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Colonel STEPHENS. May I speak to that?
Secretary BURGESS. Yes.

Colonel STEPHENS. At the time this chart was made, sir, the only data we had in fiscal 1955 which was subsequent to the enactment of the reenlistment bonus bill of this past year, was for this first quarter. That is why we have shown this comparison. We took a period back here prior to Korea, feeling that that was a more normal period than any period subsequent to June of 1950. They are both short periods but nevertheless this was a relatively normal stable time and this was the latest data we had on 1955 reenlistments.

Mr. BATES. You could have a seasonal effect there.
Secretary BURGESS. Yes.

Mr. BATEs. You have the figures and I think perhaps for comparative purposes we ought to get them in the record just in the event there are seasonal differences here.

Do you have the November-June period preceeding the first quarter of fiscal 1955?

If you put those in the record I think we could perhaps get a better idea.

Colonel STEPHENS. Yes.

Mr. Hardy. I would like to go along with Mr. Bates' suggestion, because certainly a statistical analysis ought to compare like situations.

In addition to that you have taken a period which again is prior to use a similar period in the current-as nearly current as you can.

In addition to that you have taken a period which again is prior to the beginning of the effective date of your bonus.

Secretary BURGESS. The bonus to the furthest extent that we can figure has some effect in there.

Colonel STEPHENS. Yes. It was effective July 1, and whatever effect it might have had in the 3 months would be reflected in these figures. Mr. BLANDFORD. You have one problem here, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HARDY. I thought bonuses didn't actually begin to become effective until October

Mr. BLANDFORD. You have one additional problem which you have to keep in mind and which makes comparisons almost impossible after June of 1950, and that is the involuntary extension of enlistments. Since you involuntarily extended enlistments it is, I would say, practically impossible to determine what your reenlistment rate actually was during the war in Korea.

Colonel STEPHENS. That is right.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Because it distorts the whole thing. You can't come up with any kind of a comparison.

Mr. BATEs. When did they stop doing that?

Mr. BLANDFORD. They extended that twice; they did it in 1950 and in 1951, and I think the last extension was up to June of 1952, if I recall correctly. I may be wrong in that, but I think that is about right.

Mr. BATEs. And that wouldn't have any effect on the NovemberJune figures preceding fiscal 1955?

Secretary BURGESS. Preceding Korea

Mr. BLANDFORD. But there is a hiatus from June of 1950 to June 1952 that just can't be used.

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Mr. BATES. I didn't want those figures. I wanted November-June prior to the fiscal 1955.

Mr. HÉBERT. The real crux of the situation resolves itself to this one fact, I think: That regardless of whether the bonus had its impact or didn't have an impact or whatever other incentives were given, the fact still remains that the reenlistment rate is lower and something has to be added to what you have already got. You have to implement it.

Secretary BURGESS. That is what we are trying to show.

Mr. HÉBERT. No matter what the percentage figures show, percentagewise or numerically wise, the fact still remains that you do not have a satisfactory reenlistment.

Secretary BURGESS. The stability problem is far from desirable.

Mr. RIVERS. Then let the chairman observe this: And your curve is still going down.

Mr. MILLER. These figures directly do show a very definite trend in support of the statement you have made.

Secretary BURGESS. The only thing with this chart is that it doesn't reflect similar periods. It shows the trend.

Mr. HÉBERT. Even if it showed that the bonus did help you it would show that it helped you to a certain degree and it is not sufficient and has to be implemented.

Secretary BURGESS. That is right.

Mr. Rivers. This is one of the factors you think has a part in that decline?

Secretary BURGESS. That is right.
Mr. RIVERS. Go ahead.

Secretary BURGESS. Not only is turnover a problem in the enlisted grades, but it is also

serious in the officer grades. This next chart shows how Regular officers are distributed in the Navy by year groups and grade.

(The chart appears on p. 467.)

Secretary BURGESS. The hump in the middle grades, which was created by World War II accessions, is followed by a serious deficiency in the 4 to 10 years' service bracket. While the hump is a problem, the deficiency behind the hump is a greater problem, since it foreshadows shortages in leadership for the future.

The height of the three columns on the left reflects the large numbers of young officers performing obligated service. The high rate of turnover at the completion of obligated service is illustrated by the sharp drop at the beginning of the 4th year and the continuing deficiency extending through the 10th year.

This chart shows only the Navy line officer picture, but the shortage of officers in the other services in the 4 to 10 years' service group is equally serious. None of the services are able to hold enough young officers beyond their obligated service to make up the continuing deficit.

During calendar year 1954 approximately 4,000 young naval officers completed their obligated service. Of this group only 200 elected to remain in the active service. Of these, only 13 applied for a regular commission.

