ice. The appellee, contending that he was entitled to a salary at the rate of $400 per annum, brought this suit to recover the difference between his salary at that rate and the sum which he was actually paid. The court of claims, adopting the views of the appellee, rendered a judgment in his favor for $353.33, from which the United States appealed. Asst. Atty. Gen. Simons and J. S. Blair, for appellant. Geo. A. King, for appellee. WOODS, J. It is contended on behalf of the United States that, by the appropriation acts which cover the period for which the appellee claims compensation, congress expressed its purpose to suspend the operation of section 2070 of the Revised Statutes, and to reduce for that period the salaries of the appellee and other interpreters of the same class from $400 to $300 per annum. We think this contention is well founded. The law fixing the salaries of interpreters, as found in section 2070 of the Revised Statutes, was first passed in the Indian appropriation act of February 27, 1851, (9 St. 587.) That act appropriated a gross sum for the pay of interpreters authorized by the act of June 30, 1834, (4 St. 735,) and declared that the salaries of interpreters employed in certain named territories should be $500, and in all others $400 per annum. From the passage of that act down to the passage of the Indian appropriation act of March 3, 1877, (19) St. 271,) the appropriations for the salaries of interpreters were made at those rates. The act last mentioned specifically appropriated for the pay of Indian interpreters the uniform sum of $300 each. This course of legislation was continued for five consecutive years, until the passage of the Indian appropriation act of May 17, 1882, (22 St. 68,) which appropriated the gross sum of $20,000 for the payment of necessary interpreters, to be distributed in the discretion. of the secretary of the interior, and repealed section 2070 of the Revised Statutes. A like appropriation was made in the same terms by the Indian appropriation act of March 1, 1883, (22 St. 433.) An examination of this legislation, especially of the Indian appropriation acts, beginning with that of March 3, 1877, down to and including the act of March 3, 1881, which are all similar in their provisions, will clearly reveal the purpose of congress. The act of March 3, 1877, opens with this provision: "That the following sums be, and they are hereby, appropriated for the purpose of paying the current and contingent expenses of the Indian department and fulfilling treaty stipulations with the various tribes. follow the specific appropriations, and among them the following: "For the pay of seventy-six interpreters, as follows: Seven for the tribes in Nebraska, to be assigned to such agencies as the secretary of the interior may direct, at three hundred dollars per annum, two thousand one hundred dollars." After the specific appropriation for salaries of interpreters the following clause appears: Then All "For additional pay of said interpreters, to be distributed in the discretion of the secretary of the interior, six thousand dollars." the subsequent Indian appropriation acts, down to and including the act of March 3, 1881, make in the same language the same appropriation for salaries of interpreters, and contain a similar clause for their additional compensation. We find, therefore, this state of legislation: By the Revised Statutes the salaries of interpreters were fixed, some at $400 and some at $500 per annum, with a provision that such compensation should be in full of all emoluments and allowances whatsoever. By the acts in force during the appellee's term of service the appropriation for the annual pay of interpreters was $300 each, and a large sum was set apart for their additional compensation, to be distributed by the secretary of the interior at his discretion. This course of legislation, which was persisted in for five years, distinctly reveals a change in the policy of congress on this subject, namely, that instead of establishing a salary for interpreters at a fixed amount, and cutting off all other emoluments and allowances, congress intended to reduce the salaries and place a fund at the disposal of the secretary of the interior, from which, at his discretion, additional emoluments and allowances might be given to the interpreters. The purpose of congress to suspend the law fixing the salaries of interpreters in Nebraska at $400 per annum, is just as clear as its purpose to suspend the section forbidding any further emoluments and allowances. Our opinion is, therefore, that the intention of congress to fix, by the appropriation acts to which we have called attention, the annual salaries of interpreters for the time covered by those acts at $300 each, is plain upon the face of the statute. The whole question depends on the intention of congress as expressed in the statutes. Whether a simple failure by congress to appropriate any or a sufficient sum to pay the salary of an officer fixed by previous law is of itself an expression of purpose by congress to reduce the salary, we do not now decide. That is not this case. On the contrary, in this case congress has in other ways expressed its purpose to reduce for the time being the salaries of the interpret ers. This purpose is of course irreconcilable with the provisions of the Revised Statutes on the same subject, and those provisions must be considered as having been suspended until they were finally repealed by the act of May 17, 1882. As the appellee has been paid in full his salary as fixed by the later acts, which were in force before and during and continued in force after his term of service, he has no cause of action against the United States. It follows that the judg ment of the court of claims in his favor must be reversed, and it is so ordered. (109 U. S. 143) UNITED STATES v. FISHER. (November 5, 1883.) COMPENSATION OF JUSTICES OF TERRITORIES · APPROPRIATION Acrs OF JUNE The act of June 17, 1870, "to regulate the salaries of the chief justices and associate justices in the territories," (Rev. St. § 1879,) providing that the salaries of the chief justices and associate justices of the territories of New Mexico, Washington, Wyoming, etc., should be $3,000 each per year, was not a contract that such salaries should not be reduced, nor was there any provision of the constitution which forbade a reduction, and as the appropriation acts of March 3, 1877, and down to the act of June 21, 1879, repealed the act of June 17, 1870, by reason of their irreconcilable conflict therewith, a chief justice of one of said territories is