size of the Army, and you are taking that reduction-in other words, you are cutting off your reserve, you are supporting reserve power in the Army, at a critical time in our international affairs. So that at this time, when we are in a crisis, we are going to cut the Reserve out of the Army as far as manpower is concerned, depending on the building up in future years of your civilian reserve. Isn't that substantially what you are doing?

Secretary STEVENS. Well, I think that perhaps that does not take full account of the development of the armies of the free world that has been going on in the same period.

Mr. BROOKS. Well, of course, that will disturb your balance. Suppose

Secretary STEVENS. And also the redeployment back to the United States of a considerable amount of our Army.

Mr. BROOKS. Of course that goes back to your balance.

Secretary STEVENS. Yes.

Mr. BROOKS. Whether you are going to have a balanced National Defense Department in this country.

Secretary STEVENS. That is right.

Mr. BROOKS. Because if the Europeans and the Asiatics would build up their armies to the point, you could say "Well, we will abolish the Army of the United States," you would certainly be out of balance. Secretary STEVENS. That is right.

Mr. BROOKS. And I think you would be wrong, too.

Secretary STEVENS. Yes.

Mr. BROOKS. So you are at this time reducing the size of your Army with the idea that in the future you will replace that with a more adequate reserve and in the meantime rely upon the Europeans and the Asiatics to furnish manpower?

Secretary STEVENS. Well, we certainly would count upon our allies to help us so far as manpower is concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you yield to me?

Mr. BROOKS. Sure, I always yield to our chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. In that connection it applies

Secretary STEVENS. I beg your pardon. I didn't hear that.

The CHAIRMAN. The suggestion that comes to my mind is that it applies to the fact that you will call in your reserve to augment the military missions that are assigned to the active force.

Mr. BROOKS. Well, that is true, isn't it? You would.

Secretary STEVENS. We would in the event of an emergency. The CHAIRMAN. No; not to the extent of an emergency. Now you have certain military commitments. You haven't enough men to meet that. So you would have to call in your reserves to active duty. Mr. PATTERSON. If there were an emergency.

Secretary STEVENS. That is not contemplated except in the case of an emergency, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, if that is true, it gets back to the original thought. You have the commitments and then you will either be very thin in carrying out your commitments or else some of your commitments will have to be abandoned on account of the reduction in your armed services.

Secretary STEVENS. Well, since the present size of the Army is well in excess of the 1,170,000 figure that you used this morning and will not

get down to 1,100,000 for a considerable period of time now, it may well be that there will be some change in missions during that period that have not yet been accomplished.

Mr. BROOKS. Well, this question-Mr. Chairman, are you through? The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BROOKS. This question has been asked you, but I would like for you to answer it again and perhaps amplify it.

Suppose Reserve legislation doesn't go through in the form that you think it should, what then will you do? Will you come back to us in the Congress and ask to give you the additional 140,000 men that you are now cutting off, or would you take a chance with no Reserve there and with 140,000 fewer men in the Army than you have at the present time?

Secretary STEVENS. Well, I think the answer to that is very difficult, Mr. Congressman, and would be governed, really, by the unfolding of events. We might have to come back.

Mr. BROOKS. You are sort of in the position of a man who commits his reserves in the course of battle and he has no reserves then to fall back on. Isn't that where you are?

Secretary STEVENS. Of course, what we want to do is to be in the position of having active forces in being sufficient to stand the first phase of any emergency that might be created.

Mr. BROOKS. And then hope to call in your reserves.
Secretary STEVENS. That is right, then call in the reserves.

Mr. BROOKS. Later on from civilian life, and they are not in shape

to go.

Secretary STEVENS. That is right. They are not in shape to go. We want to get them in shape to go. And then with that, for the second phase, to carry on to the third phase, which would be the mobilization, presumably, in event of such an emergency.

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, this is something that disturbs me greatly, as I think it disturbs everybody on the committee. I wondered now why we couldn't ask General Ridgway for his opinion at this point. I would like to have the general say something.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, General.

