over the years have reflected successes or reversals in conflicts localized in time or place, whether of a military or diplomatic nature.

These deviations in our military readiness must be replaced by a consistent foreign military policy. Such a policy must recognize that the Communist military and fifth-column aggressions are part of an uncompleted march of conquest that will not stop short of world domination unless deterred or defeated by superior moral and military force.

The Communist goal of world subjugation under their dictatorship need not be inferred. They have made it clear for all to see in the writings of Lenin and Stalin. Like Hitler in Mein Kampf, they have explicitly stated their goals which we cannot afford to ignore if we value our liberty and our democratic way of life.

The peaceful pursuits of the people of the United States and their hatred of war place certain self-imposed handicaps on our defense planning that must be taken into account by all of us. We cannot plan for a peak war readiness for a given date.

In contrast, the war machine of a dictator can pick the time and the place for the next aggressive action. In an age when men and their weapons can travel faster than the speed of sound, nations that were once great time distances apart have become relatively adjacent. Since the weapons of modern warfare are so destructive, the first hours and even minutes of combat will require the constant vigilance and adequate preparedness of the entire country.

I appeal today for strengthening the sea and air power of the United States Navy, and for the forces of the United States Marine Corps.

NAVAL AND MARINE CORPS MISSION

The United States Navy and the United States Marine Corps are now more important than ever before in providing security to our country. Their mission is to assure the safe and expeditious movement of men and materials to their destination in peace and war; to support United States international commitments in peacetime; to protect our shores in wartime.

That mission includes maintaining maximum offensive mobile power, speed, and flexibility of our naval vessels, naval aircraft, and a strong Marine Corps for the prosecution of campaigns designed to insure command of the seas so that the military power of the United States and our allies can be carried to any enemy soil.

If total war should come despite our best efforts to prevent it, practical self-interest requires that we carry the battle to the enemy insofar as possible so that our people, our cities, and our productive facilities may be spared the ravages of direct enemy attack. It seems appropriate that I review some recent achievements in the accomplishment of our mission.

The first 6 months of the Korean conflict posed a tremendous transportation problem that required vast movements of men and material to Japan and Korea from the United States over 5,000 miles away. The Military Air Transport Service, which includes naval components, performed outstandingly in lifting high priority cargo and personnel to the battle area. The vast proportion of material and personnel movement requirements, however, could only be met by the

greater capacity of the Military Sea Transportation Service under the protection of the United States Navy.

NAVAL MILITARY SEA TRANSPORT SERVICE CONTRIBUTION TO KOREA WAR

During this 6-month period, the Navy's Military Sea Transportation Service carried to the Japan-Korea theater over 3 million measurement tons of bulk cargo, 930,000 long tons of petroleum, and over 400,000 personnel.

The demands of the Korean conflict and of the world situation provided an opportunity to demonstrate the value of the naval mothballing and preservation programs of ships and aircraft which the Congress had previously authorized.

The inception of this program was predicated on the concept that, as a military organization, the Navy should be at all times capable of effective performance of its mission in the event of a national emer

gency.

At the outbreak of hostilities in the Far East, the United States Navy had in operation a quantity of aircraft in fleet commands that was inadequate to meet the sudden turn of events. Pacific Fleet Commands immediately appealed for more ships and airplanes. The Navy was able to supply this need from its Reserve fleet and its aircraft storage inventory.

During the first six critical months, 907 combat aircraft were withdrawn from mothballs in a ready-for-use condition, modernized by installing the latest electronic and safety of flight requirements, and put into immediate use. This preparedness, which made it possible to meet quickly the sudden aggressive action, greatly compensated for the unavailability of new aircraft.

RESERVE FLEET REACTIVATION AND COST OF PREPARATION

The combat reserve in moth balls paid off in national security. Since the start of the Korea conflict, over 300 vessels have been recommissioned and placed on active duty. We plan to raise this to a total of 381 by the close of the current fiscal year.

The estimated replacement cost of these 381 vessels would be approximately $5 billion at present prices. The cost of activating these vessels will total approximately $120 million, or 2% percent of the estimated replacement cost.

RESERVISTS ON ACTIVE DUTY

As the ships of the moth-ball fleet were reactivated, they were manned by qualified Reserve and Regular personnel. As of June 30, 1950, there were 2.398 Marine reserves, and 4,128 Navy reserves on active duty. By December 31, 1950, there were 73,000 Marine Corps reserves, and 100,700 Navy reserves on active duty. By April 30, 1951, there were 85.000 Marine Corps reserves, and 141,600 Navy reserves on active duty.

The Naval and Marine Corps Reserve training programs have been designated to provide qualified personnel to meet emergency needs quickly. The numbers of Navy reserves called to active duty were sufficient either to directly man the reactivated ships and aircraft or

to replace regular naval personnel performing training or other shore duties.

The Marine Corps Organized Reserve was called up in its entiretyexcept for 10 air squadrons-to fill its strength to 2 divisions, plus the pipeline to Korea and replacement of casualties.

The budget of the Department of the Navy for fiscal year 1952 is designed to permit performance of naval missions at levels determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as essential for national security. The programs reflected in these financial estimates have been reviewed in the Department of Defense and in the Executive Office of the President.

In general, strong emphasis has been placed on bringing the active forces to approved end strengths as rapidly as practicable and maintaining the highest degree of combat readiness. Support for the active forces has been phased to the increase in the forces and personnel.

The industrial base has been broadened by increasing the capacity to produce major equipment for the active forces and the mobilization reserves through use of facilities and tooling rather than manufacturing and products.

