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necessary, as appears to be the case in England and in several States of the United States, and if the certificate of Cooksey had been written at the foot of the will and signed by himself and by the two witnesses, Lomer and Linthorne, it would have been a sufficient attestation. How, then, can it be regarded as insufficient when an attestation in one form is signed by two witnesses and an attestation in another form by a third? Bearing in mind that the certificate, if given any force at all, must be considered an attestation, we do not think that the fact that it may have been written and signed under a mistaken impression as to its necessity and purpose, vitiates it as an attestation. What use was intended to be made of it is immaterial, if it were useless for any purpose as an official certificate. The facts certified are appropriate to the attestation of the instrument, and, if true, we see no reason for holding it to be invalid as an attestation, because it was signed under the impression that it was necessary for some possible purpose as a certificate.

The case of Adams v. No is, 23 How. 353, is much in point. This was an action of ejectment for a parcel of land in California. Plaintiffs claimed through the heirs at law of one Grimes; defendants, through the devisees in his will. The law required three witnesses to the validity of the will. Two of the witnesses signed in the usual manner, but above their signatures and beneath that of the testator was written “Before me, in the absence of the two alcaldes, Roberto T. Ridley, Sindico." The sindico was counted among the witnesses, the court saying: “We comprise among the witnesses to the will, Ridley, the sindico. It does not appear that a sindico was charged with any function in the preparation or execution of testaments by the law or custom of California. Nor is it clear that the sindico in the present instance expected to give any sanction to the instrument by his official character. He attests the execution of the will, and we cannot perceive why the description of himself; which he affixes to his signature, should detract from the efficacy of that attestation." As it did not

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appear that the sindico or the two alcaldes were charged with any special duties, it was practically held that the certificate of acknowledgment, and the official character of the sindico, might be disregarded, and the signature treated as an attestation.

In the case of Clarke v. Turton, 11 Ves. Jr. 240, the will was executed abroad. It appears that three witnesses were required, apparently under the same act of Charles II as in this case. The third signature was, as in this case, that of the vice consul, whose attestation was considered necessary to the validity of the act. The case is insufficiently reported, but the court held that the attestation was a memorandum of the vice consul, to operate as a certificate, “a separate act in his public character, and sealed with his official seal; and therefore it could not be said he subscribed as a witness." The question upon that point was sent to law, but it does not appear what disposition was made of it. It appears that the certificate was an official act, and treated as necessary, but the report fails to show what it contained, and in the absence of such showing the case is of little value.

The applicability, and to some extent the authority of this case, is somewhat weakened by that of Griffiths v. Griffiths, L. R. 2 P. & D. 300. The will was signed by the testator in the presence of two witnesses, who signed their names in his presence-one opposite the word “ Executors” and the other opposite the word “Witness." There was no attestation clause to the will. The deceased intended one of the witnesses to be his executor, and asked him to sign his name in that character. Lord Penzance held that such person did not sign the will exclusively as executor, but that he also intended by his signature to affirm that the deceased executed the will in his presence, and that consequently the will was valid. Somewhat to the same effect is Pollock v. Glassell, 2 Gratt. 439.

Conceding the general rule to be that witnesses must intend to attest the will as witnesses, the inference is strong that Cooksey did so in this case, as he certifies to the genuineness of the signature of Thomson and to the acknowledg

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ment of the will in his presence; and these are what would have been required by the law of this District had the instrument been a deed. It is argued that Cooksey did not intend to attest the will, but merely to sign the certificate; but the certificate of what? Only the fact that the will was acknowledged in his presence and that the signature was genuine. This is precisely the object of an attestation, and as an attestation we think it must be regarded. He may have supposed his official certificate of acknowledgment necessary to the execution of a will in a foreign country, but as he did certify personally to such acknowledgment the addition of his official title adds nothing to and takes nothing from the weight of his attestation. We must conclude that he intended to certify exactly what he did certify, and we are giving it exactly the effect he intended to give it.