Mr. BROOKS. General, you see our situation there and how deeply concerned the committee is in reference to cutting down the Army in a crisis when we have those in charge of the destinies of Red China threatening war on the United States and then we come out and reduce our force by 140,000 men.

Does that affect the safety of the country?

General RIDGWAY. I think it does, sir.

Mr. BROOKS. Now, General

The CHAIRMAN. You say you think it does?

General RIDGWAY. I do, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now wait 1 minute, Mr. Brooks

Mr. BROOKS. Are we taking a chance in reducing our commitments or taking a chance in losing our position in the Far East by reducing the size of our Army at this critical time?

General RIDGWAY. Mr. Brooks, you have several questions in there. I will do my best to answer them separately.

Of course, sir, the Army has little part in the formulating of commitments. Commitments derive from statements of national policy and from treaty obligations.

Mr. BROOKS. I think that is true, but I think that everybody on this committee has complete confidence in your integrity and your ability and your patriotism and would like to have a forthright answer from you.

General RIDGWAY. You shall have one, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. May I say to Mr. Brooks that I think we are practically finished with the Secretary. Let's open up with General Ridgway now and get to the point that Mr. Brooks has raised. If we don't, Mr. Brooks will be recognized to ask you again.

Mr. BROOKS. Let him answer my question, will you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. I thought-go ahead.

Mr. BROOKS. Do you want a prepared statement, rather than answer it?

The CHAIRMAN. No. Go ahead and answer the question, General. General RIDGWAY. I am a little confused as to just exactly what the last question, sir, was.

Mr. BROOKS. The last question was, Should we reduce the size of our Army by 140,000 men at this particular critical time in our international affairs and will we jeopardize our position in the Far East or will we jeopardize the safety of this country?

General RIDGWAY. I think we should not reduce it. I think we do jeopardize the security to a degree.

Mr. BROOKS. And, of course, you are opposing the reduction of the Army by 140,000 men. I agree with you, I will say that.

General RIDGWAY. May I say this, sir: It isn't up to me or to any other officer in uniform to oppose a decision by the constituted authorities of our Government. I stand on but one position, sir. Whatever be the decisions, the Army will execute them to the utmost of its capability, with unswerving loyalty, with the means assigned to it.

The Army will state forthrightly when it thinks that the means allotted to it are insufficient for execution of the missions assigned. Mr. BROOKS. Well, I know you are a great soldier there. But if we take 140,000 men away from the Army, there is a reduction by four divisions, as the chairman said; isn't that true?

General RIDGWAY. I don't think four divisions is quite accurate, sir. It is a substantial reduction which will be translated into termsMr. BROOKS. Now, will we have enough manpower in the Far East, then, to back up our commitments at that point in this world?

General RIDGWAY. We are going to have to make a major reassignment, reallocation of forces, Mr. Brooks, worldwide. It will not just affect the Far East. It is difficult to pinpoint any one region, because the entire Army is going to be affected.

Could I interpolate one word of explanation?

Mr. BROOKS. Sure.

General RIDGWAY. It might bear upon the question of reserves, because I think confusion has arisen there. I say that for this reason: We have what we call the General Reserve or frequently referred to as the Strategic Reserve in the Army. That is that portion of the active force of the United States Army in the continental United States which is ready on relatively short notice for commitment overseas to meet any assignment.

The other Reserve which may have been confused with this is our Reserve structure, our civilian components. They are two totally different things.

Mr. BROOKS. Of course, the Reserve structure is what you refer to as the civilians?

General RIDGWAY. Yes, sir.

Mr. BROOKS. Those that do not make the military a career, but come in?

General RIDGWAY. That is right.

Mr. BROOKS. To the active service in emergencies.

General RIDGWAY. That is right, the National Guard, the Organized Reserves and the ROTC.

