Admiral GRENFELL. These are Air Force figures, air training combat cost, combat-command costs, depot-maintenance costs, aircraft replacement costs, preflight training; for this particular figure here, that is, $120,000, this is for F-94-C pilot, $1,820 total for preflight; $17,800, primary training; basic, $25,180; advanced, $45,250; ADC combat crew training, $32,290; total, $122,340.

Mr. BLANDFORD. This means that this is the actual cost incurred for each pilot that is trained as a jet pilot in the Air Force?

In other words, there is no repetition of cost here? This isn't a continuing cost that would go on regardless of whether or not these men were leaving the service or coming into the service? You are talking about the cost for a young man who has to be trained in how to fly a jet, you are talking about fuel consumed in training alone, you are talking about the instructors that are required to teach a man to fly a jet, you are talking about the additional wear and tear on aircraft as a result of having to put these people through these continuous training processes, so that it is not a cost figure that would be constant regardless of that.

Secretary BURGESS. If I may, Mr. Blandford, we would like General Lee to confirm the comments.

General LEE. That is right. These figures as the admiral read them cover various items in various stages of training through the various commands that have anything to do with that training.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Once a man has completed that training-
General LEE. He is trained.

Mr. BLANDFORD. There is $120,000 invested in him and in order to put another person through there to take his place, right from the day he enters into the Air Force, to replace this individual will cost $120,000 all told.

General LEE. To get him to the same state

Mr. BLANDFORD. State of efficiency as the man who left the service.

General LEE. I might add, sir, that this is, as the admiral said, for a F-49C pilot.

Mr. BLANDFORD. I know the B-47 crew costs are fantastic.

General LEE. For B-47's it will be more. It varies by the aircraft. Mr. WILSON. How long a period of time does that cover from the time the training begins until the pilot is completely trained? Secretary BURGESS. 17 months of training.

General LEE. 17, 18 months.

Admiral GRENFELL. Yes.

Mr. RIVERS. B-47's are longer?
General LEE. Yes.

Mr. RIVERS. I was talking to General Harmon out at Colorado Springs and he related to me a little story.

He said there was a man hanging around the gates at Lowry Field-which is a continuation of Keesler Field training as you know, for radar and electronics and so forth, and he said a man representing industry went to the commanding officer at Keesler Field and said "I want to be honest with you, I want to tell you what I am doing just to show you what an honest fellow I am. I have somebody waiting outside the gates here, and the minute you release any of those boys, I am going to pay him three times what you are paying. I just want you to know that, just to show what an honest fellow I am." Secretary BURGESS. I believe in later testimony to be presented to you there will be further evidence of that.

Mr. RIVERS. I picked that up on the outside.

Mr. BENNETT. There is one thought. I don't know whether you can value it in dollars and cents. But undoubtedly there is some value of a trained pilot who leaves the service as far as the defense is concerned. I don't know whether you give consideration to that or not. I don't know how you present it but somebody on the floor might say, "Well, it is not a total loss, this man can be brought back into the service. After all, the UMT program is supposed to be designed with that in mind, for a certain number of months after the man gets out you can still snatch him back. I want to know if any consideration has been given to it.

Secretary BURGESS. I don't think it has been given in the case of dollars. It represents a plus on our side. But it doesn't mean very much to the management of the active force at any given time.

Mr. BLANDFORD. General Lee may have an answer to that with regard to the man you bring back in a Reserve capacity who was trained as a jet pilot and then left the service for 2 years and then came back on active duty.

Do you have any figures as to how much it costs to retrain that individual?

Mr. RIVERS. For a refresher cost?

Mr. BLANDFORD. Yes. Of course, it would be on a sliding scale. General LEE. It would vary; if he came right back in a few months, perhaps no cost. The longer he is out, we will have to give him more of a refresher course.

Mr. RIVERS. Those figures would be good, because we would be asked those questions on the floor. I am glad Mr. Blandford asked for that for the record.

Mr. HARRY. It seems if we are going to talk about the dollar costs that are involved here, wouldn't we have to take into account the dollar costs of maintaining combat proficiency? After you get a fellow trained up so he is ready for combat, then you still got a continuing cost to maintain that combat proficiency.

General LEE. That is right.

Mr. HARDY. And wouldn't that have to be taken into account in connection with trying to determine the actual dollar savings through reenlistments or through

General LEE. Mr. Hardy, I think it would depend on where you lost the man. If you lost him to civilian life at the time he just became combat ready your figure is $120,000 as Mr. Burgess last said. That cost you there. Now, if you keep him on for another 2 or 3 years and lost him, certainly you are putting more money into him to keep him combat ready.

Of course, he is returning something to the United States Government by being in the force and being part of the active force.

Mr. HARDY. When you finish spending that $120,000 he is combat ready?

General LEE. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARDY. And when you train his replacement up to that point, his replacement allegedly is combat ready also?

General LEE. At that point.

Mr. HARDY. But if this fellow stays on active duty you still have to be continually spending money to maintain his proficiency.

General LEE. That is right.

Mr. HARDY. Suppose over this period of 17 months of training in order to maintain the proficiency of the fellow who was trained 17 months ago, you have got to spend a certain amount to keep him in the situation that he would be, or rather that his replacement would be in 17 months later?

