I have been very interested now that the Army has testified, which includes all services having testified, and the Army, the Navy and the Air Force have all been in unison in expressing concern over the lack of attractiveness to the Armed Forces and for reenlistment purposes as you emphasized this morning.

Secretary STEVENS. Yes, sir.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I just want to make this observation for the committee, that it is very interesting to note that these 3 services are in unison, all have the same complaint, which represents about 3 million men in uniform, and yet we heard the Marines come in here with about 200,000 in uniform and say they had no complaints at all, they were ready to go, and 3 out of 4 of their men reinlisted. I was just wondering what made those 200,000 different than the other 3 million men in uniform.

Mr. RIVERS. Their only answer is to put them all in the Marine Corps.

Mr. HÉBERT. No, it was very interesting testimony. I wanted to make that observation.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, General Ridgway, on your unclassified statement there.

General RIDGWAY. Yes, sir.

I would like to say at the outset, sir

The CHAIRMAN. Let there be order now.

General RIDGWAY. It is a personal pleasure as well as a high honor to appear before this committee, sir.

The National Security Act of 1947 states that the United States Army

shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It shall be responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war. In compliance with that mission, the United States Army, in coordination with forces of the other Services, must be capable of conducting operations whenever and wherever necessary to support and defend the Constitution of the United States to maintain the security of the United States, its possessions, and areas vital to its interests; to safeguard the internal security of the United States; and to uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United States.

That there is a need for continuing vigilance and military readiness on the part of the United States is apparent from a glance at the current world situation. Almost every day there is fresh evidence of the unchanged fundamental intentions of Kremlin controlled international communism.

In assessing the Communist offensive capability, we must remember that this great military strength is controlled by a handful of men who owe no accounting to any representative body or to any public opinion, and who can put their military machine in motion on very short notice whenever they should come to believe that they would advance their purposes.

As a result, war could come with little warning, and could be initiated at any point these men might choose.

To prepare ourselves to cope with this threat, however, it is neither necessary nor desirable that the United States maintain forces of size and composition equal to those of the Soviet bloc. The industrial and technological advantages enjoyed by this Nation and its Allies offset to some degree the size and readiness of the forces arrayed aganist us.

On the other hand, there is a definite requirement for a United States Army of adequate capabilities. Fundamentally, army forces, when transported and adequately supported by naval and air forces, are the decisive component of the military structure by virtue of their unique ability (1) to seize, hold, and control critical land areas, the enemy's lines of communications, and his bases of production and supply; (2) to apply pressure of a sustained nature on the enemy's land forces, thereby causing dispersion and attrition of his forces and resources; (3) to provide a positive defense against enemy attack by land on those areas essential to the prosecution of a war; and (4) to close with and destroy both his organized and irregular forces. The basic doctrine of army operations is the defeat of an enemy by application of military power directly or indirectly against the armed forces which support his political structure.

The United States Army must have adequate forces in being to carry out its assigned missions, regardless of the nature of conflict which might conceivably develop. It must also have the mobilization capability to expand promptly and rapidly to meet any eventuality. The United States Army's problem is further complicated by.two factors: That we may become involved in either a general war or peripheral, localized wars; and that war in the future, regardless of its geographical scope, may be either atomic or nonatomic.

It is probably more than coincidence that up to the present time the Soviet bloc has not defied the United States by risking either overt or covert armed aggression in any area where Ünited States forces are deployed, although its creeping aggression in other areas has continued unabated.

It appears to be obvious, therefore, that a primary means of halting Communist armed encroachment is to maintain combat-ready United States Army forces in sufficient strength, suitably deployed, with adequate air and surface transportation and support, for commitment at any threatened point. The consequences of adopting an alternate course, and of decreasing these deployed forces, are, I believe, best described in the following excerpt from the President's message to the Congress on the 6th of January 1955. I quote:

We must stay alert to the fact that undue reliance on one weapon, or preparation for only one kind of warfare, simply invites an enemy to resort to another. We must, therefore, keep in our Armed Forces a balance and flexibility adequate to our needs.

