The CHAIRMAN. Go right ahead.

Admiral DUNCAN. It has to do with the emergence of the U. S. S. R. as a maritime power.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.
Now, in that connection-

Admiral DUNCAN. That statement is rather startling, but I would like to explore that further.

This chart, Mr. Chairman, shows the total number of new combatant ships, submarines and better, that have been delivered since the year 1946. The blue is the United States and the red is the U. S. S. R. The scale—this is numbers of ships only, large and small, except they are submarines and better-combatant ships as we call them.

The trend is clear, without reference to numbers. You can see what is going on in the U. S. S. R. as far as their Navy is concerned. They are as we used to say, building a navy.

Mr. DEVEREUX. Mr. Chairman, at that point I would like to ask a question.

As far as Russia-I mean as far as the communistic bloc is concerned, that represents the communistic bloc-building program, or a delivery program, does it not?

Admiral DUNCAN. No, sir. That is completed and delivered.

Mr. DEVEREUX. Yes. I appreciate that. But now when you compare our delivery, you do not take into consideration our allies, do you?

Admiral DUNCAN. I do not. I have that but I felt that I could not present it to this committee unclassified because it involves the NATO navies and so forth.

The CHAIRMAN. In that connection-

Mr. NORBLAD. Does this include their allies?

Admiral DUNCAN. Not significant. This is the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Mr. NORBLAD. Without regard to Poland or other satellites?

The CHAIRMAN. Let me read from Janes Fighting Ships, unofficial list. This is the Russian Navy. Battleships, 3; cruisers, 32, including 6 building; destroyers, 138; frigates, 47; submarines 370 to 400; patrol vessels, 32; mine-warfare vessels, 360.

Now, that is what Janes Fighting Ships gives about the strength of the Soviet Navy.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, could I inquire there now?

The Russian Navy, what they have, can only operate-wait now. Do the ice conditions affect operation of the Russian Navy?

Admiral DUNCAN. They affect the part of the Russian Navy that is up north. In the Baltic, I believe they have ice, above Norway. Mr. RIVERS. That certainly proscribes them there.

Would you consider the North Sea area a restricted area for the Forrestal type carrier?

Admiral DUNCAN. No, I wouldn't consider it a restricted area.

Mr. RIVERS. You think they could operate there. The degree of danger there would be much greater than in any other places. But you wouldn't hesistate to

Admiral DUNCAN. A lot of it is minable waters. It would have to be prepared. I say we can operate there. We have operated in a lot. more dangerous places than that.

Mr. RIVERS. Now, in that connection, are you familiar with that Mainbrace incident that happened up in that area in 1952?

Admiral DUNCAN. I was asked a question about that this morning. Mr. RIVERS. Would you mind

Admiral DUNCAN. By Mr. Van Zandt, which I could not answer. Mr. RIVERS. You

Admiral DUNCAN. I am in general familiar with the operation, yes. Mr. RIVERS. Could you explain that this afternoon?

Because there has been a lot of talk bandied around about that condition up there, about what happened in that incident.

Admiral DUNCAN. You mean as far as the submarines or as far as the air is concerned?

Mr. RIVERS. I am interested in the part about the submarines sinking the whole business.

Admiral DUNCAN. I can give you an account of that which I would prefer to give Wednesday, unless you would like to have it today. The CHAIRMAN. That is right, let's take it up Wednesday. (The information is as follows:)

MAINBRACE OPERATION

The purpose of Mainbrace was to exercise the forces (primarily Navy) of SACLANT and SACEUR in strategical and tactical roles, with the following specific objectives:

(a) Exercise of NATO command relationships.

(b) Establishment of requirements for communications and testing of present systems and facilities.

(c) Familiarization of participating forces with local conditions in the north European area.

(d) Maximum training in all types of operations required to fulfill strategical and tactical roles.

(e) Development of a better understanding of the logistic problems involved in the conduct of operations in this area.

Naval forces of the United Kingdom, Portugal, Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, Canada, France, and Denmark participated. More than 150 warships and hundreds of aircraft were involved, making this operation the largest of its type ever conducted.

It was the consensus of all United States and NATO commands involved that Mainbrace was neither designed to furnish, nor did its results justify the drawing of any definite conclusions on the relative merits of the forces taking part in that exercise.

