TABLE A.-Performance and cost comparison-B-17 E versus B-47B TABLE C.-Application of Air Force controls to the public-works program Screening fiscal year 1952 budget: 1. Estimate of major commands and other Air Force programs. 2. Installation Board review. 3. Civilian Committee review. Mr. Howard Bruce, Chairman. 4. Secretary's Review Committee. Program presented for authorization, 3.6 billion. Fiscal year 1952 funding, 2.4 billion. TABLE D.-An agency for efficient operation, equipment survey boards Purpose. To survey field utilization, effectiveness, and necessity of equipment authorized by tables of equipment. First Board.-After 6 months' field study: 1. Deleted 5,318 items from Tables of Equipment. 2. Directed less expensive substitution for 375 items. TWENTY-ONE EXPERTS IN FAR EAST SURVEYING COMBAT CONDITIONS Current Board.-One preliminary finding: 1. C-6 bomb hoist authorized for B-26 units, not being used. 2. C-6 hoist can be substituted for B-29 hoist, supply of which is low. 3. Survey Board caused immediate transfer of C-6 hoists to B-29 unit effecting substantial savings in material, transportation, and elimination o waste. 1. Modern equipment is highly complex and expensive. 2. Inflation has increased cost although volume savings tend to hide effect. 3. Top Air Force management realizes its obligation to conserve personnel, material, and financial resources while producing a maximum combat potential. 4. Management controls are increasingly applied to accomplish our objectives. 5. Our organization to handle these matters is growing stronger daily. COMPARISON OF B-17 AND B-47 Mr. MCCONE. The program cost of the B-17 was $402,000. The program cost for the B-47 is $3,476,000. Senator O'MAHONEY. What is the significance of the word "program" as used there? Mr. MCCONE. The program includes the cost of the airplane and the cost of the initial spares and parts that must be procured conCurrently with the airplane in order to maintain it. The difference in these two figures is quite staggering. However, when you consider this airplane has eight times the power and three times the weight of the B-17, the difference is perhaps not as signitant as the dollar figures would indicate. Mr. Chairman, you would be interested in this, which is a section of the outer skin of the B-47 indicating its thickness. I will hand it you. Here is a section of the outer skin of the B-17 indicating s thickness and a comparison of the two is a measure of the complexity of the problem. I think these two diagrams illustrate in a rather interesting way Some of the complexities of the modern aircraft. Senator O'MAHONEY. Perhaps it might be appropriate for me to remark that a comparison of these sections of the outer skin of the d plane as compared with the new makes it clear that the section of the new plane which is roughly 3 inches by 2 inches, comparatively small in area, is altogether adequate for a paperweight; whereas the wher one would be utterly useless as a paperweight. I say that for the benefit of the record because they cannot be otherwise described. Mr. MCCONE. We thought you would be interested in that. This is a schematic diagram of a B-17 landing gear despite the fact that in World War II we thought it was quite a complicated device. It looks very simple here as compared with the landing gear of a B-47. Just a glance at the sketch and without going into the technology of it, you can see how enormously complicated this article is as compared with the B-17. BOMB SIGHT I thought the committee would be interested in the bomb sight in the B-47 as compared with the famous bomb sight of World War II. This is a complete Norden bomb sight. You are all more or less familiar with it. It operated very satisfactorily at relatively low altitudes. The price in production of 300 items was $8,000 apiece then. This very complicated device is a very small part of the tracking computer of the K-2 system. I invite your attention to how exceedingly complex it is. The cost of this unit is $50,000. That is only part of the story because that tracking computer only represents that small part of this whole complex of electrical gadgets that make up an optical radar bombing navigational system of the modern heavy or medium bomber. The cost of the entire system runs in the order of $250,000 for a complete system. Senator O'MAHONEY. When you speak of a system, you are speaking of a system for a single plane? Mr. MCCONE. That is right. We speak of the system as the system that is contained in a single plane. I tried to get a similar example for you on cameras, but I was unable to do so because the door was not big enough to bring in the modern camera. Senator O'MAHONEY. Let the record show this is not a small door. AERIAL CAMERA Mr. MCCONE. I have a very interesting photograph, Mr. Chairman. It was taken by one of the modern reconnaissance cameras at 9 miles, 45,000 feet, in the B-47 aircraft. The interesting part of this is the extreme detail. You can see every automobile on the street. Here on this golf course you can see two golfers. By use of this magnifying glass you can see the golf ball on the green, and that was taken at 9 miles up. Unfortunately, we must go to this type of very complex and expensive equipment. The mission of the modern aircraft is entirely different that the mission of the World War II aircraft. All of these very complicated devices are necessary for the accomplishment of today's mission which involves flying at very high altitudes, the altitude of 8, 9, and 10 miles, at speeds that are approaching the speed of sound. Consequently, the problems of navigation and of accuracy of bombing are entirely different than they were in World War II. They are beyond the capacity of any visual device such as the original Norden bomb sight. FIELD SURVEYS Turning to some aspects of our planning and the effect of planning, have one or two examples that just show in a tangible way how some of the things we do nets results for us. We recently organized a field survey utilization, effectiveness and necessity of equipment authorized by tables of equipment board. We have within the Air Force, as does the other services, what we term our tables of equipment for all of our different units. We continually survey those in the field to see that they are right. A recent 6 months' survey