carpet wools and other similar wools. It was provided that "the duty upon wool of the first class, which shall be imported washed, shall be twice the amount of the duty to which it would be subjected if imported unwashed; and the duty upon wool of all classes, which shall be imported scoured, shall be three times the duty to which it would be subject if imported unwashed." It was then provided that the duty to be levied should be as follows: "Wools of the first class, the value whereof at the last port or place whence exported to the United States, excluding charges in such port, shall be thirtytwo cents or less per pound, ten cents per pound, and in addition thereto eleven per centum ad valorem. Wools of the same class, the value whereof at the last port or place whence exported to the United States, excluding charges in such port, shall exceed thirty-two cents per pound, twelve cents per pound, and in addition thereto ten per centum ad valorem." The collector, in making his assessment upon the importation in question, exacted duty as follows: On 3,294 pounds, @ 20 cts. per pound, Total, 658 80 357 94 $1,016 74 The importers protested that they should be charged, as an ad valorem duty, only $178.97, or one-half the amount charged and collected, being 22 per cent. on the reduced value of the wool, as if unwashed, making a difference of $178.97, which is the amount in controversy. It was proven on the trial that the value of that number of pounds of such wool, unwashed, would have been $813.50. The construction of the statute, and the rule of computation adopted by the collector, proceeds upon the supposition that the rate of duty to be charged and collected upon washed wool is to be double that charged and collected upon the same weight and value of unwashed wool. Hence, because 3,294 pounds of unwashed wool would be chargeable with a duty of 10 cents per pound, and 11 per cent. of its appraised value as unwashed wool, it is found that the same weight of washed wool would be chargeable with 20 cents per pound, and 22 per cent. of its appraised value as washed wool. The error in this calculation clearly is in assuming that the same number of pounds of unwashed wool would be worth as much as washed wool; a supposition which is inconsistent with the fact, as admitted, and with the evident meaning of the law. The language of the act of congress is too plain to admit of doubt. It declares that the duty upon a given quantity of washed wool shall be twice the amount of duty "to which it would be subjected if imported unwashed." By the terms of the comparison the weight is supposed to be the same in both cases-in the case, as actually presented, a quantity of wool weighing 3,294 pounds. Hence the duty, so far as determined by weight, is calculated upon the same number of pounds, being 11 cents per pound for the unwashed wool and 22 cents per pound for the washed wool. But when the ad valorem duty is to be determined, the relative values necessarily determine its amount; and as 3,294 pounds of unwashed wool is to be appraised at $813.50, while the same weight of washed wool would be twice that sum, or $1,627, it follows that the duty on the latter is to be double that which the law imposes upon the former, namely, 22 per cent. of $813.50, which is equal to $178.97, and not 22 per cent. on $1,627, equal to $357.94, as charged by the collector. If the rule adopted by him should prevail, the amount of the ad valorem duty collected upon equal weights of unwashed and of washed wool would be four times as great upon. the latter as upon the former, for not only is the rate of duty doubled, but it is assessed upon double the value of the unwashed wool. But the statute expressly limits the duty in the case of washed wool to double the amount to which it would be subjected if imported unwashed. It is admitted in argument that the letter of the law justifies, if it does not require, this conclusion; but it is urged that the meaning of the statute requires the construction which would impose rates of duty upon washed wool double those imposed upon unwashed, calculated upon the weight and value of each, separately considered. And this contention is maintained upon the argument that the contrary reading of the statute implies that congress has made the appraised value of wool in its unwashed state the standard for determining the amount of ad valorem duty to be collected upon washed wool, which, it is insisted upon the argument, ab inconvenienti, is not admissible. But this is not by implication merely, but expressly what the act declares; and any fancied or real objections to such a standard cannot affect the obvious meaning of the law. It is obvious, however, that the natural division of wools into the grades of unwashed, washed, and scoured, carried into the act as the ground of difference in the