Mainbrace as planned and carried out involved a movement of convoys between the United Kingdom and Scandinavia; raider operations by a cruiser; submarine and antisubmarine operations; operations of fast minelaying vessels; support of ground forces by sea and air forces; harbor defense exercises; and general replenishment at sea exercises; in addition to 2 carrier aircraft strikes of 2 days each.

There was a press criticism to the effect that weather interfered with carrier aircraft. It is quite true that weather did interfere with carrier operations. On September 18, 1952, during the phase of the exercise involving carrier air support of land operations heavy seas and gale winds hampered carrier operations. Despite the unfavorable weather a large number of sorties (110) were flown from the Midway, F. D. Roosevelt, and the British carrier, Eagle. On the following day when no carrier aircraft were launched, the weather also grounded all land-based aircraft.

The consensus of the NATO commands involved was that carrier air support would continue to play an important part in the plans for this area of the North Atlantic and Norwegian Sea or any similar area in which airfields are so scarce. The fact that requests are continually received from NATO commands for more carriers to participate in major exercises indicates that this feeling still exists. With respect to the matter of weather interference with carrier operations, the comment of the commander of the striking fleet as contained in his report is important. It is as follows:

"Weather conditions during Mainbrace were at least as bad as normally could be expected in the area of operations during September. The striking fleet encountered severe storm conditions 3 days during phase I. One-half day of air operations was completed off north Norway, and 1 full day off Denmark. Weather conditions then became such that peacetime operation of aircraft could not be justified. It is important to distinguish between peacetime and wartime operations of carrier aircraft at this point. In peacetime operations, safety must be stressed to conserve material and to insure that lives of the pilots are not needlessly risked. In wartime, air operations are conducted under more severe conditions and the possibility of damaging material and losing pilots must be accepted as necessary risk. Wartime air operations would have been feasible on both days off Norway and off Jutland. They were no worse than many days during the last war when full operations were conducted not only from large CV's but from small Kaiser class CVE's as well."

With respect to submarine activities against carrier task forces, it should be noted that in pursuit of the objective of training the submarines had information as to where the task forces were required to operate. During the whole exercise only 2 attacks were made on the carriers--1 long range and 1 short range. The submarine incident, upon which the press comment was based at the time, as reported by a participant, occurred during the initial phase of the exercise with the sortie of NATO ships from the Glasgow area. The leading units in this sortie were British ships, together with a few from other European NATO countries. These were followed by the United States destroyers. The leading units were attacked by a submarine from the opposing forces. Two British destroyers detected the submarine and made attacks upon it which they reported to the exercise commander, who considered the submarine sunk as a result of these attacks. Accordingly, the task force proceeded on through the swept channel and the larger units passed the location of the submarine which was then operating in a theoretically mined area. The submarine previously declared sunk simulated a torpedo attack by firing green flares. Apparently, news reporters on the flagship were not told at the time that this submarine had been theoretically sunk. Furthermore, the submarine undoubtedly had not received such notification because of being submerged.

The Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, in his report on the whole exercise remarked that Mainbrace demonstrated how difficult it is for submarines to detect, close, and attack fast carrier striking groups at any time, and particularly under relatively adverse weather conditions. On the whole, the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, considered the exercise to have been successful in its objective, and this also was generally agreed by all NATO commands concerned.

Admiral DUNCAN (with another chart). This is the same thing on a little bit different basis, Mr. Chairman. The United States in blue and the U. S. S. R. in red. This has to do with types of ships, 1950 to 1954. You can see that in the cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, Russia is beginning to get ahead of us.

That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Admiral.

Mr. Secretary, from what the Admiral has said, showing us the composition of the Active Fleet, the Reserve Fleet, the number of men that were in at the end of fiscal 1956, and the number of fighting planes, you have a very powerful organization under your control and management.

The Navy is in good shape. But we have to recognize the fact that we have to continue at all times to build ships. We can't let up in building ships.

Now, I am very much impressed with what the Admiral said. Admiral Carney said:

Most ships in our active and Reserve Fleet are of World War II vintage. Many of them have already passed the midpoint of their useful life expectancy. Unless a continuing and orderly ship building and replacement program is provided, a large number will become obsolete at about the same time.

And because of the long lead time for building ships, it would be impossible to replace these ships in a relatively short time, even if unlimited authorization and funds were available.

Now, that is what the Navy had in mind when back in 1934 we began to lay down ships. Pearl Harbor came along and knocked out a large number of ships. But we had the foresight to have on the way a large shipbuilding program. So while it was a great loss for the time being, we were able to get over it, because we had an orderly shipbuilding program. And we have to continue at all times, indefinitely, to have an orderly shipbuilding program.

