value of freedom to plan and develop our full human potential to an extent that is not clearly compelled. This goal, to our way of thinking, is to capitalize on our vastly superior expanding productive capacity, our general economic health in terms of efficient production for all purposes, including the military, as well as a continued rising standard of living for our people and the other peoples of the world.

The overemphasis of the importance of universal service, as presently administered under the act, represents a complete disregard for the real potential in the young individual human being. It disregards the nonmilitary potential of a great nation, in which this sort of compulsory structure has never yet been a part. This sort of violation of our total overall strength is almost beyond comprehension. Our total overall national strength is dependent upon the wisest possible use of technical skills, special training and talents, productive ability and capacity, and essentiality to the full national interest. Selective service is based upon this wise premise, while compulsory universal service violates, penalizes, and makes less effective the achievement of this premise. The total national interest in this field far outweighs the argument that to be fair to all young American males, all must serve in the Armed Forces.

Your attention is called to the following table, which was taken from page 71 of Principles of Public Health Administration, by J. J. Hanlon, and published by C. V. Mosby Co. (The costs are given in terms of 1954 dollars.)

Factors involved in the socioeconomic value of any single human being A. Capital cost (the investment that society has in each infant by the time it is born):

1. Economic incapacitation of mother.
2. Risk of death to mother (prorated).

3. Risk of injury to mother with immediate or subsequent
effect on her economic value (prorated).

$760. 00 76. 00

541. 50

104, 50

38. 00

1,520. 00

7. Interest on capital investment.

Total....

B. Installation cost (the investment that society has in each individ

ual by the time he reaches 18 years of age):

1. Shelter, clothing, and food..

2. Value of time mother devotes to child care..

3. Education-family and community contribution
4. Medical care and health.

5. Recreation..

6. Insurance_.

7. Sundries and incidentals.

8. Risk of disability during first 18 years.

9. Risk of death during first 18 years (prorated) 10. Interest on installation costs__.

Total...

C. Period of productivity (the return that society can expect from its investment with the risks involved during this period):

10, 887. 00 11, 970. 00 2, 280. 00 570. 00 2, 137. 50 95.00 617. 50

427. 50 7, 600. 00

36, 584. 50

55, 100. 00 39,900. 00

95, 000, 00

2, 660. 00 4, 180. 00

190.00

7, 410. 00

5. Interest on debit items__

15, 200. 00

The point of this table is simply to show that the mere doller investment we have in our young people is enormous. It also shows that the return to society on that investment is equally impressive. It is our contention that we cannot afford to use this investment unwisely, es we most certainly would be doing in many cases under a sustem of UMT. It also becomes clearly apparent, disregarding the dollar value of a human being, that UMT can end does affect to a terrifying extent the ment: 1 stability, the freedom to plan one's own life, and to follow that plan-affects materially the total overall contribution that any individual is destined to make to the national interest.

The primary objective of the United States is to preserve the integrity and vitality of its own free society, which is founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual. To violate this trust is to violate precepts upon which our Nation is based.

Selective service should attempt to appraise and take into account those factors that determine whether an individual can make his most valuable total contribution to the national interest, in the armed services or outside the armed services. Serving in the Armed Forces is not necessarily a prerequisite to filling our obligation of protecting our heritage of freedom. Adequate incentives, as mentioned above, will assist each individual to make an accurate personal decision and thus tend to eliminate any dependence upon any drafting program in peacetime.

Our third primary reason for opposing UMT is because of the very nature of the Armed Forces. Of necessity, they must act in a totalitarian manner. The individual largely becomes a cog in a machine; he has little voice in making decisions; he does what he is told. The decisions are made by the officers, and he often has little understanding of the "why" of the decisions. Militery training is in prit designed to mold the will of the soldie. to express the will of the leader. Their right to select their leaders, to criticize them, to make the rules by which they shall govern themselves, to go on strike to enforce their demands-all of these and many more of the basic freedoms and privileges that are a part of our democratic system are surrendered to a totalitarian authority.

This indoctrination, while probably necessary, is foreign to our way of life. This sort of indoctrination, as we see it, is dangerous. It is tragic enough to have to indoctrinate some of our young people with this philosophy-a philosophy contrary to the principles laid down by our forefathers who fled foreign lands to escape oppression from supreme rulers of one sort or another-but to indoctrinate all young men with this philosophy is to begin to undermine the will and fiber of the people to make their own decisions. It sabotages their basic concepts of the responsibilities, the opportunities, and the privileges that they have in guiding their own destiny. The expansion of this sort of centralized control is not in the interest of the America that we inherited.