Mr. BROOKS. Is our Reserve in shape to go into an emergency at the present time?

General RIDGWAY. The Reserve structure, that is the civilian components, could not furnish organized units of divisional strength which would meet minimum acceptable training levels for commitment to battle in less than 8 to 9 months today.

Mr. BROOKS. And then, knowing that, we then set out to reduce our Army by 140,000, and you think that is unwise?

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Now wait 1 minute. Now I want the general in his own way-you have a prepared statement, General?

General RIDGWAY. Yes, sir, I do, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now wait one minute. Let's have an orderly record.

Is there anything further to the distinguished Secretary?
Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, I have a question.

The CHAIRMAN. To ask of the Secretary?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Ask the Secretary. Then we are going to go in an orderly way.

Mr. JOHNSON. I am reading from a booklet called The Role of the Army. I wish you would listen carefully to what I read and I want to get from you whether that expresses the present policy of the Army with reference to strength. It starts like this:

It is not necessary to match with forces in being the newer call strength of the Soviet and satellite armed forces. Our immediate aim is to confront Soviet leaders with sufficient strength in being, backed by adequate and quickly available reserves, to discourage aggression. The comparative strength of the Communist and NATO forces can't be gaged by counting noses. The real measure is qualitative, in terms both of men and weapons. To meet the requirements of

this policy we and our allies must be best but not necessarily the biggest. Now, does that correctly state your policy with reference to the size of the Army as it was reduced down to 1,027,000 men?

Secretary STEVENS. That correctly states the mission as I see it. Mr. JOHNSON. And you think they have the capability of taking care of any situations that may arise in the immediate future, is that

correct?

Secretary STEVENS. Yes. I do think, if I may add this, Congressman Brooks, that the 140,000 figure which you use is an accurate figure, and I know just how you got that figure

Mr. BROOKS. We got them from you.

Secretary STEVENS. Yes, sir. But the point is that the 140,000 reduction is not going to be effective, if it becomes effective, for almost a year and a half from now.

The CHAIRMAN. That is true.

Secretary STEVENS. And that is a long way in the future and many things can happen that might change the program entirely.

Mr. BROOKS. Seventy thousand would be effective within the next few months, or July 1.

Secretary STEVENS. That is right. Half of it will be, and the other half during the fiscal year 1956.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, did you answer Mr. Johnson's question? Secretary STEVENS. Yes. I agree with that statement.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you answered that question.

Now,.members of the committee, it is our pleasure to have now General Ridgway, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and also a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Now, General, the committee would be glad for you to make a statement in your own way. If you have a prepared statement, I trust the members will permit you to read it without interruption. After that, we will ask you some questions. If any questions should be answered in executive session, you indicate it and we will not press for an answer then but will later on go into executive session with you and the Secretary.

Now proceed, General Ridgway.

General RIDGWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I do have a prepared statement here which could be released for publication. It would be much more effective for the members of the committee, I believe, sir, and will save them a great deal of time if this statement could be released without reading here, and then the classified statement which I am prepared to make

The CHAIRMAN. Let's see what you are releasing. We haven't anything up before us here. You read what you are releasing to the

press.

General RIDGWAY. I think the counsel has the statements.
The CHAIRMAN. Have we?

Mr. NORBLAD. Up here.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, how long will it take?

General RIDGWAY. It will take about 20 minutes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then suppose we follow the suggestion of the general, if that meets with approval, that we will just proceed to ask you questions. Is that it?

General RIDGWAY. Well. I think it would be much clearer, Mr. Chairman, if I may say so, sir, if you would permit me to read the classified statement in executive session first.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, that is right. We are.

General RIDGWAY. Most of the questions that would be asked, I believe, are covered in there, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, let's see about that. Go ahead and read what you have written here.

General RIDGWAY. The unclassified statement?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, that is right.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, may I make an observation just before the Secretary leaves?

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Secretary, this is merely an observation for the benefit of the committee and particularly in connection with the Army.