not entitled to the salary fixed by the act of 1870 during the period from June 30, 1877, to November, 1879, but only to the compensation provided by the appropriation acts for those years. Appeal from the Court of Claims. It appears from the findings of the court of claims that the appellant held the office of chief justice of the territory of Wyoming from February 14, 1876, to November 26, 1879. Up to and including June 30, 1877, he was paid his salary at the rate of $3,000 per annum. From June 30, 1877, up to and including November 26, 1879, he was paid and received, without protest, compensation as such chief justice at the rate of $2,600 per annum. The appellee, contending that he was entitled to a salary at the rate of $3,000 per annum for his whole term of service, brought this suit in the court of claims to recover the difference between what his salary at that rate would have been from June 30, 1877, up to and including November 26, 1879, and the amount actually paid him for that period. majority of the court of claims was of opinion that the contention of the appellee could not be sustained, but in order that the question might be brought to this court and finally settled, rendered a judg ment pro forma in his favor for $862.22, from which the United States have appealed. Asst. Atty. Gen. Simons and J. S. Blair, for appellant. T. H. N. McPherson and J. Thos. Turner, for appellee. The WOODS, J. The act of June 17, 1870, entitled "An act to regulate the salaries of chief justices and associate justices in the territories," (16 St. p. 152; Rev. St. § 1879,) provided as follows: "The salaries of the chief justices and assocate justices of the territories of New Mexico, Washington, Wyoming, etc., shall be three thousand dollars each per annum." This statute remaining in force, Congress, on March 3, 1877, passed an act entitled “An act making appropriations for the legislative, executive, and judicial expenses of the government for the year ending June 30, 1878, and for other purposes." 19 St. 294. This act declared as follows: "That the following sums be, and the same are hereby, appropriated out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated, in full compensation for the service of the fiscal year ending June 30, 1878, for the objects hereinafter expressed. "Territory of Wyoming. For salaries of governor, chief justice, and two associate judges, at two thousand six hundred dollars each." The act of June 19, 1878, making appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1879, contained similar provisions in the same language. 20 St. 178, 194. The act of June 21, 1879, (21 Stat. 23,) making appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1880, appriated "the same sums of money and for like purpose (and continuing the same provisions relating thereto) as were appropriated for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1879," by the act above referred to, making appropriations for that year. With the exception of the words "in full compensation," the opening clause of these acts is substantially the same as that used in all other appropriation acts of every description since the foundation of the government. Upon this state of the statute law the question is presented whether from June 30, 1877, up to and including November 26, 1879, the appellee was entitled to a salary at the rate of $3,000 per annum, or at the rate of $2,600 per annum. The contention of appellee is that under the act of June 17, 1870, he was entitled to the salary of $3,000, notwithstanding the subsequent legislation above referred to. We cannot concur in this view. The act of June 17, 1870, fixing the annual salary of appellee at $3,000, was not a contract that the salary should not be reduced during his term of office. Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402. Nor was there any provision of the constitution which forbade a reduction. Clinton v. Engelbrecht, 13 Wall. 434. Congress, therefore, could, without the violation of any contract, reduce the salary of appellee, and had the constitutional power to do so. case. Certain well-settled rules of interpretation are applicable to this One is that a legislative act is to be interpreted according to the intention of the legislature apparent upon its face, (Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 627;) another, that, if possible, effect must be given to every clause, section, and word of the statute, (Bac. Abr. St. I. 2; Poulter's Case, 11 Coke, 29a, 34a; Potter's Dwarris, St. 194; Op. Justices, 22 Pick. 571;) and a third, that where two acts are in irreconcilable conflict the later repeals the earlier act, even though there be no express repeal. McCool v. Smith, 1 Black, 459; U. S. v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88; Red Rock v. Henry, 106 U. S. 596; [S. C. 1 Sup. Ct. REP. 434;] U. S. v. Irwim, 5 McLean, 178; West v. Pine, 4 Wash. C. C. 691; Britton v. Com. 1 Cush. 302. Applying these rules, we think that the appropriation acts above referred to, so far as they concern the question in hand, are susceptible of but one meaning. Placing side by side the two clauses of the statute which relate to this controversy, their plain effect is to appropriate $2,600 for the salary of the appellee for one year, and to declare that the sum so appropriated shall be in full compensation for his services as chief justice for the year specified. There is no ambiguity and no room for construction. We cannot adopt the view of appellee unless we eliminate from the statute the words "in full compensation," which congress, abandoning the long-used form of the appropriation acts has, ex industria, inserted. Our duty is to give them effect. When congress has said that the sum appropriated shall be in full compensation of the services of the appellee, we cannot say that it shall not be in full compensation, and allow him a greater sum. Not only do the words of the statute make the intention of congress manifest, but that intention is plainly repugnant to the former statute, which fixes the yearly salary of the chief justice at $3,000. It is impossible that both acts should stand. No ingenuity can reconcile them. The later act must therefore prevail, and the earlier act must, for the time covered by the appropriation acts above referred to, be considered as suspended. The result of these views is that the judgment of the court of claims, which gives the appellant a salary at the rate of $3,000 per annum from June 30, 1877, to November 26, 1879, must be reversed, and the case remanded to the court of claims with directions to dismiss the petition. |