To sum up, we urge that H. R. 3005 be amended to effectuate a type of selective compulsory military service, removing the universal features of the law. We favor selective service only as a temporary vehicle to meet the needs of men in the Armed Forces until adequate incentives can be implemented, which in turn would secure sufficient forces on a voluntary basis. We oppose universal military training primarily because it violates our sacred, traditional reliance on incentive to the individual. This is because it completely disregards the value of the individual and roadblocks the full, efficient, voluntary use of our young skills and abilities in the national interest.

To willingly accept peacetime conscription is to ignore the fundamental principle that the basis of our whole resistance to totalitarianism is the preservation of the highest possible degree of freedom for each individual to determine how to achieve his own greatest potential and make the greatest possible contribution to the total national welfare.

We dare not lose our direction as a free people.

The CHAIRMAN. Now the next witness is Mr. Alonzo Meyers, National Council Against Conscription.

Mr. Meyers, it is a pleasure for the committee to have your views. File your statement and sit right down there and give us a résumé of what is in your statement.

Mr. SWOMLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Alonzo Meyers could not be here and I am taking his place.

The CHAIRMAN. Who are you, then?

Mr. SwOMLEY. John L. Swomley, Jr. It is on that sheet.

I am appearing on behalf of the National Council Against Conscription, of which I am the director.

Mr. RIVERS. Now, Mr. Chairman, let's find out just exactly what that outfit is.

The CHAIRMAN. Wait. We will get it.

Mr. SWOMLEY. May I proceed?

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and make your statement now.

John M. Swomley, Jr. All right.

scription.

All right.

Mr. SwOMLEY. In presenting our

four main questions:

You are

National Council Against Con

testimony, we want to deal with

(1) Is this peacetime conscription? Is there a ground war in sight in the foreseeable future?

(2) Does conscription or the size of an army deter aggression? (3) Is conscription needed for the Nation's commitments and alliances?

(4) Will peacetime conscription injure the Nation?

The present universal military training and service law was passed as a wartime measure to make possible expansion of American Ground Forces during the tension in Korea. The Korean war is now over, and the United States is not confronted with the possibility of a ground war in the foreseeable future.

Except for the vicinity of Formosa where the use of ground troops is not projected, there is no immediate danger of war anywhere else in the world.

The Secretary of Defense in announcing manpower cuts on December 20, 1954, said they were based on administration estimates that the danger of immediate war had diminished. He previously pointed out on April 19, 1954:

My analysis would indicate that the Russians have been much more afraid of us than we are of them and their buildup has been a defensive buildup (New York Times, April 20, 1954).

Hanson Baldwin, the New York Times military analyst, wrote in the December 23, 1954, Times:

Since the end of the Indochina and Korean wars, the danger of another sizable shooting war has undoubtedly diminished. Government intelligence estimates have reflected this,

He went on to point out that the Pentagon is not worried about the immediate future but the period from 1958 on.

Even this period is a matter of concern not because of tensions in Europe, but because

There is considerable fear that present politico-military policies are not adequate to meet the "creeping communism" that is still sweeping over Asia

These estimates indicate that certainly during 1955-57 no military crisis is foreseen and thereafter the problem is one of "creeping communism" in Asia, which most authorities recognize is only aggravated by attempts to use military methods.

If peacetime conscription is being sought to put an army into Asia, it should be noted in advance that there are no other situations in Asia comparable to Korea where a nation was divided into two parts, one of them virtually a protectorate of the United States.

"Creeping communism" is the use of infiltration, political subversion, and guerilla tactics. As such it involves military aid from

China rather than direct Chinese invasion of other countries. If American troops intervene in what is essentially a civil war is Asia, this will virtually guarantee the entry of Chinese troops as occurred in Korea. If both Chinese and American armies are involved, there is a real danger that China might be bombed, the war might become atomic and therefore global.

In addition to this American intervention in civil war in Asia would result in serious hostility to us throughout all of Asia and probably on a worldwide level.

Unless the United States is seriously thinking of engaging Chinese armies in the vicinity of China, there is no need for a conscript army in peacetime of a million men. As Capt. Liddell Hart has put it:

To concentrate on preparing for the improbable is a waste of our economic resources-dancing to the Communists' tune in the self-exhausting way they wish us to do.

