Evidence indicates that the Soviet space program has been built on the foundation of military rocketry and guidance systems, with military and other facilities probably engaged dually in supporting tests of military ballistic missiles and space experiments. Thus, although these first space flights were doubtlessly undertaken for the furtherance of scientific knowledge and for whatever psychological and political advantage would accrue, the Soviet military, by intimate participation of its hardware, personnel, and facilities, has been in a position to utilize immediately such knowledge for the enhancement of the Soviet military position and objectives. The realization of more advanced space projects, particularly those involving manned flight, must be preceded by a vast amount of scientific and technological work directed towards the development of useable space vehicles, the determination of basic operational requirements and limitations, and the creation of an environment and equipment capable of sustaining human life in outer space. Since such a program embraces virtually all fields of science and engineering, the following areas were particularly examined for evidence of Soviet technical capability: guided missiles (including vertical rocket launchings), re-entry vehicles and techniques, propulsion, guidance, communications, space medicine, internal power supplies, and celestial mechanics. While firm association of these fields with a space program varied considerably, it is noted that the state of Soviet art in all the sciences required in a space program is such that no scientific or technical barriers of magnitude have been noted. Four areas deemed critical to a space program have apparently received considerable attention by the USSR; e.g., development of large rocket-engine propulsion systems, vertical rocket flights with animals (including recovery devices), space medicine, and celestial mechanics. There are indications that Soviet advanced thinking and study [16] in astro-biology have been de-emphasized in favor of providing an artificial environment within a vehicle suitable for manned space flight. 5. Future Capabilities: a. There is no firm evidence of Soviet future plans for the exploration of outer space with either unmanned or manned vehicles. It is believed they will continue and expand their scientific research with further unmanned earth satellites, lunar probes (including satellites and soft landings), solar and planetary probes. Manned experiments will probably be conducted in earth satellites, circumlunar flights and soft landings on the moon. It is expected that all manned flights into outer space will be preceded by similar tests with animals, unless for political purposes the Soviets attempt a high risk program. Man-in-space programs are confronted by many problems or hazards, the most immediate of which are recovery and life support over extended periods. While data which might lead to solutions or better understandings of both can be obtained from instrumented packages which are orbited and recovered, accomplishment of the same test animals would provide data of more direct application to subsequent attempts with man. b. The dates estimated for specific Soviet accomplishments in space represent the earliest possible time periods in which each specific event could be accomplished. It is recognized that the various facets of the space flight program are in competition not only among themselves, but with other priority programs, and that the USSR probably cannot undertake all the space flight activities described below at the priority required to meet the time periods specified. At this time it cannot be determined which specific space flight activities enjoy the higher priorities and will be pursued first. c. No attempt has been made to estimate manned space missions beyond the earthmoon realm. The time periods in which the successful development of sub-systems essential to planetary flight activities can be brought to fruition and integrated into a complete space flight system cannot be foreseen. d. Similarly, considerations of military applications have been limited to earth orbiting types of space vehicles. Missions beyond this realm are considered only in the scientific or exploratory sense because we believe they cannot be successfully accomplished in the time period considered. 6. An estimate of a possible Soviet space development program is as follows: [18] Possible Soviet Space Development Program Space Program Objectives First Possible Capability Rate These dates represent the earliest possible time period in which each specific event could be accomplished. However, competition between the space program and the military missile program as well as within the space program itself makes it unlikely that all of these objectives will be achieved within the specified time periods. Unmanned Earth Satellites 5000-10,000 pounds, low orbit satellites Recoverable (including biological) satellites.. 1959 1959 Military Satellites: The dates shown are the earliest in which feasibility demonstrations could begin. Generally, militarily useful vehicles would be available 2-3 years after the feasibility demonstration. [Remainder of paragraph excised during declassification review] Manned Earth Satellites - The specified time periods for manned....accomplishments are predicated on the Soviets having previously successfully accomplished a number of similar unmanned ventures. Capsule-type Vehicles' Mid-1960-mid-1961 1 to 2 years after above Glide-type Vehicles Maneuverable (minimum: conventional propulsion) Space Platform (minimum, non-ecological, feasibility demonstration) Space Platform (long-lived) ............... ..... 