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from a letter written to him on November 11, 1892, by Maria Belen, that she recognized the plaintiff in error as her brother, for in this letter she announces the death of our beloved father,” subscribed herself as “ sister,” and requests Sixto to come over to Vieques at once, as his presence was necessary in order to collect money coming from the estate. Under these circumstances, the question of whether Sarria had notice of the plaintiff in error's rights and demands, and whether this was a valid payment, or was made in anticipation of the possible claims of Adolfo Sixto, with intent to deprive him of his rights, should have been left to the jury, instead of the instruction given which practically required a finding for the de fendant in error.

As to the third and fourth installments, the defendant claims to have paid these to one Roig. It appears that these alleged payments to Roig were evidenced by certain notarial instruments, which became of record in the office of the registrar of deeds, and, as is recited in that record, Roig appears to have been the declared purchaser of the third and fourth installment by assignment from Maria Belen, and the court of first instance, on April 25, 1896, at the instance of Sarria, permitted him to withdraw the third installment, and declared Roig entitled to collect the third and fourth installments. Upon this subject the court charged the jury:

"In this contentious suit by Adolfo Sixto against Belen, this defendant, Sarria, was ordered on June 2, 1894, to pay into court whatever money he might be owing. That order was served on Sarria on June 5, 1894, and afterwards that court decided that Sixto, the plaintiff in this suit, was not entitled to attach this money. He obtained an appeal from that judgment, but not from that portion of it that canceled the annotation made in the registry of deeds of the attachment of that fund. Subsequently, on November 17, 1894, an appeal was allowed in the upper court from that portion of it, but no notice was given as to Sarria, who was merely a garnishee in the suit, and who had received no notice not to pay over

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the money until the lower court decided whether he had the right to pay it over. Between the time the court decided the attachment and the time the appeal was allowed in the upper court, Belen Sixto assigned to Roig the third and fourth installments. I say to you, as a matter of law, that there was nothing to hinder her from doing that at that time; she had, in law, the right to do it."

The counsel for the plaintiff requested the court, upon the same subject, to charge:

As it is shown by the uncontradicted evidence that the judge of the court of first instance of Humacao was entirely without authority or jurisdiction to issue his order on August 30, 1894, directing the registrar to make annotation on his books of said order, said order to the registrar was void and the annotation made by the registrar was void, and the former annotation remained in force, which was notice to all the world, including this defendant, that the plaintiff had an interest in those payments such as might be declared by the court; and the court having afterwards decided that the plaintiff here is entitled to a one-half interest in said estate, the plaintiff is now entitled to recover one-half of the last two payments, with interest."

It appears that Adolfo Sixto was not a party to the suit between Roig and Sarria, in which it is declared that Roig was held entitled to recover the third installment, and if Sarria had notice of the pendency of the suit to establish the rights of Adolfo Sixto in such wise as to be bound by the result thereof, he could not prevent Sixto's recovering an interest in the property by wrongfully paying it over in the proceedings to which the plaintiff in error was not a party. The court below seems to have given its charge upon this subject upon the theory that the order of August 30, 1894, was not appealed from in such wise as to prevent Sarria from paying the third and fourth installments to the assignee Roig, and it is said that he was merely a garnishee in the suit, and had then received no notice not to pay over the money