To meet the Communist military threat, the United States Army maintains forces deployed in critical areas to forestall limited Soviet, or Soviet-inspired, aggression. In the Far East, the Army provides forces, in concert with our allies, to deter further aggression in Korea; to assist the Japanese in maintaining the security of their home islands; to maintain the security of the Ryukyus; to provide certain logistic support for other United States and U. N. forces in the Far East; and to assist, advise, and support development of the Republic of Korea

Army and the Japanese Self-Defense Force. In Europe, the Army contributes forces to Allied collective security to deter aggression and defend Western Europe. In the Western Hemisphere, the Army (1) provides forces for the security of Alaska and the Caribbean areas, including the Panama Canal Zone; (2) maintains forces for Western Hemisphere defense; (3) provides antiaircraft units for defense of the continental United States; (4) maintains forces capable of conducting combat operations in support of United States policies in the event of either general or limited war; and (5) maintains the means to expand the Army in the event of general war or national emergency. On June 30, 1954, the Army was manning a 19-division structure with a strength which in a year has been reduced from 1,532,000 to approximately 1,400,000. Six divisions were in the Far East, five were in Europe, and eight were in strategic reserve in the United States. Supporting combat and service troops were deployed to provide balanced forces in the areas of Army responsibility. Redeployment from the Far East had begun and two National Guard divisions had been returned to the United States for release to State control. However, the loss of those two divisions had been partially offset by the activation of a new armored division in June of 1954.

By the end of fiscal year 1955, the Army will be reduced to a strength of 1,100,000. In order to meet this ceiling, the Army has made further redeployments from the Far East and has deactivated additional operational units. During the first half of the fiscal year, the 2d and 3d Divisions were redeployed from the Far East to Hawaii. The 44th and 47th Divisions were released from active Federal service to State control. Two new divisions-the 23d in the Caribbean and the 71st in Alaska-were activated during the first half of the fiscal year by organizing into divisions separate regiments and other units already in existence. These two divisions do not have the opportunity to train as a unit, and, without regrouping for further training, would not have the capability for deployment as combat divisions, even if they could be spared from their present fixed defensive tasks, which is not the case.

Another step which the Army intends to take in order to maintain the maximum force structure throughout the current fiscal year is to deactivate selected training centers and to transfer to combat divisions a great portion of the training of new soldiers. As a result, some of the divisions in the United States will be training individual replacements and will be incapable of early deployment should the need arise.

The end strength of the Army in fiscal year 1956 will be 1,025,000. It is contemplated, therefore, that a reduction of the force structure will be made from that for the current fiscal year and that there will be reductions in strength in certain overseas areas.

In addition to insuring that the Army's forces are deployed in such a fashion as to create the maximum deterrence to Communist aggression, the Army is taking a number of other important actions to insure that maximum combat potential is obtained from the forces available. I should like to discuss briefly a few of the most vital of these actions.

The Army is bending every effort to adapt itself to the atomic age and to insure that it is constantly prepared to fight and win a future war, whether or not atomic weapons are employed. The tactics of

employing a new development must be kept abreast of the progress of the weapon or item being developed. Flexibility of thought as well as of action is essential. Thus, projection of the tactical effect of a new development must be based upon a realistic consideration, not only of its potential performance characteristics, but also of developmental progress in related fields. The analysis of the impact of new developments upon the doctrine and tactics of land forces must be accurate, constant, and detailed.

For a considerable period we have been conducting such an analysis of the impact of introducing nuclear weapons on the battlefield. Based upon a detailed study of the implications of these new weapons, we are currently conducting a program of development and test for the purpose of evolving new organizations, and concepts for their employment, for the units of the field army and its supporting elements.

