the railroad companies and others unknown, to obtain a monopoly of the supply and distribution of fresh meats throughout the United States, etc. And to that end defendants artificially restrain the commerce and put arbitrary regulations in force affecting the same from the shipment of the live stock from the plains to the final distribution of the meats to the consumers. There is a prayer for an injunction of the most comprehensive sort, against all the foregoing proceedings and others, for discovery of books and papers relating directly or indirectly to the purchase or shipment of live stock, and the sale or shipment of fresh meat, and for an answer under oath. The injunction issued is appended in a note.1

1 "And now, upon motion of the said attorney, the court doth order that the preliminary injunction heretofore awarded in this cause, to restrain the said defendants and each of them, their respective agents and attorneys, and all other persons acting in their behalf, or in behalf of either of them, or claiming so to act, from entering into, taking part in, or performing any contract, combination or conspiracy, the purpose or effect of which will be, as to trade and commerce in fresh meats between the several States and Territories and the District of Columbia, a restraint of trade, in violation of the provisions of the act of Congress approved July 2, 1890, entitled 'An act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies,' either by directing or requiring their respective agents to refrain from bidding against each other in the purchase of live stock; or collusively and by agreement to refrain from bidding against each other at the sales of live stock; or by combination, conspiracy or contract raising or lowering prices or fixing uniform prices at which the said meats will be sold, either directly or through their respective agents; or by curtailing the quantity of such meats shipped to such markets and agents; or by establishing and maintaining rules for the giving of credit to dealers in such meats, the effect of which rules will be to restrict competition; or by imposing uniform charges for cartage and delivery of such meats to dealers and consumers, the effect of which will be to restrict competition; or by any other method or device, the purpose and effect of which is to restrain commerce as aforesaid; and also from violating the provisions of the act of Congress approved July 2, 1890, entitled 'An act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies,' by combining or conspiring together, or with each other and others, to monopolize or attempt to monopolize any part of the trade and commerce in fresh meats among the several States and Territories and the District of Columbia, by demanding, obtaining, or, with or without the connivance of the officers or agents thereof, or of any of them, receiving from railroad companies or other common carriers transporting such fresh meats

To sum up the bill more shortly, it charges a combination of a dominant proportion of the dealers in fresh meat throughout the United States not to bid against each other in the live stock markets of the different States, to bid up prices for a few days in order to induce the cattle men to send their stock to the stock yards, to fix prices at which they will sell, and to that end to restrict shipments of meat when necessary, to establish a uniform rule of credit to dealers and to keep a black list, to make uniform and improper charges for cartage, and finally, to get less than lawful rates from the railroads to the exclusion of competitors. It is true that the last charge is not clearly stated to be a part of the combination. But as it is alleged that the defendants have each and all made arrangements with the railroads, that they were exclusively to enjoy the unlawful advantage, and that their intent in what they did was to monopolize the commerce and to prevent competition, and in view of the general allegation to which we

in such trade and commerce, either directly or by means of rebates, or by any other device, transportation of or for such means, from the points of the preparation and production of the same from live stock or elsewhere, to the markets for the sale of the same to dealers and consumers in other States and Territories than those wherein the same are so prepared, or the District of Columbia, at less than the regular rates which may be established or in force on their several lines of transportation, under the provisions in that behalf of the laws of the said United States for the regulation of commerce, be and the same is hereby made perpetual.

"But nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit the said defendants from agreeing upon charges for cartage and delivery, and other incidents connected with local sales, where such charges are not calculated to have any effect upon competition in the sales and delivery of meats; nor from establishing and maintaining rules for the giving of credit to dealers where such rules in good faith are calculated solely to protect the defendants against dishonest or irresponsible dealers, nor from curtailing the quantity of meats shipped to a given market where the purpose of such arrangement in good faith is to prevent the over-accumulation of meats as perishable articles in such markets.

