Consciousness: Philosophical, Psychological, and Neural Theories

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OUP Oxford, Feb 2, 2006 - Psychology - 472 pages
Consciousness is a state of being aware - of our self, of our surroundings, of our place in those surroundings. Yet what makes us conscious? What neural processes drive our awareness, and how do these processes relate to what we think of as our mind? Consciousness: Philosophical, Psychological, and Neural Theories seeks to respond to some of these questions, offering a wealth of information from which the reader can develop their own views of the subject. Taking a critical, thought-provoking approach, the book integrates studies from philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience to capture the major themes on which our current understanding of consciousness is based. Opening with a series of chapters that introduce us to thinking about mind, the book goes on to explore function and brain, examining such topics as functionalism, representation, and brain dynamics. Understanding consciousness remains one of today's greatest challenges. Consciousness: Philosophical, Psychological, and Neural Theories demystifies what is known about the interface of brain and mind, and offers intriguing insights into what remains to be discovered. Online Resource Centre The Online Resource Centre features figures from the book available to download to facilitate lecture preparation.

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PART TWO Function and brain
Recent advances in functionalism II Teleological functionalism

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About the author (2006)

David Rose is a Reader in Psychology at the University of Surrey, where he has 25 years teaching experience in physiological psychology, neuroscience, neuroanatomy, perception, cognitive psychology, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, statistics, and consciousness at all undergraduate and postgraduate levels, to students of psychology, human biology, medicine, nursing, and psychiatry. He holds degrees in psychology (BSc Bristol, 1971), neurophysiology (PhD Cambridge, 1978), and the history and philosophy of science (MPhil Cambridge, 1997). He has researched mainly on the neurophysiology, pharmacology, psychophysics and philosophy of vision, and also on time perception, memory, and hemisphere differences. David is on the Editorial Board of the Journal of Intelligent Systems.

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