In 1952 there was a general program for increases in pay, that is, in Government pay, and Congress passed increases and they were comparable to the increases in industry of 10 percent for all of the civilian employees of the Government. We had a proposal for an increase in military pay of 10 percent, identically as had been received by the civilian employees. This subcommittee reported a 10-percent increase of both pay and allowances. The full committee reported that bill to the House and the House passed that bill for a 10-percent increase in pay and in allowances. The Senate took an entirely different view of the matter and had, what I suppose they would have termed, a selective pay increase. But whereas the Career Compensation Act of 1949 and the Hook Commission report were based entirely upon responsibility assumed and service rendered, the Senate version of that bill was an apparent attempt to bring some of the lower ranks into a higher bracket and to reintroduce into our pay system compensation for multiple dependents which we had eliminated in the Career Compensation Act of 1949 only after-well, an all-out effort, a maximum effort on the floor of the House. In conference, being most anxious to maintain the philosophy of the Hook Commission report and the Career Compensation Act, and to keep our military pay based upon the responsibility assumed and service rendered, we finally agreed on what amounted to a 4-percent increase in pay and a 14-percent increase in allowances. I believe it averaged out there is some difference of opinion on this-the Department says it was 5.7 and I have always thought it was 4.6. But we I will take the 5.7. But, anyway, we came out with a good deal less than was granted to the civilian employees at that time. The purpose of these hearings, of course, is to study and determine what should be done under present conditions with reference to military pay. I have offered the bill that has been suggested by the Department. We will use it as a working draft and determine for ourselves what should be done at this time. It is my purpose today and tomorrow to hear the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Hook, Secretary Thomas, Admiral Carney, General Shepherd, and others from the top echelons of civilian and military in the departments. We must complete this portion of the hearings by tomorrow. We will sit this morning and, if necessary, this afternoon, tomorrow morning, if necessary, and tomorrow afternoon. We will then reconvene a week from Wednesday. There will be an informal recess in the House during that period of time, and it appears that we would not be able to secure proper attendance to hear the details of the bill. I assume that the Secretary and the top echelon of the military will speak in general terms, the general principles, and the general necessity for a pay increase. When we get to Secretary Burgess, Assistant Secretary of Defense in Charge of Manpower, we will, of course, have reached the details of the bill. I say this so that members may know that the details as to particular pay scales and differentials and things of that kind will be properly elicited from Mr. Burgess and from the others after we have reconvened. This, today, will be of a general nature, and I think we will save time if on technical points or individual pay scales and things of that kind we would hold our questions until Wednesday, February 16. Now, Secretary Wilson, we are glad to have you and we will be glad to receive any statement you have to make. If you have a prepared statement, we will receive it from you without interruption. STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CHARLES E. WILSON IN SUPPORT OF THE CAREER INCENTIVE ACT OF 1955 Secretary WILSON. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, in his message to the Congress on January 13, 1955, the President said: We are traditionally a peace-loving people, with a heritage founded on the dignity of the individual. Because our defense planning is developed within this framework, we seek to man our Armed Forces with volunteers to the greatest extent possible. This is a basic objective. There are many important problems that affect our military personnel in the armed services and we are recommending in the legislation before the committee certain actions which we believe are necessary in order to enable the armed services to attract and retain capable career officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioner officers in our active forces. One of the first memoranda that I received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff after assuming my present responsibilities was on the subject of The Future of the Military Services as a Career That Will Attract Capable Personnel, dated February 20, 1953. I would like to quote one paragraph from this memorandum at this time and also ask the committee's permission that the entire memorandum be made a part of the record of these proceedings: Mr. KILDAY. Without objection, it will be done. In short, the current situation invites and encourages mediocrity in the direction and management of our Armed Forces, which the Nation can ill afford. Analyzed in the light of the fact that the larger function of our great national budget is now administered by uniformed officers, in whose hands actually repose the key responsibilities for calculating vast material requirements and for supervising the expenditure of great sums of money, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that the Nation cannot afford to be content with anything short of the highest caliber personnel for our Armed Forces. To discourage the development of a high quality corps of officers, warrant officers and noncommissioned officers by diminishing the attractiveness of such service must ultimately prove to be shortsighted economy with unfavorable reflections not only upon the quality of our defense, but upon the husbanding of our national treasure as well. That is the end of the quotation from the letter from the Joint Chiefs, in February 1953. The Department of Defense, as a whole, has been keenly aware of the problems that were outlined in this memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and has carefully studied the entire problem with a view toward taking the necessary positive actions wherever possible within existing authority and further develop a legislative program to remedy any situation not within our present administrative authority. We believe that the size of the armed services, as outlined in the budget for fiscal year 1956, represents in general the military forces this country should maintain. By a continuous effort to attract to career military service men and women of ability and high potential, and through constantly improving training techniques and the availability of better weapons, a force of this size can be an increasingly effective military force for the defense of the United States without a corresponding increase in manpower. It is also the size force which I think the economy of our country can continue to support as long as may be necessary. The lack of reasonable stability in our military programs over the years has been a most wasteful and expensive practice. We must have efficiency and economy in the operation and management of the Defense Establishment and in order to achieve this we must have quality in our personnel as well as quantity. It is important that we improve the effectiveness of our armed services by being able to stabilize to the maximum degree the personnel in those services by attracting and holding the highest type of personnel in our military service. All our plans and all our effort in the Department of Defense are directed to one principal objective: To provide an efficient military force which by its existence will deter aggresive acts by those unfriendly to the United States and which is able to at any time do whatever must be done to effectively safeguard the security of the United States. This readiness is dependent upon the military leadership and technical skills of our military personnel which can only be achieved after long and constant training. The integration into our Military Establishment of an increasing number of newer and more modern weapons has rapidly raised the level of technical skill and experience required of our military personnel. At the same time we are concerned about the increased