It is one of these things that the Government must have to survive. Now, we will take a recess until Wednesday morning at 10 o'clock. And we will try to have some more testimony at that time.

Thank you.

Mr. HESS. (Aside.)

The CHAIRMAN. Tomorrow morning the committee meets. A quorum must be here.

Mr. RIVERS. On the pay bill?

The CHAIRMAN. We have to have a vote on the pay bill. And Wednesday morning we will get back on the shipbuilding bill. And Thursday morning on the rubber bill.

(Thereupon, at 3: 45 p. m., the committee adjourned until Wednesday, March 9, 1955, at 10 a. m.)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

Washington, D. C., Wednesday, March 9, 1955. The committee met at 10 a. m., the Honorable Carl Vinson, chairman, presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order.

Admiral Leggett, the committee will be pleased to have you make any statement in regard to the justification for favorable consideration of H. R. 4393.

Admiral LEGGETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. WILSON D. LEGGETT, JR., USN, CHIEF, BUREAU OF SHIPS

Admiral LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am glad to appear before you this morning in support of H. R. 4393. This bill would provide specific authorization, by ship types, for the 161,409 tons of new naval vessels and the 294,200 tons of conversions comprising the Navy's fiscal 1956 program. The new construction would be charged against previously authorized and unobligated tonnage balances.

Most of our authorization statutes of recent years have, of course, granted new increments of tonnage authority by category and subcategory, without reference to specific ship types. However, as coordinator of naval shipbuilding, I strongly favor enactment of H. R. 4393, because it constitutes positive and detailed approval of our proposed program, including the new aircraft carrier.

The Navy has a further reason, however, for supporting H. R. 4399. This bill affords us an opportunity to present our plans for fiscal 1956 in detail before this committee and to receive the benefit of its counsel and guidance. In this connection I would like to say that for any further program beyond fiscal 1956, we shall also, in all probability, need to seek new tonnage authorizations before this

committee.

In all categories and subcategories except warships, the Navy's current unobligated balances are greatly depleted, because there has been no broad grant of new tonnage authority since enacement of Public law 3 of the 82d Congress. After giving effect to the fiscal 1956 program, we shall have only 314 tons left in the patrol vessels subcategory and a total of less than 18,000 tons remaining for future minecraft, amphibious warfare vessels and landing and service craft.

Admiral Duncan has already outlined the characteristics of the new ships comprising the program and their relation to the Navy's operational needs. I would like to give you a brief report on the status of our current shipbuilding program.

Contracts or project orders have been placed and work is in progress on all ships comprising the fiscal 1955 program, except 2 nuclearpowered submarines, 6 tank landing ships, 3 wooden minesweepers, and 2 utility landing craft. These ships are of new design. Plans are being prepared, and awards are expected to be made later this year.

During calendar year 1954, 112 vessels and 2,436-plus 5,762 rubber boats-boats and craft were constructed in this country under supervision of the Bureau of Ships. These consisted of 41 vessels and 1,187-plus 5,762 rubber boats-boats and craft for the Navy, 884 boats and craft for the Army and Air Force, and 71 vessels and 365 boats and craft for mutual defense assistance. Among the naval vessels completed were the following: 2 destroyer leaders, 2 escort vessels, 1 auxiliary submarine, 29 minesweepers, 1 oiler, 2 dock landing ships, and 4 tank landing ships. In addition, conversions of 23 naval vessels were accomplished during 1954. These consisted of 3 aircraft carriers, 3 submarines, 1 radar picket destroyer, 14 mine hunters and 2 store ships.

The Nautilus, the world's first nuclear-powered submarine, was commissioned last year and is now undergoing her sea trials. The Forrestal, our first attack aircraft carrier of postwar design, became waterborne last December. As Secretary Thomas has previously indicated, these are proto-types of the modernized fleet which will be required to maintain our supremacy at sea in the years to come.

They contain many technical innovations. I shall mention only one of them and that particularly because of the recent emphasis which has been placed on the fallout from nuclear explosions. During the early tests at Bikini the Navy ships were occasionally referred to as "floating atomic ovens" because of fallout contamination. We have since developed and tested out a washdown system which enables any ship to rapidly decontaminate itself. This system was actually tested in the very heavy falloff in the Eniwetok tests of the thermo-nuclear device. It is most effective where an unlimited water supply is available and, of course, not usable except under these conditions.