confidered; may be unfit upon the Whole, SER. VII. all Circumstances and Confiderations being laid together. Thus confider the Neceffities of a poor Man feparately, and you may think it proper he should be relieved: But if you know he will abuse your Charity in Drunkenness, or do himself or others fome Prejudice, the Fitness ceaseth. Here then the Fallacy lieth. We form Our Judgment of what God ought to do upon one fingle View of the Neceffities of Men; where several other Particulars ought to be taken into the Account to make our Reasoning just and exact. We know not, fór Inftance, whether an Attempt to remedy the Disadvantages of thofe, who want a Revelation, might not be attended with greater Difadvantages to them: Whether they might not inflame their Account by rejecting it, if offered; or abusing it, if received. He alone, who fees through the whole Plan of the Creation, who knows before-hand the different Tempers and Difpofitions of all Mankind, in all Ages and Nations, and the various Confequences that would arife from every poffible Männer of acting at every Period of Time; knew alone, at what Period of

A

SER. V.H. Time, to what Ages and Nations it was

proper to give a Revelation. God them
might be equally willing at all Times to
make a fuller Manifeftation of his Will
(for fome Traces and Remains of a Reve-
lation Men ftill had :) But Men might not
at all Times be equally difpofed and quali
fied to receive it.

I answer farther, that it might as well be objected, why has not God given to alb Men equal inward Abilities to discover the Truth as why he has not given to all Men equal external Evidences? The Anfwer is the fame to both Objections, viz. that God is not obliged to deal equally with all his Creatures in the Difpenfation of his Favours, having a Right to do what he will with his own: It is enough to vindicate his moral Character, that he will deal equitably with them according to the Improvement of their refpective Talents, cnmpenfating for fome People's want of Knowledge, whether natural or revealed, by making favourable Allowances to them, and balancing the fuperior Advantages of others, by making larger Demands from them, and requiring no more of any Person than he has given him fufficient Means to

know,

know, and Ability to perform. Let us bay SERVIN

lance the Account.

greater Knowledge

To the Christians

greater Duty

greater Difficulty greater Reward, if they do well greater Punishments, if ill. To the Heathens lefs Light

Duty lefs Reward if they do well less Punishment if ill.

1

lefs

Thus all feeming Inequalities are ad jufted. Where the Difficulty of the Conquest is the greateft, there the Triumph ought to be the most glorious, and the Prize most valuable. If thofe, who have the most clear and diftinct Notices; of their Duty, will be more feverely punished for their Crimes than others; it is but equit able, that they should be entitled to fuperior Rewards, when their Practice in fome Measure keeps Pace with their Knowledge: Otherwife, Knowledge would be a great Misfortune, and Darkness better. than Light.

That Reason therefore is fo far fufficient, as to enable Men to procure as much Hap piness here and hereafter, as God, accord ing to the Variety of his Difpenfations to Creatures, whether of the fame or a dif ferent Order, has, in his comprehensive

...

2

Wisdom,

SER. VII Wildom, thought fit; and that none will be accountable for invincible Ignorance; this we readily grant: But that Reason is fo unlimitedly fufficient, as to discover without the Affiftance of God all thofe beneficial and spiritual Truths, which are revealed; and to procure, without the Merits of Christ, all that Happiness which is promised to Chriftians; this we deny.

God may diverfify his Creation, as he pleafes, his manifold Wisdom may bring upon the Theatre of Nature, Variety of Creatures, under unequal Circumstances, confiftently with his Goodnefs; provided he has put it in every one's Power to make his Happiness prepollent and fuperior to his Mifery in the Whole of his Existence. But this God may have done, without having Recourfe to levelling Principles, without being obliged to put Heathens and Chriftians; any more than he has put Men and Angels, on the fame Foot.

The main Stress of the Queftion then lyes here. Whether, notwithstanding the diftinguishing Advantages of fome Creatures above others, it be not enough to vindicate God's Goodness, that he has formed no Creature whatever, whether Angel or Man, Chriftian,

Christian or Heathen, but what has fuffi- SER. VII.

cient Means to make the Sum of his Hap

piness exceed that of his Mifery, either here or hereafter? If they fay, this is not fufficient; they are not Deifts but something worfe; they fet afide that Principle, which feems to account for that Disproportion of Happiness in the World, fo vifible in the Scale of Beings rifing one above another, from the meaneft Infect to the highest Archangel. If they fay, it is fufficient; the fame Reason, which justifieth God in giving Angels greater Degrees of Knowledge and Bliss, than Men; will justify him too in giving Chriftians a larger Allotment of both than Heathens. For there is the fame Principle to vindicate God in both Cafes, viz. every one's Enjoyments will, if it be not their own Fault, over-balance their Unhappiness: 'Therefore the Conclufion ought to be the fame, viz. God is equally justified in both Cafes. When once his Goodness has defigned every Creature, who is not wanting to himself, a Preponderancy of Blifs; his unerring Wisdom may difpofe of the Surplus, that remains beyond this, as he thinks fit. Whereas, according to the Suppofition of the Deifts, there VOL. II. muft

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