Secretary BURGESS. In the past, a career as a Regular officer was sought after, and selection was in itself a mark of distinction. This

[graphic]

DISTRIBUTION OF NAVY LINE OFFICERS ON ACTIVE DUTY

By year group and grade as of July 1, 1954

9123

0

1954 1953 1952 1951 1950 1949 1948 1947 1946 1945 1944 1943 1942 1941 1940 1939 1938 1937 1936 1935 1934 1933 1932 1931 1930 1929 1928 1927 1926 1925
ENS JG

LT
LCDR
CDR

CAPT
CHART 4

chart shows how the interest in Regular commissions has declined among various groups of those eligible to apply.

(The chart follows:)

THE DECLINE IN APPLICATIONS FOR OFFICER COMMISSIONS WILL BE REFLECTED IN

THE QUALITY OF FUTURE MILITARY LEADERSHIP

[graphic][merged small][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][merged small]

Whereas more than half of the eligible officers in the Army, Navy, and Air Force submitted applications in 1949, the numbers applying in 1954 were extremely low.

The Army comparison reflects experience with distinguished graduates of the ROTC and OCS. In the Navy, aviation cadets only were permitted to apply in 1949, whereas 16,000 officers were eligible to apply in 1954. The Air Force comparison depicts applications from among all eligibles during both 1949 and 1954.

It is evident that the military career holds much less attraction to the young officer today than it did only a few years ago.

Mr. BLANDFORD. May I ask a question at this point?
Mr. RIVERS. Yes.

Mr. BLANDFORD. In order that we won't get ourselves into a situation that could be embarrassing later on, is there any way of determining the accumulative effect of people here who have once applied for a Regular commission and have been turned down, but stay on active duty and, therefore, do not apply again?

In other words, your high percentage of applications back in 1949 was, we will say, when everybody took a crack at it. Now, as the percentage starts to come down, what portion of those people either won't apply again, having been turned down, or perhaps applied but weren't accepted ?

Because your selection factor starts to go down even though you may be working with a large number of the same people. In other words, is this proportion as bad as it looks statistically?

Secretary BURGESS. I don't have those figures, Mr. Blandford. I think one of the things we have certainly got to do, and I believe Mr. Wilson discussed this the other day with the committee, and that is we have to consider some broader integrations into the regular com

missioned ranks, by coming first and deciding how many Regulars there should be under the new end strengths that we have—that we hope are fairly stable and also the legislation which would be required to increase the numbers into which we can move officers toward Regular commissions.

Now, that is one of the studies that we have going on right now, and that may be a partial answer to your question. But I do not have the figures that would bear out the condition which you state there.

Mr. RIVERS. Could I inquire there, Mr. Blandford, of the Secretary! By that do you mean, Mr. Secretary, that it would broaden the base of ages in these respective groups to take in some Reserves ?

Secretary BURGESS. I don't know just exactly what the effects of this study will show. But I think we are running fairly low percentages of Regular commissioned officers against the end strengths which we are now working toward. In other words, the gap is being made up with officers who do not

ar commissions. Now that we have gone through this endstrength adjustment discussion, and the desire is to hold that at a fairly stable point, we have to decide how many Regular commissioned officers we need to run an establishment of that size and increase the percentages as they are now set, to offer more people opportunities in the Regular grades.

Mr. RIVERS. Could that mean that there is a possibility of you letting a man, first, be a J.G., or lieutenant commander !

Secretary BURGESS. That is where one of the problems exists, and the effect of this would be to open up more opportunity for Reserve J.G.'s to move into Regular commission status.

Mr. BLANDFORD. They have the authority to integrate which expires July 1 of this year. They have asked for renewal of the authority. The problem of integration is the age-old problem of adding to the hump. The Navy now has a hump problem as well as a valley problem. They have insufficient numbers in the J.G. grades and too many people in the lieutenant commander grades.

Now, the Navy has, I think very wisely, decided to allow people serving as, say, senior lieutenants to apply for integration but knowing that if they integrate they will have to be integrated as lieutenants, J.G.'s. In other words, they will lose numbers, but the Navy has got to always be conscious of their hump problem because it just compounds itself if you add more people to it.

Now, that goes right into the face of this pay bill, because all of you have received letters and you are going to hear more about it, people who are being released from service who want to stay on active duty.

Mr. RIVERS. That is right.

Mr. BLANDFORD. And the service on the one hand says we can't get the officers we want, so we have got to make the service more attractive.

On ther other hand, they are letting officers go that want to stay in.

Mr. RIVERS. In answer to my inquiry, the Secretary of Air Force some time ago said a lot of these Reserves who desire to remain on active duty as Regulars were too old an age group and you may have to broaden that age group to meet that inevitable shortage which will happen in some of those categories to which you are referring.

Mr. BLANDFORD. But the point is that if we do that, you are either going to slow down promotion, you are going to add to the hump,

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