Within the limitations of presently obtainable equipment, these organizations must provide greater mobility and flexibility than current organizations, in order to provide for maximum dispersion, yet permit the rapid concentration of forces required to defeat a numerically superior enemy. They must also be capable of making maximum use of scientific or technological developments as they become available. To meet the requirements imposed by the Army's new tactical and strategic concepts, research and development efforts are being directed toward providing the new weapons and equipment necessary for mobile, flexible combat units. Included in these developments are improved guided missiles, rockets, tanks, artillery, small arms, and ammunition, which will enhance the striking power of our organizations. Also included are lighter, mobile, air transportable items of equipment which will not sacrifice essential combat effectiveness. Measures for increased mobility are of vital importance to the Army. They mean saving time in the accomplishment of our missions-and in war, time saved means lives saved.

The Army research and development program is also directed toward providing improved weapons for air defense of vital areas of the United States.

An additional means of increasing the Army's combat potential is Operation Gyroscope, a plan whereby divisions and smaller combat units from the continental United States periodically relieve and replace like units in overseas areas. The initial moves under this plan will be made July 1, 1955, when an infantry division in the United States begins relief of an infantry division in Europe, and an airborne RCT replaces another airborne RCT in Japan. One of the principal objectives of the program is to secure the maximum possible stabilization of personnel in combat units. By so doing, the requirement for individual replacements for the overseas commands will be lowered, and smaller numbers of personnel will be in an unproductive transient status. Stabilization should also do much to enhance the esprit and morale so vital to combat unit efficiency and thereby increase reenlistment rates, which in turn will reduce the expenses of inducting and training new personnel.

Next, the Army has developed an up-to-date Reserve unit organizational structure which is designed to provide upon mobilization the forces necessary to expand the active Army and to meet initial mobilization requirements. This new structure is currently being put into

effect. We expect to complete the majority of the adjustments of existing units necessary to effect the revised structure by the end of this calendar year. Additional units over and above those in existence will also be required to complete the structure.

If provided with necessary funds and with adequate numbers of basically trained personnel to participate in training with the Army's Reserve forces units, these forces can be brought to an effective degree of readiness, although the program has to be developed through several phases and the entire new structure will not be completed for several years.

I should like to interpolate just a minute there to point out that these Reserve forces now are comprised of civilian components. They are entirely unrelated to the general or strategic Reserve to which I referred some time ago, sir.

It should be noted, however, that the current voluntary program has been unsuccessful in attracting trained personnel and attaining the necessary unit strengths.

The Army is also continuing its program of reducing to an absolute minimum the use of personnel in other than the operating forces. The results that have been achieved by this program are demonstrated by the fact that our supporting forces were reduced from 23 percent of the Army in fiscal year 1950 to 16.5 percent of the Army in fiscal year 1954, and will have been reduced to 15 percent at the end of fiscal year 1956.

The reductions in the supporting areas have been drastic. Further reductions of any considerable magnitude will be impractical from a military or administrative viewpoint.

The reduction in supporting forces was made possible by improved utilization of personnel and installations and by the substitution, whenever feasible, of civilians, both United States and indigenous, for military personnel. This reduction in noncombat forces was made despite the fact that the Army provides approximately 55,000 men in functions where personnel requirements do not vary with the strength of the Army-for example, military assistance advisory groups and missions, research and development activities, the attaché system, the personnel on duty with Reserve forces, and military and governmental agencies outside the Army.

Over the same period, training and transient personnel were reduced from 21 percent of the Army to 17 percent as a result of continuing efforts to reduce to a minimum the time that an individual spends in a training or travel status en route to his assignment. Operation Gyroscope, which I described previously, should produce further savings in this area.

Finally, the Army is doing its utmost within its capabilities to secure and retain the most competent personnel possible. Obviously, the retention of such personnel not only eliminates the dollar and manpower costs of training new personnel, but results in greater efficiency wherever the better personnel are engaged.

The Army is sparing no effort to achieve the highest attainable standards of readiness. In personnel, in training, in equipment, and in doctrine our emphasis is upon the continuing development of ever higher quality.