If conscription is being advocated for possible trouble in Asia in 1958 or thereafter, its passage now would tend to create the impression in public and Government circles that a military program had some validity for the problem.

The problem we face in Asia is essentially the problem of revolt against imperialism, hunger and inequality. The Communists did not create the problems against which the Asians are revolting, nor yet the revolutionary movements. The problem is not one of stopping such movements, but of how to prevent them from being captured by and integrated into the Communist movement led by the Soviet Union.

This is essentially a political and economic task which our concentration on military solutions makes it impossible for us to achieve. As Prof. Hans Morgenthau of the University of Chicago puts it:

The counterrevolutionary appearances of our military-oriented policies disarm us not only in the struggle for the minds of men but in the military struggle as well. For it can be asserted axiomatically that once the problem of revolution can be stated only in military terms it has become insoluble and even an unlikely military success would only obscure the political defeat (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1954).

If it is argued that the Army must be ready at all times for a major war such as one with Russia would be, then it can also be argued that a conscript army of a million as proposed by the President is also inadequate.

It can also be pointed out that major wars never happen without advance warning. International tension and unusual military buildup by the potential enemy occur well in advance of actual hostilities. Even "surprise" attacks such as Pearl Harbor are a surprise only as to the exact time or place.

No one in a position of authority was really surprised when Japan broadened the war in December 1941.

If we ask whether the size of an army deters aggression, the answer would have to be "No." Hitler's armies attacked Russia despite Russia's mass army program.

Poland and Germany both had large conscript armies prior to World War II. Yet Germany attacked Poland, and Britain went to war against Germany. The recent war in Indochina continued despite conscription in the United States and our threats to use armed power. These illustrations indicate that there are factors

other than size and military power which play a decisive role in preventing or causing war.

Secretary of Defense Wilson arrived at the same conclusion when he said:

I got to thinking here 3 or 4 months ago about Korea, Indochina, and EDC and I came to the conclusion that nothing different from what happened would have happened if we had been twice as strong in a military sense *** (New York Times, January 14, 1955).

Certainly mass armies will not keep other nations from going to war if our possession of atom and hydrogen bombs has not caused them to be peaceful.

The CHAIRMAN. Now

Mr. SWOMLEY. The problem of commitments and alliances-
The CHAIRMAN. One minute.

Mr. SWOMLEY. Excuse me.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, your 10 minutes almost expired. I would like to ask you: Have you any amendments that you propose to offer to the extension of the draft? Any amendments that you are offering?

Mr. SWOMLEY. No, sir, Mr. Chairman. I would like, if I could, to continue. This is the first

The CHAIRMAN. We want to be as courteous and considerate of everybody that we can. We have 12 more witnesses here and we must finish this this afternoon. So we will have to limit everybody. You already consumed your 10 minutes, which was set out for every witness. So I will have to ask you to file the remainder of your statement and it will be considered as a part of the record. We will be careful to consider it.

I am trying to be as courteous and considerate of everyone. But you will just have to accept that.

Mr. SWOMLEY. Mr. Chairman, I am very sorry that you won't hear the opposition at all.

The CHAIRMAN. We are hearing the opposition.

Mr. SWOMLEY. You heard plenty of testimony on the other side. The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman

The CHAIRMAN. No, sir.

Mr. RIVERS. Wait a second. I don't think our record indicates exactly what this outfit is. I would like to know something about them. That is my part.

(The balance of the statement is as follows:)

3. The problem of commitments and alliances is one involving the Air Force and Navy as well as the Army. In fact, the commitment to Formosa is entirely a matter of naval and air power.

The Army is the only branch of the Armed Forces that wants conscription or intends to make use of it. Both the Navy and the Air Force rely on volunteers. They prefer the voluntary method not only because they want willing rather than unwilling sailors and airmen, but also because they prefer longer term enlistments. For example, Lt. Gen. Emmett O'Donnell, head of Air Force personnel, said: "We have got to have 4-year men. If we were forced to the 2-year draft it would be the end of the Air Force." He indicated that the Air Force could use only long-term enlistees because of the technical training they must have.

Maj. Gen. Kenneth B. Hobson, Director of Manpower Operations, is on record as stating that before using the draft the Air Force would hire civilians to fill military operations, particularly in "support" areas.

Brig. Gen. Bonner Fellers, writing in the December 1953 Air Force magazine, said that "ever since Gen. George C. Marshall became Army Chief of Staff in Sep