General LEE. That is right. That would vary as I say, depending on where you lost him, how many months out into the future you lost him after his 17 months. It would vary, and continue if he stayed in for 20 years

Mr. HARDY. My point is this: From the standpoint of making a dollar comparison you can't say that it is $120,000 difference.

General LEE. You can, I believe up to the point, if you take the two to the same point in training.

Mr. RIVERS. Combat readiness?

General LEE. Yes, sir. I believe you can say that.

Secretary BURGESS. Of course he is saving you something, too, while he is staying with you.

Mr. HARDY. Of course he is. But I am trying to answer these questions in my own mind and actually, I don't see this $120,000 economy. Secretary BURGESS. It is a protection of investment.

Mr. HARDY. Of course, you have a protection there that we can't put a dollar value on.

Secretary BURGESS. That is right, sir.

Mr. RIVERS. Go ahead, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Before you get into the statement, two things, I would like to indicate that the $3,200 figure was consistent with the reenlistment bonus bill. I have the hearings here. Mr. Burgess, you

were using 100,000 people multiplied by 3,200, and what General Lee was testifying to before the committee-just to act as his adviser at this moment, he was talking about a 5 percent increase over and above existing rates which translated into people would give you a lesser number than 100,000, but would result in a savings of approximately $68 million. So that there wasn't anything inconsistent in it, Mr. Bates.

Mr. BATES. I was out to lunch then. [Laughter.]

Mr. Gavin was giving me some important information. I missed your point.

Mr. WILSON. It is in the record.

Mr. BLANDFORD. The reenlistment bonus testimony does jibe. The Secretary was talking about 100,000 people multiplied by $3,200Mr. RIVERS. Don't let us get this thing any more confused because we have to get through here.

Mr. BATES. I understand the top of the chart referred to 100,000 men and the figure was $320 million, which is quite a bit different than the question I directed to the Secretary.

All I asked him was what does the 10 percent represent? He said if you increase reenlistments by 10 percent then you are going to save not 320 to 220.

Mr. BLANDFORD. No. He was referring to 10 percent of the people. General Lee was taking 5 percent of a lesser number.

Mr. RIVERS. Let us find out.

Secretary BURGESS. I understand the figure that way.

General LEE. We are talking about two different figures.

Mr. BATES. I merely asked the question does it mean if you increase enlistments by 10 percent, does that mean you save 220 million, 320 million?

Secretary BURGESS. $320 million.

Mr. BATES. By increasing reenlistments by 10 percent?
Secretary BURGESS. That is what I used.

Mr. BLANDFORD. That is on the basis that 1 million will leave the service in fiscal 1956. Now what General Lee was referring to was a 5 percent increase over and above existing reenlistment rates, not on the basis of 1 million leaving the service but on the existing reenlistment rates. And the $3,200 figure multiplied by the number of people that would be expected to reenlist representing a 5-percent increase in the reenlistment rate would give you a net savings of $68 million.

Mr. WILSON. Not a 5 percent over

Mr. BLANDFORD. Because it is not 5 percent of a million people— 5 percent of 400,000 or 500,000.

Mr. BATES. That is as clear as mud.

Mr. WILSON. In other words 10 percent of a horse is much bigger than 5 percent of the horse's leg.

Mr. BLANDFORD. May I ask one question because this is going to come up on the floor just as sure as we are sitting here. I know Admiral Grenfell will be very happy to answer this question.

You talked about insurance rates for hazardous occupations and we say that the hazard insurance rates are very high for those engaged in flying. That is not true of people engaged in submarine duty. Therefore, you cannot use the same argument for submarine pay that you use for flight pay.

Now, we are going to be faced with that, because somebody usually does raise the question of why should submarine pay be the same as flight pay? If you are going to argue that you are going to give more pay because of higher insurance rates you can't make the same argument for those in the submarine category.

Secretary BURGESS. Maybe Admirals Grenfell and Holloway can give a better answer.

But my feeling about it is this: You have to protect and encourage the buildup of trained personnel in the submarine force because if that level drops, you are then in a situation of more danger than you are, say, with one man in a jet plane. I mean you have a whole crew in that craft. So I think that you have to realize that the Navy has built the submarine force up to a safe performance record. You have to maintain a safe performance record because if you don't you are then getting into some real great hazard because of the particular operation of that type of vessel.

Mr. BLANDFORD. I think that is a good answer, Mr. Chairman. I think we should have it in the record.

Mr. RIVERS. I think so, too. I think that is a good answer, Mr. Secretary.

Go ahead, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary BURGESS. This chart shows that the accident rate due to pilot error falls off sharply after the first few years of flying. (The chart follows:)

MAJOR ACCIDENT RATES OF AIR PILOTS RELATE DIRECTLY TO THE PILOT
EXPERIENCE LEVEL

Secretary BURGESS. As flying hours build up among career personnel, the accident rate flattens out. While the data shown on this chart applies to fiscal year 1953, the experience in 1954 was essentially the same.

The Navy reports comparable experience with equipment losses due to new personnel.