NEW OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY REQUESTED FOR 1952

The total new obligating authority in Navy estimates for fiscal year 1952 is $15,071,444,000. These funds which the Navy requests are essential to support the international policy and commitments of the United States. Our Navy today is based at many distant places in support of these commitments.

We have prepared a comprehensive and detailed outline of the Navy's justification of the budget it is requesting. The facts and figures involved will be presented in orderly sequence by the administrative officers best qualified to do so with the least tax on your time

and endurance.

Admiral Sherman will tell you about the operating forces and how they will be used.

General Cates will discuss Marine Corps requirements.

Admiral Clexton will tell you about the financial aspects of the estimates.

You may be sure that, as usual, the bureau chiefs, and any other Navy personnel whom you may wish to question, will appear before you to discuss any details of the estimate in which you may be interested.

Senator HAYDEN. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question?

Senator O'MAHONEY. Yes.

Senator HAYDEN. On page 4 in the second paragraph, it states that: During this 6-month period the Navy's Military Sea Transportation Service carried to the Japan-Korea theater over 3 million measurement tons of bulk cargo, 930,000 long tons of petroleum, and over 400,000 personnel.

I did not think that we had that many people over there.

Secretary MATTHEWS. We have not possibly all those personnel there now, but that is the personnel that was carried over. Some of them have come back, of course. I cannot give you the exact figures of how many the Army has there. I do not know whether Admiral Clexton can, or not.

Senator HAYDEN. Did the Navy's Military Sea Transportation Service convey all of the Army personnel?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator HAYDEN. There used to be an Army Transportation Service.

Admiral SHERMAN. The Military Sea Transportation Service represents a consolidation of all sea transportation for all the services and it consists of ships in commission with Navy crews, certain ships in commission with civilian crews, which is the carry-over from the old Army system, and then any further need either for personnel or for cargo space the Sea Transportation Service arranges for by charter through the Maritime Administration, or in some cases by direct contracts for partial loadings.

Senator YOUNG. Were not some of them carried by airplane? Admiral SHERMAN. That is another organization, sir. At the same time we pooled all of the shipping service for the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, we pooled the greater part of the Air Transport Service. The Navy discontinued all scheduled air transport operations and they were put into the Military Air Transport Service under the Air Force.

Over and above that we have a pool of naval transport aircraft which can be shifted from one area to another as the fleet moves.

Senator HAYDEN. I was under the misapprehension that the Military Sea Transportation Service did all of this with their own vessels, but I see you chartered vessels, so that combination made the service possible.

I thank you.

Secretary MATTHEWS. There was some personnel carried by the Air Force in airplanes, quite substantial numbers of them.

Senator THYE. Is this statement classified by the Secretary?

Secretary MATTHEWS. No; it is not classified.

Senator O'MAHONEY. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Now, Admiral Sherman, if you will make your statement, please.

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL FORREST P. SHERMAN, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

PURPOSES OF 1952 BUDGET ESTIMATE

Admiral SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, during the period of preparing its request for appropriations for the fiscal year 1952, the Navy, and, in fact, the Nation as a whole has been confronted by a situation for which there is no precedent. Never before under conditions short of full mobilization has the Navy faced the double responsibilities of carrying on full-scale combat operations in one area and at the same time building toward that strength and degree of readiness we must have if we are either to deter the Communists from expanding the Korean conflict into a general war, or to defeat them if deterrent efforts fail.

The Navy has done a seaman-like job of meeting the first of these rsponsibilities. The appropriations request now under consideration is designed to prepare the Navy to meet the second.

POSTWAR NAVAL FLUCTUATION

Since 1945, the Navy has been through a year of precipitate demobilization, a year and a half of more gradual shrinkage, about a year of moderate expansion, a year of drastic cut-backs to an austere peacetime establishment, and, since June 25, 1950, 12 months of hurried expansion.

Less than 6 weeks have elapsed since the Vice Chief of Naval Operations appeared before this committee in connection with the fiscal year 1951 fourth supplemental appropriations. At that time there was outlined briefly the development of the Navy program objectives for the whole 18-month period from the President's proclamation of the existence of a national emergency to the end of fiscal year 1952 and the committee was told how, after the cost of the entire program had been estimated, those funds and only those funds required at the earliest possible time to cover imminent deficiencies and insure production continuity were requested in the fiscal year 1951 fourth supplemental.

That supplemental request was carefully screened to eliminate items which would involve advance commitment with respect to the whole program. It is the remainder of that program which is now before you.

Before giving you the details of the Navy program, I must emphasize features which affect all parts of it in a major degree. Last December when the preparation of the fourth supplemental 1951 and the estimates for fiscal year 1952 was commenced, it was impracticable to determine when the hostilities in Korea might end. It was impracticable to estimate very far ahead the tempo of combat and consequent fiscal requirements. It was therefore decided that estimates covering the remainder of fiscal year 1951 would include appropriations to cover combat requirements.

SUPPLEMENTAL 1952 BUDGET ESTIMATE ANTICIPATED

It was decided that the estimates for the fiscal year 1952 would provide only for a base-a year of steady sustained expansion toward approved force levels, accelerated training, and commencing the acquisition of realistic mobilization reserve levels of supply or their equivalent in the broadening of the mobilization base. This will, of course, make it necessary to submit supplementary estimates to cover the additional costs arising from combat operations as their intensity and duration are determined.

STOCKPILING

The acquisition of material reserves is planned to be continued during the early part of fiscal year 1952 at an accelerated rate. A decision will have to be made in the second quarter of fiscal year 1952 as to whether the procurement rate can prudently be slowed. If it cannot, additional funds will be required in advance of the normal fiscal 1953 appropriations..

In designing a program to meet the demands of the situation, the Navy has placed strong emphasis on bringing active forces to approved