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Stat. section 720, Act of 1887, 1888 (see Removal of Causos, 1): Trac-

tion Co. v. Mining Co., 239.
JUDICIARY, Act of 1887, section 1 (see Action): Traction Co. v. Mining Co.,

239. Act of 1887, 1888 (see Jurisdiction, B 1): McDaniel v. Traylor,
415. Act of March 3, 1891 (see Jurisdiction, A 1, 2): Courtney v.

Pradt, 89; Lucius v. Cawthon-Coleman Co., 149.
Locus CRIMINIS, Rev. Stat. section 731 (see Criminal Law, 2): Burton v.

United States, 283.
MISSOURI, Acts of 1820 and 1836 (see Boundaries, 2): Missouri v. Nebraska,

23.
NATIONAL BANKS, Rev. Stat. section 5198 (see National Banks): First Na-

tional Bank v. Lasater, 115
Navy, Rev. Stat. sections 1556, 1571 (see Naval Officers): United States

v. Engard, 511.
Navy PERSONNEL Act (see Navy Personnel Act): United States v. Cros-

ley, 327.
NEBRASKA, Act admitting to statehood (see Boundaries, 2): Missouri v.

Nebraska, 23.
OKLAHOMA, Act of 1889; Town site act of May 14, 1890 (see Public Lands,

4): Oklahoma City v. McMaster, 529. Act of May 2, 1890, 2€ Stat.
81, 85, sec. 9 (see Appeal and Error): Oklahoma City v. McMaster,

529; (see Jurisdiction, A 4): Comstock.v. Eagleton, 99.
Public Lands, Act of July 2, 1864, grant to Northern Pacific R. R. Co.

(see Public Lands, 6): United States v. Montana Lumber Msg. Co., 573.
Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 557 (see Public Lands, 7): Ramsey v.

Tacoma Land Co., 360.
PUBLIC OFFICERS, Rev. Stat. section 1782 (see Criminal Law, 1): Burton

v. United States, 283.
STATES, Act of June 28, 1834, 4 Stat. 708, confirming agreement between

New York and New Jersey (see Waters, 1): Hamburg American Steam-

ship Co. v. Grube, 407.
TERRITORIAL COURTS, Act of 1874 (see Appeal and Error): Oklahoma City

v. McMaster, 529.
WAR REVENUE Act of 1898 and amendatory, refunding and repealing acts

of 1901 and 1902 (see War Revenue Act): Vanderbilt v. Eidman, 480.

ADMIRALTY.
See MARITIME LAW.

AGENCY.
ee BANKS AND BANKING;

CORPORATIONS, 2;
MAILS, 3.

ALIMONY.
See BANKRUPTCY, 7.

AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY.

See JURISDICTION, B 1.

ANTI-TRUST ACT.
See COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE;

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 8.

APPEAL AND ERROR.
Review of judgment of Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
The review by this court of final judgments in civil cases of the Supreme

Court of the Territory of Oklahoma is not controlled by the act of 1874
in regard to territorial courts but by $ 9 of the act of May 2, 1890,
26 Stat. 81, 85, providing the territorial government for Oklahoma,
and in an action at law where a jury has been waived the review is by
writ of error as in the case of a similar judgment of a Circuit Court,
and not by appeal. Oklahoma City v. McMaster, 529.

See FEDERAL QUESTION;

JURISDICTION.

ARMY.
Status of cadet at military academy.
A cadet at the West Point Military Academy is not an officer of the United

States Army within the meaning of $8 1229, 1342, Rev. Stat., and, if
delinquent, may be dismissed by the President without trial and con-
viction by court-martial. Hartigan v. United States, 169.

ARMY REGULATIONS.
See Navy PERSONNEL Act.

ARREST.
See JURISDICTION, A 6.

ATTESTATION.
See Wills, 2.

AUTOMATIC COUPLERS.
1. Equipment amounting to non-compliance with law.
The equipment of cars with automatic couplers which will not automatically

couple with each other so as to render it unnecessary for men to go
between the cars to couple and uncouple is not a compliance with the
law. Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 1.

2. Scope of words "any car" in act of March 2, 1893.
Locomotive engines are included by the words "any car" contained in the

second section of the act of March 2, 1893, 27 Stat. 531, c. 196, re-
quiring cars engaged in interstate commerce to be equipped with auto-
matic couplers. And although they were also required by the first
section of the act to be equipped with power driving wheel brakes, the
rule that the expression of one thing includes others does not apply,
inasmuch as there was a special reason for that requirement and in

addition the same necessity for automatic couplers existed as to them
as in respect to other cars. A dining car regularly engaged in inter-
state traffic does not cease to be so when waiting for the train to make
the next trip. Ib.

3. Act of March 2, 1903, construed.
The act of March 2, 1903, 32 Stat. 943, c. 976, reiterates the view herein

expressed and is declaratory thereof. Ib.

AVULSION.
See BOUNDARIES.

BANKRUPTCY.
1. Exemptions: right of bankrupt dependent upon laws of State.
The rights of a bankrupt to exempt property are those given by the statutes

of the State, and if such exempt property is not subject to levy and sale
under those statutes, it cannot be made to respond under the Federal
bankrupt act. Smalley v. Laugenour, 93.

2. Exemptions: right of creditor to contest bankrupt's claim-Appeals.
A creditor may contest the bankrupt’s claim to exemption in the bank-

ruptcy court, or may invoke the supervision and revision of the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, but, failing to do that, cannot, unless the order
setting the bankrupt's exemption apart be absolutely void, question
its validity in another proceeding in the state court. Nor can the
judgment of the state court, following the order of the bankruptcy court
and giving effect to the exemption be reviewed by this court on writ
of error under $ 709, Rev. Stat., on the ground that plaintiff in error
was denied a title, right, privilege or immunity, under the Constitu-
tion or authority of the United States specially set up or claimed in
the state court. Ib.

