tion, and ask, why I did not avoid such forms of speech while I was an Athanasian ? I answer, I was not aware of the inconsistency between my common forms of speech and the theory I had adopted. If this be your case, you may possibly be excused in respect to what is past; but what will you do in time to come ?

To evade the argument resulting from the use of singular pronouns and verbs, some will probably say, that each Person in the Trinity is God, and may say I am God; and that when a singular pronoun is used for God, one Person only is intended. In reply, the following questions may be asked.

1. If each Person, as a distinct Person, may say am God, will it not follow that there are as many Gods as Persons ?

2. If there be three self-existent and co-equal Persons in God, can it be proper for either of the three to say I am GoD, and there is No GOD BESIDES ME ? When any one Person adopts this language, does he not naturally exclude every other Person from the dignity which he claims for himself? Suppose three Persons to be united as co-equal in one government, under the title of King, would it be consistent for either of those Persons to say I am King, and there is no King besides ME? If any one of the three should say thus, would it not be untrue in itself, and a contempt of the other Persons ?

Supposing that you are of the number of divines who venture to tell what is to be understood by the word Person as applied to God, and that by three Persons you mean "three Agents," I would here suggest some thoughts for your consideration.

Those who avow, that, by three Persons, they understand three distinct Agents, allow to each of these.

Agents self-existence, independence, infinite intelligence, and almighty power, as distinct Persons. Of course, the three Persons are three infinite Agents. I would now wish to be informed, what more would be necessary to constitute three infinite Beings. And I would ask you seriously to consider whether it be possible for you to form any idea of three infinite Agents, which does not involve the precise idea of three infinite intelligent Beings.

I will next bring into view a text, in which the FATHER, the SON, and the HOLY GHOST, are exhibited, that you may see to what the representation in the text would amount on your hypothesis.

The text we find, Acts x. 38. "How Gop anointed JESUS OF NAZARETH with the HOLY GHOST and with Power; who went about doing good, and healing all that were oppressed of the devil: for God was with him.”

Here, sir, we have the Trinity fairly exhibited. But what would be the representation, if by the THREE be intended three infinite Agents? Would not the representation be distinctly this, that the FIRST INFINITE AGENT gave the THIRD INFINITE AGENT to enable the SECOND INFINITE AGENT to perform miracles?

LETTER IV.

The Language of good Writers in favor of what they mean to deny.

REV. SIR,

FOR the support of the doctrine, that the self-existent God is but one Person, my reliance is placed on

the most obvious and natural import of Scripture language. It is, however, hoped, that it will not be deemed improper or unfriendly, should I avail myself ⚫ of the reasonings, concessions, and language of Athanasian writers, for a farther illustration and confirmation of what I esteem to be the truth. The authors, whose writings I shall quote, are, in my opinion, deservedly in high estimation, as learned, discerning, and correct writers. And no author will be quoted or named with the least desire to provoke controversy, or in any respect to detract from his reputation.

I would now solicit your attention to some passages from Dr. Hopkins. In his chapter on the Unity of God, and the Trinity, to prove the Unity of God, or that there is but ONE GOD, he has made use of some arguments, which, if I mistake not, are of the same weight against the doctrine of a plurality of selfexistent Persons, that they are against the doctrine of a plurality of self-existent Gods. Thus he reas

ons.

"There can be but one First Cause who exists necessarily, and without beginning; for there can be but one infinite Being. To suppose another, or a second, necessarily excludes the first; and to suppose the first, necessarily excludes the second, and any other infinite Being. The same is evident from the consid-eration of the Divine perfections. God is infinite Power, infinite Wisdom. But there cannot be two infinite Wisdoms, &c. for this implies a contradiction."

Yet, sir, your theory supposes that there are three distinct self-existent and independent Persons, which, if I mistake not, as fully implies three "infinite Wisdoms," &c. as the supposition of three infinite Beings.

The Doctor proceeds...." Moreover, if we make the impossible supposition that there are two or more infinite Beings, they must be perfectly alike in all respects, or not. If not perfectly alike, and without any difference, in any respect, then one or the other must be imperfect; for absolute infinite perfection admits of no variation or difference: so that if any two Beings differ in any respect, they cannot be both absolutely perfect; therefore cannot both be God. But if they are perfectly alike in every respect and every thing, then they are perfectly one and the same; and the supposition destroys itself, being a direct contradiction."

If this reasoning be conclusive, will it not apply, in the most direct manner, to invalidate the theory of three self-existent and infinite Persons? The three Persons must be perfectly alike in all respects, or not. If not perfectly alike, one or the other must be imperfect, and therefore cannot be God: "But if perfectly alike in every respect, then they are perfectly one and the same."

Those who admit the Doctor's reasoning as conclusive against three infinite Beings, must, I suspect, to be consistent, reject the theory of three infinite, independent Persons.

Dr. Emmons, in his Discourse on the Trinity, has made this concession...." Did the Scripture doctrine of the Trinity imply that three Persons are one Person, or three Gods one God, it would necessarily involve a contradiction."-Yet this correct writer has adopted forms of speech which evidently imply that one Person is three Persons. Such are the following. "GoD can, with propriety, say, I, Thou, and He, and mean only HIMSELF.""Nothing short of three distinct. Persons in the one undivided DEITY, can render it

proper for Him to speak of HIMSELF in the first,TM second, and third Persons, I, Thou, and He."*"And so there is a certain SOMETHING in the Divine Being, which renders it equally necessary that He should exist in THREE PERSONS."

In these passages, HE, HIM, and HIMSELF, are used as pronouns for God or Deity. And each of these pronouns strictly conveys the idea of one Person only. Yet the Doctor supposed that this one He or HIM, might speak of HIMSELF as THREE DISTINCT PER

SONS.

Dr. Spring, in his Sermon on the self-existence of Christ, gives the following exhortation.... "Let us then not deny the self-existence of God, nor the universality of His existence, nor that His indivisible essence comprises THRee distinct PERSONS."

By the pronoun His, God is, in the first place, clearly considered as but one Person; yet we are fervently exhorted not to deny that "His indivisible essence comprises THREE distinct Persons."

Mr. Jones stands on similar ground. He says, "No sensible reason can be given, why God should speak of HIMSELF in the plural number, unless HE consists of MORE PERSONS THAN ONE."

And thus says Dr. Hopkins, "If there be a God, He does exist without beginning or succession; and this is as much above our comprehension, as that He exists in THREE PERSONS."

To what, sir, are we to attribute these solecisms? Not to the want of mental energy; nor to the want of piety; nor to the want of scientific or grammatical

*

Astonishing! Did not the Doctor know that it was a common thing for a man to speak of himself in the first, second and third person?