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Army and the Japanese Self-Defense Force. In Europe, the Army contributes forces to Allied collective security to deter aggression and defend Western Europe. In the Western Hemisphere, the Army (1) provides forces for the security of Alaska and the Caribbean areas, including the Panama Canal Zone; (2) maintains forces for Western Hemisphere defense; (3) provides antiaircraft units for defense of the continental United States; (4) maintains forces capable of conducting combat operations in support of United States policies in the event of either general or limited war; and (5) maintains the means to expand the Army in the event of general war or national emergency.
On June 30, 1954, the Army was manning a 19-division structure with a strength which in a year has been reduced from 1,532,000 to approximately 1,100,000. Six divisions were in the Far East, five were in Europe, and eight were in strategic reserve in the United States. Supporting combat and service troops were deployed to provide balanced forces in the areas of Army responsibility. Redeployment from the Far East had begun and two National Guard divisions had been returned to the United States for release to State control. However, the loss of those two divisions had been partially offset by the activation of a new armored division in June of 1954.
By the end of fiscal year 1955, the Army will be reduced to a strength of 1,100,000. In order to meet this ceiling, the Army has made further redeployments from the Far East and has deactivated additional operational units. During the first half of the fiscal year, the 2d and 3d Divisions were redeployed from the Far East to Hawaii. The 14th and 47th Divisions were released from active Federal seryice to State control. Two new divisions—the 23d in the Caribbean and the 71st in Alaska-were activated during the first half of the fiscal year by organizing into divisions separate regiments and other units already in existence. These two divisions do not have the opportunity to train as a unit, and, without regrouping for further training, would not have the capability for deployment as combat divisions, even if they could be spared from their present fixed defensive tasks, which is not the case.
Another step which the Army intends to take in order to maintain the maximum force structure throughout the current fiscal year is to deactivate selected training centers and to transfer to combat divisions a great portion of the training of new soldiers. As a result, some of the divisions in the United States will be training individual replacements and will be incapable of early deployment should the need arise.
The end strength of the Army in fiscal year 1956 will be 1,025,000. It is contemplated, therefore, that a reduction of the force structure will be made from that for the current fiscal year and that there will be reductions in strength in certain overseas areas.
In addition to insuring that the Army's forces are deployed in such a fashion as to create the maximum deterrence to Communist aggression, the Army is taking a number of other important actions to insure that maximum combat potential is obtained from the forces available. I should like to discuss briefly a few of the most vital of these actions.
The Army is bending every effort to adapt itself to the atomic age and to insure that it is constantly prepared to fight and win a future war, whether or not atomic weapons are employed. The tactics of
employing a new development must be kept abreast of the progress of the weapon or item being developed. Flexibility of thought as well as of action is essential. Thus, projection of the tactical effect of a new development must be based upon a realistic consideration, not only of its potential performance characteristics, but also of developmental progress in related fields. The analysis of the impact of new developments upon the doctrine and tactics of land forces must be accurate, constant, and detailed.
For a considerable period we have been conducting such an analysis of the impact of introducing nuclear weapons on the battlefield. Based upon a detailed study of the implications of these new weapons, we are currently conducting a program of development and test for the purpose of evolving new organizations, and concepts for their employment, for the units of the field army and its supporting elements.
Within the limitations of presently obtainable equipment, these organizations must provide greater mobility and flexibility than current organizations, in order to provide for maximum dispersion, yet permit the rapid concentration of forces required to defeat a numerically superior enemy. They must also be capable of making maximum use of scientific or technological developments as they become available.
To meet the requirements imposed by the Army's new tactical and strategic concepts, research and development efforts are being directed toward providing the new weapons and equipment necessary for mobile, flexible combat units. Included in these developments are improved guided missiles, rockets, tanks, artillery, small arms, and ammunition, which will enhance the striking power of our organizations. Also included are lighter, mobile, air transportable items of equipment which will not sacrifice essential combat effectiveness. Measures for increased mobility are of vital importance to the Army. They mean saving time in the accomplishment of our missions—and in war, time saved means lives saved.