amount of duties to be assessed accordingly, fully explains the intention of congress to tax the wool itself uniformly by varying the amount of duty according to the degree to which a given quantity has been freed, by processes of cleansing, from the dirt and foreign matter with which, in its unwashed state, it is usually found. There is no error in the record, and the judgment is affirmed. (109 U. S. 121) MANHATTAN LIFE INS. Co. v. BROUGHTON, Trustee. (November 5, 1883.) JUDGMENT OF NONSUIT-EFFECT ON SUBSEQUENT ACTION-LIFE INSURANCE SUICIDE BY INSANE PERSON. A judgment of nonsuit is no bar to a new action, and of no weight as evidence at the trial of that action. Pending an action in a court of the state of New York against a corporation established in that state, by a widow, a citizen of New Jersey, upon a policy of insurance on the life of her husband, the plaintiff assigned the policy to a citizen of New York in trust for her benefit, and was afterwards nonsuited by order of the court. Upon a subsequent petition by the trustee to another court of the state to be relieved of his trust, a citizen of New Jersey was at her request appointed trustee in his stead. One object of this appointment was to enable a suit on the policy to be brought in the circuit court of the United States, which was afterwards brought accordingly. Held, that the suit should not be dismissed under the act of the third of March, 1875, c. 137, §§ 1, 5. A self-killing by an insane person, understanding the physical nature and consequences of his act, but not its moral aspect, is not a death by suicide, within the meaning of a condition in a policy of insurance upon his life, that the policy shall be void in case he shall die by suicide, or by the hands of justice, or in consequence of a duel, or of the violation of any law In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. James Otis Hoyt, for plaintiff in error. Erastus F. Brown, for defendant in error. GRAY, J. This is an action brought on the ninth of June, 1879, in the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York, by John G. Broughton, a citizen of Bloomfield, in the state of New Jersey, against a corporation established in the city and state of New York, upon a policy of insurance in the sum of $10,000, on the life of Israel Ferguson, of New York, dated the fifteenth of June, 1864, made and payable to his wife, and containing a condition that it should be null and void "in case he shall die by suicide, or by the hands of justice, or in consequence of a duel, or of the violation of any law of these states, or of the United States," or of any other country which he might be permitted by this policy to visit or reside in. At the trial, the plaintiff offered evidence that Ferguson died in the city of New York on the fourteenth of August, 1876, and that presently afterwards his widow and family removed to Redbank, in the state of New Jersey, and had since had their home there. He also introduced a deed dated the tenth of February, 1877, by which Mrs. Ferguson assigned the policy to John G. Nestell, of New York, in trust, to pay a claim for $2,000, and the necessary expenses of collecting the amount of the policy, and to invest the surplus for her benefit; and a record of the supreme court of New York, showing that in May, 1879, in a suit brought by Nestell against Mrs. Ferguson to be relieved of his trust, Broughton, the plaintiff, was, upon her request, substituted as trustee in Nestell's stead. There was evidence tending to show that one object in having Broughton appointed was that a suit could be brought in his name in the United States court. The defendant, having pleaded in bar a former judgment in an action brought against it upon the policy by Mrs. Ferguson, in October, 1876, in the court of common pleas for the city and county of New York, offered evidence by which it appeared that in such an action the death of Ferguson by hanging himself was proved, and the only question in controversy was whether, and how far, he was insane at the time of his death; and that upon the defendant's motion the court, in December, 1878, granted a nonsuit, because he was not shown to have been so insane as not to know the physical consequences of his act, and the decision was entered of record in this form: "Motion for nonsuit granted, and complaint dismissed; allowance, one hundred and fifty dollars to defendant, if further litigation be carried on by plaintiff." The defendant requested the circuit court to direct a verdict for the defendant, because the former judgment was a bar, and afterwards objected to the introduction by the plaintiff of evidence of the condition of Ferguson's mind at the time of his death, because that question had been tried and determined in the former action. The court rightly denied the request, and overruled the objection. A