are, nevertheless, instances, as in the case of the Pacific railroads, where this has been done. Confessedly, however, in this case the congressional grant of 1846 did not include the lands now in controversy. Whatever reservation there was to interfere with the railroad grant of 1856 grew out of what was done by the executive officers of the government after the act of 1846 was passed, and while its effect was in doubt. That the state claimed all the alternate sections within five miles of the river, on each side, and as far north as the state line, is not denied. That the intention of the president and his cabinet was to make the reservation as broad as the claim, is, to our minds, perfectly apparent from the language of the instructions of the secretary of the interior to the commissioner of the general landoffice in his communication of the twenty-ninth of October, 1851. His words are: "I am willing to recognize the claim of the state, and approve the selections without prejudice to the rights, if any there be, of others, thus leaving the question as to the proper construction of the statute entirely open to the action of the judiciary." He then directed lists of selections to be prepared, and submitted for his approval, as the surveys were completed and returned. At this time all the Indian title that could, by any possibility, interfere with the grant, as claimed by the state, was in the process of extinguishment. Treaties which were to have that effect had already been negotiated with the Indians, and were waiting ratification by the United States. There could hardly have been a doubt in the minds of any of the parties that long before any judicial determination of the matters in dispute every vestige of Indian title would be gone. Hence, to leave "the question of the construction of the statute"-that is to say, the effect of the grant— "entirely open," all the lands within the limit, surveyed or unsurveyed, and, as we think, incumbered by an Indian title or unincumbered, were reserved from sale until the "action of the judiciary.' This reservation was in force when the act of 1856 was passed, and it is the reservation which this court has held prevented the grant under that act from attaching to the lands within the limits of the river grant, as claimed by the state. The act of 1862 afterwards, in express terms, granted to the state, for the use of its grantees, "the alternate sections, designated by odd numbers, lying within five miles of said river, between the Raccoon Fork and the northern boundary of the state.' At this time there was no Indian title in the way of the grant, and if the reservation was good as against the railroad companies in 1856, the title of the Des Moines Valley Railroad Company, the grantee of the state, was perfected. 2. As to the east branch. Much of what has been said about the Indian title applies to this objection. The state claimed the lands along the river, and the reservation as promulgated was of what was claimed. No one now supposes the east branch was in fact the Des Moines river. It is undoubtedly true that at some time some officers of the government, as well as some officers of the state, supposed the branch was the main river, and acted accordingly, but that does not change the geographical fact that what was taken for the river was only a branch. The lists of selections along the branch, and their approval by the secretary, were mistakes, which the record shows were corrected in the final settlements between the state and the United States by allowances in account. The same may be said of the marks on the plats sent out from the general land-office to the local land-officers. They were clerical mistakes, growing out of an imperfect knowledge of the geography of the country. They did not change the reservation, but only gave wrong information as to what it was. There is no question of estoppel as a consequence of the mistake involved. The railroad grant of 1856 was subject to the reservation for the river grant. There is no pretense of fraud anywhere, and the record does not show that the conduct of the appellants or their grantors has been in any way influenced by the plats or the unauthorized selections and certificates. They knew, or ought to have known, that the reservation was confined to the river lands, and that the branch was not the river. Hence the reservation is to have effect according to its terms, and not according to any mistaken interpretation which may at some time have been given to it. We find no error in the record, and the judgment is affirmed. (109 U. S. 244) LOUISVILLE & N. R. Co. v. PALMES, Collector, etc. (November 19, 1883.) IMPAIRING OBLIGATION OF CONTRACT-EXEMPTION OF RAILROAD PROPERTY FROM As the exemption of railroad companies from taxation, created by the eighteenth section of the act of January 6, 1855, passed by the general assembly of Florida, "to provide for and encourage a liberal system of internal improvements in that state, was not assignable, the right to such exemption was not acquired by the Pensacola Railroad Company by the conveyances in this case, and could not be by it transferred to