3. Jurisdiction of bankruptcy court-Appeals.
The bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to determine on a claim asserted by

the bankrupt whether property in the hands of the trustee is exempt;
and while an erroneous decision against the asserted right may be
corrected in the appropriate mode for the correction of errors, the
jurisdiction of the court is not in issue within the meaning of the act
of March 3, 1891, and a direct appeal to this court will not lie. Lucius
v. Cawthon-Coleman Co., 149.

4. Preference-Sums collected for bankrupt and withheld by creditor not a

voidable preference-Creditor acting as trustee not entitled to set off sums

collected
The bankrupt was largely indebted to a corporation whose laborers pur-

chased supplies from him; periodically he rendered the corporation a
statement of amounts due from its laborers which it deducted from
their wages and remitted to him in a lump sum. Prior to, and within
four months of, the filing of the petition, the corporation several times

deducted from its pay roll, amounts aggregating over $2,000, so due.
by its laborers but did not pay them over, and on filing its claim it
embodied as an integral part thereof the amounts so deducted and
retained as a proper credit or offset. The Circuit Court of Appeals
found that the corporation retained the amounts with the knowledge
of the bankrupt's insolvency and with the intention to secure a prefer-
ence to that extent thereby, but that the bankrupt had no such in-
tention, and ordered that the entire claim be expunged unless the cor-
poration paid the amount so retained to the trustee. On appeal
objections were taken to the jurisdiction of this court. Held, that as
the claim to set off is controlled by and is necessarily based on the
provisions of $ 68 of the Bankrupt Act and its construction is neces-
sarily involved, and the question is one which might have been taken
to this court on appeal or writ of error from the highest court of a
State, this court has jurisdiction of the appeal. Under the facts as
found below the deductions from pay roll did not give rise to a voidable
preference nor was the corporation entitled to credit them as a set-off
as they were not mutual debts and credits within the set-off clause of
the bankrupt act, but were collections made independently of other
transactions and as trustee for the bankrupt. The corporation was
entitled to prove its gross debt with the alleged set-off eliminated and
was a debtor to the bankrupt for the amount of such deductions, and
the court below has power to protect the bankrupt's estate in respect
to dividends to the corporation in case it should not discharge its
obligations. Western Tie and Timber Co. v. Brown, 502.

5. Preference not constituted by mortgagor consenting to mortgagee's possession

of mortgaged property within statutory period.
The enforcement of a lien by the mortgagee taking possession, with the

consent of the mortgagor, of after acquired property covered by a
valid mortgage made and recorded prior to the passage of the act, is
not a conveyance or transfer under the bankrupt act; and, where it
does not appear that it was done to hinder, delay or defraud creditors,
it does not constitute a preference under the act although at the time
of the enforcement the mortgagee may have known that the mort-
gagor was insolvent and considering going into bankruptcy and the
petition was filed within four months thereafter. Thompson v. Fair-
banks, 516.

6. Property rights of bankrupt after discharge-Effect of secretion from trustee.
If a claim owned by a bankrupt is of value his creditors are entitled to it,

and he cannot, by withholding knowledge of its existence from the
trustee, after obtaining a discharge of his debts, immediately assert
title to and collect the claim for his own benefit. First National Bank
v. Lasater, 115.

7. Provable debt-Arrears of alimony not provable debt barred by discharge.
A husband owes the duty of supporting his wife and children not because

of contractual relations with the wife but because of the policy of the

law which will enforce the duty if necessary and the bankruptcy act
was not intended to be a means of avoiding this obligation. Arrears
of alimony awarded to a wife against her husband for the support of
herself and their minor children, under a final decree of absolute divorce,
is not a provable debt barred by a discharge in bankruptcy, nor does
the fact that there is no reservation in the decree of the right to alter
or modify it deprive the debt of its character of being for the support of
the bankrupts wife and children. The amendment of February 5,
1903, excepting decrees of alimony from the discharge in bankruptcy
was not new legislation creating a presumption that such decrees were
not excepted prior thereto, but was merely declaratory of the true
meaning and sense of the statute as originally enacted. Wetmore v.
Markoe, 68.

8. Trustee's right of election as to bankrupt's property.
While a trustee in bankruptcy is not bound to accept property of an onerous

or unprofitable character, and in case he declines to take it the bank-
rupt may assert title thereto, he is entitled to be informed of the prop-
erty and have a reasonable time to elect whether he will accept it or
not. First National Bank v. Lasater, 115.

BANKS AND BANKING.
Relation of bank to customer in the matter of checks deposited.
The deposit of checks in a bank and drawing against them by a customer

constitutes the relation of debtor and creditor and the bank becomes
the absolute owner of the checks so deposited, and not the agent of
the customer to collect them; this relation is not, in the absence of any
special agreement, affected by the right of the bank against the cus-
tomer, and his liability therefor, in case the checks are not paid. Bur-
ton v. United States, 283.

See NATIONAL BANKS;

CRIMINAL LAW, 2.

BILL OF LADING.
See MARITIME LAW.

BONDS.
See Local Law (S. C.);

TAXATION, 6, 8, 10.

BOUNDARIES.
1. RiversAccretion and avulsion definedChange of boundary not affected

by avulsion.
Accretion is the gradual accumulation by alluvial formation and where a

boundary river changes its course gradually the parties on either side
hold by the same boundary--the center of the channel. Avulsion is
the sudden and rapid change in the course and channel of a boundary
river. It does not work any change in the boundary, which remains

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