Secretary THOMAS. Well, we are not going to do that. As I said before, when you are budgeting and planning a year and a half in advance and you are budgeting around $9 billion, you can't hit it right on the nose. I mean, I defy anybody to be that accurate.

Mr. HARDY. Well, more often

Secretary THOMAS. What we are going to try to do: We think this is a rock-bottom budget, but we are going to try, to do a good management job and if there are some areas that we can save some money and carry out our commitments, we will come and tell you and I would think you would expect us to do that.

Mr. HARDY. Absolutely. That is right. But now, just this one other aspect of this matter. Of course I know you can't hit it right on the nose. But it seems to me that I can recall in the not too distant past we have had such things as deficiency appropriation bills that have had to come up with the military.

Secretary THOMAS. That is right.

Mr. HARDY. So looking at the present picture, we can anticipate there will be no necessity for any deficiency appropriation bill for 1956, and in addition to that you are going to save $13 billion in the total military. And I don't want to see the Navy suffer in its program, which has already been cut down, in order to contribute to the $134 billion.

Mr. Chairman, I am through.

Secretary THOMAS. I don't think I said either one of those.

The CHAIRMAN. Not a bit.

Secretary THOMAS. That we are going to come in for a deficiency appropriation

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield at that point? The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. HARDY. I am happy to.

Mr. SHORT. It seems to me we ought to get clearly in mind what seems to be a bone of contention, and I see no excuse for it. The Secretary has been asked if he is satisfied with this program. Well, of course he isn't. Whenever a nation, an institution, an organization, or an individual becomes satisfied, he ceases to grow or to progress. No general ever has an army big enough to command. No member of Congress or politician ever has a big enough crowd at a political rally, any more than a preacher ever has a big enough congregation. God pity us when we become self-satisfied.

The CHAIRMAN. We become static.

Mr. SHORT. We become static. Now, you can't hit it on the nose. If I remember the testimony of the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Wilson, he did not say he would not come in here and ask for an additional appropriation. He said there would be a variance of 5 percent up or down. And he thought that was a reasonable margin of safety.

You have brought the strength of all the armed services down to an irreducible minimum. It may be that you have to ask for more if conditions change, but if they don't change, the head of each Department is going to put forth his level best to get the most for the dollar, and if at all possible save us money. I don't think there shoud be any quarrel about it at all.

Mr. HARDY. I would like to comment on that because I don't want it to be construed that I am stirring up any contention on the matter. The thing that I want to avoid is any idea that here is pressure applied

on the three services to accomplish an unwise saving. Now that is just exactly my point in the matter.

Mr. SHORT. Well, as we have been told by the Secretary and by the Commandant of the Marine Corps at a private luncheon-and there is nothing secret about it because I am sure they would be glad to state it publicly-while they may not get everything they would like to have, they can live and get along with the figures that were accepted by the different branches of the service after a long, exhaustive, and thorough investigation of the Joint Chiefs and of the National Security Council and all. The overall national security program is a sound one, and each branch of the service has to give of course as well as to take.

The CHAIRMAN. In fairness, I want to make this statement. From the testimony, I don't think the press would be warranted or the country be warranted or the Congress be warranted in drawing the conclusion that there is a cushion and padding-I am using those words reliberately so it can be understood-of a billion-and-some-odd dollars. Mr. HARDY. That is the point.

The CHAIRMAN. There is nothing in the budget that would indicate that. There is nothing in the testimony that would indicate that.

Any budget of some $34 billion, by good management and by close scrutiny, probably a reduction in prices or various factors which might later arise, might make it possible to save 5 percent. Now, that didn't carry in my mind that there was a padding or a cushion in the budget of 5 percent.

Mr. HARDY. Not deliberate, certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, that is the whole thing. Mr. Miller? I won't forget you gentlemen sitting back there in the back row.

Mr. MILLER. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Doyle?

Mr. DOYLE. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, in the last page of your very informative statement, you made the statement:

However, the main reasons the personnel give for leaving the services continue to be pay, poor and insufficient housing, and inadequate dependent care.

