Factors used in planning our strategic forces are discussed in Section III. I am confident that our current strategic forces and those we propose are consistent with the continued maintenance of essential equivalence under current Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreements. With time, and the completion of new agreements, the composition and size of these forces will undoubtedly change. We hope that the size of the forces on both sides can be significantly reduced, and their characteristics made less threatening. However, we will continue to insure that any strategic arms limitation agreement is equitable and consistent with the concept of equivalence of nuclear forces. There is no generally accepted single way to compare our strategic capability with Soviet capability. However, our primary measure of strategic capability is our ability to retaliate after a Soviet firststrike. Analyses show that, over a range of hypothetical major wartime events, our current forces could ride out a massive Soviet first-strike and retaliate with devastating effect. Chart 1A-1 shows comparative U.S. and Soviet force capabilities under various scenarios. The comparison. considers projections of the Soviet offensive and defensive threat under a SALT II agreement (U.S. forces include cruise missiles on B-52s but exclude wide-bodied cruise missile carriers, B-1, and MX) but does not consider changes in the size or characteristics of the Soviet target base. The charts show, for example, that for the scenario in which the Soviets strike first, with U.S. forces on day-to-day alert, we are planning for an increased retaliatory capability. As the early 1980's evolve, the U.S. residual forces increase with the deployment of the cruise missile. We plan this capability increase: - to offset growing Soviet strategic armaments in order to ensure that there is no doubt as to our capability in the minds of Soviet leaders, in the minds of our allies, or even in our own minds should we be faced with a moment of deep crisis; and to hedge against the uncertainty of future political and Note: RELATIVE FORCE SIZE CHART 1A-1 U.S. AND SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES COMPARISON Relative force size is a measure of force capability to destroy a given set of economic and military targets. The charts are based on U.S. day-to-day alert forces. Soviet "pre-attack" forces are those on day-to-day alert; Soviet residual forces after a first-strike are those which could be generated; and Soviet post-attack forces assume that the same Soviet bombers and SLBMS could be generated prior to U.S. counterforce retaliation. When both sides are on a generated alert, or when the U.S. strikes first, the relative force size measure is more favorable to the United States than shown in these charts. The matter of perceptions, to which increased second strike capability contributes, has been addressed in Section III. To hedge against the unexpected, we maintain three separate strategic forces, ICBMS, SLBMS and air-breathing systems, in part to ensure that breakthroughs in offensive or defensive technology do not unacceptably degrade our retaliatory capability. The recent cruise missile decision and its emphasis on air-launched weapons recognized a growing relative reliance on the Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) leg of the TRIAD and the need to hedge against potential Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) threats or a breakthrough in Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) capability. A basic motivation of the TRIDENT program, with its longer range missile and quieter submarine, is also to hedge against unexpected ASW developments, while providing a cost/effective replacement for our aging SLBM force. Similarly, development of a new Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), the MX, that may be deployed in a mobile mode is motivated by a desire to maintain the option of having a survivable ICBM leg of the TRIAD to hedge against both the expected threat e.g., the growing threat to MINUTEMAN - and the unexpected. In addition to being able to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union in retaliation, our surviving strategic offensive forces must have the ability to: implement a range of selective options to allow the National Command Authorities (NCA) the choice of other than a fullscale retaliatory strike if needed; and hold a secure force in reserve to ensure that the enemy will not be able to coerce the United States after a U.S. retaliatory strike. Force characteristics consistent with these objectives are being pursued in each element of the TRIAD. The MK-12A warhead, combined with greater accuracy, will improve the flexibility and effectiveness of a portion of the MINUTEMAN III force. MX and TRIDENT II would provide higher survivability as well as high effectiveness and flexibility against the full range of threat targets. We are investigating the feasibility of improved SLBM accuracy and pursuing improved SLBM command, control and communications (C) which would provide SLBMS greater effectiveness and flexibility in the execution of various response options and as part of a secure reserve. Finally, the accuracy and yield of the cruise missile married with the bomber will provide the National Command Authorities (NCA) with a system, on a recallable launcher, that can be employed against virtually the entire target spectrum with high effectiveness and low collateral damage. The unique role played by the ICBM force in the current TRIAD of strategic forces is well recognized. The ICBM combines yield, accuracy and timely response which alone permit it to be deployed effectively against the entire range of targets. It enjoys the additional advantages of secure and timely command, control and communications, and operating costs which are markedly less than those of bombers or SLBMs. Today, the ICBM force contributes significantly to the effectiveness of our deterrent forces. The projected vulnerability of both the United States and Soviet silo-based ICBM forces is also well recognized. It exists with or without SALT limitations though it may be possible to delay that vulnerability through SALT proposals, it is doubtful that this situation can be reversed by a negotiated accord. Increasing silo vulnerability does not mean the end of the TRIAD concept, however, even if we do nothing more than upgrade the silos to enhance survivability. The silo-based ICBM force will continue to remain a potent force against which the Soviets would have to allocate considerable effort to destroy with even medium confidence. Moreover, there would be considerable uncertainties associated with any Soviet attempt to execute a coordinated and successful attack against all U.S. MINUTEMAN silos. Fratricide, missile reliability, and possible operational degradation of Soviet ICBM accuracy are all complicating factors. Nor can an attacker ignore the possibility that we might launch our ICBMs under attack an approach which requires the greatest caution, but through which vulnerability problems are avoided. The seemingly paradoxical situation that results from these technological and strategic considerations is that, in the early 1980s, we will not have much confidence that more than a small percentage of our silo-based missiles can survive a Soviet preemptive attack. But the Soviets could not be at all confident of destroying the bulk of our missiles. - If beyond the mid-1980s we desire to retain the same retaliatory effectiveness provided by today's ICBM force, we will need a more survivable ICBM basing mode, or a considerably more capable silo-based |