"Nor shall anything herein contained be construed to restrain or interfere with the action of any single company or firm, by its or their officers or agents (whether such officers or agents are themselves personally made parties defendant hereto or not) acting with respect to its or their own corporate or firm business, property or affairs."

shall refer, we think that we have stated correctly the purport of the bill. It will be noticed further that the intent to monopolize is alleged for the first time in the eighth section of the bill as to raising, lowering and fixing prices. In the earlier sections, the intent alleged is to restrain competition among themselves. But after all the specific charges there is a general allegation that the defendants are conspiring with one another, the railroads and others, to monopolize the supply and distribution of fresh meats throughout the United States, etc., as has been stated above, and it seems to us that this general allegation of intent colors and applies to all the specific charges of the bill. Whatever may be thought concerning the proper construction of the statute, a bill in equity is not to be read and construed as an indictment would have been read and construed a hundred years ago, but it is to be taken to mean what it fairly conveys to a dispassionate reader by a fairly exact use of English speech. Thus read this bill seems to us intended to allege successive elements of a single connected scheine.

We read the demurrer with the same liberality. Therefore we take it as applying to the bill generally for multifariousness and want of equity, and also to each section of it which makes a charge and to the discovery. The demurrer to the discovery will not need discussion in the view which we take concerning the relief, and therefore we turn at once to that.

The general objection is urged that the bill does not set forth sufficient definite or specific facts. This objection is serious, but it seems to us inherent in the nature of the case. The scheme alleged is so vast that it presents a new problem in pleading. If, as we must assume, the scheme is entertained, it is, of course, contrary to the very words of the statute. Its size makes the violation of the law more conspicuous, and yet the same thing makes it impossible to fasten the principal fact to a certain time and place. The elements, too, are so numerous and shifting, even the constituent parts alleged are and from their nature must be so extensive in time

and space, that something of the same impossibility applies to them. The law has been upheld, and therefore we are bound to enforce it notwithstanding these difficulties. On the other hand, we equally are bound by the first principles of justice not to sanction a decree so vague as to put the whole conduct of the defendants' business at the peril of a summons for contempt. We cannot issue a general injunction against all possible breaches of the law. We must steer between these opposite difficulties as best we can.

The scheme as a whole seems to us to be within reach of the law. The constituent elements, as we have stated them, are enough to give to the scheme a body and, for all that we can say, to accomplish it. Moreover, whatever we may think of them separately when we take them up as distinct charges, they are alleged sufficiently as elements of the scheme. It is suggested that the several acts charged are lawful and that intent can make no difference. But they are bound together as the parts of a single plan. The plan may make the parts unlawful. Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194, 206. The statute gives this proceeding against combinations in restraint of commerce among the States and against attempts to monopolize the same. Intent is almost essential to such a combination and is essential to such an attempt. Where acts are not sufficient in themselves to produce a result which the law seeks to prevent-for instance, the monopoly-but require further acts in addition to the mere forces of nature to bring that result to pass, an intent to bring it to pass is necessary in order to produce a dangerous probability that it will happen. Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 177 Massachusetts, 267, 272. But when that intent and the consequent dangerous probability exist, this statute, like many others and like the common law in some cases, directs itself against that dangerous probability as well as against the completed result. What we have said disposes incidentally of the objection to the bill as multifarious. The unity of the plan embraces all the parts.

One further observation should be made. Although the

combination alleged embraces restraint and monopoly of trade within a single State, its effect upon commerce among the States is not accidental, secondary, remote or merely probable. On the allegations of the bill the latter commerce no less, perhaps even more, than commerce within a single State is an object of attack. See Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640, 647; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 59; Allen v. Pullman Co., 191 U. S. 171, 179, 180. Moreover, it is a direct object, it is that for the sake of which the several specific acts and courses of conduct are done and adopted. Therefore the case is not like United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1, where the subject matter of the combination was manufacture and the direct object monopoly of manufacture within a State. However likely monopoly of commerce among the States in the article manufactured was to follow from the agreement it was not a necessary consequence nor a primary end. Here the subject matter is sales and the very point of the combination is to restrain and monopolize commerce among the States in respect of such sales. The two cases are near to each other, as sooner or later always must happen where lines are to be drawn, but the line between them is distinct. Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38.

So, again, the line is distinct between this case and Hopkins v. United States, 171 U. S. 578. All that was decided there was that the local business of commission merchants was not commerce among the States, even if what the brokers were employed to sell was an object of such commerce. The brokers were not like the defendants before us, themselves the buyers and sellers. They only furnished certain facilities for the sales. Therefore, there again the effects of the combination of brokers upon the commerce was only indirect and not within the act. Whether the case would have been different if the combination had resulted in exorbitant charges, was left open. In Anderson v. United States, 171 U. S. 604, the defendants were buyers and sellers at the stock yards, but their agreement was merely not to employ brokers, or to