My brief question is directed only to the subject of inadequate dependent care, as one of the three main reasons that you elucidate that the personnel give for leaving the service. I want to ask you if in your judgment the personnel in giving the reason of inadequate dependent. care is a just and sound reason under present conditions? Do you agree with the personnel that that is a sound and valid reason for leaving the service under present conditions?

Secretary THOMAS. Well, Mr. Doyle, I do, myself. I think it is a very valid reason. I would guess that I have probably covered as many military installations as anybody in the service, because I was Assistant Secretary of Defense before. I have covered Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy installations, and many of them. And that was one of the major factors that I found in the morale situation. And unless-when a man goes overseas or he goes out of the country or he is away, unless his family-unless he thinks his family can have medical care while he is away, it is one of the major factors, morale factors, in my opinion, that we have in the armed services today.

Mr. DOYLE. Now, Mr. Secretary, I know of your very sympathetic and valid interest in the personnel of the Navy. What is the Navy

Department doing at this time as part of a specific program to remove the just and valid complaint by the personnel as to inadequate dependent care? What are you doing to correct it?

Secretary THOMAS. Well, we are doing everything we can. Of course, at the moment we are frozen, as you know, to 3.26 doctors per thousand and that is our difficulty. Until we get that raised, we will not be able to do any better than we are doing now. Now, we have used a lot of ingenuity, I will say that, though. Admiral Holloway has done a fine job. And when the fleet is in, for instance, in a place like Norfolk or San Diego, they have used the fleet doctors to come ashore and help with the dependent care. And we have devised a lot of interim means. But we need to raise the 3.26 figure.

Mr. RIVERS. That is right. Amen.

Mr. DOYLE. Mr. Secretary, I know of the esteem in which your neighbors in Los Angeles County hold you, because I live there, too. I think you are aware of the shortage of adequate medical care in the Navy in the Los Angeles County area. Do I hear you say "Yes"? Secretary THOMAS. Yes, sir.

Mr. DOYLE. Is there a program to correct that?

Secretary THOMAS. Well, trying to get that 3.26 raised, because we can't correct it until we get that raised, because that freezes us on the number of doctors we can assign per thousand people.

Mr. DOYLE. Mr. Secretary, I want to make this observation in commendation of our distinguished chairman's remark, an observation when he called your attention to the fact that in substance it was timely for the Navy to think in terms of building some of these carriers and other Navy ships on the Pacific coast. I want to supplement his very wise and unusually helpful and encouraging and well-informed opinion on those matters and urge to your attention, because I know you are thoroughly informed with conditions on the Pacific coast, and I as a longtime resident there, having been born there, I think I am aware of the fact that we have the capacity on the Pacific coast, even though it may cost a dollar or two more, we have the capacity, and the Pacific-coast shipbuilders' interest and the Navy's best interest in my humble judgment is that some of these huge ships should be built on the Pacific coast, and that that program should begin as promptly as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Doyle. Of course the Chair recognizes the fact that there are four Members from California on the committee, and he knew he would be pleasing each one when he made the utterances he did. [Laughter.]

Mr. Norblad?

Mr. NORBLAD. With reference to pay, that, of course, includes the matter of increases in retired pay, which is quite an incentive for men to stay in the service, I take it?

Secretary THOMAS. Well, I think the whole program is.

Mr. NORBLAD. I live in Arlington County and I notice most realestate agents there are retired Navy commanders trying to supplement their income in order to try to get along. I noticed that.

Secretary THOMAS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I couldn't hear your question.

Mr. NORBLAD. He answered it, having to do with retired pay.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bennett?

Mr. BENNETT. I don't know whether you would like to have this done instead in executive session, but I would like to know what portion of the funds in research are being placed in amphibious warfare and what our present capabilities are. For instance, I want to know how many troops actually are being trained in amphibious operations today. Now you may not want to answer that

Secretary THOMAS. I would rather answer that in executive session. Mr. BENNETT. The first part of my question: do you think you can answer that? The first part of my question dealt with the degree in which we are making progress in amphibious operations.

Secretary THOMAS. I think we are making, the Marine Corps is making tremendous advancement in the techniques of amphibious warfare.

Mr. BENNETT. In research?

Secretary THOMAS. Oh, yes. I would like to have you interrogate the general later on what they are doing in that field, the studies they are making. I mean, I think it is outstanding.

Mr. BENNETT. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bennett. Mr. Mollohan?