caused the deletion of 5,318 items from tables of equipment that were surveyed and directed the substitution of 375 items because they were less expensive than the original items. Another example of management-we sent a group of 21 experts to the initial Far East to survey our tables of equipment under combat conditions. In one finding we found where the C-6 bomb hoist that was sent over for the B-26 units was not being used. The B-29 units, on the other hand, have no bomb hoists. We were under great difficulty here to try and activate the factory to manufacture bomb hoists, the factory which had gone out of production. The Board determined that the B-26 bomb hoist could be used in the B-29. They effected a transfer from one command in one area of the Far East to the other, with the result of substantial savings in material, transportation, and the elimination of waste. I cite those just as two concrete examples of things that are going on every day. This is an interesting example of a series of actions. The budget advisory committee at that level in reviewing our requirements for the B-36 program determined there were B-36 spare engines on request. The Financial Policy Committee concurred in and approved the findings of the Budget Advisory Committee and requested action by the Air Force Council. The Air Force Council reduced the number spare engines and directed the matériel and comptroller team to study the methodology used in computing requirements. After the study was completed, a new formula was developed and new pipeline requirements were set up for this particular engine. The result was there was a reduction of 25 percent in the spare engine requirement for the B-36 and a saving of $54,500,000 in the particular budget under of review. This is another example of a series of reviews on our public works program and the effect of screening. We started by an estimate of the major commands and other Air Force programs in regard to their requirements for public works. Those were reviewed by the Installation Board and a substantial reduction resulted from that review. We were not entirely satisfied, neither General Vandenberg nor Secretary Finletter, so we employed a civilian committee of competent individuals under the chairmanship of Howard Bruce, and they reviewed the findings of the Installation Board and made another reduction. Then there was a further review by the Secretary of the Review Committee and a final review by the Bureau of the Budget. The final program after the fifth review was $3.6 billion request for authorization and $2.4 billion sum which must be funded in 1952. Those indicate to you how this process of review and control continually works. I thought the committee would be interested to know that they do actually work. I thought those examples would be of particular interest to you. INFLATION COST INCREASES I would like to discuss for just a minute what we are up against on prices. I thought it would be best to consider price of materials rather than end products such as airplanes, because there our prices are adversely affected by inflation; but they are favorably affected by quantity production. So the price today and the price a year ago is not comparable because of the quantities being produced. However, here are some very interesting things. Shoes, of a type-the World War II price was $4.10. The pre-Korean price was the same. There was no increase there. The present price is $7.25. Then we have a 2-ton truck. The price pre-Korea was $3,970. The price now is $4,695. Then we have a piece of office equipment, a drafting machine. In World War II we paid $42, pre-Korea $58, and now we pay $67. The price of steel per ton as published in the Iron Age in World War II was $2.10 or $42 a ton. Pre-Korea it was $3.40 or $68 a ton, and the present price is $3.65. Air bolt lubricants in World War II were priced at 29 cents a gallon and they gradually declined until the price pre-Korea was 20 cents but it is now up to 36 cents. Lumber was $70 a thousand, then it went up to $90 a thousand and now it is $100 a thousand. A pump driven by a gasoline engine, a standard piece of equipment for the Air Force, pre-Korea was $1,033. Today it is $1,764. That is a 70-percent increase in price. Office furniture: The price of a steel, desk has increased from $59 to $80 since the start of the Korean conflict. A 27-inch automobile tire was $30 in World War II. It is $40.95 pre-Korea and now it is $46.22. Paper products, bond typing paper: Pre-Korea the price was 28 cents; now it is 34 cents. That gives you some indication of what we are up against on prices. I have tried to demonstrate by these charts our modern equipment is highly complex and expensive. Inflation has increased our costs although volume savings tend to hide the fact in some of our end products. Top Air Force management: The Air Force realizes its obligation to conserve personnel, material, and financial resources while producing a maximum combat potential. In that regard, as the other services are expanding, we are expanding our production base and providing for duplicating sources of production on all of our end items. Management controls are increasingly applied to accomplish these objectives. We are organized to handle these matters and our organization is growing stronger every day. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator O'MAHONEY. Thank you very much, Secretary McCone. Let me say I think this has been a most excellent and impressive statement. It reveals in a way that has never come to my knowledge before the magnitude and complexity of the task which the Department of Defense must carry through. I am sure it has been mos impressive. The committee will not be able to sit this afternoon. would be very inconvenient for some of the members to sit tomorrow I am wondering, Secretary Lovett, if it would be agreeable for your group to return here Monday morning for such questioning as the members of the committee may wish to undertake. I Mr. LOVETT. Certainly, Mr. Chairman. I think if it meets the wishes of the committee we may have to run in one or two substitutes Senator O'MAHONEY. The committee will now stand in recess unti 10 o'clock Monday morning. (Whereupon, at 12:35 p. m., Thursday, June 7, 1951, the committe recessed until 10 a. m., Monday, June 11, 1951.) |