the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company; and as the legislature, after the adoption of the state constitution of 1868, could not create a railroad corporation capable in law of acquiring and holding property free from taxation, no exemption was conferred by the act of 1872 on the Pensacola & Louisville Railroad Company, or by the act of 1877 on the Pensacola Railroad Company, the successor of the Pensacola & Louisville, which the latter company could transfer to the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, that company acquired no such privilege, and the act of March 5, 1881, imposing a tax on that company, is not unconstitutional as impairing the obligation of an existing contract. A fact impossible in law cannot be admitted by demurrer. v.3--13 In deciding whether a judgment of the supreme court of a state gives effect to a law of the state which, in violation of the constitution of the United States, impairs the obligation of a contract, this court will decide, independently of the decisions of the state courts, whether there is a contract and whether its obligation is impaired; and if the decision of the question as to the existence of the alleged contract requires a construction of state constitutions and laws, the court will not necessarily be governed by the previous decisions of the state courts upon the same or similar points, except where they have been so firmly established as to constitute a rule of property. In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Florida. E. A. Perry, for defendant in error. MATTHEWS, J. This is a writ of error bringing into review a decree of the supreme court of Florida, dismissing a bill in equity filed by the plaintiff in error, which sought to enjoin the defendant, a collector of revenue under the laws of Florida for the county of Escambia, from collecting, by a sale of property levied on for that purpose, certain taxes claimed by him to be due from the complainant. The ground of our jurisdiction is, as stated and shown in the record, that in the cause wherein the decree complained of was rendered there was drawn in question the validity of a statute of the state of Florida, to-wit, "An act entitled an act for the assessment and collection of revenue," approved March 5, 1881, wherein and whereby certain taxes for state and county purposes were imposed upon the line of railroad extending from the city of Pensacola, in the state of Florida, to the northern boundary of the state of Florida, in the direction of Montgomery, Alabama, of which railroad the plaintiff in error is in possession and is owner; the validity of this statute being questioned on the ground that it was repugnant to the constitution of the United States, in that it impaired the obligation of a contract, and the decision of the supreme court of Florida being in favor of its validity. The contract, the obligation of which it is alleged has been thus impaired, and of which the plaintiff in error claims the benefit, is as serted to arise as follows: The general assembly of the state of Florida passed an act, which took effect January 6, 1855, entitled "An act to provide for and encourage a liberal system of internal improvements in this state," the preamble to which recites that— "The constitution of the state declares that a liberal system of internal improvements, being essential to the development of the resources of the country, shall be encouraged by the government of this state, and it shall be the duty of the general assembly, as soon as practicable, to ascertain by law proper objects of improvements in relation to roads, canals, and navigable streams. and to provide for a suitable application of such funds as may be appropriated for such improvements."" The act then proceeds to create an internal improvement fund to aid in the construction of certain described railroads, and other works of internal improvement, by means of corporations organized or to be chartered for that purpose; and the eighteenth section provides as follows: "That the capital stock of any railroad company accepting the provisions of this act shall be forever exempt from taxation, and the roads, their fixtures and appurtenances, including workshops, warehouses, vehicles, and property of every description, needed for the purpose of transportation of freight and passengers, or for the repair and maintenance of the roads, shall be exempt from taxation while the roads are under construction, and for the period of thirty-five years from their completion, and that all the officers of the companies, and servants and persons in the actual employment of the companies, be and are hereby exempt from performing ordinary patrol or militia duty, working on public roads, and serving as jurors.” By an act of the general assembly of Florida, approved December 14, 1855, it was enacted "That a line of railroad to be constructed from the city of Pensacola, or any other point or points on the waters of Pensacola bay or the waters of.S Andrew's bay, to the north line of the state, leading in the direction of Montgomery, Alabama, shall be considered proper improvements to be aided from