1963 about 1970 1965 about 1970 Manned Lunar Flights Circumlunar Satellites (temporary) 1964-1965 1965-1966 about 1970 4. Recovery would probably be attempted after the first few orbits but life could probably be sustained for about a week. These figures represent a level of effort which corresponds to an efficient and steadily growing capability. The rate of progress could be improved by an increased funding level, primarily by improving the certainty of the timely completion of the many essential engineering developments. Document title: Cyrus Vance, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Directive Number TS 5105.23, “National Reconnaissance Office,” March 27, 1964. Source: Space Policy Institute, George Washington University, Washington, D.C. In February 1958, President Eisenhower directed the CIA to develop a reconnaissance satellite. He did so because the Air Force's WS 117L was unlikely to be available soon because it relied on the still-untested Atlas rocket. The CIA began the development of a reconnaissance satellite for launch atop Thor IRBMs. The result was that the United States had two reconnaissance satellites in simultaneous development. In August 1960, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) was created to manage the development and operation of reconnaissance satellites. The existence of this office was highly classified and was formally established in DoD Directive Number TS 5105.23. The existence of the NRO was not officially acknowledged until September 1992. This document, dated March 27, 1964, is the earliest declassified charter for the NRO. Neither the earlier version of DoD Directive 5105.23 mentioned in this document nor the presidential directive—possibly a National Security Council memorandum-has been publicly released. Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense and the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, including the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, a National Reconnaissance Office is hereby established as an operating agency of the Department of Defense, under the direction and supervision of the Secretary of Defense. II. Organization and Responsibility The National Reconnaissance Office will be organized separately within the Department of Defense under a Director, National Reconnaissance Office, appointed by the Secretary of Defense. The Director will be responsible for consolidation of all Department of Defense satellite and air vehicle overflight projects for intelligence into a single program, defined as the National Reconnaissance Program, and for the complete management and conduct of this Program in accordance with policy guidance and decisions of the Secretary of Defense. III. Relationships A. In carrying out his responsibilities for the National Reconnaissance Program, the Director, National Reconnaissance Office shall: [2] 1. Keep the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) personally informed on a regular basis on the status of projects of the National Reconnaissance Program. 2. Similarly inform other Department of Defense personnel as he may determine necessary in the course of carrying out specific project matters. 3. Establish appropriate interfaces between the National Reconnaissance Office and the United States Intelligence Board, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. 4. Where appropriate, make use of qualified personnel of services and agencies of the Department of Defense as full time members of the National Reconnaissance Office. B. Officials of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, military departments, and other DoD agencies shall provide support within their respective fields of responsibility, to the Director, National Reconnaissance Office as may be necessary for the Director to carry out his assigned responsibilities and functions. The Director, National Reconnaissance Office will be given support as required from normal staff elements of the military departments and agencies concerned, although these staff elements will not participate in these project matters except as he specifically requests. IV. Authorities A. The Director, National Reconnaissance Office, in connection with his assigned responsibilities for the [3] National Reconnaissance Office and the National Reconnaissance Program, is hereby specifically delegated authority to: 1. Organize, staff, and supervise the National Reconnaissance Office. 2. Establish, manage and conduct the National Reconnaissance Program. 3. Assist the Secretary of Defense in the supervision of aircraft and satellite reconnaissance photographic projects, and be his direct representative on these matters both within and outside the Department of Defense. 4. Review all Department of Defense budget requests and expenditures for any items falling within the definition of the National Reconnaissance Program, including studies and preliminary research and development of components and techniques to support such existing or future projects. B. Other authorities specifically delegated to the Director, National Reconnaissance Office by the Secretary of Defense will be referenced in numbered enclosures to this directive. V. Project Assignments All projects falling within the definition of the National Reconnaissance Program are assigned to that program and will be managed as outlined herein unless specific exception is made by the Director, National Reconnaissance Office. Announcements of any such exceptions will be made by numbered enclosures to this directive. A. The Director, National Reconnaissance Office will establish the security procedures to be followed for all matters of the National Reconnaissance Program, to protect all elements of the National Reconnaissance Office. B. All communications pertaining to matters under the National Reconnaissance Program will be subject to special systems of security control under the cognizance of the |