requirement for technical personnel, and we must be ever conscious of the fact that this country cannot afford anything less than first-rate military leadership. We cannot entrust our Military Establishment to any but men of the very highest caliber who will maintain and improve the high standards of service and leadership which our Armed Forces have always enjoyed. I shall not go into a detailed discussion of the personnel problems or of the incentive plan we propose. I would, however, like to call your attention to some of the disturbing situations we now face and will continue to face if the present high rate of personnel turnover continues. We have been impressed for some time with the seriousness of the personnel problems in the Armed Forces, but lately we have seen an already crítical situation get worse. Large numbers of men who entered the service during the emergency period in the past few years are now becoming eligible for return to civilian life. A number of these men have been men who were inducted for 2 years of service, but a much larger number of those that we will separate during the coming year are men who volunteered for longer periods of time. Approximately 1 million men-one-third of our planned size for the active forces-will become eligible for some form of release during the next year. This high turnover rate is extremely costly in dollars, but it is even more costly in terms of loss of experience and operational efficiency. Too many of our young officers and men, after receiving their technical training, are leaving the service at the first opportunity. As a result we face a continuing shortage of personnel in the 4 to 10 years' service bracket and the readiness of our combat units will be difficult to improve if we are unable to induce more men to stay with us longer. Today more than at any other time in our peacetime history we must have men who are willing to serve anywhere in the world, undergoing hardships, inconveniences and the disruption of a normal family life. This deployment of our armed services abroad to so many areas of the world is also placing an increased responsibility upon our military personnel. It would be difficult for any business to survive on the same basis with such a high loss of experienced personnel. I know of no easy solution to our manpower problems. Many things can be done and are being done by the military services to improve the conditions under which our people work. This is being done to treat our people fairly, and we hope that it will result in more of them electing to make military service a career. Nevertheless, we must attack the whole problem in a realistic manner and provide material inducements wherever necessary that will add up to a comparable standard of living offered to men who are engaged in civilian pursuits. Military pay has fallen behind that of industry and it has lagged behind the advanced cost of living. Health insurance, retirement benefits, bonus plans, and other similar benefits are now widespread in industry. This has tended to neutralize the extra personal security that a military career may have offered in years past. The proposed military career incentive bill has as its fundamental objectives the attraction of young men to a military career and the retention of men in this service career once they have chosen it. It is also necessary to offer special attractions to men who undertake particularly hazardous jobs. We have given a lot of study to these problems, and I am convinced that the time has come when we must recognize that the present pay scales for military service are not sufficient recognition for the high standards of individual performance which military service demands to attract and retain the leadership and levels of skill and experience that are so vital to our modern military forces. It is not enough, however, to raise the pay of a youngster for the immediate future. There must be a goal to which the young man can aspire. This goal must include, in addition to the intangible rewards which any American gets for patriotic service, an ultimate material reward commensurate with the responsibilities with which he is entrusted. If the peak of the career is not attractive to the type of young men we need for future leaders in this multi-billion-dollar defense business, true leaders will not seek a military career. For this reason, it is essential that we recognize the requirements for adjusting the pay of our senior officers as well as for the juniors. We know that devotion to duty and dedication to high professional standards cannot be bought, but I know from experience that the lack of good leadership at every level in a large organization can cause conditions to deteriorate to the point where desire to remain with an organization is lessened. While no exact comparison can be made between military leadership and executive responsibilities in civilian life, the disparity between salaries available to men with top responsibilities in industry and those in the top leadership of our military forces is too great. A comparison can be made, however, between compensation in recent years and what it has been in the more distant past in the military services. During the course of the hearing I would like to invite the committee's particular attention to the tables and charts that show basic pay scales for various years beginning in 1908 as compared to what they are at present. For example, in more than 45 years the pay of a major general or rear admiral has been increased 50 percent. The pay of the lowest enlisted grade has been increased by nearly 800 percent during this same period. Considering the inflation, our higher ranking officers are paid only about one-half as much as they were 45 years ago, while the enlisted men are paid about 3 times as much. This country must maintain a high state of readiness for the indefinite future, and the very existence of this Nation may depend upon the judgment, devotion to duty, and technical skills of our career military people. We owe a responsibility to our country to help the armed services attract the finest type of young Americans and induce them to make a career of patriotic service. The Secretaries of the military departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have asked permission to testify in support of this Career Incentive Act and the representatives of the military departments are prepared to furnish all of the detailed information that the committee will need in its deliberations. I urge your careful consideration of this proposed Career Incentive Act which we feel is designed to help us accomplish what I am sure we all agree is necessary—a Military Establishment adequate in all ways to defend this country. (Memorandum of February 20, 1953, follows:) THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON 25, D. C. FEBRUARY 20, 1953. MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Subject: The future of the military services as a career that will attract capable personnel. 1. During the course of the past several years, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have become increasingly concerned about the growing lack of confidence among Armed Forces personnel in the military services as a worthwhile and respected career. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are particularly concerned, however, as to the implications of this situation as they affect the future of the military services as a career that will attract and hold capable officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers. 2. This concern stems from discussions, observations, and impressions gained on visits to military installations, both in the United States and overseas, and from mail and reports received from various representatives of the military services. A brief discussion of some of the facts which have brought about this problem, together with some thoughts concerning an approach to its resolution follow. 3. The primary reason for this growing lack of confidence in the military services as a career, stems from the feeling that the Government has broken contract with military personnel and has changed the rules in the middle of the game. Military personnel feel that the Government should keep its part of the contract and abide by the rules with the same degree of conscientiousness as it demands from them. To support this contention, military personnel point |