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verdict for defendants on the ground that the Government had failed to prove its ownership of the land from which the timber was cut.
It is true while some authorities hold that the grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company was a grant in præsenti, it is also true that no title can pass to any particular land until. the regular official survey has been made, for until then there is no identification of the land granted. Therefore the Government, by its proof of the fact that township 26'was Government land, sustained the allegations of its complaint, and the defendants were therefore forced to disprove the Government's case if they could. This they sought to do by the same evidence which they were to offer in support of their special plea. If, then, such evidence was incompetent, it neither disproved the Government's case nor proved their special plea.
Outside of the thirteen original States of the Union we have been unable to find that any court has ever decided, or that any counsel has ever made the claim, that it was necessary that the United States, being the party plaintiff, should prove the title to its land. As in England primarily all lands were property of the Crown, so in the United States all lands outside of the said original States are presumed to belong to the United States, and any party claiming a title adverse to the Government must prove his way from the Government by a regular chain to himself. Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Hussey, 61 Fed. Rep. 231; Deseret Salt Co. -v. Tarpey, 142 U. S. 241; United States v. Loughrey, 172 U. S. 206.
There was no brief or appearance for defendant in error.
MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
In the view we take of the case the answer to the second question becomes unnecessary. The answer to the first and third depends upon the effect of the grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company by the act of July 2, 1864.
The third section of that act contains the usual granting words: “That there be, and hereby is, granted to the 'Northern Pacific Railroad Company,' its successors and assigns," every alternate section of public land, not mineral, designated by odd numbers, on each side of the line of the railroad when definitely fixed.
It has been decided many times that such grants are in præsenti, and take effect upon the sections of the land when the road is definitely located, by relation as to the date of the grant. But the survey of the land is reserved to the Government (section 6); in other words, the identification of the sections—whether odd or even-is 'reserved to the Government; and by the act of July 15, 1870, making appropriations for the sundry civil expenses of the Government for the year ending June 30, 1871, it was provided, in regard to the grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, that the cost of surveying must be paid by the company, and no conveyance should be made of the lands until such cost be paid. On account of that provision it was held in Northern Pacific Railroad Company v. Traill County, 115 U. S. 600, that the land of a railroad company was not subject to taxation. It was said, "to secure the payment of those expenses, it (the Government) decided to retain the legal title in its own hands until they were paid.” See also New Orleans Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 124 U. S. 124. The equitable title becomes a legal title only upon the identification of the granted sections. Deseret Salt Co. v. Tarpey, 142 U. S. 241. As expressed in Leavenworth &c. Railroad Co. v. United States, 92 U. S. 733, 741, “They” (the words “there be and is hereby granted ”) “vest a present title,
though a survey of the lands and a location of the road are necessary to give precision to it, and attach it to any particular tract.” The right of survey is in the United States. It was error, therefore, in the trial court to admit the survey made by Ashley. It was also error to instruct the jury to return a verdict for the defendants. Until the identification of the even and odd-numbered sections the
United States retained a special property, at least, in the timber growing in the township; and this was sufficient to enable it to recover the value of the timber cut and removed by the defendants. A contrary conclusion would impair the Government's right of survey and force it into controversies over surveys made by the railroad or its grantees. It would enable the railroad company or its grantees to despoil the lands of their timber and leave them denuded, and, may be worthless, to the Government. Indeed it would reverse the statutory grant of powers and transfer the location of the sections from the Government to the railroad company. The extent and the effect of the power of the Government to make its own surveys is expressed and illustrated in the following cases: Maguire v. Tyler, 8 Wall. 650; Cragin v. Powell, 128 U. S. 691; United States v. McLaughlin, 127 U. S. 428; Blake v. Doherty, 5 Wheat. 358; Central Pacific Railroad Co. v. Nevada, 162 U. S. 512; United States v. Hanson, 16 Pet. 196; Les Bois v.. Bramell, 4 How. 449; Mackey v. Dillon, 4 How. 421; Glenn v. United States 13 How. 250; Smith v. United States, 10 Pet. 326.
There is nothing in Northern Pacific Railroad Company v. Hussey, 61 Fed. Rep. 231, which militates with these views. In that case relief was granted by injunction against a 'trespasser upon unsurveyed land at the suit of the railway company, its contingent interest being held sufficient for that purpose. The paramount control and property in the United States was not in question.
We, therefore, answer the first and the third question certified by the Circuit Court of Appeals in the affirmative.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER concurs in the result.
196 U. S.
Statement of the Case.
DOCTOR . HARRINGTON.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK,
No. 477. Submitted January 25, 1906.--Decided February 20, 1905.
The presumption of law that stockholders are deemed to be citizens of the
State of the corporation's domicil must give way to the actual fact proved that complainant is a citizen of a different State from the corporation, and in such a case the stockholder, if other conditions of jurisdiction exist can bring his suit against the corporation in the Circuit Court of the
United States. The ninety-fourth rule in equity contemplates and provides for a suit
brought by a stockholder against the corporation and other parties on rights which may be properly asserted by the corporation, and when such a suit is between citizens of different States and is not collusive, but the corporation is controlled by interests ant nistic to complainant, it involves a controversy which is cognizable in a Circuit Court of the United States, and the defendant corporation is not to be classed on the same side of the controversy as complainant for the purpose of determining the diversity of citizenship on which the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court must rest.
THE bill in this case was dismissed by the Circuit Court on the ground that it had no jurisdiction upon the fact alleged, and certified to this court the question of jurisdiction. The following is the question certified:
“Whether or not the complainants' bill of complaint showed that there was such diversity of citizenship between the parties complainant and parties defendant in this cause as would be sufficient under the provisions of the United States Revised Statutes to confer jurisdiction upon the United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, of this cause."
The court further certified that it entered a decree dismissing the bill, "holding that it appeared from the said bill of complaint that there was no such diversity of citizenship between the parties complainant and defendant as would confer
jurisdiction upon the United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York in the cause within the meaning of the United States Revised Statutes, and that in arranging the parties to this cause relatively to the controversy the Sol Sayles Company must be grouped on the side of the complainants, with the result that citizens of the same State would thus be parties on both sides of the litigation, and thus deprive this court of jurisdiction.”
The bill is very voluminous, and, as it is agreed by appellees that the statement of appellants substantially states its allegation, we quote from appellants' brief as follows:
“This action was brought by the appellants, as stockholders of the Sol Sayles Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of New York, for the purpose of vacating and setting aside a judgment obtained by the appellees Harrington against the Sol Sayles Company in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, on October 28, 1902, and the levy and sale under an execution issued thereunder, and of requiring the appellees Harrington to deliver to the Sol Sayles Company certain shares of stock in the Sayles, Zahn Company, and certain bonds, belonging to the Sol Sayles Company, which had been sold under such execution, and for other equitable relief.
“In substance, the complainants allege in their bill of complaint that they are citizens of Morris County, New Jersey; that the defendants Harrington are citizens of the State of New York, and that the defendants Sol Sayles Company and Sayles, Zahn Company are likewise citizens of said State, both being incorporated under the laws of that State; that the Sol Sayles Company was organized with a capital stock of $100,000, divided into 1,000 shares of the par value of $100 per share, of which the complainants owned 500 shares and the defendants Harrington 500 shares; that by an arrangement made between the owners of the stock, the voting power on a majority thereof was given to the defendant John J. Harrington, who directed the management of the affairs of the corporation, dictated its