by a trip around the moon, or by a rocket to go to the moon and back with a man? Is there any other space program that promises dramatic results in which we could win?" The president asked for a report on Johnson's findings "at the earliest possible moment.

The review was carried out under the auspices of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, which Kennedy had decided the vice president should chair. Even before the review began, in reaction to presidential guidance at an April 14 White House meeting, NASA had been examining the feasibility and costs of an accelerated civilian space effort. The Department of Defense provided its initial input on April 21. [III-7] Vice President Johnson asked a number of individuals inside and outside government for their views, including rocket engineer and space exploration visionary Wernher von Braun. [III-9] By April 28 the vice president could report to Kennedy [III-8] that “dramatic accomplishments in space are being increasingly identified as a major indicator of world leadership." He added that "if we do not make a strong effort now, the time will soon be reached when the margin of control over space and over men's minds through space accomplishments will have swung so far on the Russian side that we will not be able to catch up, let alone assume leadership," and that “manned exploration of the moon...is not only an achievement with great propaganda value, but it is essential as an objective whether or not we are first in its accomplishment-and we may be able to be first."

8. In addition to the specific sources cited below, this account is based on Logsdon, Decision to Go to the Moon.

9. "Report to the President-Elect of the Ad Hoc Committee on Space," January 10, 1961, NASA Historical Reference Collection. Quotes are from p. 9 and p. 16.

10. John F. Kennedy, Memorandum for Vice President, April 20, 1961, Presidential Files, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, MA.

11. Lyndon B. Johnson, Vice President, Memorandum for the President, "Evaluation of Space Program," April 28, 1961, p. 2, Presidential Papers, Kennedy Presidential Library.