judgment of nonsuit does not determine the rights of the parties, and is no bar to a new action. Homer v. Brown, 16 How. 354. A trial upon which nothing was determined cannot support a plea of res adjudicata, or have any weight as evidence at another trial. The defendant, at the close of the plaintiff's evidence in chief, and again at the close of all of the evidence in the case, moved to dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction, because Broughton had only a nominal interest, and the real controversy was between citizens of New York; and at the argument in this court contended that the action should be dismissed because the evidence showed that the plaintiff was made trustee for the purpose of bringing an action in the United States court, after Mrs. Ferguson had failed to recover in the state court, under the rule established by the recent decisions of the court of appeals in Van Zandt v. Mutual Benefit L. Ins. Co. 55 N. Y. 169, and Weed v. Same, 70 N. Y. 561. But the case does not fall within the prohibition of the first section of the act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, that no circuit court shall have cognizance of any suit founded on contract, in favor of an assignee, unless a suit might have been prosecuted in such court to recover thereon if no assignment had been made; nor within the provision of the fifth section of the same act, authorizing the circuit court to dismiss a suit, upon being satisfied that it does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within its jurisdiction, or that parties have been improperly or collusively made or joined for the purpose of creating a case cognizable by that court. 18 St. 470, 472; Williams v. Nottawa, 104 U. S. 209. Mrs. Ferguson, the assured and payee named in the policy, was herself a citizen of New Jersey, and as such, if no assignment had been made, might have sued the company in the circuit court of the United States; and Bromfield, a citizen of the same state, was appointed in the stead of the former trustee, a citizen of New York, not by Mrs. Ferguson's deed in pais, but by a court of competent jurisdiction. Under these circumstances the mere fact that one object in having him appointed was to enable a suit to be brought in the circuit court is not sufficient to require or justify the construction that he was improperly, and it cannot be pretended that he was collusively, made a plaintiff for the purpose of creating a case cognizable by that court. The question involved was not a question of local law, but of general jurisprudence, upon which Mrs. Ferguson, and Broughton, as her trustee, had a right to seek the independent judgment of a federal court. Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, 368; Mich. Cent. R. Co. v. Myrick, 107 U. S. 102; [S. C. 1 SUP. CT. REP. 425;] Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20; [S. C. 2 SUP. CT. REP. 10.] Several minor points suggested at the argument hardly present any question of law. The interrogatories put by the counsel for the plaintiff to the expert called by the defendants were clearly admissible on cross-examination for the purpose of testing the knowledge and accuracy of the witness, and require no special consideration. The instruction requested, that "the only legal test of insanity is delusion," was in direct contradiction of the testimony of the experts called on each side, and could not properly be given as a rule of law. The court rightly refused to direct a verdict for the defendant, on the ground that there was no sufficient evidence to show that Ferguson was insane, or to render the defendant liable upon its contract. Without undertaking to recapitulate the evidence, it is sufficient to say that members of his family, and persons well acquainted with him in his business, testified that he was naturally of a lively, cheerful, sanguine disposition; that in 1874 he met with heavy losses in business, and his son died suddenly by falling from a window; that from that time forward there was a marked change in his demeanor; "he was always walking with his head bowed down, and a gloomy expression, and the entire vitality and cheerfulness which the man had before was gone;" "he was gloomy, dull, mopish;" "he sat down in the office and moaned and would be gloomy there;" "he always complained of his head; he would say, The trouble is here; it is all in my head, my head;' " that shortly before his death he had "a vacant expression in his face;" "he had a queer expression about his eyes; it was a sort of wild, unnatural expression;" "that kind of expression which the human face takes on when one is frightened; a far-off, glassy look, as though the mind was dwelling on nothing;" that "he was very much changed, and was very excitable; he looked different, and had a wild expression; he staid a great deal by him |