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until the lower court had decided whether he had the right to pay it over. The payment of the third and fourth installments was made to Roig by permitting Sarria, in the court of first instance, to withdraw the installment which he had paid into court under the order of June 2, 1894. These installments were paid to Roig on May 16, 1896, but in the attitude of the suit then pending to establish the rights of Adolfo Sixto, and Sarria's knowledge thereof, could the latter legally make these payments so as to conclude the rights of the plaintiff in error ? It is true that the lower court on August 30, 1894, had held in favor of Maria Belen, vacating the notice sent to Sarria and the cautionary notices to the registrar, and the plaintiff in error had prayed an appeal“ in both effects," i. e., for a review of the order and a stay of proceedings, but was refused an appeal in the latter aspect, from which refusal he also appealed, and this was the attitude of the case at the time of the alleged purchase by Roig on September 11, 1894. On November 17, 1894, the audiencia considered the application of Sixto for the enlargement of the appeal, and held that such allowance was wrongfully denied in the lower court, and ordered that the appeal be “considered as having been taken for both effects.” On January 8, 1895, Sarria was notified of this order, and appeared and asked that a clear and detailed statement he given him “as to what he was to comply with.” Thereupon a new ex.. planatory order was directed to Sarria, informing him that the previous requisition meant the ratification of the one previously directed to him by the court, “in order that the sums which he owed from that time to Mr. Manuel Sixto should not be derivered by him except to the court in order to deposit the same in the royal treasury.” This order was duly served on Sarria on February 5, 1895.

On November 29, 1895, the audiencia heard the appeal, and, reversing the order of August 30, declared the order of June 2, 1894, in full force, whereby the cautionary entry was crdered to be made by the registrar of property, and the notification

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ordered to Sarria to hold the payments on the mortgage or pay the same into the treasury, to abide the order of the court.

The registrar refused to comply, assigning as a reason that the encumbrance had been assigned to third parties and that the mortgage law did not justify such an order. Subsequent proceedings resulted in the final decree of the military court deciding the merits of the controversy in favor of Sixto. The decision of November 29, 1895, was also notified to Sarria, and on May 4, 1896, the entry of the court discloses:

On May 4, 1896, appeared Mr. Laureano Sarria y Gonzalez and stated: that, having received notice that the installment of the mortgage had been transferred to Mr. Antonio Roig, who has recorded said transfer in the registry of property, and supposing that he will proceed to collect the same judicially, as he did the previous installment, he is unable to accept the notification, and he will appear before the audiencia in the premises.

Over the objection of the plaintiff in error, Sarria was permitted to testify that he paid the installment to Roig by order of the audienca. But the plaintiff in error was not a party to such proceeding, if it had been legally proved, and of course could not be concluded by it. On being notified that the order of June 2, 1894, was in full force, requiring him to hold the funds, while Sarria says he is unable to accept the notification, he declares “ he will appear before the audiencia in the premises. Instead of so doing, unless the appearance in the Roig case can be so considered, he made application in the court of first instance for a release of the deposited installment in order to pay it to Roig, and that court made the order, although it had been notified of the decision of the audiencia of November 29, 1895. This order could have no effect on the rights of the plaintiff in error, nor can it protect Sarria, who acted in the face of knowledge of the decision of the higher court instead of appearing in that court at the suit of Sixto, and having the rights of Roig and the contesting heirs determined. We conclude that the plaintiff in error had the right to recover his share of the third and fourth installments,

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notwithstanding the alleged transfers and payments to Roig,
and the alleged decree of the audiencia in the proceeding to
which Sixto was not a party.
For error in the court's charge as to the second, third and fourth

installments, the judgment will be reversed and the cause re-
manded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.




No. 112. Argued December 16, 1904.-Decided January 9, 1906.

It is too late to raise a Federal question by petition for rehearing in the

Supreme Court of a State after that court has pronounced its final decision unless it appears that the court entertained the petition and dis

posed of the question. The certificate of the presiding judge of the Supreme Court of the State, made

after the decision, to the effect that a Federal question was considered and decided adversely to plaintiff in error, cannot in itself confer jurisdiction on this court; and on the face of this record and from the opinions the reasonable inference is that the application for rehearing may have been denied in the mere exercise of discretion, or the alleged constitutional question was not passed on in terms because not suggested until too late. The facts are stated in the opinion.

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Mr. William W. Griffin, with whom Mr. A. D. Englesman was on the brief, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. C. K. Bell, Attorney General of the State of Texas, appeared for defendant in error but did not make any argument or file any brief.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the court:

Fullerton was charged by information with unlawfully conducting, carrying on and transacting the business of dealing in futures in cotton, grain, etc.; and unlawfully keeping a bucket shop, so called, "where future contracts were then and

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