If the certificate were an official act and material as a separate acknowledgment of the execution of the will, as in the acknowledgment of a deed, the case would be different, since it has never been supposed that a notary, who takes an acknowledgment of a deed, could be counted as a witness to the deed without a separate signature. But here the certificate was a wholly unofficial act, and we see no objection to disregarding the words “ Vice Consul of the United States," and treating it as an acknowledgment of the execution before a competent witness. The acknowledgment of a will is really a feature of the attestation. The statute did not require that the devisor should sign the will in the presence of the witness, but that the witness should sign in the presence of the testator.

2. The evidence of Thomson's insanity was quite unsatisfactory. It appears that during the autumn or early winter of 1885 he was seized with an acute mania, and on December 15 was committed to a private insane asylum as a lunatic, upon the certificate of two physicians, and at the request of a cousin named James E. Cunningham, a merchant of London, who appears to have taken temporary management of his affairs. He remained in the asylum about six weeks, and

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on February 1, 1886, somewhat more than three weeks before he executed his will, was discharged as probably cured—in reality granted a leave of absence on probation. The belief in his cure being justified by his subsequent conduct, a formal order of discharge was entered on the record of the asylum on June 26, 1886. Lomer and Linthorne, the witnesses who were present at the execution of the will, and Septimus Cooksey, the son of the vice consul, all testified to the mental capacity of the testator at that time.

In this connection exception was taken to the exclusion of the application of James E. Cunningham for the admission of Thomson to the insane asylum, and of the certificate of the two physicians as to his insanity. These were properly excluded, not only because they were unsworn testimony, but because they were given in a different proceeding and upon a different issue. Thomson may have been insane to the extent of being dangerous if set at liberty, and yet may have had sufficient mental capacity to make a will, to enter into contracts, transact business and be a witness. In the case of Leggate v. Clark, 111 Massachusetts, 308, the admission of similar testimony was treated as error. In addition to this, however, these certificates were both dated December 14, 1885, more than two months before the will was made, and are by no means inconsistent with the other testimony that he was released from the asylum as cured February 1, 1886, and that three weeks after that, when he executed the will, he appeared to be of sound and disposing mind and memory.

In addition to the proof of his commitment to the asylum, and of his undoubted insanity prior and for some time subsequent thereto, there was slight evidence of insane acts during the month of February, though there was no opinion expressed by any one that he was incapable of making a valid deed or contract. The whole testimony regarding his insanity was duly submitted to the jury, who were instructed that if they found his insanity to be permanent in its nature and character, the presumptions were that it would continue, and the

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burden was upon the defendant to satisfy the jury by a preponderance of testimony that he was at the time of executing the will of sound mind. There was no error in this instruction.

There were also a large number of exceptions taken to the admission or exclusion of testimony and to the charge of the court, but to consider them in detail would subserve no useful purpose. We have examined them carefully, and have come to the conclusion that there was no ruling of the court of which the plaintiffs were entitled to complain. The evidence of insanity was very slight, and there was no legal testimony to show that the will was executed under the pressure of an undue influence. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, therefore,

Affirmed.

HUNT v. SPRINGFIELD FIRE AND MARINE INSUR

ANCE COMPANY.

ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

No. 66. Argued December 1, 2, 1904.-Decided December 19, 1904.

A policy of insurance provided that it should be void if the interest of the.

insured was other than the unconditional and sole ownership or if the property were encumbered by a chattel mortgage. It was in fact subject to certain trust deeds which the insured claimed after loss were different in

struments in law. Held, that: A deed of trust and a chattel mortgage with power of sale are practically

one and the same instrument as understood in the District of Columbia. The rule that in case of attempted forfeiture if the policy be fairly suscepti

ble of two constructions the one will be adopted which is more favorable

to the insured was inapplicable to this case. The contract of an insurance company is a personal one with the assured

and it is not bound to accept any other person to whom the latter may transfer the property.

This was an action to recover on a policy of insurance upon household furniture and ornaments.

Defense: That it was provided that the policy should be

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