Mr. MOLLOHAN. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lankford?

Mr. LANKFORD. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, in talking about reduction in personnel of 62,000 in 2 years in the naval forces and 31,000 in the Marines, and yet the Marines stay at 3 divisions and 3 air wings that they have now, and the Navy reduces its ship complement by roughly 100 ships, and I gathered from that that most of the reductions were to be made in shore establishments through means, partly through consolidation. Do you have any plans presently for consolidation of naval establishments and will this committee be informed of those plans?

Secretary THOMAS. Well, I think that is more a management problem. I mean, as I say, 317 major installations in the Navy, 259 in the United States and 58 overseas. Now, you have a continuous review of those from the management standpoint, and you tighten up here and there. Maybe it is 10 men, maybe it is 200, maybe you consolidate some facilities that are minor in relation to the overall picture. I think that is more a management problem. We have no intention of eliminating any major thing or anything like that.

Mr. LANKFORD. Will this committee be informed of any consolidations that you contemplate making?

Secretary THOMAS. Well, certainly we would have no reason not to inform you of it. As I say, that is a management problem. Whether we can keep you advised of all the moves we make in that field, I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. I would say to the Secretary and Mr. Lankford, that if the abandonment or consolidation brings about declaring a certain place as surplus and transferred to the disposal agency, GSA, it would come before the committee and the committee would be cognizant of it.

Mr. LANKFORD. May I just add, Mr. Secretary, to Mr. Hébert's felicitations on the Navy Sugar Bowl game. I live in Annapolis and we in Annapolis have a sort of proprietary interest in the Navy team. We are very proud of it, and we think you did a grand thing in letting them play.

Secretary THOMAS. Thank you.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman

The CHAIRMAN. Wait 1 minute, now. Let's go around the table and then we will come back. Mr. Huddleston?

Mr. HUDDLESTON. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, in your very comprehensive statement on page 8, you mentioned that at long last the research and development programs of the Navy, the various bureaus of the Navy, BuShips, BuAer, BuMed, and the rest, have been consolidated under a single head. That is certainly a fine step in the right direction. I was wondering what steps have been taken to further coordinate the research and development programs of the various services insofar as it is possible. I know each service has a different-has different problems that have to be solved within their own orbit. But insofar as it is possible, what steps have been taken to coordinate the various research and development programs among the different branches of the service?

Secretary THOMAS. Well, I think you have that well controlled now because that is done through Mr. Quarles in the Department of Defense, and every project we have has to be coordinated through a committee to see it is not overlapping with another service. That has full coordination. And I think very effective coordination. I think it is very good for the program.

Mr. HUDDLESTON. Just one other question, Mr. Secretary. You have testified on the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve training programs. During the so-called Korea fracas, the Navy had one policy of calling up the Reserves and the Army had another policy. The Navy, it seems, apparently called up men out of the organized units for the most part, insofar as possible, and the Army called up many men who were not attached to organized units. In my own district, that policy of the Navy has resulted in reluctance of men who entered the service-were called back into the service from the Naval Reserve-to affiliate themselves actively with the program when they return. The first question I would like to ask: Has the Navy revised that program based on the lessons of the past; and, secondly, I would like to ask if there has been some step taken to synchronize the various methods that the different branches of the service have for calling up the Reserves, so that there won't be-no branch of the service will suffer from a different practice than is used in calling the Reserves back into the service.

Secretary THOMAS. Of course, the Navy has had a Reserve program of its own in the past, as you know. It has been a very, very efficient Reserve program, in my opinion. I think your new legislation that is before the Congress now will do what you are talking about, will unify or stabilize the Reserves of the three services. The Navy's program, though-after Korea, we got down to a Reserve of 122,000 from 182,000. Now we are building that back up, and we are doing a very good job with it. We are back now to 142,000 as of November 30, and it is coming up. So we will be up, I think, shortly. The Marine Corps got down-they were 40,000 before Korea, and they got down to, I think, oh, 2,000, around there. They are back up to 32,000 now and they are doing a good job. So our Reserve programs are coming along very well from that standpoint.

Mr. HUDDLESTON. I know during 1951, particularly in 1951, practically every officer and petty officer in the various Reserve units was