the internal improvement fund in the manner provided for, or may hereafter be provided for, in 'An act to provide for and encourage a liberal system of internal improvements in the state,' approved January 6, 1855." The Alabama & Florida Railroad Company, by an act approved January 8, 1853, had been incorporated to build a railroad falling within that description, to extend from some point on the bay of Pensacola to some point on the boundary line between the states of Florida and Alabama, to meet and connect with a railroad leading thence to the city of Montgomery. This company, it is alleged in the bill, built and for a time operated the line of railroad contemplated by its charter, and became entitled to the benefits and privileges of the internal improvement act of 1855, by accepting its provisions and complying with its conditions. Its line of railroad was completed about January 1, 1860. By virtue of a decree of foreclosure and sale at the suit of trustees of a first mortgage, to satisfy the bonds secured thereby, the railroad of the Alabama & Florida Railroad Company, and all the rights, privileges, and franchises of the said company, were sold and conveyed on August 7, 1872, to one A. E. Maxwell, his heirs and assigns, in trust, and by him were sold and conveyed on December 10, 1872, to the Pensacola & Louisville Railroad Company, a corporation created by the laws of Florida. The original act incorporating the last-named company was passed July 16, 1868, but it appears to have been reorganized by an amendatory act which took effect February 4, 1872, the eighteenth section of which is as follows: "That the Pensacola & Louisville Railroad Company, having become the assignee of the Alabama & Florida Railroad, of Florida, and the franchises of the said corporation, and being in possession of and operating the said line of road, which corporation was exempt from taxation for a limited period, the said Pensacola & Louisville Railroad Company and its property, now owned or hereafter to be acquired, shall also be exempt from taxation during the remainder of said period." On May 6, 1878, in pursuance of a decree of the circuit court of the state of Florida, sitting in Leon county, a sale and conveyance was made transferring the title of the Pensacola & Louisville Railroad Company in and to its road and other property, "together with all the franchises, rights, privileges, easements, and immunities" of that company, to the Pensacola Railroad Company. This company was a corporation of the state of Florida, created by an act of the general assembly which took effect February 27, 1877. The second section of that act is as follows: "Sec. 2. Be it further enacted, that the said Pensacola Railroad Company be, and it is hereby, authorized and empowered to acquire by purchase and assignment all the property, rights, franchises, privileges, and immunities of the Pensacola & Louisville Railroad Company, a corporation created by an act of the general assembly of the state, approved July 16, A. D. 1868, whether the same were acquired under the laws of the states of Florida or Alabama, or the laws of the United States, or as the assignee and successor of the Alabama & Florida Railroad Company; and upon completion of the said purchase and assignment, the said Pensacola Railroad Company shall be deemed in law and equity to be fully invested with and entitled to all the said property, rights, franchises, privileges, and immunities of said Pensacola & Louisville Railroad Company, as though the same were originally granted to or acquired by the said Pensacola Railroad Company." By the thirteenth section of the act of 1872, amending the charter of the Pensacola & Louisville Railroad Company, it was provided that "it shall be lawful for said company to purchase, lease, acquire an interest in, to unite or consolidate with, lease or sell to, any other railroad company in or out of the state, and to make the same one company, with a consolidated stock and property, and with one board of directors," etc. The right under this section to sell and transfer its property and franchises to a corporation of another state, it is claimed, passed from the Pensacola & Louisville Railroad Company to the Pensacola Railroad Company; and accordingly, on October 20, 1880, the Pensacola Railroad Company conveyed to the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, the plaintiff in error, its railroad from its junction with the Mobile & Montgomery Railway, to its terminus in Pensacola bay, its property, real and personal with certain exceptions, all its franchises, except the franchise to be and exist as a corporation, rights, privileges, easements, and immunities, by virtue of which conveyance the plaintiff in error claims in the bill that it became entitled to all the rights, property, privileges, franchises, and immunities of the Alabama & Florida Railroad Company, the Pensacola & Louisville Railroad Company, and the Pensacola Railroad Company, under the various acts incorporating these companies, and acts amendatory of the same. The plaintiff in error, the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Com |