The Army research and development program is also directed toward providing improved weapons for air defense of vital areas of the United States.
An additional means of increasing the Army's combat potential is Operation Gyroscope, a plan whereby divisions and smaller combat units from the continental United States periodically relieve and replace like units in overseas areas. The initial moves under this plan will be made July 1, 1955, when an infantry division in the United States begins relief of an infantry division in Europe, and an airborne RCT replaces another airborne RCT in Japan. One of the principal objectives of the program is to secure the maximum possible stabilization of personnel in combat units. By so doing, the requirement for individual replacements for the overseas commands will be lowered, and smaller numbers of personnel will be in an unproductive transient status. Stabilization should also do much to enhance the esprit and morale so vital to combat unit efficiency and thereby increase reenlistment rates, which in turn will reduce the expenses of inducting and training new personnel.
Next, the Army has developed an up-to-date Reserve unit organizational structure which is designed to provide upon mobilization the forces necessary to expand the active Army and to meet initial mobilization requirements. This new structure is currently being put into
effect. We expect to complete the majority of the adjustments of existing units necessary to effect the revised structure by the end of this calendar year. Additional units over and above those in existence will also be required to complete the structure.
If provided with necessary funds and with adequate numbers of basically trained personnel to participate in training with the Army's Reserve forces units, these forces can be brought to an effective degree of readiness, although the program has to be developed through several phases and the entire new structure will not be completed for several years.
I should like to interpolate just a minute there to point out that these Reserve forces now are comprised of civilian components. They are entirely unrelated to the general or strategic Reserve to which I referred some time ago, sir.
It should be noted, however, that the current voluntary program has been unsuccessful in attracting trained personnel and attaining the necessary unit strengths.
The Army is also continuing its program of reducing to an absolute minimum the use of personnel in other than the operating forces. The results that have been achieved by this program are demonstrated by the fact that our supporting forces were reduced from 23 percent of the Army in fiscal year 1950 to 16.5 percent of the Army in fiscal year 1954, and will have been reduced to 15 percent at the end of fiscal
The reductions in the supporting areas have been drastic. Further reductions of any considerable magnitude will be impractical from a military or administrative viewpoint.
The reduction in supporting forces was made possible by improved utilization of personnel and installations and by the substitution, whenever feasible, of civilians, both United States and indigenous, for military personnel. This reduction in noncombat forces was made despite the fact that the Army provides approximately 55,000 men in functions where personnel requirements do not vary with the strength of the Army-for example, military assistance advisory groups and missions, research and development activities, the attaché system, the personnel on duty with Reserve forces, and military and governmental agencies outside the Army.
Over the same period, training and transient personnel were reduced from 21 percent of the Army to 17 percent as a result of continuing efforts to reduce to a minimum the time that an individual spends in a training or travel status en route to his assignment. Operation Gyroscope, which I described previously, should produce further savings in this area.
Finally, the Army is doing its utmost within its capabilities to secure and retain the most competent personnel possible. Obviously, the retention of such personnel not only eliminates the dollar and manpower costs of training new personnel, but results in greater efficiency wherever the better personnel are engaged.
The Army is sparing no effort to achieve the highest attainable standards of readiness. In personnel, in training, in equipment, and in doctrine our emphasis is upon the continuing development of ever higher quality.
Grave dangers face our Nation. Adequate, properly proportioned military strength, active and reserve, can mitigate these dangers, reduce them to an acceptable degree; can do much to deter others from resort to war; and, if war comes, provide the Nation its best hope for victory.
The United States Army remains a decisive instrument of our national defense.
You may have complete confidence, gentlemen, that to the limit of its resources, the Army will continue to carry out its tasks and perform its assigned missions with unswerving fidelity, skill, and determination.
The spirit which imbues the members of your Army—a spirit of determination and dedication is the same spirit which permeates the American people today as it has done down through the generations which have preceded us. Because of that spirit we look to our Nation's future-militarily, politically, and economically-not with complacency, certainly, but with firm and unshakable confidence.
The CHAIRMAN. General, I want to compliment you on that frank and candid statement. I think that will answer, after reading that statement, your conclusions in reference to what has happened,
when you reduced down from 1,100,000—from 1,170,000 down to at the end of the fiscal year 1,025,000—I think the answer is clear from your statement.
But I would like to ask you this. In studying this matter and reading the newspapers and talking to my staff, we decided there were only two questions involved in this whole thing. We wrote it out there.
Now it seems to me that there are two basic questions involved in this whole problem of the size of our Armed Forces, and particularly in respect to the Army: First, what are the Army military commitments, and second, can you meet these commitments with the manpower strength that will be permitted you for the remainder of this year, 1955, and fiscal year 1956.
Now that is the whole case as I see it.
General RIDGWAY. Would you like those answered in open or executive session, sir!
The CHAIRMAN. Can you answer that in open session?
The CHAIRMAN. That is what I have been trying to get across to the
The CHAIRMAN. Now, we are not going to direct you to do anything that you do not think is proper in reference to making an answer. You can probably go in executive session. Can you answer that publicly? If so, I think the country would like to have the answer. If you do not think it is proper, then we will go in executive session.
General RIDGWAY. I think it would be better, Mr. Chairman, if the answer were given in executive session and left to the determination of the committe as to whether the public interest is better served by its publication or not. - The CHAIRMAN. Then, members of the committee, I think we better now go in executive session. Everyone in the room, except those connected with the Army and its aides and assistants and advisers, we will have to respectfully ask you to leave. (Whereupon the committee proceeded into executive session.)
SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING ON H. R. 2581 AND H. R. 2123
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE No. 3, Washington, D. C., Monday, February 7, 1955. The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., the Honorable Carl T. Durham, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.
Mr. DURHAM. I think we will proceed, if there is no objection.
The committee will come to order. We have two bills before us this morning. The first one, H. R. 2581, contains the fiscal year 1956 construction program for the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics.
I note that the Langley, Ames, and Lewis Laboratories, and the Pilotless Aircraft Station, at Wallops Island, each has construction items planned for the coming year. The largest amount in the bill is for the Lewis Laboratory, at Cleveland, and the greater part of that proposed expenditure is in the field of research in nuclear propulsion. The total authorization of the bill is $13,300,000.
The other bill which I hope we will find time to consider is a small bill which we passed out last year, but it failed to become law during the session. It is commonly known as the Natural Fibers Act.
I see Dr. Dryden is here this morning, whom we have had the pleasure of having before us since this program was first initiated.
We are very glad to have you people here with us this morning, and if you will proceed to tell us what you need, and what you want, Doctor-H. R. 2581. (The bill is as follows:)
[H. R. 2581, 84th Cong., 1st sess.) A BILL To promote the national defense by authorizing the construction of aeronautical research facilities and the acquisition of land by the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics necessary to the effective prosecution of aeronautical research
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, pursuant to subsection (b) of section 1 of Public Law 672, approved August 8, 1950 (50 U. S. C. 151b), the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics is authorized to undertake additional construction, to acquire land, and to purchase and install additional equipment at the following locations:
Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, Hampton, Virginia: Improvements to an existing transonic tunnel and improvements to roads, $3,395,000.
Ames Aeronautical Laboratory, Moffett Field, California: High-speed freeflight facility, range for aerodynamic heating and dynamic stability testing, and data-reduction equipment, $1,055,000.
Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory, Cleveland, Ohio: Component research facility for nuclear propulsion, improvements to an existing transonic tunnel, additions to two existing laboratory buildings, repairs and modifications to utility installations, and acquisition of not to exceed five hundred acres of land, $8,760,000.
Pilotless Aircraft Station, Wallops Island, Virginia: Fuel-storage magazine, $90,000. 55066-55-No. 41